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From 1968 to 1991 the acclaimed film 
theorist Christian Metz wrote several 
remarkable books on film theory:   
Essais sur la signification au cinéma,  
tome 1 et 2; Langage et cinéma; Le sig-
nifiant imaginaire; and L’Enonciation 
impersonnelle. These books set the 
agenda of academic film studies  
during its formative period. Metz’s  
ideas were taken up, digested, refined, 
reinterpreted, criticized and some times 
dismissed, but rarely ignored.
 
This volume collects and translates  
into English for the first time a series  
of interviews with Metz, who offers  
readable summaries, elaborations, and 
explanations of his sometimes complex 
and demanding theories of film. He 
speaks informally of the most funda­
mental concepts that constitute the 
heart of film theory as an academic  
discipline – concepts borrowed from  
linguistics, semiotics, rhetoric, nar­
ratology, and psychoanalysis.
 
Within the colloquial language of the 
interview, we witness Metz’s initial  
formation and development of his film 
theory. The interviewers act as curious 
readers who pose probing questions  
to Metz about his books, and seek  
clarification and elaboration of his key 
concepts. We also discover the contents 
of his unpublished manuscript on jokes, 
his relation to Roland Barthes, and the 
social networks operative in the French 
intellectual community during the  
1970s and 1980s.
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Introductions
The international reputation of the work of Christian Metz, translated into 
more than twenty languages, justif ies the homage paid here to the founder 
of a discipline: f ilm semiology. 
(Michel Marie, speaking of the conference ‘Christian Metz and Film Theory’, 
held at the Cerisy Cultural Centre in 1989).
Modern f ilm theory begins with Metz.
(Constance Penley, Camera Obscura)
 A Furious Exactitude: An Overview of 
Christian Metz’s Film Theory
Warren Buckland
Buckland, Warren and Daniel Fairfax (eds), Conversations with Christian 
Metz: Selected Interviews on Film Theory (1970–1991). Amsterdam: Amster-
dam University Press, 2017.
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Abstract
This f irst Introduction to Conversations with Christian Metz presents a 
brief and basic overview of Metz as writer and researcher, focusing on the 
key concepts that influenced him (especially from linguistics, semiology, 
and psychoanalysis), and those he generated, supplemented with some 
of the issues he raises in the interviews.
Keywords: Christian Metz, f ilm theory, semiology, psychoanalysis, 
interviews
Those who know Metz from the three perspectives of writer, teacher, 
and friend are always struck by this paradox, which is only apparent: of 
a radical demand for precision and clarity, yet born from a free tone, like 
a dreamer, and I would almost say, as if intoxicated. (Didn’t Baudelaire 
turn H. into the source of an unheard of precision?) There reigns a furious 
exactitude. (Roland Barthes)1
From 1968 to 1991, Christian Metz (1931–1993), the pioneering and ac-
claimed f ilm theorist, wrote several inf luential books on f ilm theory: 
Essais sur la signification au cinéma, tome 1 et 2 (volume 1 translated as Film 
Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema); Langage et cinéma (Language and 
Cinema); Le signifiant imaginaire. Psychanalyse et cinéma (Psychoanalysis 
and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier); and L’enonciation impersonnelle 
ou le site du film (Impersonal Enunciation or the Place of Film).2 These 
books set the agenda of academic f ilm theory during its formative period. 
Throughout universities around the world, Metz’s ideas were taken up, 
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digested, ref ined, reinterpreted, criticized, and sometimes dismissed, 
but rarely ignored.
This volume collects and translates into English for the f irst time a series 
of little-known interviews with Christian Metz. In these interviews, Metz 
offers summaries, elaborations, and explanations of his sometimes complex 
and demanding theories. He speaks informally of the most fundamental 
concepts that constitute the foundations of f ilm theory as an academic 
discipline (concepts from linguistics, semiology, narratology, and psycho-
analysis). Within the interview format, Metz discusses in elaborate detail 
the process of theorizing – the formation, development, and ref inement of 
concepts; the need to be rigorous, precise, and to delimit the boundaries of 
one’s research; and he talks at great length about the reasons theories are 
misunderstood and derided (by both scholars and students). The interview-
ers act as inquisitive readers, who pose probing questions to Metz about 
his inf luences and motivations, and seek clarif ication and elaboration 
of his key concepts in his articles and books. Metz also reveals a series 
of little-known facts and curious insights, including: the contents of his 
unpublished manuscript on jokes (L’Esprit et ses Mots. Essai sur le Witz); the 
personal networks operative in the French intellectual community during 
the sixties and seventies; his relation to the filmology movement, cinephilia, 
and to phenomenology; his critique of ‘applied’ theory; the development of 
a semiology of experimental f ilm; his views on Gilles Deleuze’s f ilm theory; 
the fundamental importance of Roland Barthes to his career; and even how 
many f ilms he saw each week.
Roland Barthes mentions three ways he knew Metz: writer, teacher, and 
friend. Barthes characterizes Metz’s disposition as a ‘furious exactitude.’ 
This was not only manifest in his writing; Maureen Turim mentions Metz’s 
‘incredible intensity’ as a teacher: “He talks for three hours, breaking only in 
the middle to retreat with his students to a café, ‘boire un pot’, and gossip. But 
in the seminar itself, the lecture is given with minute precision, no pauses, 
no stumbling, with few notes, mostly from an articulate memory.”3 But 
Metz’s exactitude also allowed for “a free tone,” an issue he discusses with 
Daniel Percheron and Marc Vernet in Chapter 4 of this volume. Metz tells 
them that his policy in tutorials involved being “ready to speak to people (to 
listen to them especially), to give people space to talk about their research, 
to let them speak, give the freedom to choose one’s topic of interest, etc. …. It 
is rather a ‘tone’, a general attitude ….” Metz emphasized the need to speak 
to students as individuals, to express a genuine interest in their ideas, rather 
than simply rehearse a pre-formulated (empty) speech when responding to 
their research. With regard to supervising theses, Martin Lefebvre notes in a 
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conversation with Annie van den Oever that “[a]n almost entire generation 
of [French] scholars was either supervised by [Metz] or had him sit as a jury 
member for their doctoral defense. […] For several years he was literally at 
the center of the f ield and therefore had a large role in shaping it.” 4
In the following pages, I present a brief and basic overview of Metz as 
writer and researcher, focusing on the key concepts that influenced him 
and those he generated, supplemented with some of the issues he raises in 
the interviews.5
Foundations: Structural Linguistics
Cultural meanings are inherent in the symbolic orders and these mean-
ings are independent of, and prior to, the external world, on the one hand, 
and human subjects, on the other. Thus the world only has an objective 
existence in the symbolic orders that represent it.6
Christian Metz’s f ilm semiology forms part of the wider structuralist move-
ment that replaced the phenomenological tradition of philosophy prevalent 
in France in the 1950s and early 1960s. Phenomenology studies observable 
phenomena, consciousness, experience, and presence. More precisely, it 
privileges the inf inite or myriad array of experiences of a pre-constituted 
world (the given) that are present in consciousness. In contrast, structural-
ism redef ines consciousness and experience as outcomes of structures 
that are not, in themselves, experiential. Whereas for phenomenology 
meaning originates in and is fully present to consciousness, for structur-
alists meaning emerges from underlying structures, which necessarily 
infuse experience with the values, beliefs, and meanings embedded in 
those structures. A major premise of structuralism, and its fundamental 
difference from phenomenology, is its separation of the surface level (the 
infinite, conscious, lived experiences of a pre-given world) from an underly-
ing level (the f inite, unobservable, abstract structure, which is not pre-given 
and not present to consciousness). The two levels are not in opposition to 
one another, for structuralism establishes a hierarchy whereby the surface 
level, consisting of conscious experience, is dependent on the underlying 
level. Structuralism does not simply add an underlying level to the surface 
phenomenological level, it also redefines the surface level as the manifesta-
tion of the underlying level. A fundamental premise of structuralism is 
that underlying abstract structures underpin and constitute conscious 
lived experiences.
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Metz’s work is pioneering in terms of reconceiving f ilm within the frame-
work of structuralism – or, more precisely, its derivative, semiology. From a 
semiological perspective, f ilm’s properties cannot be studied as a conscious 
aesthetic experience or be defined as a sensory object. Instead, this sensory 
object is reconceived as a form of signif ication – as the manifestation of a 
non-observable, underlying abstract structure. To analyze f ilm as signif ica-
tion therefore involves a fundamental shift in perspective, from the study 
of f ilm as an object of experience in consciousness to the study of f ilm’s 
underlying structures, which semiologists call systems of codes.7
This shift in perspective is largely attributable to the foundational text of 
structural linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics 
(f irst published in 1916). Saussure redefined meaning internally, by locating 
it within language itself, conceived as an underlying f inite system, rather 
than in the referent or in the experiences of language users. This reloca-
tion of meaning has profound consequences for the way language (and 
other systems of signif ication) is conceived. The term ‘meaning’ within 
this theory is def ined narrowly: it is synonymous with ‘signif ication’ 
(the signif ied), rather than ‘reference’ or ‘lived experience’. Signif ication 
is an internal value generated from the structural differences between 
codes. This is one of the foundational principles of semiology: it replaces 
an external theory of meaning, which posits a direct, one-to-one causal 
correspondence or link between a sign and its referent, with an internal 
theory, in which the meaning is based on a series of differential relations 
within language: “In language, as in any semiological system,” writes 
Saussure, “whatever distinguishes one sign from the others constitutes it.”8 
Saussure identif ied two fundamental types of relation within semiologi-
cal systems: syntagmatic and paradigmatic (what he called associative) 
relations. ‘Syntagmatic’ refers to the relation of signs present in a message, 
while ‘paradigmatic’ refers to signs organized into paradigms – classes 
of comparable signs that can be substituted for one another. Paradigms 
are systems of available options, or a network of potential choices, from 
which one sign is chosen and manifest. The sign manifest in a message 
is not only syntagmatically related to other signs in the message, but is 
also structurally related to comparable signs in the paradigm that were 
not chosen. Signs are therefore def ined formally, from an intrinsic rather 
than extrinsic perspective, and holistically, as a network of paradigmatic 
and syntagmatic relations. A sign in a message does not embody one f ixed 
meaning predetermined by its link to a referent, and cannot therefore 
be interpreted by itself in isolation. Instead, it gains its meaning from its 
structural relations to other signs.
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Structural linguistics is founded upon the hierarchy between langue/
parole, the linguistic equivalent of the structuralist hierarchy between surface 
and underlying level. La parole refers to language’s phenomenological level 
(the conscious, experiential level of speech), whereas la langue refers to the 
underlying language system of codes. La parole is simply the manifestation 
of la langue and is reducible to it. Saussure described la parole as infinite 
and heterogeneous, and la langue as f inite and homogeneous. Generating an 
infinity of speech utterances with finite means is possible by recognizing that 
all utterances are composed from the same small number of signs used recur-
sively in different combinations. This principle – the principle of economy – is 
another founding assumption of semiology: all the infinite surface manifesta-
tions can be described in terms of the f inite system underlying them. The 
structural linguist André Martinet explained this principle of economy via the 
concept of double articulation.9 The first articulation involves the minimally 
meaningful units, which Martinet calls ‘monemes’. These monemes, in turn, 
are composed of non-signifying significant units (phonemes), which constitute 
the second level of articulation. Meaning is generated from the recursive 
combination of the small number of phonemes to generate a large number 
of monemes, and then by the recursive combination of monemes to generate 
potentially inf inite number of sentences. This is how double articulation 
accounts for the extraordinary economy of language, which is, according to 
Martinet, language’s unique, defining characteristic. The meaning of monemes 
is generated from the structural relations between phonemes, rather than from 
a referent. The phonemes are autonomous from reality (they do not ‘reflect’ 
reality, but are arbitrary); meaning emerges out of non-meaning – from the 
selection and combination of phonemes into monemes.
These basic semiological principles – meaning is def ined intrinsically, 
as sense rather than reference; meaning derives from syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic relations; the principle of economy, in which an inf inite 
number of messages can be reduced to an underlying f inite system that 
generated them – presents to f ilm and cultural theorists a framework in 
which to study and analyze the ‘symbolic order’: the realm of language, 
discourse, and other systems of signif ication (literature, f ilm, fashion, 
gestures, etc.). Structural linguistics and semiology oppose positivism, 
behaviorism, phenomenology, and existentialism, which remain on the 
surface, on the level of lived experience. Structural linguistics analyzes the 
underlying codes of verbal language, and semiology employed its methods 
to analyze the underlying codes of additional systems of signif ication.
Employing the methods of structural linguistics to analyze additional 
systems of signif ication does not entail a reduction of these other systems 
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to verbal language, despite Roland Barthes’ reversal.10 Although Saussure 
worked out his method of analysis via verbal language, he did not restrict 
this method to verbal language, but conceived it at the outset as a part 
of semiology; verbal language is just one system of signif ication among 
many. Film semiology conceives f ilm not as a language but as a coded 
medium, a system of signification that possesses its own specific underlying 
system of codes, which can be studied using general structural methods 
that have been developed in structural linguistics. Metz makes this point 
clear in his interviews with Raymond Bellour (Chapter 3) and André Gardies 
(Chapter 12). He tells Bellour that: “In no case is it a matter of exporting to 
semiology those linguistic concepts that are linked to language [langue] 
alone.” He then gives an example: “‘Paradigm’ and ‘syntagm’, such as they 
have been defined by Martinet, are legitimately exportable concepts […]. 
[They are] in no way linked to the specif icity of language systems.” The 
semiologists’ study of f ilm is therefore made, not via any direct resemblance 
between f ilm and verbal language, but by studying f ilm within the general 
context of signif ication. The question ‘Is f ilm a language?’ is ill-formed and 
not very interesting; it is a terminological quibble. Linguistics becomes 
relevant on methodological grounds: f ilm’s specif ic, underlying reality can 
be reconstructed by a set of “legitimately exportable concepts” developed 
by structural linguists. At least from this methodological viewpoint, f ilm 
semiologists were justif ied in using structural linguistics to study f ilm, 
because this discipline is the most sophisticated for analyzing a medium’s 
underlying reality, its system of signif ication. Therefore, David Bordwell’s 
critique of f ilm semiology is entirely misplaced when he writes: “Despite 
three decades of work in f ilm semiotics, however, those who claim that 
cinema is an ensemble of ‘codes’ or ‘discourses’ have not yet provided a 
defense of why we should consider the f ilm medium, let alone perception 
and thought, as plausibly analogous to language.”11 This mistaken view is 
what Metz calls (in the same interview) a reflex response, a conceptual 
blockage. “If a notion was emphasized by a writer who was a linguist by 
occupation, it is once and for all [mistakenly perceived as] ‘purely linguistic’, 
prohibited from being exported.” When Metz (or his interviewees) uses the 
term ‘f ilm language’, he uses it in the sense of ‘f ilmic signif ication’.
Metz’s Key Works in Film Theory
Metz’s f ilm theory contributes to the foundations of semiology as conceived 
by Saussure. Studying f ilm from a structural-semiological perspective 
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involves a fundamental shift in thinking: rather than study f ilm ‘in general’, 
in all its heterogeneity, Metz instead studied it from the point of view of 
one theory, a prerequisite for adopting a semiological perspective according 
to Barthes:
To undertake this research, it is necessary frankly to accept from the 
beginning (and especially at the beginning) a limiting principle. […] [I]t 
is decided to describe the facts which have been gathered from one point 
of view only, and consequently to keep, from the heterogeneous mass of 
these facts, only the features associated with this point of view, to the 
exclusion of any others.12
The researcher’s focus is deliberately limited to the relevant (pertinent, 
essential) traits of the object under study while f iltering out all other traits. 
What is relevant is dependent on or def ined by one’s theoretical perspec-
tive. Semiology focuses on the underlying system of signif ication while 
excluding the heterogeneous surface traits of phenomena. Similarly, D.N. 
Rodowick characterizes the rise in structuralism and semiology in the 
1960s as “a stance or perspective on culture that is […] nothing less than the 
imagination of a new conceptual and enunciative position in theory.”13 That 
new position comprises a singular unifying perspective: “theory must rally 
around a method, which can unify synthetically from a singular perspective 
the data and knowledge gathered within its domain.”14
This new position does not analyze pre-given experiences, behavior, 
or facts in the manner of phenomenology, behaviorism, and positivism. 
Instead, as soon as the analyst moves beyond the pre-given and the self-
evident, he/she must construct the object of study – the virtual underlying 
system that generates and confers intelligibility on behavior, facts, and 
experiences. The ‘underlying reality’ of systems of signification is not an em-
pirical object simply waiting to be observed. Instead, it is an abstract object 
that needs to be modeled: “One reconstitutes a double of the f irst [original] 
object,” writes Metz, “a double totally thinkable since it is a pure product of 
thought: the intelligibility of the object has become itself an object.”15 This 
new, virtual object of study places theory centre stage, for it is via theory that 
this abstract object becomes visible. And each theory constructs its abstract 
object differently in accordance with its own concepts. This non-empirical 
mode of analysis necessitates a reflexive attitude toward theoretical activ-
ity. Rodowick calls this the metatheoretical attitude: “a reflection on the 
components and conceptual standards of theory construction.”16 Metz not 
only foregrounds this metatheoretical attitude in his published research, 
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he discusses it extensively in the interviews published in this volume. For 
example, in his 1986 “Responses to Hors Cadre on The Imaginary Signifier” 
(Chapter 9), he dispels the notion that one simply ‘applies’ concepts from 
one domain to another:
I have not applied anything, I have placed the cinema within more all-
encompassing ideas, which fully concern the cinema just as much as they 
concern other objects: the general mechanisms of signif ication (whence 
the use of the term ‘denotation’, etc.), or of the imaginary subject, with 
ideas that have come from psychoanalysis but that are today, as with 
their predecessors, circulating far beyond their place of origin. (Metz, 
“Responses to Hors Cadre on The Imaginary Signifier”)
In other words, he argues that he studies f ilm within the conceptual spheres 
it already belongs to (including signif ication); it is therefore incorrect to 
think he applies to f ilm concepts foreign to it.17
In addition to theorizing f ilm within the parameters of one set of 
theoretical concepts, Metz explicitly def ined his method of analysis, 
which he derived from Saussure. Semiological analysis names a process 
of segmentation and classif ication that dismantles all types of messages 
(speech, myths, kinship relations, literary texts, f ilms, etc.) to reveal 
their ultimate components and rules of combination. These components 
and rules constitute the underlying codes that enable these messages 
to be produced. Metz therefore attempted to reconceive f ilm according 
to the semiological principles presented above – meaning is intrinsic; it 
is generated from syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations; and inf inite 
messages can be reduced to an underlying f inite system that generated 
them. He aimed to develop a precise, delimited study of one aspect of f ilm, 
its level of signif ication, illuminated and explained from one theoretical 
perspective.
New Objects and Problems of Study: ‘Cinema: Language or Language 
System?’
In his f irst essay on f ilm semiology, ‘Cinema: Language or Language Sys-
tem?’18 (initially published in 1964), we encounter Metz’s exact, rigorous, 
and reflexive academic approach, one that aims to clarify his theoretical 
terms and problems. He asked if there is a f ilmic equivalent to la langue/
language system in f ilm. Metz’s background assumption in this essay is that 
f ilm must possess an equivalent to la langue to be def ined as a language 
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(langage). Not surprisingly, the results were negative: he concluded that 
cinema is a language (langage) without a language system (langue). Much 
of his description involves documenting how the underlying reality of f ilm 
does not resemble la langue. The negative results are not unexpected, for 
the semiological language of f ilm does not possess the same system specif ic 
as verbal language. Metz’s failure to establish the semiology of f ilm in this 
essay is due to two factors: under the influence of Barthes, he analyzed f ilm 
in terms of the result of a structural linguistic analysis of verbal language. 
Secondly, he was unable to def ine f ilm (the f ilmic image) as a symbolic 
order independent of, and prior to, the external world. In other words, he 
could not locate a system of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations in 
the f ilmic image. This means he was unable to analyze the potentially 
inf inite number of f ilmic images in terms of a f inite system of underlying 
codes. He could not, therefore, def ine the meaning of images intrinsically, 
but had to fall back on the pre-semiological referential theory. Despite the 
limited success of his results in ‘Cinema: Language or Language System?,’ 
Metz established a new object of study, new problems to address, and a 
new methodology with which to approach f ilm. Francesco Casetti argues 
that Metz’s 1964 essay “introduces a shift in the approach to the f ilmic 
phenomenon and in the kind of topics leading to this approach. A new 
research paradigm is born, as well as a new generation of scholars.”19 The 
new object of study was the unobservable, latent level of f ilmic signif ica-
tion or codes that makes f ilmic meaning possible and which def ines its 
specif icity. Metz explored this new level of f ilmic reality in subsequent 
work.
Identifying Film’s Paradigmatic Axis: ‘Problems of Denotation in the 
Fiction Film’
In ‘Problems of Denotation in the Fiction Film’20 Metz employed the semio-
logical method of segmentation and classif ication to identify an internal 
level of signif ication in f ilm, a level of meaning generated by the f ilmic 
text, not by the f ilmed events. He discovered a f inite set of syntagmatic 
types – different sequences of shots identif iable by the specif ic way each 
structures the spatio-temporal relations between the f ilmed events. Metz 
detected eight different spatio-temporal relation ships in total, which con-
stitute a paradigm – a code – of different forms of image ordering. Metz 
called the resulting ‘paradigm of syntagmas’ the grande syntagmatique 
of the image track. These image syntagmas form a code to the extent that 
they offer eight different ways of reconstructing f ilmed events, which 
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indicates that each syntagmatic type gains its meaning in relation to the 
other seven types. Metz outlines all eight syntagmas and discusses the 
need to ref ine them in his interview with Raymond Bellour (Chapter 3), 
where he emphasizes that the syntagmatic types are primarily manifest 
in classical narrative cinema.
Cinematic Codes and Filmic Textual Systems: Language and Cinema
Metz’s reconceptualization of f ilm as a semiological object reached its 
zenith in Language and Cinema. He achieved this by introducing a series 
of theoretical distinctions: between cinema/the f ilmic/the cinematic 
(where ‘the cinematic’ designates a subset of the f ilmic – codes specif ic to 
f ilm); between cinematic codes (common to all f ilms)/cinematic sub-codes 
(cinematic codes common to some f ilms); and, most importantly, between 
codes/singular textual systems (underlying abstract systems/the totality 
of f ilmic and cinematic codes combined in a single f ilm). As Metz explains 
in more detail in the f irst two interviews published here, but especially 
in ‘Cinema and Semiology: On ‘Specif icity’’ (Chapter 2), within this more 
expansive study, the cinematic language system, or cinematic specif ic-
ity, is def ined as a specific combination of codes and sub-codes. Defining 
specif icity as specif ic combination of codes has several implications for 
f ilm semiology: (1) cinematic codes cannot be studied in complete isolation 
as abstract paradigmatic systems, but can only be studied from a joint 
syntagmatic-paradigmatic perspective: that is, in terms of a combination of 
codes specif ic to f ilm; (2) codes are not unique to one semiological system, 
but belong to several systems: and (3) codes can only be studied in relation 
to their substance, not purely in terms of an underlying abstract formal 
system.
By emphasizing substance, Metz followed the work of Danish linguist 
Louis Hjelmslev, who divided language into an expression plane (the signi-
f ier) and content plane (signif ied), and divided each plane into material, 
form, and substance, yielding the six-fold distinction:
  Material (or purport) of expression
Signif ier Substance of expression
  Form of expression
  Material (or purport) of content
Signif ied Substance of content
  Form of content
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Material is the amorphous unformed continuum upon which form is 
projected, segmenting the material into distinct units. The material so or-
ganized is the substance. That is, material + form = substance. The material 
of expression in verbal language refers to amorphous sounds. The form of ex-
pression refers to an abstract system imposed on those amorphous sounds, 
which yields the substance of expression, or phonemes (structured sounds). 
The material of content in verbal language refers to an amorphous mass 
of thoughts. The form of content refers to an abstract system imposed on 
those thoughts, yielding the substance of content, or structured concepts.21 
Metz concedes that f ilm semiology cannot operate only in the abstract 
realm of pure form – the form of expression and form of content. Instead, he 
emphasized the need to include the substance of expression – that is, “the 
action of the form in the material.”22 Metz’s expanded conception of f ilm 
semiology therefore challenged his previous assumptions – that specif icity 
can be def ined in terms of one code (the grande syntagmatique), and that 
specif icity can be def ined in terms of an abstract underlying system.
In several interviews (Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7), Metz discusses Emilio 
Garroni’s Semiotica ed Estetica.23 Garroni thought the attempt to def ine 
f ilmic specif icity a spurious activity. Following Hjelmslev, he divorced 
codes from material of expression, claiming that codes should be def ined 
formally, in abstract terms. This, in effect, implies that codes are not tied 
to or manifest in the material of expression of any particular language and 
are not, therefore, specif ic to any language; a code is pure form and can 
therefore be manifest in the material of expression of multiple languages. 
Metz agrees with Garroni that a language consists of multiple codes, but 
disagrees that all codes are formal, not related to material of expression. 
For Metz, some codes are specif ic – are tied to f ilm’s material of expres-
sion – and some are non-specif ic. But Garroni rejects the attachment to the 
immediate material qualities of media, and instead defines a shared system 
of codes. That is, Metz’s f ilm semiology attempts to create a ‘disembodied’ 
abstract theory of formal codes – disembodied in terms of their separation 
from the material of expression; but, in the end, he def ined f ilm in terms 
of a specif ic combination of formal and manifest codes, whereas Garroni 
argued that all codes are formal, non-manifest, and abstract.
In their interview with Metz, Daniel Percheron and Marc Vernet 
(Chapter 4) interrogate Metz in depth over the diff iculties of Language 
and Cinema. They express the experiences of many f ilm scholars when 
confronted with Metz’s excessively cautious approach in this book – his 
incessant return to previous positions to restate, ref ine, or update them; 
the abstract nature of his concept of the code; and the lack of any f irm 
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enumeration of cinematic codes. Metz’s response in the interview is to 
say that such a level of abstraction is common in other disciplines such as 
linguistics, and that he really needs to write a second volume, for whereas 
Language and Cinema cleared the groundwork, the second volume (never 
written) needs to categorize and list the various codes in detail.
Nonetheless, the enriched f ilm semiology presented in Language and 
Cinema contributed to the transformation of three long-held theories of 
f ilm: auteurism, realism, and f ilm as narrative. The assumption behind 
auteurism is that meaning is located in the individual(s) in control of 
the production. Within semiology, the underlying system of f inite codes 
determines meaning, not the code user; the code user does not ‘express’ 
himself or herself – does not convey some authentic experience; instead, 
his/her intervention simply involves selecting from a pre-existing system 
of codes. The code user therefore submits to the code, to its meanings 
and limits (or submits to the law of the signif ier, in Lacan’s terms). Film 
semiology challenged theories of realism by relocating meaning within 
f ilm. The assumption behind realism is that meaning is located in f ilm’s 
recording capacity – in its ‘direct’, ‘naturalistic’ referential relation to reality. 
In Language and Cinema, Metz successfully challenged this assumption by 
relocating meaning within the f ilmic text itself, for he reconceived f ilms as 
complex textual phenomena consisting of a specif ic combination of codes. 
Within semiology, what we traditionally call ‘reality’ is redef ined as an 
effect or impression of codes, as Metz discusses in some detail in the f irst 
interview published in this volume (Chapter 1). Finally, in Language and 
Cinema Metz redefined his grande syntagmatique as just one contingent 
code manifest in f ilms.
Psychoanalysis and Semiology: ‘The Imaginary Signifier’
Metz extended his semiological analysis of f ilm in his essay ‘The Imaginary 
Signifier’ (f irst published in 1975).24 Although he appears to have abandoned 
semiology and replaced it with psychoanalysis, he argues in his opening part 
that “the psychoanalytic itinerary is from the outset a semiological one.”25 
Later, he argues that linguistic-inspired semiology focuses on secondary 
processes of signif ication (mental activity and logical thinking), while 
psychoanalysis focuses on primary processes of signif ication (unconscious 
activities that Freud identif ied, such as condensation, displacement, sym-
bolization, and secondary revision).26 For Metz, psychoanalysis (especially 
Lacan’s structural linguistic reinterpretation of Freud) addresses the same 
semiological problematic as linguistics, but on a deeper level, the primary 
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subterranean forces that drive language, f ilm, and other symbolic systems. 
These forces continually modify, displace, and transform signif iers, ne-
cessitating a reconceptualization of the object of study (verbal language, 
f ilm, etc.) as a process or activity, not as a static object. The symbolic order 
is thereby expanded to include primary as well as secondary systems of 
signif ication, and is reconceived as a dynamic system.27
The wellspring of subterranean primary forces that drive f ilm is ab-
sence, the absence of referents from the space of the f ilmic image, and 
the psychological consequences of this absence. Absence generates the 
spectator’s desire for the absent object, thereby bringing into play the role 
of human subjectivity, especially phenomenological accounts of conscious 
lived experiences, in the generation of intrinsic f ilmic meanings. In ‘The 
Imaginary Signif ier’ and in his response to the editors of the journal Hors 
Cadre (Chapter 9), Metz attempted to reveal how the imaginary (in Lacan’s 
sense of the term) and desire operate on the level of the f ilmic signif ier. He 
argues that the function of the imaginary in the cinema is to fabricate two 
structurally related impressions: the impression of reality (the sense of a 
coherent f ilmic universe) and a subject position for the spectator to occupy 
(the impression of psychic unity).
Conf ining himself to the analysis of the imaginary status of the f ilmic 
signif ier, Metz discovered that the image on screen and the image in the 
mirror have the same status – both are inherently imaginary because 
both offer the spectator a dense, visual representation of absent objects 
(the objects photographed are absent from the space of the screen and 
the objects ref lected in the mirror are absent from the mirror’s virtual 
space): “In order to understand the f ilm (at all), I must perceive the pho-
tographed object as absent, its photograph as present, and the presence of 
this absence as signifying.”28 It is because of the f ilmic signif ier’s lack, its 
limitations in representing the absent events, that a theory incorporating 
the spectator becomes necessary to explain the production of meaning 
in f ilmic discourse, for the spectator temporarily f ills in the lack. That 
is, the image, structured upon a lack (the absence of the f ilmed events), 
requires the spectator to f ill in meaning and ‘complete’ the image. Here, 
we see Metz combining semiology with a psychoanalytically-inf lected 
phenomenology, for the cinema’s impression of reality attempts to dis-
avowal from the consciousness of the spectator the inherent lack in the 
f ilmic signif ier. This is only achieved when it transforms the spectator’s 
consciousness – that is, displaces his/her consciousness away from the 
material surface of the screen and toward the f ictive, imaginary elsewhere 
of the f ilm’s diegesis.
26 Conversations with Christian Metz 
Beginning from the premise that the f ilmic signif ier represents absent 
objects, Metz proceeded to define the spectator’s position in relation to the 
f ilmic signif ier in terms of voyeurism and disavowal. The conditions that 
constitute the pleasures associated with voyeurism are ‘mirrored’ in the 
semiological structure of the f ilmic signif ier. The voyeur, removed from 
the space of his object of vision, experiences visual mastery and pleasure 
over that object through this secure and superior spatial position. Similarly, 
in the spectator’s perception of the f ilmic signif ier: the f ilmed events ex-
ist in a different space (and time) to the spectator; there is no reciprocal 
relation between spectator and f ilmed events, for these events are absent, 
represented in eff igy by the f ilmic signif ier. For Metz, the f ilmic signif ier 
therefore locates the spectator in a position equivalent to the space of the 
voyeur, and confers upon him the same pleasures and resulting illusory, 
transcendental psychic unity.
Yet, Metz did not suff iciently take into account the argument that the 
function of the imaginary (and the impression of reality) is, primarily, to 
act as a defense against the ‘problems’ feminine sexuality poses to the 
masculine psyche. It is precisely when the imaginary successfully acts as a 
defense against feminine sexuality that it is able to constitute an illusory, 
transcendental masculine psychic unity. Any analysis of the imaginary 
(and the impression of reality) must therefore begin with the problemat-
ics of sexual difference and identity. But in his attempt to disengage the 
cinema object from the imaginary, Metz ended up constructing his own 
imaginary discourse, a fetish that elides questions of sexual difference (but 
see Chapter 7, where he directly addresses sexual difference). Analysis of 
the problematics of sexual difference in the cinema is the primary object 
of study of second-wave feminist f ilm theory. Laura Mulvey’s foundational 
essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ is representative of this work.29 
She shifted f ilm feminism to the study of images as a semiological form of 
discourse, rather than a transparent window on to a pre-existing reality. 
The image was conferred its own materiality, its own signifying power. 
Mulvey also expanded the object of study: not just a critique of the image, 
but also the unconscious ideological-patriarchal nature of the cinematic 
apparatus – its semiological creation of a male gaze, of gendered (masculine) 
subject positions, and patriarchal (Oedipal) narrative forms that regulate 
desire, def ining it as masculine: “Playing on the tension between f ilm as 
controlling the dimension of time (editing, narrative) and film as controlling 
the dimension of space (changes in distance, editing), cinematic codes 
create a gaze, a world, and an object, thereby producing an illusion cut to 
the measure of [male] desire.”30
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Primary Forces and Secondary Codes: ‘Metaphor/Metonymy, or the 
Imaginary Referent’
[In] the long piece on metaphor and metonymy, you see that [Metz is] 
not really interested in these terms, “metaphor” and “metonymy,” per se. 
What interests him is the deep semantic and logical structure they stand 
for, a structure which is independent of their surface manifestation in 
rhetoric or verbal language. A deep structure that seems to manifest itself 
also in dreams (according to psychoanalysis) and in f ilms. This is why 
his isn’t an attempt to “map” linguistics or classical rhetoric onto f ilm.31
Metz’s essay on metaphor and metonymy constitutes the next stage of his 
constant investigation of f ilmic signif ication.32 In this long essay, he does 
not so much search for local metaphors and metonymies (or other f igures 
and tropes) in the manner of the classif ication schemes of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, but instead seeks the deep semantic and logic 
structure of f ilmic discourse. This parallels his study of f ilm language, which 
was not a search for local analogies between f ilm and verbal language, but 
an attempt to def ine the conditions of possibility of f ilmic signif ication in 
terms of codes and their structural relations.
In ‘Metaphor/Metonymy,’ Metz characterizes signif ication in terms of 
primary (unconscious) forces or pressures, rather than exclusively second-
ary codes and structures; or, more accurately, codes and structures are 
driven by unconscious forces such as desire. This task requires Metz to 
tread a f ine line between two positions he rejects: (1) positing that the 
primary and secondary are separate; and (2) positing that they need to 
be merged. With regard to position (1), Metz does not uphold an absolute 
opposition between primary and secondary processes. Instead, he argues 
that we cannot know these primary forces in themselves, for we only 
encounter them once they have been represented on the secondary level. 
And inversely, codes and structures are not purely secondary, but are driven 
by primary processes. With regard to position (2), Metz develops the ideas 
of Jakobson and Lacan in pursuing the parallels between unconscious 
processes (condensation and displacement), linguistic processes (paradigm 
and syntagm) and rhetorical processes (metaphor and metonymy), without 
collapsing the three sets of terms into each other. In his interview with 
Jean Paul Simon and Marc Vernet (Chapter 6), Metz acknowledges the 
frustration that readers and seminar participants express when he adds 
complexity to his model of f ilmic rhetoric by refusing to collapse the three 
levels into each other:
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Deep down, I know very well, from the numerous discussions I have 
had with very diverse audiences, that what anxious readers expected 
was for me to say: ‘On the one side, we have metaphor = paradigm = 
condensation = découpage, and on the other side we have metonymy = 
syntagm = displacement = montage’. The only thing is that this does not 
hold water, it is a caricature of semiology.
Here, again, we encounter Metz’s exactitude in refusing to simplify the 
complexity of the f ilmic and semiological phenomena he is studying.
Filmic Reflexivity: Impersonal Enunciation
The f inal three interviews published in this volume (Chapters 10, 11, 12) all 
took place around the same time, during the seminal conference ‘Chris-
tian Metz and Film Theory’, held at the Cerisy Cultural Centre in 1989.33 
Several issues recur: Metz’s absence from research for a number of years 
(the f irst half of the 1980s), his return to research with an essay and book 
on impersonal enunciation, and his homage to his teacher and mentor 
Roland Barthes. It is only in his interview with André Gaudreault (chapter 
11) that Metz directly reveals that Barthes’ death in 1980 had a profound 
effect upon Metz.
Before developing his theory of impersonal enunciation in the late 1980s, 
Metz discussed enunciation in his short essay ‘Story/Discourse (A Note on 
Two Types of Voyeurism).’34 The linguistic concept of enunciation refers to 
the activity that results in the production of utterances, or discourse. Emile 
Benveniste further distinguished between two types of utterance, histoire 
(story) and discours (discourse). For Benveniste, discours in natural language 
employs deictic words such as personal pronouns (I, you) that grammatical-
ize within the utterance particular aspects of its spatio-temporal context 
(such as the speaker and hearer), whereas histoire is a form of utterance that 
excludes pronouns. Discours and histoire therefore represent two different 
but complementary planes of utterance: discours is a type of utterance that 
displays the traces or marks of its production, its enunciation, whereas 
histoire conceal the traces of its production. In his ‘Story/Discourse’ essay, 
Metz transferred Benveniste’s two forms of utterance to a psychoanalytical 
theory of vision. He identif ies exhibitionism with discours and voyeur-
ism with histoire. The exhibitionist knows that she is being looked at and 
acknowledges the look of the spectator, just as discours acknowledges the 
speaker and hearer of the utterance, whereas the object of the voyeur’s gaze 
does not know that she is being watched. The voyeur’s look is secretive, 
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concealed, like the marks of the speaker and hearer in histoire. Metz argued 
that classical narrative f ilm is primarily voyeuristic, hence histoire, for it 
conceals its own discursive markers (the spectator’s look).
Returning to f ilmic enunciation in Impersonal Enunciation or the Place of 
Film, Metz emphasized its impersonal status. That is, he acknowledged that 
f ilm bears the traces of its production-enunciation, but that those traces 
are not analogous to personal pronouns. Instead, the traces of the process 
of enunciation are reflexive – they refer back to the f ilm itself. In interview 
10, Metz identif ies two variants of reflexivity – reflection and commentary: 
“Reflection: the f ilm mimes itself (screens within the screen, f ilms within 
the f ilm, showing the device, etc.). Commentary: the f ilm speaks about 
itself, as is the case with certain ‘pedagogical’ voiceovers about the image 
[…] or in non-dialogue intertitles, explicatory camera movements, etc.” One 
consequence of def ining enunciation impersonally is that it can become 
a general concept close to narration, a point Metz makes at length in the 
same interview. It is with the concept of impersonal enunciation that Metz 
returns to the roots of semiology and its theory of signif ication, where 
meaning is def ined as an internal value generated by the f ilm itself.
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Abstract
This second Introduction to Conversations with Christian Metz presents 
Metz’s interaction with and contributions to French journals dedicated 
to f ilm criticism. This introduction surveys Metz’s engagement with a 
number of publications during the 1960s and 1970s, including Cahiers du 
Cinéma, Cinéthique, La Nouvelle Critique and Ça-Cinéma.
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journals
In addition to providing new insight into Christian Metz’s thinking on 
the cinema and its evolution over the course of nearly three decades, the 
interviews included in this book shed valuable light on another aspect of 
Metz’s theoretical activity, namely, his interaction with French journals 
dedicated to f ilm criticism. During the 1960s and 1970s in particular, Metz 
freely engaged with a number of publications, including Cahiers du Cinéma, 
Cinéthique, La Nouvelle Critique and Ça-Cinéma. The resulting interventions 
take the form not only of the interviews published below, but also various 
articles, chapters, and letters, in addition to the personal relations Metz 
forged with the critics and editors who worked for these journals. Although 
his contributions were not entirely free of partisan considerations, Metz 
was never aff iliated with any one journal in particular, and the theorist 
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adopted a broadly ecumenical approach toward organs that were other-
wise renowned for their internecine, often bitter disputes with each other. 
Such an approach was reflected in the consideration his work was given 
by these same journals, which often combined admiration and critique 
in equal measure. Notably, the often-venomous tone that characterized 
these journals’ polemical jousts with each other contrasts markedly with 
the generally respectful and amicable nature of the interviews conducted 
with Metz, even when differences in position were being thrashed out. This 
stands as a testament, above all, to the calming effect of Metz’s patient, 
methodical temperament.
In the ‘constellation’ of journals that marked French f ilm culture dur-
ing this period, Metz can thus be seen as something of a shooting star: 
periodically making fulgurant appearances in unpredictable locations 
before receding once more into the darkness. Moreover, the nature of his 
interventions, and the reception he was given by the journals with which he 
interacted, were overdetermined by the broader social context of the time: 
as the political status quo in France was irrevocably shaken by the uprising 
of May 1968 and its aftermath, so too did French f ilm culture undergo 
tumultuous transformations in the late 1960s and 1970s, which inevitably 
had profound implications for the response to Metz’s ideas. Importantly, 
too, Metz’s periodic collaboration with the major French f ilm journals 
of this time had a pronounced effect on his theoretical approach toward 
the cinema. The more radical conclusions of Langage et cinéma from 1971 
and, later, the adoption of a psychoanalytic framework in The Imaginary 
Signifer (1977), served to bring his work closer to the concerns of publica-
tions like Cahiers du Cinéma and Cinéthique than his earlier more strictly 
semiological project. We can therefore posit a relationship of reciprocal 
influence between the theorist and the constellation of f ilm criticism that 
surrounded him, one where they entered into a dialogue with each other, 
pushed and critiqued each other, and, ultimately, shaped each other’s ideas 
about cinema.
Cahiers du Cinéma
By far the most prolonged, regular, and theoretically fertile collaboration 
Metz had with a f ilm journal during this time was with Cahiers du Cinéma, 
although, strangely, he was never interviewed by the journal. Founded by 
André Bazin, Cahiers had come under the editorship of Jean-Louis Comolli 
by the time Metz f irst published with it in 1965. While later, in tandem 
with co-editor Jean Narboni, Comolli would steer Cahiers on a Marxist 
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course, in the mid-1960s the journal was still very much in keeping with the 
heritage of the nouvelle vague f ilmmakers it had helped foster in the 1950s 
(Jacques Rivette had only recently handed over the editor-in-chief position 
to his younger colleague). With this in mind, Metz’s f irst intervention in 
Cahiers was a curious one: in February 1965, the critic Gérard Guégan had, 
in a review of Jean-Luc Godard’s Une femme mariée (1964), accused Metz 
of ostensibly committing a ‘regrettable misconception’ in his recently 
published article ‘Le cinéma. Langue ou langage?’ by refusing montage 
and ‘assimilating it with the manipulation of the real that Rossellini was 
so wary of.’1 Metz hastily issued a corrective: a letter from him, personally 
addressed to Guégan and published in the journal’s April issue, insisted that 
the critic had misunderstood his text: he had only intended to condemn ‘a 
certain form of montage (and ‘f ilm syntax’) which the cinema has, in any 
case, already left behind,” specifying that this “montage-roi” consisted of 
“the abuse of non-diegetic metaphors, superimpositions, rapid editing, etc.” 
While the ideas of Eisenstein, Gance and company are clearly intended as a 
target (as the ‘Langue ou langage’ article makes abundantly clear), Metz also 
asserts that a new form of montage had arisen in the work of Welles, Resnais 
and Godard, one which was no longer “a caricature of verbal structures.” 
He concludes his missive with the statement that “only a certain form of 
montage is dead…”2
This exchange may not have augured a propitious relationship between 
Metz and the journal – the theorist bluntly states that he has “very few 
opinions in common with Cahiers.”3 Nonetheless, the next month, the 
editors of Cahiers elected to publish a major article by Metz that would be 
of considerable importance for Comolli, Narboni and their colleagues, ‘À 
propos de l’impression de la réalité au cinéma’. Borrowing the concept of 
the ‘impression of reality’ from Barthes’ discussion of photography in his 
article ‘Rhétorique de l’image’, Metz argues that cinema has a considerably 
greater ‘projective power’ than photography (that is, the spectator has a 
much greater tendency to project themselves into the world depicted on 
the screen), owing, above all, to the movement of images, which furnishes 
‘a higher degree of reality [un indice de réalité supplémentaire], and the 
corporality of the objects,” as well as imparting a sense of “being present 
[actuel]” in the events depicted.4 For Metz, the movement of images is not 
merely analogous to movement in real life; rather, it actually does provide 
the spectator with the “real presence of movement” and he def ines the 
“secret” of the cinema as follows: “to inject the reality of motion into the 
unreality of the image and thus to render the world of the imagination more 
real than it had ever been.”5
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A year later, Metz would publish a second major article with Cahiers, this 
time on the occasion of a special issue on ‘cinema and the novel’. ‘Le cinéma 
moderne et la narrativité’ avows the effervescence of cinematic modernism 
in the 1960s – with the rise of f ilmmakers such as Resnais, Godard and Anto-
nioni – but seeks to provide a corrective to the overly simplistic oppositions 
between classical and modern f ilms prevalent in f ilm criticism at the time, 
none of which truly satisf ied the theorist. Rather than a sweeping rejection 
of narrative, spectacle, or drama, Metz sees the specificity of modern cinema 
as residing in ‘a vast and complex movement of renewal and enrichment’ 
of f ilm syntax, consisting in the abandonment of certain commonplace 
clichés, the evolution and modif ication of other f igures, and the invention 
of new, hitherto inexistent syntactic forms.6 Evoking the classif ication of 
his grande syntagmatique, then being adumbrated in articles published in 
other periodicals, Metz confesses that an early sequence in Pierrot le fou 
(1965), in which Anna Karina and Jean-Paul Belmondo flee Paris in their 
404 convertible, conforms to none of the syntagmatic categories he had 
established therein. It is the bold narrative innovation in Godard’s f ilms 
that leads Metz to end his article with a rhetorically f lorid tribute to the 
“man with the double-barreled f irst-name,” who is described on the pages 
of Cahiers as “a poet-novelist of unimpeachable narrative inventiveness, 
a man of a thousand tales in whom the fecundity of fabulation has those 
natural qualities […] that belong to the great storytelling temperaments.”7 
This dithyrambic conclusion, however, would be substantially tempered 
when, as with the earlier article on the ‘impression of reality’, ‘Le cinéma 
moderne et la narrativité’ was republished in Metz’s Essais sur la significa-
tion au cinéma.8
Much of ‘Le cinéma moderne et la narrativité’ consisted of a critique 
of Pier Paolo Pasolini’s concept of the ‘cinema of poetry’, also expounded 
on the pages of Cahiers du Cinéma, which, in Metz’s view, unsatisfactorily 
calques cinematic categories onto those of literary language.9 In opposition 
to Pasolini, Metz contends that modern cinema is not to be distinguished 
from the f ilms of earlier eras by its possession of an inherently ‘poetic’ qual-
ity – if anything, the literary form it most closely resembles (and even here 
it is a loose approximation) is that of the novel. He nonetheless recognizes 
the Italian f ilmmaker’s analysis as offering “by far the most serious and 
most penetrating” attempt at def ining f ilmic modernity, and there was 
much common ground in their parallel attempts to construct a semiology 
of the cinema. The same year as these articles were published, Pasolini 
and Metz, alongside Barthes, found themselves attacked by Luc Moullet, 
a critic for Cahiers and f ilmmaker in his own right, at a roundtable during 
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the Pesaro f ilm festival. In a philippic titled ‘De la nocivité du langage 
cinématographique, de son inutilité, ainsi que des moyens de lutter contre 
lui’, Moullet fulminated, with his typical mordant humor and a taste for 
Ubu Roi-like provocation, against the “congenital artistic mediocrity of 
cinematic languages past, present and future,” and argued that “there is a 
complete opposition between cinematic language and cinematic art, for 
cinematic language overwhelms art, invades it, stif les it.”10
The other panelists at the session were scandalized at this caricature of 
their project. According to Narboni’s account of the proceedings, Barthes 
accused Moullet of “incessantly confusing language and stereotypes” as well 
as pandering to “anti-intellectualism” (which Narboni himself took as an 
accusation of poujadisme).11 Metz would offer a more conciliatory stance, 
ascribing the difference to that between theorists and artists, and arguing 
“Our task is not so much to say how f ilms should be made, but to f ind out 
how they manage to be understood.”12 Shortly afterwards, Godard would is-
sue a defense of Moullet in his text ‘Trois mille heures du cinéma’, describing 
the Pesaro pronunciamento as ‘Moullet’s sublime missive, Courtelinesque 
and Brechtian, screaming in the face of the structuralists: language, my 
good sir, is theft. Moullet is right. We are the children of f ilm language. 
Our parents are Griff ith, Hawks, Dreyer and Bazin, and Langlois, but not 
you, and in any case, without images and sounds, how can you speak of 
structures?’13
Toward the end of the 1960s, however, Cahiers would become much 
more closely aligned with the structuralist theory denounced by Moullet, a 
process that occurred in tandem with the journal’s political radicalization 
surrounding the events of May 1968. While this shift meant that Metz would 
continue to be a valued interlocutor for the journal, the growing influence 
of Althusserian Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis within Cahiers saw 
its writers develop a critique of the analytic method of Metzian semiology. 
In a roundtable on ‘Montage’ in March 1969, Narboni would broadly adhere 
to the argument made by Metz in ‘Problèmes de dénotation dans le f ilm 
de f iction’ that a shot in the cinema corresponds to a sentence rather than 
a word (or, in Metz’s famous example, the shot is equivalent to the phrase 
‘Here is a revolver!’ rather than the word ‘revolver’), but he would proceed 
to note that Jean-Daniel Pollet’s 1965 f ilm Méditerranée strives precisely 
to transform its constituent shots into lexical units approximating words, 
by diminishing the oppositions Metz had established and “effecting a 
perversion […] of the actualization of the images and of their quality of 
assertiveness” – a process which is enabled in large part by the ‘poetic’ 
commentary to the f ilm provided by Tel Quel editor Philippe Sollers.14 A 
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more strident critique of the analytic method of the semiologists – and 
proof of Cahiers’ vexed relationship to it – came later that year. In October 
1969, in the same issue in which Narboni and Comolli’s landmark editorial 
text ‘Cinéma/Idéologie/Critique’ appeared, the journal published Raymond 
Bellour’s painstaking analysis of the Bodega Bay sequence from Hitchcock’s 
The Birds (1963). While Bellour himself, at the time closely linked to Metz, 
took care to avoid a hasty use of semiotic/linguistic concepts in his study, 
and would admit in the text’s preface to the necessarily incomplete nature 
of any attempt at f ilm analysis, invoking Freud’s notion of ‘die endliche 
und unendliche Analyse’ (f inite and inf inite analysis), Narboni saw f it to 
append a rejoinder to Bellour’s article, which, despite acknowledging its 
theoretical importance, criticized his “phenomenological attempt to […] 
only conceive of the invisible as being temporarily and reducibly dissimu-
lated, or the provisionally masked reverse-side of the visible.”15 To Bellour’s 
close analysis, Narboni preferred the method of symptomatic reading drawn 
from Althusser’s Reading Capital, in which “The invisible is not therefore 
simply what is outside the visible, the outer darkness of exclusion, but also 
the inner darkness of exclusion, inside the visible itself because def ined by 
its structure.”16
In the ensuing period, the sporadic critiques Cahiers would make of 
Metzian f ilm semiology centered precisely on the question of ideology, 
or, more precisely, the lack thereof in Metz’s theories. In 1971–1972, both 
Pascal Bonitzer and Jean-Louis Comolli would offer harsh critiques of 
Jean Mitry – contrasting markedly with Metz’s favorable stance toward 
the theorist’s Esthétique et psychologie du cinéma – in parallel multi-part 
studies published over several issues. Bonitzer’s ‘Réalité de la dénotation’, 
for example, begins with a discussion of the close-up that insists on the 
ideological nature of the ‘technical classif ication of shot-sizes,’ which fun-
damentally rests, in the Cahiers critic’s view, on a “metaphysical ordering 
from the part to the whole.”17 In adopting the system of shot categories 
established by Mitry, Metz’s grande syntagmatique thus has an explicitly 
empiricist foundation, which “reaff irms the illusion of the text’s autonomy 
by privileging linearity, ‘lived experience’, the ‘f low’, that is, the diachronic 
level, where the denotation effects are reinforced.”18 Moreover, his broader 
distinction between f ilmic denotation and connotation is similarly cri-
tiqued: denotation has the effect of “constraining the f ilm and its reading to 
a transcendental semantic level that would be ‘f ilm language’,” at the same 
time as condemning connotation “to the role of ‘artistic’ supplement, expres-
sive redundancy.”19 Bonitzer is careful to clarify, however, that he is referring 
to arguments made in Metz’s earlier works, which, he foreshadows, will 
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be addressed in the semiologist’s “upcoming book.” The “upcoming book” 
was to be Langage et cinéma, published later in the year, and the aff inities 
between Metz’s newer thinking and Cahiers were highlighted not only in 
Comolli’s more favorable comments toward Metz in the third installment 
of his ‘Technique et idéologie’ series,20 but also in Cahiers’ willingness to 
print chapter 6 of Section XI of the book (‘Cinéma et idéographie’) in their 
March–April 1971 issue, as well as the essay ‘Ponctuations et démarcations 
dans le f ilm de diégèse’ (included in vol. II of Essais sur la signification au 
cinéma) in their December 1971–February 1972 issue.21
The Dispute with Positif
In the same period, one of the most notorious quarrels in the history of 
French f ilm criticism broke out when Positif published Robert Benayoun’s 
stinging attack on Cahiers’ new-found Marxist approach to cinema, ‘Les 
enfants du paradigme’. The immediate pretext was Cahiers’ support for 
Straub/Huillet’s f ilm Othon, but the Positif writer used the opportunity 
to launch into a sweeping denunciation of its rival journal, lambasting it 
for its supposed political tergiversations, theoretical disingenuousness, 
and general illegibility. In this, Benayoun unequivocally contrasted the 
output of Cahiers with the writing of Metz, who was praised for avoiding the 
“frivolous, autocratic and threatening attitude” of the journal, and in whose 
work “the semiological lexicon is natural, restrained, devoid of coquetry and 
fatuity.”22 Benayoun would even claim that Metz’s condemnation of “the fa-
naticism of the cinema-cinema” and his stated wish for “a junction between 
thinking on cinema and the general movement of ideas” are tendencies 
that have always been exemplif ied by Positif, again in contradistinction 
to the journal founded by Bazin.23 In their January–February 1971 issue, 
the Cahiers editors responded to Benayoun’s charges with vociferous op-
probrium, and some degree of haughty disdain: their rejoinder to Positif, ‘Sur 
quelques contresens’ was presented merely as a corrective to a “calumnious 
campaign” and was in no way to be considered a response to an ongoing 
debate: “the true debate,” Narboni explained, was taking place “in a f ield 
from which, in spite of its parasitic efforts, Positif f inds itself, owing to its 
regressive practices, excluded.”24
Benayoun’s broadside nonetheless earned f ive pages of rebuttal within 
Cahiers, a letter published in his own journal containing vague threats of 
legal action, and a statement titled ‘Cinéma, littérature, politique’ co-signed 
by the editors of Cahiers, Cinéthique and Tel Quel (the latter two journals, 
while engaged in their own theoretical altercations with Cahiers, had also 
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found themselves in Benayon’s polemical crosshairs), which accused Positif 
of a “confusionist-reactionary discourse.”25 Additionally, Metz himself sent 
a missive to Positif, rejecting Benayoun’s imputation of a fundamental op-
position between himself and the journals under attack:
It happens that I am in relations of work and discussion, more or less close 
depending on the case, with all those whom your collaborator assails, 
beginning with Cahiers du Cinéma. This is not to say, of course, that I 
agree with every single one of them on every single sentence they may 
pronounce. But these people and these groups are carrying out research 
for which, on the global level, I feel a great deal of esteem, sympathy, and 
a lively intellectual interest. On the subject of cinema, the most serious 
effort at theoretical reflection, today, is located in my opinion on the side 
of those whom your journal attacks. To this extent – and beyond all the 
complex details one would like – I feel that I am on their side far more 
than on the side of Positif, in spite of the compliments Robert Benayon 
addresses to me.26
Metz, it seems, never had a great tenderness for Positif: in a footnote to 
the version of ‘À propos de l’impression de réalité au cinéma’ published in 
Cahiers, he accuses the journal of “cheerfully assumed irresponsibility” for 
publishing a dismissive eight-line review of Mitry’s Esthétique et psychologie 
(“one of the most important books on the cinema in existence,” according 
to Metz).27 Later, in 1976, Positif published a harsh rebuke of Metzian f ilm 
theory by Jean-François Tarnowski, in a text that, ironically, was primarily 
a defense of Mitry. The article was of such rebarbative vitriol – Tarnowski 
speaks of the “theoretical quasi-stupidity” of Metz’s work, and his “incred-
ibly impotent and strained distortion” of Mitry’s ideas28 – that a petition in 
defense of the semiologist was launched, signed by Jean Narboni and Pascal 
Bonitzer among others.29 This support marked the end of an extensive 
period during which Metz’s work was largely neglected by Cahiers: with 
the journal’s adoption of a Maoist political outlook from 1972 onwards, 
less consideration was given to the purely theoretical questions that preoc-
cupied Metz. It was not until his shift from the semiological method of his 
earlier work to the psychoanalytic paradigm of The Imaginary Signifier 
that something of a reconciliation with Cahiers was effectuated: not only 
did this new allegiance bring Metz closer to the thinking of Cahiers (and 
particularly the work of writers such as Pascal Bonitzer and Jean-Pierre 
Oudart), it also came at a moment when Cahiers had rejected its earlier 
political dogmatism and was returning to a spirit of intellectual openness. 
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Bonitzer’s 1977 text ‘Voici (La notion de plan et le sujet du cinéma)’ draws 
signif icantly on Metz in discussing what he dubs the ‘effet de voici’: if a 
close-up of a revolver, to return to Metz’s example, conveys the message 
“here is a revolver,” this “here is…” is not only an “actualization effect,” as 
Metz argues, it is also an effect produced by the cinematic gaze, and is thus 
an “index of f iction” allowing the audience to grasp their own position as 
spectator of a f ilm.30 Metz would respond to the renewed interest in his 
work from Cahiers by publishing a segment of his ‘Métaphore/Métonymie’ 
chapter from The Imaginary Signifier (titled ‘L’incandescence et le code’) 
in the journal’s following issue (March 1977), despite the rather tenuous 
connection of the passage’s subject matter with f ilm per se.31
Cinéthique
While Metz’s association with Cinéthique was far briefer than his prolonged 
relationship with Cahiers, it was, in many ways, no less determinant for 
the theoretical outlook of the journal. Founded in 1969 by the f ilmmaker 
Marcel Hanoun, Cinéthique was quickly taken over by the young critics 
Gérard Leblanc and Jean-Paul Fargier, who closely allied themselves with 
Tel Quel. In doing so, they also appeared to outflank Cahiers to its left, as 
the more venerable journal was conducting an attempted rapprochement 
with the French Communist Party at this time. This political radicalism, 
combined with the nascent apparatus theory developed under the auspices 
of Tel Quel (with interventions by Marcellin Pleynet and Jean-Louis Baudry 
playing a key role in attuning the Cinéthique editors to the literary journal’s 
theoretical optic), led to an almost cinephobic outlook toward f ilmmaking 
on the pages of the Cinéthique. With the cinematic mechanism understood 
as being ineluctably imbued with bourgeois ideology, Leblanc and Fargier 
paid little heed to f ilm history (the work of Dziga Vertov constituting the 
primary exception to this rule), and their list of f ilms meriting critical 
approbation was both exiguous and eclectic, with favored titles including 
Méditerranée, Le Joueur de Quilles (Jean-Pierre Lajournade, 1969), Octobre à 
Madrid (Marcel Hanoun, 1969) and the post-1968 output of Jean-Luc Godard.
If anything, the theoretical framework developed by Cinéthique, while it 
led to forthright polemics with Cahiers du Cinéma, shared with that journal 
an unabashedly prospective outlook, focused as much on ushering in a 
new form of cinema divested of ‘bourgeois ideology’ as it was on evaluating 
f ilms that had already been made. This, perhaps, formed the key line of 
demarcation between Cinéthique and Metz’s semiological project, which, 
in contrast, was rigorously concentrated on analyzing pre-existing works of 
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cinema, and had an overwhelming focus on narrative f ilms from the classi-
cal period. Nevertheless, the interview carried out with Metz in issue no. 6 
of Cinéthique (dated January–February 1970) – where the semiologist spoke 
with René Fouque, Éliane Le Grivés and Simon Luciani – was conducted 
in a fraternal and sympathetic manner. Differences were not disavowed, 
and Metz would elsewhere express skepticism toward what he dubbed 
‘cinematic tel-quelism’ (see Chapter 4), but points of contact were stressed. 
Almost inevitably, the discussion turned toward Méditerranée, and, more 
pointedly, the possibility of spectatorial recognition in a f ilm so formally 
remote from the conventions of narrative cinema. The interview concludes 
with Cinéthique stressing the distinction between “an already-made cinema” 
and “a cinema to be made,” a point to which Metz responds by recalling the 
modest scope and descriptive purpose of his grande syntagmatique. The 
interview even presents an occasion for Metz to discuss the question of 
the “ideological apparatus” of the cinema that was of prime importance for 
Cinéthique at the time: here, Metz aff irms his agreement with the opposi-
tion between “the ideologies that are conveyed by the f ilm and those that 
the f ilm develops by dint of the very fact that it is a f ilm.” He nonetheless 
confesses to being “less optimistic” than the writers at Cinéthique, asserting 
that, “it seems to me to be more diff icult than you believe […] to draw a 
distinction between what is ideological, within the very optical possibilities 
of the camera, or between what is a kind of ‘castration’ of the possibilities 
(a factor that certainly intervenes), and what pertains more radically to 
the camera itself.”32
In the journal’s following issue (no. 7–8, dating from c. mid-1970), 
Cinéthique published a lengthy appraisal of Metzian theory by Michel 
Cegarra, composed in December 1969–January 1970. Although not a regular 
contributor to Cinéthique, Cegarra perhaps best encapsulates the journal’s 
thorny relationship with Metz in the opening lines of his article: “Metz’s 
endeavor appears to be both meandering and precise, hasty and effective, 
unfortunate and auspicious, uncertain and confident.”33 While appreciat-
ing f ilm semiology’s gesture of clearing the way for “a radical reading of 
texts/f ilms,” Cegarra warns that it also risks remaining trapped by its own 
“presuppositions, pre-notions, preconceptions,”34 and his ensuing study is a 
patiently elaborated, albeit overly schematic, overview of Metz’s key ideas.
In tandem with Cahiers, Cinéthique underwent a distinct political 
hardening in the years following these two texts: by 1972, the journal had 
adopted a more rigidly dogmatic ‘Marxist-Leninist’ position, which even 
entailed a spiteful rupture with its erstwhile ‘mentors’ at Tel Quel. Even at 
its most politically dogmatic, however, Cinéthique still felt the need to give 
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a detailed critical response to Metz’s Langage et cinéma in issue no. 13 of 
the journal, a book that evinces traces of the impact Metz’s interaction with 
Cinéthique and Cahiers had on his thinking. This anonymously-authored 
review (at this point the authorial responsibility for all texts published in 
Cinéthique was collectively assumed by the entire editorial committee) 
has the merit of soberly elucidating the key differences dividing Cinéthique 
and Metz, while at the same time acknowledging that Langage et cinéma 
‘combats a good number of received ideas, falsehoods [and] spontaneous, 
naïve notions’ that ‘block the development of a Marxist-Leninist practice of 
f ilm and its theory.’35 The critiques made of Metz are no less fundamental, 
however. At their core, they again come down to the descriptive/norma-
tive opposition. Cinéthique censures Metz for disavowing a normative 
element to his study,36 and in striving to keep his work strictly descriptive 
in nature, he ends up reinforcing a “positivist ideology”. Metz’s concern 
for scientif icity in fact results in an exclusion of the “science of histori-
cal materialism” from the terms of his study, and the intended political 
neutrality of his project is, in reality, an illusion, as it cannot avoid being 
positioned within “the ideological ensemble of discourses on the cinema.”37 
By contrast, Cinéthique argues for the possibility of being both “scientif ic” 
and normative – it unabashedly, to use Metz’s words, “explains to future 
f ilmmakers how they should go about making a f ilm,” and does so from a 
self-declared revolutionary perspective. Hence, whereas the question of 
ideological struggle is central to Cinéthique’s theoretical framework, the 
journal critiques Metz for largely avoiding this matter, and notes that the 
rare mentions of ideology in Metz’s book are generally pejorative in nature, 
relating to notions such as ‘stereotype’, ‘propaganda’, and ‘banality’. While 
Metz is careful to give a clear conceptual def inition to terms such as ‘f ilm’ 
and ‘cinema’, he errs, in Cinéthique’s view, by blithely rehashing the every-
day notion of the term ‘ideology’ rather than utilizing the concept in the 
theoretical sense developed by the Marxist tradition, with the result being 
that “in the place of Marxist concepts, the foreground of semiological theory 
is massively occupied by vague psychological and sociological notions.”38
La Nouvelle Critique
Curiously, Metz’s appearances in La Nouvelle Critique were almost exactly 
contemporaneous with those in Cinéthique: an interview in 1970 foreshad-
owing some of the main arguments of Langage et cinéma was followed by 
an in-depth review of the work in 1972. While both Cinéthique and La NC 
espoused a Marxist perspective on art and ideology, there was little common 
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ground between the two journals. Cinéthique’s editors were grounded in 
gauchiste politics, eventually turning to a strain of Maoism that was relent-
lessly hostile to the French Communist Party (PCF); La NC, meanwhile, was 
one of the PCF’s main cultural organs at this time. As a general cultural 
review, La NC concerned itself with literature, art, philosophy and other 
broader issues, but f ilm criticism played an increasingly prominent role on 
its pages, particularly due to the contributions of former Cahiers writers 
Jean-André Fieschi, Bernard Eisenschitz, and Eduardo de Gregorio. Having 
adopted a new format in 1967, La NC reflected a period of cultural openness 
on the part of the PCF following the landmark Argenteuil central committee 
meeting of March 1966. More cynical minds saw the PCF’s new cultural 
strategy as a way of circumventing the attraction of radical groups to left-
leaning intellectuals in the political climate of the late 1960s. Nonetheless, 
the years 1969–1971 saw productive exchanges take place between La NC 
and journals such as Cahiers and Tel Quel, and the September 1970 interview 
with Metz took place in this context. In the ‘Battle of Othon’, for example, 
La NC joined Cahiers as virtually the only organs to defend Straub/Huillet’s 
f ilm from the derisive ridicule it received at the hands of the majority of 
French f ilm critics.
This said, the question of ‘ideological struggle’ was a much less press-
ing one – on both the theoretical and political levels – for the NC critics 
than it was for their counterparts at Cahiers and Cinéthique. It is notable, 
for instance, that, when interviewing Metz, Fieschi speaks of a “veritable 
dogmatic, normative peril, conceivable at the level of aesthetic tenden-
cies […] but unacceptable at the level of a professed scientif ic analysis.”39 
Although this normative tendency is expressly linked to the ideas of Bazin 
by both Fieschi and Metz, the exchange foreshadows a polemic between 
Cahiers’ Jean-Louis Comolli and the PCF critic Jean-Patrick Lebel on the 
question of cinema and ideology, which would flare up over the course of 
1971. Whereas Comolli insisted on the ideological determination of the 
cinematic apparatus, Lebel viewed the camera as a scientif ic technology 
that was, in essence, ideologically neutral, and thus able to be used with 
equal eff icacy by reactionary and revolutionary f ilmmakers alike. The 
debate was so acrimonious that it led to a severing of ties between Cahiers 
and La NC, and Cahiers would soon turn to denouncing the PCF-aligned 
journal for its ostensible “revisionism” and abandonment of a revolutionary 
cultural-political perspective.
By the time that Michel Marie reviewed Langage et cinéma for La NC in 
February 1972, the ‘cinema and ideology’ debate was drawing to a close, and 
the two journals would cease any meaningful dialogue with each other. 
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Marie – who would later become a key f igure in French f ilm studies, and, 
indeed, an interviewer of Metz for Iris in 1989 (see Chapter 10) – is generally 
laudatory of Metz’s book, hailing it as “marking a turning point in reflection 
on the cinema,” but he concludes his piece with two key criticisms of Metz, 
which are worth outlining in some detail. Firstly, Marie argues that Metz is 
overly insistent on the notion of cinema as a ‘langage d’art ’, and this factor, 
as well as an overestimation of the role of the individual creator (the auteur 
director) in the elaboration of f ilm language, leads Metz, in Marie’s view, 
to conflate f ilm language with narrative cinema, thereby neglecting other 
social uses of the cinema, such as the development of scientif ic f ilms in the 
GDR. Although Marie notes that Metz is self-critical of his prior work on this 
point, he judges that the semiologist has “not completely disembarrassed 
himself of this ‘Bazinian heritage’ (mise en scène as an activity of arrange-
ment and reorganization proceeding directly from ‘reality’).”40 Secondly, and 
more crucially, Marie takes issue with Metz’s definition of f ilm language as 
“a f irst, purely denotative level where the code of analogy and recognition 
intervene + a second level consisting of artistic connotations as a supple-
ment,” and he rejects the idea of an “anteriority of the denotative level,” even 
if Metz explicitly declares this anteriority to be a f iction constructed for the 
sake of analysis.41 Despite the tense relations between La NC and Cahiers, 
to defend his perspective Marie invokes Bonitzer’s repudiation of Metz in 
“Réalité’ de la Dénotation”, discussed above, and echoes Jean Louis Schefer’s 
warning that the semiological project risks reducing the status of the image 
to that of a mere text. In the end, however, rather than a clear-cut antithesis, 
Marie prefers to see the writings of Bonitzer, Oudart, Schefer and Francastel 
on scenographic representation as providing a complement to the semiology 
of Metz, Umberto Eco and Emilio Garroni, with the NC writer concluding 
that “all theoretical reflection on the cinema today must interrogate the 
analogical status of the image and the very notion of representation.”42
Ça-Cinéma
Our f inal star in the constellation is a journal of a rather different ilk to 
Cahiers, Cinéthique and La Nouvelle Critique. Whereas these three organs 
were monthly magazines intended, at least in theory, for a wide readership, 
and blending theoretical texts with reviewing and other critical activities, 
Ça-Cinéma sought to explicitly position itself as being closer to an elite 
literary review, following the model of publications such as Tel Quel or 
Les Temps Modernes, but with a specif ic focus on f ilm theory. Founded 
by François Barat and Joël Farges in July 1973 and published by Éditions 
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Albatros, Ça-Cinéma appeared on a quarterly basis, with issues generally 
containing a small number of long, often theoretically dense articles. A 
premium was placed on drawing prominent writers: the f irst issue notably 
contained texts by Marguérite Duras, Philippe Sollers and Jorge-Luis Borges. 
The raref ied literary register of the journal, meanwhile, was established 
by Farges’ initial editorial, which stated: ‘The anaphoric trajectory (con-
notation) of the (cleaved) subject is to multiply (by homological locks) the 
markers of a specific problematic (in the movement of Film practice), to shift 
across inventories (f ilms, paintings, writing, etc.), the pluralism of systems 
and, on the basis of practice, reveal the constraints that ligate the Film.”43
That f ilm semiology would be at the core of Ça-Cinéma’s theoretical 
endeavor was also evinced in the journal’s inaugural issue, which published 
a French translation of Emilio Garroni’s article ‘Sémiotique des messages 
artistiques’.44 It was the May 1975 issue, however, that solidif ied the journal’s 
link with Metz, with the publication of a 176-page double issue dedicated 
entirely to the semiologist’s work, edited by his pupil Marc Vernet, and 
featuring, in addition to the interview reprinted in this volume (Chapter 4), 
texts on Metz by f igures such as Roland Barthes, Stephen Heath, Jean Louis 
Schefer, Felix Guattari, Raymond Bellour, Thierry Kuntzel, and Michel 
Marie. Vernet described the goal of the dossier as being “to sketch what f ilm 
semiology is today” at a time when “this domain is in the process of changing 
orientation, with Metz, alongside other semiologists, departing somewhat 
from the linguistic approach in order to integrate a psychoanalytic approach 
into their method.”45 For Vernet, “the current face of semiology is a plural 
one” and the fact that the discipline was at a methodological crossroads was 
demonstrated, above all, by the inverse theoretical trajectories of Metz and 
Guattari: while the former had turned toward psychoanalysis, the latter was 
“tackling the reading of Hjelmslev proposed in Langage et cinéma.”46 The 
conversation with Metz, meanwhile, was one of the most comprehensive 
and thoroughgoing interviews he gave during this period (in this its main 
rival is the dialogue that Metz and Bellour conducted for Semiotica, also 
republished here [Chapter 3]).
Vernet would subsequently become a permanent member of the journal’s 
editorial board, and under his auspices a pair of issues dedicated to psy-
choanalysis and the cinema were published in 1978–1979: once more, Metz 
was a privileged interlocutor, with the journal’s format again allowing for 
an in-depth exchange on Metz’s theories (see Chapter 6). That Ça-Cinéma 
was experiencing troubles during this time, however, was indicated by 
the same issue’s editorial, in which Vernet lamented the sporadic, ad hoc 
nature of previous numbers (which made consolidating a regular readership 
Christian Metz and the Constellation oF FrenCh FilM Journals 47
diff icult) and announced a restructuring of the quarterly to “allow us to 
clearly re-situate the journal and the work that it will produce in its f ield: 
f ilm analysis.”47 The results of this revamp were mixed, however, and the 
journal ceased publication in 1980. While Ça-Cinéma had a relatively brief, 
intermittent existence, a number of its editors went on to be involved with 
the bilingual f ilm theory journal Iris in the 1980s, and its texts stand today 
as valuable documents of an incomparably fertile, albeit turbulent, period 
for reflection on the cinema in France. To a signif icant degree, such a state 
of affairs was a legacy of the groundbreaking theoretical work carried out 
by Christian Metz during this time.
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Abstract
In this interview, conducted in 1970 for the journal Cinéthique, Christian 
Metz discusses his f ilm semiology from the 1960s (including his grande 
syntagmatique), as well as the work of Sergei Eisenstein, cinéma-vérité, 
the concept of verisimilitude, and the f ilm Méditerranée (Jean-Daniel 
Pollet, Volker Schlöndorff, 1963).
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‘Sémiologie, linguistique, cinéma. entretien avec Christian Metz’. René 
Fouqué, Éliane Le Grivès, et Simon Luciani. Published in Cinéthique 6 
(January–February) 1970, pp. 21–26. Translated by Daniel Fairfax.
Cinéthique: Can you situate your work on the grande syntagmatique and 
its history within your general semiological project?
Christian Metz: Insofar as my general project is indeed a contribution to a 
semiology of the cinema, a contribution to overcoming the state of most 
writing on f ilm (which is, for the most part, journalistic in nature), in favor 
of a more theoretical approach, which, for me, is a semiological approach, 
I have encountered a code operative within each f ilm – that is, one code 
among many others. It is this code that I dubbed, at the time, the grande 
syntagmatique of narrative film. I conceive this grande syntagmatique as 
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something partial: f irstly, because it can only be applied to a certain histori-
cal phase in the development of the cinema. It is applicable, let us say, to 
classical narrative cinema, from roughly 1935 onwards (that is, with the 
stabilization of sound f ilm), up until around 1955, with the appearance of 
the tendencies known as ‘modern cinema’ or ‘new cinema’. Thus, I believe 
that the code of the grande syntagmatique is diachronically partial. It is also 
partial in a second way, because, even in f ilms from the period in question, 
it was not the only code. It is a code that simply offers a breakdown of the 
major units of f ilmic narration, and that puts to one side the organization of 
all the other motifs and themes in a f ilm. I already believed at the time that 
this attempt was doubly partial, but I believe this even more today. Simply 
put, it seems to me that we must have a point of attack in order to study the 
problems of f ilm. The problems of the grande syntagmatique and of f ilm 
narrativity were particularly ripe at this point in time (it was three years 
ago now). Perhaps this is why I chose to attack it from this angle. Today, 
what I f ind more striking is the multiplicity of codes at work in a f ilm, of 
which only some – for example, the grande syntagmatique – are specifically 
cinematic, while others appear inside the f ilm in much the same way that 
they appear outside of the f ilm. In other words, they are not specif ically 
cinematic – which does not prevent them from being f ilmic.
Cinéthique: Could you try to def ine the different codes operative within a 
f ilm, and, more particularly, those that are specif ic to the cinema?
Metz: It seems to me that research has not reached the point where it could 
give an exact enumeration of specif ic codes – or of any other codes, by 
the way. But initially, one can think that the specif ically cinematic codes 
consist of all those codes that relate to the work of the moving photographic 
image organized sequentially, and of sound, of their reciprocal relations, as 
well as of the relations between the image, the sound and the spoken word.
Aside from this, there are codes that are not specif ically cinematic. 
For example, in certain cases (though not always), the social systems that 
organize the content of f ilm are not systems proper to the cinema. I f ind it 
more and more striking to see that the content of f ilms – or what we call 
the content of f ilms, because there is a real problem with this notion – is 
organized by systems, by codes that are, I would say, ideological; that is to 
say, they are susceptible to appearing in the cinema, but without a major 
change in their structure, for they can appear just as well in languages other 
than the language of f ilm: in a novel, for example, or on a poster, or on TV, 
etc. Another example of a non-specif ic code that nonetheless plays a very 
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important role in the cinema is, quite simply, the language code [langue] 
that the f ilm uses: there are f ilms that speak English, German, etc. Now, this 
code, obviously, is not cinematic, and yet this does not prevent the use of 
this language (which must be distinguished from the language itself), once 
it is in the f ilm, from being susceptible to becoming specif ically cinematic.
I am not saying that it is always cinematic, but it is susceptible to 
becoming so. At the time of the Manifesto for Orchestral Counterpoint [A 
Statement on Sound], there were many things that were very advanced in 
what the three signatories, Eisenstein, Pudovkin, and Alexandrov stated. 
They said, for example, that intertitles may be used, that is, that written 
language (but this is also transposable to spoken language) may be used 
in a specif ically f ilmic manner, a manner that would be different from the 
code of ordinary writing, different from written language outside of the 
cinema. And they had in view specif ic kinds of systems concerning what 
we could call a typography of the intertitle (titles increasing in size, for 
instance). Moreover, they actually used these techniques in their f ilms. I 
was sensitive to the fact that Solanas, in Hour of the Furnaces [1968], totally 
resurrects this kind of approach. In this f ilm, there is an absolutely (or at 
least proximally) Eisensteinian usage of the intertitle, which plays around 
with the size of the writing. By contrast, the language code [langue] – the 
language-system itself, the language-system of Saussure, the phonological 
system for instance – is reiterated as such by f ilms.
Cinéthique: Is it possible to think of the ideology of f ilm practice and to 
def ine the code of this ideology?
Metz: In your journal, I have noticed that you make a distinction, with 
which I am fundamentally in agreement – between those ideologies that 
are conveyed by the f ilm and those that the f ilm develops by dint of the 
fact that it is a f ilm. I have also noticed that among this latter category of 
ideologies, you accord the greatest importance to the impression of reality. I 
do too, by the way; but I am not sure if we are in agreement on its definition. 
Nonetheless, there is a point of contact between us here.
One thing f irst: you often insist, in various articles in your journal, on 
the fact that the camera is regulated [réglée]: initially on the level of its 
construction, and then on the level of its operational settings in the strict 
sense of the term (its buttons, and so on), since, even with the instruments 
manufactured today, there are still regulatory forms that are not used. So, 
on this double level, the instrument is regulated in order to reconstitute a 
monocular perspective, which is, roughly speaking, the non-disorienting 
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perspective of the Quattrocento. This is also how I see things. This prop-
erly optical ‘castration’ of the camera is something that had already been 
studied, in particular (and in spite of major divergences between you and 
him) by Jean Mitry, who showed that, by constructing camera instruments 
differently, by regulating them differently, and so on, one could obtain very 
surprising perspectives, and that these were expressly refused due to the 
desire to attain the impression of reality. There is indeed a kind of under-
employment of the optical possibilities of the camera, because one sought, 
in general, to use it to attain the perspectival space of the Renaissance, 
by wagering on the possibilities offered by the monocular factors of the 
impression of three-dimensionality.
But I am less optimistic than you. It seems to me to be more diff icult than 
you believe (I even ask myself whether it is at all possible, in the current 
historical situation to which we are ourselves limited) to draw a distinc-
tion between what is ideological, within the very optical possibilities of 
the camera, or between what is a kind of ‘castration’ of these possibilities 
(a factor that certainly intervenes), and what pertains more radically to 
the camera itself, which has limitations that are, I would say, not simply 
technical, but scientif ic in nature. It is an apparatus that, like any other, is 
not quite capable of doing anything and everything. I have written a study, 
‘On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema’, in which, by the way, I make 
no mention of this aspect you are so insistent about (that is: the properly 
ideological limitation of the possibilities of the camera), and where I put 
greater emphasis on the limitations that I considered to be inherent to its 
nature. I am a little less certain of this today. I must revisit the text from 
this perspective. On the other hand, I have the impression that your journal 
has just reactivated a debate that had been, in a way, terminated before 
your intervention. I am thinking of the quarrel that took place in Bazin’s 
day between his ideology of the sequence-shot, of ‘non-montage’, etc., and 
the theories of the likes of Eisenstein, Kuleshov, and Vertov – who offered 
rather extremist theories of montage. Even after your intervention, this 
debate does not appear completely clear to me, and it seems to me that 
there is ideology on both sides.
In certain passages in Bazin’s writings, there is indisputably something 
like a shift to metaphysics (a metaphysics which, in this case, is called phe-
nomenology), a sort of cosmophanic myth according to which the function 
of the cinema would be to render the real more eloquent than it is – it is, as 
it were, as if the real itself spoke through the means of the cinema. We can 
also, by the way, f ind this mythology in certain attempts at cinéma-vérité, 
which proceed from a truly magic belief in the innate purity [adamisme] 
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of the image, with the idea that everything that is uttered [énoncé] by 
words is guilty, loaded with heavy connotations, and that suddenly, through 
the passage of the word to the image, we could accede to an absolutely 
innocent rendering of the real. I am thinking, for example, of dialogues 
that are deliberately garbled in order to ‘seem real’ – or rather, to create 
reality-effects, as Barthes puts it. I can clearly see where the part of ideology 
is situated in Bazin’s thinking (and it is a considerable part): it lies in the idea 
that the world is unveiled, in all its innocence, by the image, whereas what 
is actually revealed is only ever the real as seen by someone in particular.
Robbe-Grillet and others have insisted on the fact that the image is never 
innocent, even if this is only due to the necessary choice of camera angles, 
that is, to the most immediate constraint of a f ilmmaker’s work. God does 
not take the photograph; the camera angle cannot be the doing of God, or 
of nature (which amounts to the same thing in this ideology). Rather, it 
has been chosen by a f ilmmaker who had his reasons, whether conscious 
or unconscious. Robbe-Grillet, at the time of his ‘turning-point’ – that is, 
when he himself reinterpreted objectivity [l’objectal] in a more subjectivist 
sense – insisted on this point in a text called, if I remember correctly, ‘Note 
on the Localization and Displacement of the Viewpoint of the Camera in 
Novelistic Description’.
In contrast, however, I f ind that the montage theories developed in 
the 1920s among the great classics of the Soviet school are themselves not 
exactly bereft of ideology.
Firstly, in his theoretical writings (but much less so in his f ilms), Eisen-
stein willingly assumes the mantle of what I would call the ‘artistic type’. 
He speaks about montage in an ambiguous fashion: at times, he claims 
that it must be at the service of the ideological point of view of the working 
class, but at other moments he states that it should be at the service of f ilm 
art, or a sort of genesis in the mind of the spectator (reproducing what has 
gone through the mind of the f ilmmaker). He does so with a very forceful 
insistence on things in which we believe less and less today – such as expres-
sion, creation, etc. In short, with Eisenstein we f ind an entire romantic 
ideology of pure creation, in such a way that he often mingles problems 
of montage with his claims to being a creative artist (which are fatally 
overdetermined and opaque to themselves). There is another problem, 
that you also present in your journal, when you say that the work of the 
film (the economic conditions of its production on the one hand, and on 
the other hand the directorial [cinéastique] texture in the midst of being 
made) must be legible in the f ilm itself. Now, Eisenstein, in his theories on 
montage, at certain moments, almost arrives at the same conclusions that 
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you do. At times, he seems to say that rapid editing is necessary so that it 
becomes visible, whereas at other times he presents montage as a kind of 
agogia, a technique for training, or even conditioning, the spectator – this is 
montage as an effect that, he states, mobilizes people, in a sense of the term 
that is occasionally close to deception. It almost amounts to forcing people, 
without them realizing it, to adopt the same point of view as the creative 
f ilmmaker. Conversely, in his texts on The Best Years of Our Lives [William 
Wyler, 1946], and the f ilms of Welles and Renoir (La Règle du jeu [The Rules 
of the Game (Renoir, 1939)] for example), Bazin aff irms that ‘non-montage’ 
leaves the spectator with the freedom to choose, to create his own montage 
within a complete action, through the use of extended takes in deep-focus 
long-shot. The only problem with this is that ‘non-montage’ does not exist. 
That said, however, I am not so sure that there is not an element of truth in 
this aspect of Bazin’s thinking. This is why I would say that, fundamentally, 
nothing is very clear in this polemic.
Cinéthique: In a way, montage can lead Eisenstein to speak of mobilizing the 
people, intending to partly deceive them, or using his mobilizing effects to 
create rupture effects with respect to an expected model. In fact, if you take 
a commercial f ilm, which is made for a particular public, you are certain of 
the model that will be supplied, in terms both of its content and of its editing 
principles. It nonetheless remains to be known whether there are not codes 
which have dual effects, which at a certain moment, within apparently 
traditional forms of editing, create rupture effects. Likewise, Sade’s writing, 
for example, which very often obeys the model of the eighteenth-century 
novel, with an entire tradition born of the Gothic novel, creates a rupture 
effect, precisely at the level of what we currently call the ‘reality effect’. But 
what, precisely, is this reality effect, and how is it constituted at the level of 
editing? Can we see it on the level of the constitution of a model that would 
be an ideological vehicle, not on the level of the content, but on the level of 
the f ilmic work in the strict sense of the term?
Metz: I can perceive what I call a ‘reality effect’ more on the side of ‘non-
edited’ f ilms, those cinéma-vérité f ilms that I spoke of earlier. Films that, 
through the absence of montage, shooting in continuity, or through delib-
erately disordered montage, seek to ‘appear real’. To simplify matters, I see 
it more on the side of f ilms in the Bazinian tendency.
Cinéthique: In effect, cinéma-vérité does indeed make ample use of non-
montage, with garbled discussions, shaky close-ups, bad framing, etc. And 
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yet, these do not belong to the order of the real, but to that of the camera. 
And through their very means of expression, there is an effort to create a 
truth effect rather than a reality effect. The reality effect is more due to 
the complete synthesis of something that has been broken into pieces, 
presented as a single tableau. In cinéma-vérité, there is an emphasis on 
surface appearance that seeks to confer truth on every element it represents, 
but which does not actually yield a reality effect on the broader level.
Metz: Perhaps there is a difference between us in vocabulary. I tend to call 
‘truth’ something constructed and quite theoretical, and I consider the 
reality effect to be a sort of pretense that protects itself from ‘raw mate-
rial’. Cinéma-vérité strives to give us an impression of the real captured 
unawares; or, alternatively (and here you are correct), it introduces, through 
specif ically f ilmic means, a type of disorder in the traditional ordering 
of the narrative. Something that struck me in cinéma-vérité f ilms is that, 
for example, one can take a social situation (I am thinking of f ilms that 
are more or less based on the techniques of the psychological drama) and 
disrupt it in some way, and we are supposed to believe that one has raised 
by this disruption some kind of hidden content, when in fact nothing comes 
out but pure and simple artifacts.
Cinéthique: Exactly. In cinéma-vérité f ilms there is no reality effect at the 
level of the image, because all the images that are shown to us are shown 
through a gaze that seeks to be true, that does not seek to determine a 
real, but a series of true points: the camera suddenly captures an awkward 
facial expression, or a meaningful look, or a hand trembling, etc. That is to 
say, it tries to create what is held to be, not so much a psychoanalysis, but 
a psychomorphology, or the psychoanalysis of gestures. The reality effect 
would be something much more elaborate, but in a contrary sense, in order 
to constitute a recognition model for the individual who is looking at it. In 
all f ilms, there are attempts at reality effects: people recognize themselves, 
and it is possibly here that we should look for rupture effects. We should 
f ind out where, precisely – when one shows people things in which they 
could recognize themselves – is the moment that they no longer recognize 
themselves.
Metz: All this returns us to a problem that greatly interests me, and on 
which I have written: namely, the problem of verisimilitude. It seems to me 
that the cinema, perhaps even more than other modes of expression (due, 
I suppose, to the fact that, through the sheer magnitude of the material 
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means it requires, it is more closely controlled), is pervaded by verisimili-
tude. And this takes place insofar as, I would not even say in a f ilm, but, in 
general, in a tiny fragment of a f ilm, a rupture is produced, where something 
unexpected happens, and where, for a single moment, on a single point, 
f ilmic verisimilitude gives way. This is a dialectical problem because, in the 
history of the cinema, it often happens that these moments of ‘true truth’ 
themselves become the basis for a new verisimilitude, which feeds off them. 
This is typically what has happened to what we could call the Czech New 
Wave, the school of intimist cinema derived from Forman, Passer and their 
ilk, which has very quickly become a type of system, in the bad sense of 
the term, a new verisimilitude, a verisimilitude such as Aristotle def ined 
it, as that which conforms to common opinion or to the rules of a genre.
Cinéthique: But how has it come about that people recognize themselves in 
an episode of Knowledge of the World on Palmyra, for example, but that they 
no longer recognize themselves in Méditerranée [Jean-Daniel Pollet, Volker 
Schlöndorff, 1963], which shows an entire series of images of Palmyra? All 
the same (it would be necessary to see what cultural and social level one is 
placed on), in Méditerranée there is a whole series of cultural commonplaces 
that can be found in any documentary on the same geographic area. Here, 
it would perhaps be necessary to interrogate the f ilm’s technique, its use 
of the camera, editing, etc.
Metz: People no longer recognize themselves in Méditerranée because the 
cinema is not only the image, it is also the work done on the image, and 
in Méditerranée this work is evidently very different from what it is in a 
classical documentary. In this way, we could equally return to the problem 
of the iconic analogy between the moving photographic image and that of 
which it is the eff igy. Personally, I think that analogy itself is already coded: 
under the cover of this analogy, the different social codes that function in 
the deciphering of reality are intended to function to the f ilm’s benefit, in 
the deciphering of photographic spectacles. I no longer have the same ideas 
as f ive years ago when I wrote ‘Cinema: Language or Language System?’ In 
this text, my point of departure was the word ‘analogy’, taken in opposition 
to the arbitrary (in the Saussurian sense). From the fact of this point of 
departure, I was led to posit antagonistic relations between analogy and 
codif ication. And yet analogy can very much be coded without, however, 
ceasing to function for the user on a psychological level, as analogy. The basis 
of the problem is possibly that this resemblance is not so much between the 
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photograph and its model, as it is between the structuring activities of the 
viewer [récepteur] placed respectively before these two instances.
Cinéthique: So, in Méditerranée, where we see the sea, and in a documentary 
where we also see the sea, people should be equally capable of recognizing 
themselves, in the sense that, as you say, it is no longer the model and its 
eff igy that are placed face to face, but the eff igy and a viewer [récepteur] 
who carries out work, which he likely would have done if he had been on 
the beach in the position of the camera. It is through the intervention of 
the camera that people cease to recognize themselves.
Metz: In the case of Méditerranée, I don’t think so. I feel that if it happens to 
the spectators that they cease to recognize themselves, when confronted, 
for example, with the image of the sea, this is not due to the image itself, 
but to the ordering of images. In other words, there has been a disruption to 
spectatorial habits on the level of editing to such an extent that the spectator 
becomes inhibited, in his decoding activity, on the level of the image itself.
Cinéthique: I even think that there has been a disruption on the level of the 
camera, because, in the documentary, the camera is seen as an archetypal 
spectator – that is, the spectator is the deferred camera and the camera is 
the deferred spectator, whereas in Méditerranée there is a specif ic role for 
the camera, which is precisely not this role of différance, to subsequently 
provide the spectator with something to see. There is another function 
of the camera, with, as you said earlier, in spite of everything, a series of 
implications that we cannot overcome.
Metz: Yes, but what I f ind striking is that, all the same, there are images in 
Méditerranée that, if you took them one by one, if the f ilm was left unedited, 
would allow the spectator to recognize himself. In other words, I wonder 
if it is not the work of montage that prevents spectatorial recognition in 
these images.
Cinéthique: Exactly. I wanted to ask you about knowing how we can define 
those units that are not as great as those def ined by the grande syntagma-
tique, and how far we can go with this. Because, obviously, if you extracted 
static images from Méditerranée, and if you chose well, everybody would 
be able to recognize themselves in them. But as soon as there is not simply 
a static image, but a series of images in motion, at a given speed, forming 
lexical units of varying size, then perhaps people will recognize themselves, 
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but it is far from certain. There is, perhaps, work to be done on this matter. 
If people recognize themselves, then this may be because the f ilm has not 
gone far enough, has not suff iciently broken with norms.
Metz: I am not so sure, because we could admit (and, roughly speaking, this 
is my opinion), that the conscious or unconscious purpose of Méditerranée 
was to carry out a deconstructive activity on the assemblage of images, 
and not at the level of the image itself. There is the problem of the relative 
autonomy of each level: the image and the succession of images.
Cinéthique: This remains to be proven. Take certain shots from Méditerranée 
where the camera moves in a lateral tracking shot on a background that 
remains monocular, on a completely flat perspective. We see row upon row of 
columns, and I am practically certain that the images, taken one by one, are all 
identical, which would, perhaps, deconstruct the very notion of images which 
are generally supposed to reproduce movement. Here, unlike, for example, an 
image of a man walking, they do not reproduce a segment of motion.
Metz: Yes, if you like, but I retain the impression that the essence of the f ilm’s 
deconstructive purpose is at the level of editing. Nonetheless, this does not 
exclude there also existing a deconstruction at the level of a given image.
There is something else that complicates the problems we have spoken 
about, and this is the notion of cinematic specificity. Personally, I think 
that there is a cinematic specif icity, which I would def ine as a set of codes 
that appear nowhere else but in the cinema. In your journal, I have noticed 
that you believe that the principal object of a theoretical practice, when it 
is concerned with the cinema, is to focus on what is specif ically cinematic 
and not, for example, to use f ilm to disseminate the results of a theoretical 
praxis of a more general, non-cinematic nature.
Cinéthique: Yes, in order to pass to another level, we must f irst resolve the 
problem of the specif icity of the cinema.
Metz: Well, it may be that we do not exactly understand the same thing by 
this term. But in the end, there remains the fact that we believe in it. Now, 
in 1968, in Italy, a book by a Marxist semiologist called Emilio Garroni was 
published with the title Semiotica ed estetica. Garroni completely refuses the 
notion of cinematic specif icity. He considers it to be a sort of confusionist 
myth, and he critiques me, among others, for having spoken about it. He 
relies on texts by Eisenstein (which does not make our conversation any 
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simpler) in order to insist precisely on the fact that Eisenstein always con-
ceived of the notion of montage as not being particular to the cinema, and 
that it can be found everywhere. Garroni thinks that a language [langage], 
like cinematic language for example, is only specif ic by the combination 
of codes it uses, but that there are no codes that are specif ic to a language. 
I wrote a response to his book, in which I said that, in my opinion, certain 
codes are specif ic to the cinema. But, even though I disagree with him, I do 
not think that his idea is entirely false. According to Garroni, we must make 
a careful distinction between language and code. He operates a complete 
break [coupure] between this material of expression and its form (in the 
sense in which Hjelmslev uses these terms). In other words, the technico-
material or technico-sensorial specif icity of the cinema absolutely does 
not lead, for him, to even a mere probability that there are specif ic codes. I 
agree with him on one point: namely, when you have the technico-sensorial 
specif icity of the cinema, you do not yet have its structural specif icity.
Cinéthique: Yes, but you can push this technico-sensorial specif icity fur-
ther. I do not understand why we should stop there. Montage, such as it is 
practiced in the cinema, is fundamentally specif ic to the cinema, and the 
same thing is not done in literature or painting. And, beyond montage, we 
should see how far we can push this specif icity. Perhaps Garroni has not 
done this work, but if it is done, we would perhaps perceive that, simply at 
the technico-sensorial level, specif icity goes very far indeed.
Metz: Yes, that is your opinion, and to a large degree it is also my own. But the 
crux of the problem is that Garroni rejects the fact that montage is specif ic 
to the cinema, because it is also manifest elsewhere. In contrast, I have 
personally been puzzled by the inexact notion of ‘pre-cinema’ (configura-
tions pre-existing the cinema that anticipate cinematic procedures). In 
general, you can look very far back indeed, and see tracking shots in Livy, 
or shot/reverse shots in Tacitus…
Cinéthique: Barthes has done so, but not to show that there is a ‘pre-cinema’. 
Rather, it was simply to show that, in history, we proceed as we do in the 
cinema, because we have the means to do so, by, for example, depicting an 
overarching tableau of a battle, then focusing suddenly on a detail of the 
general commanding his troops, then a detail of the battalion attacking, 
etc. Of course, this is true, but in history it only serves to write history, 
while in the cinema, it only serves to make a f ilm. So there is still, at least, 
a specif icity of the f inal product.
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Metz: I agree with your conclusion, but you should not be so dismissive of 
Garroni’s objections. I think that the specif ic codes of the cinema could 
appear, once they have been established (which would be the most urgent 
thing to do), as not being radically specif ic from within, in the same way 
that an analogy can be coded without ceasing to be an analogy. The units 
f iguring in the grande syntagmatique owe a lot to a rhetorical culture. 
Figures such as alternating montage or parallel montage are only possible 
in a civilization profoundly impregnated by forms such as antithesis or 
parallelism. My current work, and, for example, the book that I am presently 
writing [Language and Cinema], corresponds to a double movement. I would 
be inclined to express the first movement as a distinction between the filmic 
and the cinematic, by baptizing the f ilmic as everything that appears in the 
f ilm (a nomination that appears quite logical to me), and cinematic as being 
only a part of the f ilmic, that which is linked to the f ilm itself. The second 
movement would involve showing that, within these properly cinematic 
constructions, there is a kernel of non-specif icity. In sum, it is something 
of a self-critical movement.
Cinéthique: Do you not have the impression that Garroni may be speak-
ing of a cinema already made and a cinema to be made? That is to say, 
at bottom everything we say about cinematic codes relates to a cinema 
already made, and what Garroni says relates to f ilms to be made – that is, 
a cinema that would once again examine what it believes to be specif ic to 
its own function. The syntagmatique, which is close to rhetoric, undeniably 
exists, but maybe it needs to be interrogated in order to see how it conveys 
an entire series of ideologies (not only in the f ilm, but on the f ilm and on 
the cinema in general), and to know if it ought to continue to exist. What 
Garroni says seems interesting to me at the predictive level: namely, can 
we make f ilms without utilizing what we believe is a code specif ic to the 
cinema? If there are no specif ic codes, then all codes are generalized. It 
remains to be seen if there is not some kind of barrier that ensures that we 
continue to consider montage in the way it is currently practiced as being 
indispensable to making a f ilm.
Metz: I do not agree with your interpretation of Garroni. I believe that he 
places himself in, let’s say, a traditional conception (which is also mine) of 
semiology as non-interventionist, analyzing f ilms already made. Conse-
quently, he does not pose the problem of f ilms to be made, which is one of 
the differences with your journal, for example, since you resolutely place 
yourselves within an interventionist perspective.
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Cinéthique: Yes, of course, Garroni should not explicitly come out and say: 
this is what is done, and this is what should be done. But it seems to me 
that, from the semiological study of what is made, we should draw out what 
is not acceptable at a certain level – above all at the level of the product. 
Perhaps the element of confusion in this conversation is the role played by 
semiology. Semiology makes no illusions about its role in a comprehensive 
theory of the cinema, that is, a complete reading of f ilms, which would not 
only be semiological in nature, but which could also incorporate politics, 
economics and psychoanalysis.
Metz: I would respond to you that this depends on the semiologists. My 
conception of semiology is relatively modest, in the sense that, for example, 
I do not think that, in the present state of things, semiology can seriously 
claim that it will decode a f ilm in its entirety. That said, however, I am 
obliged to mention a historical fact, which is that, quite often, semiology 
implicitly presents itself as a total science, as a type of general science of 
culture which, ideally, could subsume psychology, sociology, etc. In a way, 
this is a dream that we already f ind in C.S. Peirce, which personally I do not 
adhere to, but which I do not completely reject, at the level of ambition. To 
a certain extent, semiology can be a kind of epistemology of the social sci-
ences. But I think that, as long as we do not possess the suff icient scientif ic 
tools for realizing such a program, arrogant declarations of exclusivism and 
totality do a great disservice to semiology.
It simply seems to me that semiology can provide a contribution that, 
on its own level, is rigorous. This is what I consider my profession to be: un-
dertaking this contribution inspired by linguistic methodologies (whether 
generative or structuralist). From that point on, people should do with it 
what they want! By the way, even if this contribution is rigorous (given that 
semiological work, like every activity, is susceptible to being poorly done), 
I do not believe that absolutely anything can be done with it. But I believe 
semiology qua semiology must make an extremely precise analysis of codes, 
and demonstrate these codes – and that is all. As a result, I have never 
been bothered about being in a rather partial position; that is, lending my 
semiological contribution to enterprises that could well be, in their center 
of gravity, very out of step with respect to my own project. I am referring to 
encounters such as our own one today, but also to encounters between semi-
ologists and psychologists, pedagogues, etc., where the ultimate endpoints 
are very different. If a semiological contribution is rigorous on its own level, 
it represents progress in our knowledge of the cinema, and a more general 
theory, of whatever kind, can then utilize or criticize this contribution.
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Abstract
In this interview for the journal La Nouvelle Critique in 1970, Christian 
Metz discusses the semiological concept of ‘f ilm language’ and the 
concept of ‘specif icity’. He def ines specif icity in terms of underlying 
abstract structures and codes rather than the surface qualities of f ilm. 
He also makes the distinction between the ‘f ilmic’ and the ‘cinematic’, 
and aligns the ‘cinematic’ with ‘specif icity’.
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‘Cinéma et Sémiologie: Sur la “Specif icité”. Entretien avec Christian Metz.’ 
Jean-André Fieschi. La Nouvelle Critique, 36 (September, 1970), pp. 48-53. 
Translated by Daniel Fairfax.
This interview with Christian Metz conducted by our regular contributor 
Jean-André Fieschi aims to illuminate the current theoretical debate – both 
here and abroad – on the cinema: the contribution of semiology to this 
debate is designated as one of the possible (and desirable) components of a 
general theory of the cinema.
In order to deepen the following reflections, we refer the reader to the 
author’s other works, notably Essais sur la Signification au Cinéma (pub-
lished by Klincksieck), and, taking stock of the current state of this impor-
tant research, to recent interventions published in a number of journals: 
‘Propositions méthodologiques pour l’analyse des f ilms’ (in Information sur 
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les sciences sociales), ‘Spécif icité des codes et spécif icité des langages’ (in 
Semiotica vol. 1 no. 4 [1969], pp. 370-96), and ‘Au delà de l’analogie, l’image’ 
(in Communications no. 15, an issue entirely dedicated to the ‘analysis of im-
ages’, and including, alongside several enlightening texts – Eco, Schefer – a 
bibliographic guide for a semiology of the image).
Jean-André Fieschi: To help situate historically the current stakes of the 
theoretical debate concerning the cinema, would you mind looking back, 
even schematically, on the evolution, since the silent era, of the various 
conceptions related to the infamous problem of ‘specif icity’?
Christian Metz: Well, it seems to me that there was an initial period in 
thinking on the cinema in which the dominant idea, the dominant drive, 
among all the f ilm critics and theorists, as well as among those f ilmmakers 
with a theoretical pretension, was a certain conception of f ilmic specif icity. 
This notion recurs today, but it does so in a much more detailed manner.
At bottom, this idea of specif icity was, in this initial period, a largely 
normative idea. There was also a demand for cultural legitimacy: there 
was always, in the background, sometimes even in the foreground, the 
idea of demonstrating that f ilm is as noble as the novel, for example, or 
as the theatrical play, and that it is also a language [langage] – this is the 
expression most frequently used at the time – or a form of writing (to tell 
the truth, a distinction was barely made between the two), a specif ic form 
of writing, in the same way that literature or painting are specif ic forms 
of writing.
It seems to me that this is the central idea, or in any case the central 
motivation, for a whole period of thinking on the cinema.
Very well. It is in this period, notably, that what I would call the ideology of 
montage was developed, which I have spoken about in certain of my articles, 
because montage was seen as a convenient argument for demonstrating the 
specif icity of the cinema in a manner that saw itself as peremptory. The 
cinema is specif ic, it is a language, it is not merely a recording medium, 
because there is montage. This is both correct and false at the same time. It 
is true that there is montage but, f irst of all, there can very well be montage 
without editing [collures] – montage within a sequence shot, for example; 
and, moreover, if there is cinematic specificity, it is not reducible to montage 
alone, it also entails the composition of the image and a host of other factors.
Subsequently, it seems to me that there was a second period dominated, 
let us say, to simplify matters somewhat, by Bazin, with the various theories 
of non-montage, of shooting in continuity, of shooting with wide-angle 
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lenses (La Règle du Jeu [The Rules of the Game (Renoir, 1939)]) or in depth of 
f ield (Orson Welles). There was an entire second period which was a reaction 
against the theories of montage, and which at the same time was an effort 
to account for the advent of sound cinema. This effort at accounting for the 
sound cinema is, in fact, much rarer than one may believe. Even today, many 
people continue to reason as if the cinema were still silent.
In this second period, therefore, the belief in cinematic specif icity be-
comes less arrogant, less importunate, and tends to assume subtler forms. 
I am referring to Bazin’s studies, in which he shows that, for example, the 
profound cinematicity of a f ilm like Les Parents Terribles [1948] by Cocteau 
consists in exacerbating its theatricality by means of a properly cinematic 
procedure.
Thus, in sum, I believe we pass from an unsophisticated demand for 
specificity to one that is subtler, more at ease, that is less prone to insecurity, 
and hence goes more on the attack.
Very well. It seems to me that we are presently in a third period of 
thinking on the cinema, a period where we have returned, in a way, to 
the ref lections on the great era of montage, and where the problem of the 
specif icity of f ilm is once again posed in a quite radical fashion, much as 
it was posed in the f irst period, but in a wider cultural horizon. That is to 
say, at bottom, that what is beginning to be done (and which, by the way, 
has, in my opinion, not yet been carried out as much as one could wish), 
and what has, in the end, never been done until now, is the creation of a 
junction between thinking on cinema and the general movement of ideas. 
The fact is that f ilm and thinking on f ilm are progressively leaving behind 
the provincial status in which they had hitherto always been confined, are 
leaving behind the status of cultural isolation, that the fanaticism of what 
I would call the cinema-cinema tends to be dissolved, and that thinking 
on f ilm becomes less and less separate from more general thinking on the 
text, on writing, on the relationship with linguistics, Marxism, analysis, 
etc.
Fieschi: In the 1920s (a moment of intense theoretical research, and of 
formal experimentation with rich repercussions), specif icity was the node 
for thinking on the cinema, among f ilm theorists (Balázs, Arnheim) and 
among theorist-f ilmmakers (Epstein and his friends in France; Kuleshov, 
Vertov, and Eisenstein in the USSR). But this word often encompassed 
notions that, from one school to another, from one thinker to another, were 
very contradictory. Thus Vertov, on the basis of certain Proletkult tempta-
tions, postulated a kind of tabula rasa, a radical virginity of the cinema 
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with respect to cultural heritage, whereas others sought its specif icity, 
as a function of the naturally composite character of this new art, on the 
side of polyphony, or ‘synthesis’, to adopt a word that was widely used at 
the time.
Has this quarrel, after a long detour and multiple contributions, been, 
in a certain manner, reactivated and resituated today?
Metz: Indeed, I believe that during the great period of, let’s say, naïve think-
ing on the cinema (without intending anything pejorative by this at all, 
certain of these thinkers were exceptionally brilliant), during the period of 
naïve thinking on specif icity, one of the two currents – and here I am fully 
in agreement with you – tended to recuperate the cinema as a synthesis of 
the arts, and this is the period where it was said that the cinema had, for 
example, realized the Wagnerian dream of the total work of art, or Diderot’s 
dream of a spectacle for the masses that would appeal to all the senses at 
once, that would mobilize all of them, etc.
Fine. But where do matters lie today?
Well, let’s say that we are at the stage, it seems to me, where these concep-
tions can be resumed – I am not saying they have been resumed, but that 
they can be resumed. The general cultural state makes this possible, but not 
necessary, nor ineluctable. … It becomes possible to resume these reflections 
on a more precise basis.
To put it simply: personally, and from my point of view as a semiologist (a 
point of view, let me clarify, that can only be partial, a partial contribution to 
a general theory of cinema), what strikes me the most is that the specif icity 
of the cinema cannot be def ined in terms of its “material of expression” – I 
am taking the word in the sense in which Hjelmslev uses it – that is to say, 
in terms of the physical or technico-sensorial definition of the signifier.
In particular, I am thinking of these extremely widespread def ini-
tions  –  to which we cannot even give a name, since they belong to a 
common vernacular – according to which we are told that the cinema is 
movement, or that the cinema is the image, for example. These two themes 
are particularly impoverished and foolish, but they circulate furiously in 
certain publications.
Now, this genre of def inition consists in def ining cinematic specif icity 
in terms that Hjelmslev would have called the material of expression, that 
is, I repeat, the material def inition of the signif ier.
It is indeed true that f ilm language (if we take f ilm language in its widest 
sense, that is, as the set of messages that society calls a f ilm) can effectively 
be defined with technico-sensorial, physical criteria. It is a fact that society 
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bestows the word f ilm on any message whose physical def inition is pretty 
much the following. A f ilm is composed of f ive materials of expression 
(here I am speaking of sound f ilms), namely, moving photographic images 
placed in sequences. I am obliged to clarify all these adjectives in order 
to differentiate, on the level of the material of expression, cinema from 
painting, or from the comic book, etc. So: the moving photographic image 
placed in sequences, that makes one. Secondly, there is phonetic sound – I 
am still at the level of the material of expression, so I will not say spoken 
words [paroles], but phonetic sound in talking f ilms, then there is musical 
sound in f ilms with music, and what we call real noises, which is in fact 
another system of signif ication, or another set of systems of signif ication, 
and f inally the graphic trace of written texts. Once again, I will not even 
say ‘written texts’, because I am at the level of material, but ‘the graphic 
trace of written texts’, that is to say, the title sequence, intertitles, and 
even written texts f iguring in the image itself, for example in the f ilms of 
Godard, or many others.
So, from this point of view, we can evidently envisage a definition of f ilm 
language that would be purely technico-sensorial. I hereby understand 
technique to be on the side of the emission, and sensorial on the side of 
the reception. In simple terms, such a def inition does not seem interesting 
to me, or even operative, and offers nothing different to what is already 
implicitly contained in common sense notions of the cinema.
There is another possible notion of f ilm language – this is what I am 
reflecting on and working on at the moment – which would be formulated in 
codic terms, that is, not in terms of the material of expression, but in terms 
of the forms of expression, and the form of the content, in other words, in 
terms of structures and codes.
In the traditional conception, let us say that there exists a certain 
number of ‘languages’ [langages] – and I am placing the word between a 
lot of quotation marks – that are aligned alongside each other, following 
each other, and uniformly enjoying relationships of exteriority with each 
other, in the sense in which the logicians use this term, that is, absent of 
any common zone, as if, for example, it were not possible for a code to be 
common to several languages. And we imagine, albeit confusedly, that there 
is a pictorial language, musical language, verbal language, etc., with each 
one being a homogenous set without any f issures.
On the contrary, it seems to me that one could give the name f ilm lan-
guage, and this time in terms of codes, to the set of codes that are specif ic 
to the cinema and that are not the only ones to appear in f ilms. We would 
thus be led, in my opinion, towards a new formulation of the difference 
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between the cinematic and the f ilmic, if we considered that the f ilmic is 
the entirety of what appears in f ilms, the set of signifying configurations 
appearing in f ilms (and many of them are not specif ic to f ilms, as they 
equally appear in all sorts of other cultural manifestations, and not only in 
the novel, the theater, etc., which have always been spoken of in connection 
with the cinema, but also everyday life, social rhythms, and, in the end, 
anything you wish; but, from the moment when such structures actually 
appear in a f ilm, they are f ilmic, and they can be subject to a coeff icient 
of remodeling which, for its part, is specif ically f ilmic, and which does not 
prevent the code itself being f ilmic from the very beginning). Alongside this 
we can also f ind other f ilmic codes, f ilmic because they appear in f ilms, 
but that one can, in addition, call cinematic (this is why I speak of a new 
distinction between cinema and f ilm) in the sense that they are linked 
to the preferential adoption of the cinema as a vehicle rather than of any 
other vehicle.
So, there are specif ic and non-specif ic codes. Both are f ilmic, because 
they can be located in f ilms, but only certain among them are cinematic. 
Thus, the cinematic is a subset of the f ilmic.
Among those codes that I would now call cinematic (and not merely 
f ilmic), there is the set of structures and configurations that concern the 
specif ic arrangements of moving images and large segments of speech (I 
specif ically refer to large segments of speech because the study of smaller 
segments of speech cannot be carried out by a theory proper to the cinema; 
the study of speech in its smallest segments, such as phonemes, morphemes, 
etc., is quite obviously the domain of linguistics, which is another discipline; 
and from this point of view, at the level of the smaller segments, a f ilm 
spoken in Italian, for example, is purely and simply content with borrowing 
a code, another code, which has absolutely nothing cinematic about it, i.e., 
the Italian language [langue]; here we have a good example, particularly 
crude perhaps, but striking all the same, of a non-cinematic f ilmic code: in 
a f ilm in which Italian is spoken one of the codes mobilized is the Italian 
language, which is in no way cinematic). By contrast, the relationship of the 
large segments of Italian utterances with the image or with the music of this 
same f ilm obeys constructions that, for their part, are properly cinematic.
We can thus make a distinction between f ilm and cinema, with the 
idea that the cinema is only a part of the f ilm, and with the idea which, 
at bottom, seems to me to be more and more central in contemporary 
thinking, of a necessary pluralism of codes; the idea, in sum, that we will 
never get to the bottom of all the semiological material locatable in any 
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f ilm whatsoever, including even the weakest, most common of them all, 
with the aid of single code.
In other terms, we must carefully distinguish between language [langage] 
and code, we must carefully distinguish between the sets that are given, and 
that correspond to social perception and the usual social classif ication such 
as cinema, painting, theater, etc., and the sets constructed by the analyst.
In yet other terms, we would need to distinguish, it seems to me, between 
two sorts of homogeneity: the observed homogeneity, which is that of the 
language [langage], and constructed homogeneity, which is of a codic na-
ture, the physical, technico-sensorial units on the one hand, and the purely 
logical (or codic) units on the other hand, which simply correspond to sets 
within which one can substitute [commuter] codes, but whose boundaries 
one may not cross.
This is what is known as a code, a f ield of differentiality, under the influ-
ence, among others, of Garroni’s book, which has had a major influence 
on me of late. (Emilio Garroni is an Italian semiologist and aesthetician 
who is professor of aesthetics at Rome, and who published a book called 
Semiotica ed estetica – that is, Semiotics and Aesthetics – in 1968. Although 
its title does not point this out, Garroni’s book is entirely dedicated to the 
cinema, and its point of departure is the principle of a distinction between 
code and language [langage].)
Fieschi: What you say here seems to imply a certain evolution with respect to 
your earlier works. On what precise points would you now refute yourself?
Metz: In order to study the cinema, we must abandon any idea that there 
should be a cinematic code. In this sense, in any case, I was right, in my 1964 
article “The Cinema: Language or Language System?,” when I said: there is 
no language system [langue] in the cinema. It is quite true that there is not 
a code in the cinema. But I also believe that I was wrong to have looked for 
it; obviously, I did not f ind it, I found its absence, but f inding its absence 
means looking for it in the f irst place.
There is obviously nothing in the cinema that corresponds to a language 
system, this goes without saying. But there is, by contrast, within a f ilm, a 
set of specif ically cinematic codes, which are to the cinema, to the cinema 
as a totality, what the language system is to language, language as a totality.
Saussure had already remarked that the language system is not the en-
tirety of language, that the language system is one of the codes of language. 
In the same way, I believe, the set of specif ically cinematic codes are only 
one of the sets of codes among those which appear in a f ilm, and which, 
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with respect to the f ilm, play the same role that the language system plays 
with respect to language.
So I would be, let us say, half self-critical with respect to my work in the 
years 1963-1964, and even in the two years following, in the sense that – how 
can I put it? – as much as it is true that from the point of view of internal 
description, we do not f ind in the cinema any code that might have the 
characteristics of a linguistic code, with articulations, etc. (from this point 
of view, I believe that what I said at the time remains true), and as much 
as it is true, therefore, that from the point of view of internal description 
we will f ind nothing in the cinema that could correspond to a language 
system. By contrast, from an external point of view, that is, from the point 
of view of the relationship of codes with each other, we do indeed f ind an 
instance which, in the cinema, plays the same role with respect to the other 
codes that the language system plays with respect to language in general.
From this point of view, therefore, my current position is a little self-
critical with respect to the position I held several years ago.
As for the question you put to me regarding the conception of cinema 
as a synthesis of the arts, from this point of view I think that the cinema 
actually does offer us the synthesis of several codes, which is what I was 
just speaking about. It is the synthesis of several codes, but this does not at 
all mean the same thing as the synthesis of several arts, because the arts, or 
what we have traditionally called the arts, the various art forms, each one 
of them would merit, in my opinion, that we say of them what I have said 
of the cinema, because each one of them is also a set of codes.
There is a widespread tendency to confuse two matters. From the fact 
that the cinema is materially composite, because certain of its signif iers 
are visual, while others are auditory, and so on. In other words, due to the 
fact that the cinema already includes several languages [langages], there 
is a tendency to conclude that it should, in the end, be more pluri-codic 
than the other arts. And yet, I believe that we must not confuse material 
homogeneity, which is specif ic only to certain means of expression, like 
the cinema (certain signif iers are physically visual, others are physically 
auditory, etc., it is a composite on the physico-sensorial level…), that is, we 
must not confuse this material composite, which characterizes certain art 
forms and not others, with a much more general and much more essential 
phenomenon, which is pluri-codicity, and which can very well manifest 
itself within an art or within a means of expression that is not composite, 
that is to say, of which all the signifiers are materially of the same nature. It 
is quite evident that in a painting, for example, as someone like Jean-Louis 
Schefer has ably demonstrated, in spite of the homogeneity of the material 
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of the signif ier, which consists uniformly in a series of lines and colors, etc., 
there are a large number of codes.
Thus, the widespread idea that insists on saying: the cinema is at one 
and the same time music, because there is a music track, as well as being 
similar to the dialogues of a novel, because there are speeches, and it is also 
a painting in motion, because there are images. This idea in fact confounds 
the physico-sensorial composite with codic pluricity, which is a much more 
important and much more substantial phenomenon; all the more so because 
nothing tells us that the different codes within a f ilm coincide with the 
different sensorial spheres. And here, on this point, I believe that the work of 
Eisenstein was extremely advanced when he showed, apropos of Alexander 
Nevsky [1938] for example, that the same structures in a given passage in 
the f ilm (the same structures, that is to say, in my vocabulary: the same 
code, if we remain at the level of form), or the same code, can apply to the 
image track and to the music track.
In other words, if there are several codes in the f ilm, this does not mean 
that the distribution, the division of these codes coincides with the distribu-
tion of the sensorial spheres of the f ilm.
Codes are not sensorial spheres, they are sets reconstructed by the 
analyst, they are f ields of commutability, they are f ields of differentiality, 
inside of which the units acquire meaning in relation to one another.
Hence, for this problem of synthesis, I believe the following: every f ilm 
actually does operate a sort of synthesis, if you will, between several codes, 
but this synthesis does not seem to me to define the art of cinema in general. 
I believe that we are concerned, here, with a combination of several codes, 
and that this combination is different in each f ilm. Consequently, the in-
stance that operates this synthesis is not the cinema, as the old aestheticians 
said, but rather, the instance that operates this synthesis is the f ilm, that 
is, the text (the word synthesis, by the way, is not to my liking, and not only 
due to the rather antiquated air the word has to it).
At present, therefore, I would be tempted to distinguish between, let’s 
say, two types of systems: the codic systems, that is, the systems that are 
codes, or codes tout court, whose specif ic quality is to be applied to several 
texts without concern for any of them individually, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, textual systems, that is to say systems linked to a text, to 
a single text in particular. Obviously, I have taken the word ‘text’ in a sense 
in which each f ilm is itself a text. Here, the combination of different codes 
is operative, and not at the level of some kind of cinema in a metaphysical 
realm, but in every f ilm, inasmuch as it is a textual unfolding [déroule-
ment], and inasmuch as this textual unfolding is itself constructed and can 
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itself be taken as a corpus by the analyst. Here there is a textual system 
that combines several codes, a textual system constructed from several 
codes, and not from a single code – on this matter, too, I have changed my 
mind – and above all a textual system that is constructed against these 
codes just as much as it is constructed with them. I would say that it is 
constructed on the basis of them – with ‘on the basis of them’ meaning on, 
with and against them. It is constructed on the basis of them; that is to say 
that, on the one hand, each f ilm takes different structures that were either 
in earlier f ilms, or elsewhere, that were wandering around somewhere 
within the culture; or, on the other hand, it is the specif ic nature of every 
f ilm, insofar as it is declared to be a stable unfolding text, to actively add 
value [projeter dans les redevances] to the codes on which it is constructed. 
It is the text’s specif ic nature to declare that the only relevant system is at 
the level of the combination and displacement of these codes, and not at 
the level of these codes themselves.
Fieschi: From this perspective, how would you define the current tasks of 
f ilm analysis?
Metz: At present, I f ind that there are two tasks for f ilm analysts (by this I 
mean those f ilm analysts who place themselves in a semiological perspec-
tive, because there are plenty of other types as well…). These two tasks are 
related but distinct, and the principles of pertinence they obey are twofold: 
f irstly, there is the study of codes, and more particularly the specif ic codes 
of the cinema, and secondly there is the study of f ilmic textual systems, 
which is what is currently called the study of f ilms. I would immediately 
add, by the way, that the denomination ‘study of f ilms’ appears absurd to 
me, because whoever studies a cinematic code also studies f ilms.
If you consider that studying f ilms means that the given object on which 
the analysis is developed is the f ilm, then in this case it remains true that 
whoever studies a cinematic code has, as their point of departure, the f ilm, 
and whoever studies a f ilmic textual system, that is, the system of a f ilmic 
text, also has, as their point of departure, a f ilm. The only difference is that 
the analysis of a textual system has, as its point of departure, a single f ilm 
and studies all of its codes, as well as, perhaps even more so, the manner 
in which these codes displace each other, combine with each other and 
form what we earlier called a synthesis. (But, in my opinion, it is more a 
general movement of displacement, which is at the same time a form of 
placement [mise en place], so it would be a displacement-placement, that 
is to say that there is a general displacement of the codes that influence 
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each other, and at the end of which each one of the codes f inds its place 
in the very unfolding of the f ilmic text…). Nevertheless, the study of a 
f ilmic textual system has a f ilm as its point of departure, whereas the 
study of cinematic codes has film as its point of departure. In the study 
of a cinematic code, we do not have, as the point of departure, a f ilm 
in its entirety, but partial segments of several f ilms, a cinematic code 
concerning several f ilms – either all f ilms if it is a cinematic code, or (which 
equally occurs) an entire class of f ilms if it is a cinematic sub-code: the 
code of the Western, things like that. Hence, in any case, whoever studies 
a cinematic code or sub-code has f ilm as their point of departure. They 
simply have a great number of f ilms – as opposed to the analysis of the 
textual system – and none of the f ilms are studied in their entirety; for if 
one studies a cinematic code, let’s say the code of the usage of the paradigm 
of the dissolve in the f ilms of a given era, a given nation and a given genre 
(here is a good example of the study of a cinematic sub-code), at this point 
it would be necessary to have, as material, all the f ilms of this era, of this 
genre, of this nation, but it is not necessary to study them in their totality. 
At no moment would any of these f ilms be studied as a singular totality, 
whereas this is precisely the goal of textual analysis, which takes a single 
f ilm only, but takes it as a singular totality.
The analyst of cinematic codes – or sub-codes, it is the same thing – will 
always, it seems to me, consider more than a f ilm and less than a f ilm: 
more than a f ilm because a code, by definition, is an anonymous structure 
that concerns several messages without specif ically concerning any one 
of them (as there will be several f ilms in the corpus); and less than a 
f ilm because if I study, for example, the code of the dissolve, I am only 
authorized, methodologically speaking, to investigate in my group of 
f ilms those isolated passages where there are dissolves, unless there is a 
need for catalysis (in Hjelmslev’s sense of the term, that is, unless there 
is a need for taking into account the elements that necessarily enter into 
relations with the dissolve, then we are obliged to bring catalysis into 
operation). Catalysis minimally re-establishes, that is, takes into account, 
elements other than those f ixed by the principle of pertinence, but only 
by mobilizing the minimum number of them. Hjelmslev called catalysis 
the fact that, for example, if you want to study the subject-predicate 
structure in a given language, and if the utterance that has been recorded 
on tape and that has been provided by the informant only bears the 
subject, then one can re-establish the predicate, but it alone, if it is the 
subject-predicate structure that one is studying. Thus, catalysis is the 
minimum addition to the methodologically indispensable corpus that 
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facilitates research in relation to the principle of pertinence that has 
been adopted.
I said that there is currently, in relation to the cinema, two major types of 
study inspired by semiology, which involves either pursuing a code across 
several texts (the study of codes), or studying all the codes in a text (textual 
analysis, the analysis of a f ilmic textual system). The only difference is that 
what we see when we are the spectator of a f ilm is the unfolding of the text, 
and the textual system is the intelligibility of this same unfolding such as 
it can be established by the analyst, or if needs be by the creator himself, 
insofar as he undertakes the deconstruction of his work, self-explanation, 
etc.
Fieschi: In certain periods of critical thinking (and this danger is still 
far from being averted), people – Bazin for example – have often fallen 
into a type of essentialism, pure and simple. Certain cinematic f igures 
have thus been adorned with intrinsic qualities (cf. “The Life and Death 
of Superimposition” by Bazin1) and, at the same time, have been either 
valorized or prohibited. Here there is a veritable dogmatic, normative 
peril, conceivable at the level of aesthetic tendencies (for such perils have 
often led to progress in research), but unacceptable at the level of so-called 
scientif ic analysis.
Metz: This normative peril, which until now has only very rarely been 
avoided, was itself linked to what you call, quite correctly, essential-
ism – that is, the idea of values, in which each cinematic procedure, each 
cinematic f igure, has a certain value. In sum, each cinematic procedure 
possesses a meaning, or even three or four easily catalogued meanings, 
like a polysemic word in language systems, it is basically the same… This 
essentialist idea inevitably resulted in normative conceptions because 
one was either for this value, or one was against it, and one either had 
to say that dissolves must be used, or that dissolve must not be used, or 
superimpositions, and so on.
To my mind, the problem can now be posed in an entirely different 
way. I believe that a great number of cinematic f igures are – at the level 
of the most general cinematic codes – signifiers without a signified, that 
is, there is a certain number of f igures of which one can say that they 
are cinematic because their realization (even in the most literal form) 
requires cinematic equipment. The signif ier appears on the level of 
general cinematic codes; the signif ied, meanwhile, appears either in the 
cinematic sub-codes, or in the f ilmic textual systems – the dissolve has 
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a given value in a given f ilm – or, if needs be, in both. In other words, it 
assumes an initial meaning that is still rather general at the level of the 
sub-code; and then it subsequently receives additional meaning through 
its place – that is, its displacement and its placement – in the textual 
system of a particular f ilm.
Note
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Raymond Bellour: Can we consider your Essais sur la Signification au Cinéma 
(Paris, Klincksieck 1968) as the f irst book of f ilm semiology?
Christian Metz: On a level that I would call ‘off icial’, we could indeed, and it 
has been done. Nonetheless, in my opinion, this is not the f irst book where 
we can f ind reflections of this nature. We must not forget the various con-
tributions of the Russian formalists, in particular the collective anthology 
Poetika Kino (Film Poetics), on which Shklovsky, Tynianov and Eichenbaum 
collaborated. Additionally, in a more diffuse, scattered manner, there are 
certain passages in the writings of the best f ilm critics and/or theorists: 
Eisenstein, obviously, but also Arnheim, Balázs, Bazin, Laffay, Mitry; and, in 
another perspective, Cohen-Séat and Morin. These authors (and others I have 
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not thought of at present) posed with a reasonable degree of precision various 
problems of signification – it would thus be absurd to flatly ignore them 
under the pretext that they did not officially brandish the ‘semiological’ label.
What we can say, simply, is that my 1968 book is the f irst work on f ilm 
that explicitly and systematically draws on the concepts and methods of 
modern linguistic theory.
In sum, I wanted to get to the bottom of the ‘film language’ metaphor, to 
try to see what it hid, and in view of this goal to mobilize in a sustained 
yet ‘compact’ manner the experience of those who have best studied lan-
guage – that is, linguists.
Bellour: The text introducing the second section of your book, its true core, 
expresses this very precisely. (Let us recall that these Essais, various contri-
butions that perfectly complement one another, are ordered in four sections:
1. “Phenomenological Approaches to the Cinema”
2. “Problems of Film Semiology”
3. “The Syntagmatic Analysis of the Image Track”
4. “The ‘Modern’ Cinema: Some Theoretical Problems.”)
This decisive, relatively polemical text poses by its very title (“The Cinema: 
Language or Language System?”) the question that is of necessity located 
at the origin of the semiological project.
Metz: In effect, Lévi-Strauss says in Structural Anthropology, with regards 
to rites and different ethnological systems, that we can and must pose, 
for every system of signif ication (I won’t say ‘system of signs’, because the 
notion of the sign, narrower than that of signif ication, is much less central 
to semiology today than it was in the past), a fundamental question which 
is something like this: to what extent is it actually a language [langage]? 
The only system that is thoroughly made to signify is language in the strict 
sense of the term (= phonic, or ‘articulated’ language). As for all the others 
(those that semiology studies), there intervenes a prejudicial question that 
is well formulated by Lévi-Strauss. This question is both prejudicial and 
contradictory, because in order to respond to it we must, in a sense, have 
already covered the f ields of knowledge that it allows us to define: we must 
have already saturated what it opens.
Bellour: How did this question come to be uttered in the cinematic f ield?
Metz: Its formulation is based on an astonishment, which explains why 
the 1964 text (“Cinema: Language or Language System?”) can appear so 
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polemical. My astonishment was at seeing numerous works dedicated 
to ‘f ilm language’ that totally dispensed with the f indings of linguistic 
research, but that nonetheless insistently aff irmed the idea that the cinema 
is a language, or a language system. What’s more, it has often occurred 
(even in Eisenstein) that these last two terms are employed as if they were 
synonymous.
I wanted to uncouple these two terms, as is apparent in the very title 
of the 1964 article. My starting point here was the Saussurian notion of 
language system (which would no longer be the case today, at least not in 
the same manner), or more precisely the Saussurian trichotomy ‘language 
system/speech/language’, which defines language as a vast ensemble of phe-
nomena in which are grouped the language system (a very well-organized 
system) on the one hand, and various speech acts on the other hand. It 
seemed to me that the cinema could be compared to a language, but not 
to a language system: one does not f ind, in the cinema, a highly integrated 
set of f ixed structures, which defines a language system, but one does f ind 
recurrent assemblages, more or less codified schemas, ‘patterns’ of all kinds, 
which evoke the phenomena of partial codif ication proper to ‘speech’, or 
rather to what we now call discourse, in the sense that Benveniste, for 
example, understands this term. (I have become, in the meantime, quite 
skeptical about the notion of ‘speech’, at least once it is conceived as a sort 
of unorganized residue; ‘speech’, in reality, is a set of sub-codes.)
In traditional literature on f ilm, one of the most widespread ideas is that 
the cinema is a language because images are organized within the sequence 
like words are organized within a sentence. Now, not only are these two 
modes of assemblage entirely different (as both structural linguistics and 
transformational generative linguistics show), but furthermore the shot is 
in no way assimilable to a word, and nor is the sequence assimilable to a 
sentence. If you must seek out assimilations, it would be less false to liken 
the shot itself with, if not the sentence, then at least a discursive segment 
on the level of the utterance [énoncé].
This allows, I feel, for a sort of morality: very often, excessive linguistic 
assimilations do not involve too much dependency on linguistics, but too 
little.
A little linguistics leaves one disoriented, but a little more leaves one 
enlightened. There are two sides to this remark. It is polemical, because 
among the reproaches of unwarranted linguisticity that have been made 
against me (as is the case with many semiologists), there are some that I 
categorically deny. But it is also self-critical: my own reflections on the 
relations between linguistics and f ilm analysis (and notably in the article 
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we are speaking about) had not been suff iciently thought through. Since 
then, I have been hard at work, and there still remains much work to do.
Nonetheless, I persist in believing that the majority of traditional consid-
erations on f ilm language rested on a type of widespread misunderstand-
ing of logical successivity. In the f irst stage the cinema is declared to be a 
language. In the second stage it is studied like a language system. In the 
third stage (if I can put it like that), linguistics is ignored, even though it is 
the study of language systems and their relationship to language.
The semiological enterprise, at the beginning, appeared to me to have 
two sides. The f irst, the negative side, involves clarifying what the cinema is 
not (we thereby proceed by difference with what we know about language 
systems, which have the advantage of being better known). The second, 
positive side, theoretically following on from the f irst (even if, in the mind 
of the researcher, they ceaselessly depend on each other in a bidirectional 
dynamic), must study what the cinema is. Linguistics, then, remains useful 
for its methods, to the extent that it transcends itself in moving towards 
a general semiology. It thus serves a twofold function in the study of the 
cinema, but not in the same way, and it is not exactly the same linguistics.
Bellour: This negative, critical phase indeed appears totally decisive, and 
I believe that the weight of the equivocations linked to the history of 
f ilm art and f ilm theory largely explains the acute terminological rigor 
of your book. You bring to an end a movement whose two extremes are 
simultaneously incomparable and comparable: one, that of Dziga Vertov 
and Eisenstein, where the excessive reference to language is inscribed in 
the purely creative, futurist perspective of the cinema as the language of 
revolution, an admirable utopia with scientific lyricism destined to interpret 
reality through the methodological prism of historical materialism; the 
other, that of all those f ilm ‘grammars’, which are essentially reductive 
and passé, insofar as, operating a posteriori a wild assimilation with the 
structures of phonic language and, through them, the expressivity of literary 
forms, it denies the art of cinema any specif icity. (Let us note that while 
the former programmatically target the being of the cinema, in reality they 
instruct us about the structures and the genesis of their own films; the latter 
meanwhile, speaking naïvely in the name of all f ilms, are logically led back 
to only ever being able to utter erroneous propositions on any given f ilm.)
I think it is particularly important that the terms that until now have 
been almost taboo – shot and sequence – appear, at the conclusion of this 
negative operation, to lose value, any stable reference, whether this be an 
extrinsic one, with respect to the language system, or an intrinsic one, 
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insofar as the raising of any trace of phonic language breaks them up and 
redistributes them according to a specif ic code, analogically determined 
by the linguistic model, and whose positioning [mise en place] constitutes 
the truly positive aspect of your work.
In all this, it seems to me that f ilm semiology has only been able to 
provoke a series of oppositions, to the extent that it also confronts head-on 
an idealist tradition that, far from wishing to recognize a language system 
[langue] in the cinema, denies it even the possibility of being considered a 
language [langage].
Metz: It does indeed challenge the validity of a dual trend: on the one hand, 
a metaphysics of the visible, which constitutes the cinema, on the basis of its 
photographic precision, as an authentic double of reality, maintaining it in 
some way beneath language; on the other hand, a confused and spontaneous 
ideology of pure creativity, which initially propels cinema beyond language.
For me, f ilm semiology seems to offer, among other things, the pos-
sibility of overcoming this double pitfall, by considering, on the one hand, 
that the f ilm assembles various spectacles in a different way to what they 
were or would be in a-f ilmic perception (known as ‘reality’) – and that it 
is thus an act of language, and on the other hand, that f ilmic productivity 
is only intelligible on the basis of a set of pre-existing codes, even if their 
combination (or, sometimes, their destruction) remains a fully ‘creative’ act.
I would add that the resistance of the resolute defenders of the citadel of 
iconicity (and visuality) – those who accuse semiology of utilizing linguistic 
notions to tackle a non-linguistic object (this last point, by the way, is not 
even true since the advent of talking cinema) – f inds its analogue in the 
resistance of linguistic purism, which aims to critique all exportation of 
linguistic notions outside its own f ield. These two forms of resistance, 
which come from entirely different horizons, nonetheless manifest a kind 
of objective complicity, because they both communally rest on the idea of 
‘undue extrapolation’, thus risking an abandonment of the study of cinema 
in favor of the generalizations of the worst of traditional aesthetics.
Personally, I f ind that there is a lot to say on the very notion of ‘undue 
extrapolation’. Linguistics offers us two distinct types of concepts that the 
semiologist must untangle from each other. It is evident that a notion such 
as that of the phoneme, for instance, does not concern all signifying systems; 
nor is the question of claiming to locate phonemes within the f ilm image 
(here I am thinking of certain reproaches that [Pierre] Francastel has ad-
dressed to semiology, and which seem to me to be ill-founded – all the more 
so given that his own work, in my opinion, is authentically semiological 
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in nature, setting aside all debates on labels). In no case is it a matter of 
exporting to semiology those linguistic concepts that are linked to language 
[langue] alone. But in the work of linguists, we also f ind a series of notions 
that are of great interest to general semiology.
Bellour: In the sense that, for Saussure, linguistics was only a privileged 
sector of general semiology.
Metz: Exactly. And this according to two different modalities (but which 
both lead to the same result): either, in certain cases, linguists, when defin-
ing a term, situate it initially in the explicit perspective of general semiology, 
thus forbidding the very idea of a ‘borrowing from linguistics’ (see the ‘sign’ 
in Saussure, ‘form/substance/ matter’ and ‘content/expression’ in Hjelmslev, 
etc.); or, alternatively, such and such a notion was posed by linguists who 
did not especially think of semiology, but was def ined in a movement and 
an acceptance which were suff iciently ample that they enabled the no-
tion to be rightfully applied to codes other than phonic language systems. 
‘Paradigm’ and ‘syntagm’, such as they have been def ined by Martinet, 
are legitimately exportable concepts, because the fact that units may be 
co-present in a text, or that, inversely (if we can put it like that), they may be 
‘co-absent’ – a unit of the text being commutable with another one which is 
not in the text – is in no way linked to the specif icity of language systems. 
The syntagmatic fact and the paradigmatic fact do not number among those 
that separate language systems from other codes, but which connect them. 
There is therefore no unjustif ied borrowing (and, at bottom, no borrowing 
at all): we simply draw from general semiology’s arsenal of notions, which 
happens to have been constituted, to a signif icant extent, by linguists, but 
which has been equally elaborated by logicians, psychoanalysts, specialists 
in informatics, etc.
Nevertheless, there remains, among many people, a kind of ref lex, a 
genuine blockage. If a notion has been emphasized by a writer who was a 
linguist by occupation, it is once and for all ‘purely linguistic’, prohibited 
from being exported. The only thing that counts is the profession of the 
father.
Bellour: How, in your view, has semiological description in the strict sense, on 
the basis of this prior operation of destruction-definition, been concretized?
Metz: I chose to study closely a cinematic code, which I called the code of the 
grande syntagmatique. It is one cinematic code among many others. Today, 
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I am fully aware of this – but when I was carrying out this research things 
were much less clear in my mind: I was studying one code of the cinema, 
but without brushing aside from the margins of my consciousness the vague 
impression that it was possibly the code of the cinema (the vacillation is 
noticeable in my book).
In any case, my starting point was the notion of the ‘sequence’, which 
is endowed with a strong degree of sociological existence, as much in the 
practice of f ilmmakers as it is in the perception of spectators. It seemed to 
me that this vague term ‘sequence’ in fact covered several distinct modes of 
combining images, that these different modes entered into opposition with 
each other, were organized in a code, and that they were f inite in number 
in a given synchronic state of f ilm language (even if a later evolution of 
the language-object can modify this code, just like any other code). I have 
clarif ied the very notion of the sequence with the linguistic concept of the 
syntagma, because a sequence, by def inition, is an alignment of several 
successive images co-present in the text (= the f ilm). As for the differences 
separating the various types of sequence from each other, I gave them the 
name paradigms. By substituting them for each other, I strove to take stock 
of the various types of sequence that are distinguishable in the image-track 
of narrative f ilms from the classical era (= three limitations, therefore, in 
order to reach an object that could even come close to being mastered). I 
thus arrived at a paradigm with eight types, or rather twelve types, as the 
f irst type contains f ive sub-types.
This is the example of a code which is at once, and indistinctly, ‘gram-
matical’ and ‘rhetorical’. Grammatical, because it assures the most literal 
intelligibility of the visual narrative (it is a code of denotation, although, 
on top of this, it strongly connotes). Rhetorical, because it concerns syntag-
matic elements of major dimensions (= ‘sequences’, precisely), and because 
it is thus tied to the composition of the f ilm and its narrative organization 
(it is a code of dispositio, in the technical sense that this word had in clas-
sical rhetoric). Of course, there are other codes that organize, in the f ilm, 
the play of elements of a smaller syntagmatic dimension (the relation of 
motifs within a single shot, etc.); but as we advance towards the ‘smaller’ 
elements, we encounter a problem that, for me (even today) remains open: 
among the codes intervening on this level, which ones are specif ically 
cinematic, and which ones are integrated into the f ilmed spectacle? In the 
latter case, we are dealing with what is commonly called, in discussions of 
cinema, ‘reality’, that is to say, in fact, a set of perceptive, iconographic and 
symbolic structures which pre-exist the intervention of the camera, which 
is content to relay, under the cover of analogical recording (the notions 
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of ‘representation’ and ‘iconicity’ used by the American semioticians, or 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s ‘likeness’) – something which does not preclude 
superimposing its specif ic codes on them.
To return to the larger segments (sequential types), I was struck by the lack 
of distinction, in the domain of f ilm studies, between grammar and rhetoric. 
Under various forms, this idea was also expressed by others (recently, for 
example, by Pasolini and Mitry). Connotation can be extracted from the 
very form of denotation; by choosing between several denotative structures, 
a connotative signif ier can also be established. Maybe the language system 
(the phonic language system) is the only code in which we can isolate a ‘pure’ 
grammar logically separable (even by abstraction) from all rhetoric, even if 
this is only because of the existence of several idioms? Obviously we should 
leave aside, in this discussion, those codes which, at least ideally, have no 
connotation whatsoever (mathematical languages, logical languages, etc.). 
But it is too early to draw conclusions on such a vast and complex problem.
Bellour: Can you briefly recall the eight types of this ‘grande syntagmatique’?
Metz: I initially make a distinction between the autonomous shot (type no. 1) 
and the seven other types. The autonomous shot is a single shot equivalent 
to a ‘sequence’ (= an entire episode of the f ilm treated in a single shot); the 
seven other types (including types 2 and 8) are sequences in the proper sense 
of the word: each one has several shots and thus rests on ‘f ilm editing’ in 
the narrower sense of the term (splicing shots together [collure]).
The autonomous shot includes, on the one hand, the ‘sequence-shot’, 
well known by f ilm analysts and frequently studied since Bazin, and on 
the other hand what I have called ‘inserts’: single shots which owe their 
autonomy to their status of syntagmatic interpolation in the f ilmic chain, 
and which are not on the same level of reality as contiguous images (a typical 
example: the non-diegetic metaphor, which presents an object external 
to the action of the f ilm and only having a ‘comparative’ value). I have 
distinguished four kinds of inserts, the def initions of which would take us 
too long to recall here.
Within the ‘autonomous syntagmas’ (= 2 to 8), the a-chronological syn-
tagmas (2 and 3) are opposed to the chronological syntagmas (4 to 8). In 
the a-chronological syntagmas, the f ilmic discourse deliberately abstains 
from clarifying what, in the storyline, is the chronological relationship 
between the different images of the same ‘sequence’ (= a momentary, 
voluntary defection of the signif ied from temporal denotation). Here we 
f ind the parallel syntagma (type no. 2), better known under the name of 
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‘parallel montage’: several recurrent motifs are interwoven together, to 
directly symbolic ends, without any knowledge of their temporal relation 
in the action of the f ilm. There is also the bracket syntagma (type no. 3): a 
succession of brief evocations that the f ilm does not ‘date’ with respect to 
one another, but which it gives as samples of an identical order of realities 
(by way of example: the initial erotic evocations in Jean-Luc Godard’s Une 
femme mariée [1964]).
In the chronological syntagmas (4 to 8), the f ilm explains the literal 
temporality – and not only the symbolic or ‘profound’ temporality – that 
links the images of a sequence to each other. The descriptive syntagma (type 
no. 4) represents the only case where this temporality consists exclusively in 
simultaneities. (It is a matter here, of course, of the temporality of the signi-
f ied; on the level of the signif ier, every ‘sequence’, whatever it is, consists of 
the unfolding of a succession of events.)
Opposed to the descriptive syntagma are the various narrative syntag-
mas (5 to 8), in which the temporal relations between shots – which are 
still relations of the signif ied – can be categorized as consecutive. When 
a single ‘sequence’ presents, in alternation, several (most frequently, two) 
distinct events consecutively, we are dealing with the alternate syntagma 
(type no. 5), often called ‘cross-cutting’ [montage alterné]. For example, a 
shot of the pursuers, then a shot of the pursued, then a shot of the pursuers, 
etc. Between the different images of each series of events, the relation is con-
secutive. Between the two series taken en bloc, the relation is simultaneous.
Distinguished from the alternate syntagma are linear narrative syntag-
mas (6 to 8), ‘sequences’ dedicated to a single consecutive action. In the 
case of the scene properly speaking (type no. 6), the chronological limits of 
the single consecutiveness of the signif ier (= what unfolds on the screen) 
and the single consecutiveness of the signif ied (= the temporality of the 
f iction) coincide: the scene ‘lasts in real time’, even though it results from 
the editing of several separate shots (= there can be spatial hiatuses, but 
not temporal hiatuses).
On the contrary, these temporal hiatuses – moments that ‘jump’, and 
that can be perceived to do so – characterize the sequences properly speak-
ing (types 7 and 8): single but discontinuous consecutive actions (it is in 
this sense that, among the eight types, only they truly merit the name of 
sequence). In the episodic sequence (type no. 7), discontinuity is erected into 
a principle of construction and intelligibility, the segment is built around its 
ellipses: each image resumes a ‘phase’ or a ‘stage’ of a long, monodirectional 
evolution, and is separated from the preceding and following images by a 
major gap. For example, the famous sequence from Citizen Kane (Orson 
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Welles, 1941) where we see, in a sort of short-cut, the affectionate relations 
of the hero and his f irst wife progressively deteriorate before our eyes. On 
the contrary, the ordinary sequence (type no. 8), which is very frequently 
employed in f ilms, is content to dispose of its ellipses in a dispersed order, 
in order to ‘skip’ those moments that it intends to skip, and thus without 
conferring a short-cut value to the others.
There you have it. I have tried to summarize, in order to respond to 
your question, the general tableau of my ‘grande syntagmatique’, such as 
I conceived of it in 1968 (see text no. 5 of my Essais sur la signification au 
cinema [chapter 5 of Film Language]). But I fear that I have been both too 
brief and too long-winded…
Bellour: What is the domain of applicability for this code, to the extent 
that you have us understand that it responds to a given synchronic state 
of f ilm language, which you designate, in this case, by the term ‘classical 
narrative cinema’?
Metz: It seems to me that the grande syntagmatique translates the effort the 
cinema has made to return to the classical 19th century novel. The eight types 
of sequences are charged with expressing different kinds of spatio-temporal 
relations between successive images within an episode, so that the f ilm 
can have a clear and univocal storyline, and the spectator can always tell 
if image no. 3, on the level of the diegesis (the signif ied) ‘takes place’ before 
image no. 2, or after it, or at the same time, etc. Historically, the validity of 
this code overlaps with what I would call the ‘classical’ cinema: since the 
stabilization of the sound f ilm (in the early 1930s), up to the f irst manifesta-
tions of what is known as ‘modern’ cinema, which can be approximately 
situated, in France, to around 1955 (= the f irst short f ilms of the nouvelle 
vague). Obviously, many f ilms made after 1955 have remained very classical 
in the way they are made and do not witness any effort at innovation, at 
least on the level of what is considered here; to this extent, the grid that I 
have just summarized can be applied to them.
There are also generic limitations. This code only applies to narrative 
cinema (= f iction f ilms), and so it excludes – unless the grid is specif ically 
rearranged on the basis of a new corpus – pedagogical cinema and a certain 
category of documentary f ilms.
As for ‘modern’ f ilms, their goal, and/or their effect, is precisely to enrich, 
modify, loosen and diversify (and sometimes even to destroy or corrupt) 
this grande syntagmatique. This amounts to saying that the structures are 
situated in history, and that in the cinema (as elsewhere) there is diachrony. 
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It is not an essential aspect of the cinema to have eight types of sequences 
(supposing that there even are eight of them, that is, supposing that I have 
not committed an error of formalization). This character is attached to 
given f ilms in a given period.
Bellour: I suppose that the establishment of this code is the result of an 
inquiry that is all the more empirical given that you are the f irst to have 
considered the cinema entirely from this angle.
Metz: Certainly. We cannot even conceive that an empirical inquiry, even if 
it is restrained to a defined period and genre (which would already comprise 
thousands of f ilms), manages to unconditionally establish that there are 
not, in such and such a f ilm, sequences unable to be categorized in one 
of the eight types. We cannot view every f ilm sequence by sequence. The 
table of the grande syntagmatique has been obtained, inevitably, in a rather 
intuitive manner: successively viewing numerous f ilms of this genre and 
this period led me to progressively add more types of sequences until the 
moment when, having arrived at eight of them, I could not f ind a ninth. 
In semiology, this is what is known as the saturation of the corpus, when 
examining the text no longer reveals a new structural f igure, but only new 
occurrences of f igures already located.
Here we touch on the problem known as discovery procedures. In lin-
guistics itself, the most recent theories judge that they do not exist. This is 
a fortiori the case in semiology, where we are groping around much more.
Bellour: It seems that the constitution of the grande syntagmatique comes 
up against an obstacle that you underline in a long footnote, which applies to 
the very high degree of complication that the f irst type in your table offers. 
You reach a point where you express the idea that it might be necessary to 
create two syntagmatic tables of the image-track. What do you mean by this?
Metz: There is indeed a complication in the autonomous shot, and above all 
in the ‘sequence-shot’ which is one of its sub-types (I will not mention the 
other sub-types, such as inserts). The era that my grande syntagmatique cov-
ers is principally characterized by what Bazin called ‘classical découpage’: an 
analytic découpage which, in order to apprehend a complex segment of the 
action, prefers to fragment it into several successive shots rather than f ilm 
it in continuity. We then f ind ourselves, by def inition, in one of the seven 
other types of my classif ication (= autonomous segments formed of several 
shots). But before and after this classical period, f ilmmakers have been more 
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willing, in their practice, to allow the inclusion of much longer and more 
complex elements of the storyline in a single shot. This often happened in 
Feuillade’s f ilms, for example, and it often happens, to varying degrees, 
in ‘modern’ cinema, which Bazin correctly def ined, in a rather symbolic 
manner, by the appearance of the sequence-shot. But these periodizations 
overlap each other – and are intertwined with one another – in such a way 
that the f ilms I have dealt with offered me both sequence-shots (type no. 
1) and syntagmas (types 2 to 8). This coexistence is particularly striking in 
the work of Orson Welles, for example.
The sequence shot, a particularly long and complex variety of the au-
tonomous shot, gives rise to an internal construction (‘internal montage’, 
as it is sometimes called), which plays on the duration of the continuous 
take (see the famous gluttony episode in Welles’ Magnificent Ambersons 
[1942]), the axial staging of the motifs (= the problem of depth of f ield; see 
the episode of the pianist in The Best Years of Our Lives [1946] by William 
Wyler), their lateral staging (= the width of the f ield; see the crossed paths 
of the characters in La Règle du Jeu [1939] by Renoir), characters entering 
and leaving the frame, etc. In short, it plays on a whole range of spatio-
temporal relations, but which the f ilmic discourse operates inside a single 
shot, without recourse to cutting [collure].
What also strikes me is that in the sequence shot we can f ind, at least up 
to a certain point, various spatio-temporal schemas that equally appear in 
the types that I have numbered 2 to 8. A given logical connection which, 
in these latter cases, is operated by montage in the narrow sense can also 
be achieved within a sequence shot, by means of camera movements. Here 
we have an idea that was clearly formulated by Jean Mitry: montage in the 
broader sense (= the general activity of syntagmatic assemblage) is a more 
expansive notion than mere ‘editing’ [collage]. It can be a description, in 
a f ilm. So it can be carried out in several shots (shot 1: the stream; shot 2: 
an adjacent tree; etc.) – in which case it is a ‘descriptive syntagma’ (type 
no. 4). But it can also be brought about in a single shot – the passage of 
visual details being here the result of a pan. Now, the logical schema is 
the same in both cases: the consecutiveness of signifying elements = a 
simultaneity of corresponding signif ieds (this is the very def inition of the 
term ‘description’).
In this sense, the methodological task would consist in pinpointing which 
of my syntagmas (of types 2 to 8) are susceptible to having equivalents 
within the sequence shot. Not all of them are. It is obvious, for example, 
that the bracket syntagma or the episodic sequence could not be realized 
in a single shot.
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We thus arrive at a second table in the grande syntagmatique, which 
would more specif ically concern ‘internal’ montage. In comparison to the 
syntagmatic table, its homology would be partial and lacunary in nature. 
As for the grande syntagmatique itself, it f inds itself split into two, in a way. 
Our present type no. 1 would no longer be placed on the same axis as the 
seven other types.
Nonetheless, I left it in there – for the meantime. Why? Because the 
sequence shot (as its name indicates, by the way) is commutable with a true 
sequence, and represents, in comparison with the entire f ilm, a subdivision 
of the same rank. Certain linguists estimate that, in order to get to the 
bottom of the phonological system of a particular language system [langue], 
it is more economical to establish two distinct sub-systems, one for vowels 
and one for consonants. All the same, in language systems such as French, a 
consonant can commute with a vowel, and this substitution may suff ice to 
differentiate two morphemes whose phonematic tenor is otherwise identi-
cal. These problems, as you can see, only have a methodological resemblance 
with my own. But this counts, and it has helped me to glimpse – but only 
glimpse, at least at the present moment – the possibility of dividing my 
typology of ‘classical’ sequences into two.
Bellour: It is certain that the mere constitution of a second table allows us 
to incorporate, without an excessive degree of schematism, a f ilm like Rope 
[1948] for example, which Hitchcock, as if he were intentionally laying a trap 
for the semiologist, insisted on f ilming in a single shot (or in eight shots, if 
you want to take account of the pans to black determined by the length of 
f ilm contained in the camera’s magazines) but where we can f ind, within 
this codic displacement, all the laws of assemblage specif ic to his other 
f ilms, which are constructed on an extreme fragmentation of the shot. 
(Hitchcock rightly states: “The camera movements and the movements of 
the actors exactly reconstituted my usual way of cutting, that is to say, I 
maintained the principle of the proportion of images with respect to the 
emotional importance of a given moment.”)
It seems to me that this double table also presents the advantage of being 
able to alleviate a certain arbitrary periodization. I was actually quite struck 
by the fact that, by approximately delineating the classical cinema to the 
years between around 1933 (the stabilization of sound f ilm) and 1955 (the 
appearance of ‘modern’ cinema), you naturally cited the most remarkable 
examples of sequence shots in f ilms like The Magnificent Ambersons and 
Rules of the Game, which date from the 1940s. It is as if the classical cinema 
lost its unif ied nature as soon as it had found it, and as if your diversif ied 
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code was capable of marking, more than the overly simplistic division 
between periods, the levels that make them intermesh with one another, 
hence allowing us to re-establish, with the rigor of formalization, the 
concrete motion and pluralism of a historical process.
Metz: Your second hypothesis corresponds to the attitude I have adopted 
towards my own work. In the book we are speaking about [Essais sur 
la Signification au Cinema/Film Language], a large number of copious 
footnotes demonstrate my dissatisfactions and the problems that remain 
unresolved (= the notions of ‘alternating syntagma’, ‘frequentative variant 
of a syntagma’, etc.). I think there remains much work to be done.
Conversely, I criticize my classif ication, in its current state, for placing on 
the same level types that I would call hard and other types that seem soft to 
my mind. Hence, the bracket syntagma or the non-diegetic insert are very 
distinct, particular configurations that can be easily recognized without 
error. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the ordinary sequence or scene 
has rather indistinct contours. Sometimes it is diff icult to distinguish them 
from a shapeless mass, isolate them from the general f ilmic flux.
In my opinion, there is no need to hide the fact that f ilm semiology as a 
discipline is still in its infancy (this does not, however, prevent it from having 
made considerable progress in comparison to traditional reflections on 
f ilm language). We are starting off from zero (or almost zero). This is why I 
feel – including in the affectivity of my work – a considerable disproportion 
between the breadth of my efforts and the degree of certainty for the results 
attained up to now. This is a result of the situation – in both scientif ic and 
historical terms. I think we have to accept this, and keep going forward 
nonetheless.
Bellour: You said you were tempted, when you started your research, to 
consider the grande syntagmatique of the image-track as the code of the 
cinema, whereas it appears to you now as merely one code among others. 
This pluralization of codes presents a f ield of essential questions that you 
have not truly addressed in your book.
Metz: In fact, this problem of the plurality of codes was not ripe in my mind 
at the moment when I wrote this book. It happens that the f irst code I 
studied is that to which I gave the name grande syntagmatique (it is also the 
only one which, for the moment, I have studied in a truly detailed fashion). 
This is the source of a certain wavering that is inscribed in the book itself: 
in some passages, I explicitly state that it is one code among others, but 
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elsewhere I let it be understood that, even if it is not exactly the cinema’s 
only code, it could at least be its most important code.
Today, the pluralist hypothesis strikes me as the only one that gives us 
a chance of mastering a f ilm’s semiological material. At the beginnings of 
semiological research, it is diff icult to escape a sort of common representa-
tion that seeks to recognize a language code – aligning languages such as 
‘f ilm language’, ‘musical language’, verbal language’, etc. with each other 
in a relationship of uniform exteriority (in the logical sense of the term). 
In fact, this is to confuse language with code.
The same year as my Essais, Emilio Garroni published a book on f ilm 
semiology, Semiotica ed Estetica (Bari, Laterza 1968), which helped me a lot 
to reflect on this point in a self-critical perspective. This book established, 
with great clarity, the distinction between ‘language’ and ‘code’, which 
is not very well formulated in my Essais, but occupies a central place in 
my current thinking, and notably in the book that I am in the process of 
completing [Language and Cinema]. It seems to me that we can give the 
name ‘language’ to a unity that def ines itself in terms of its material of 
expression (a Hjelmslevian notion), or the ‘typical sign’ as Barthes puts it 
in Elements of Semiology. Literary language is the set of messages whose 
material of expression is writing (primarily physical writing); f ilm language 
is the set of messages that are identical in their material of expression, 
which is f ivefold: moving photographic images, recorded phonetic sound, 
recorded noises, recorded musical sound, and writing (intertitles, credit 
sequences, etc.). Hence ‘language’ is a technico-sensorial unity, immediately 
discernible in perceptive experience, and consequently in the usual social 
classif ications: ‘cinema’, ‘painting’, ‘gesture’, etc.
Conversely, a code is a purely logical and relational set that only the 
analyst may construct, and which is not based on material but on form, in 
the sense understood by Hjelmselv (= form of content + form of expression). 
A code is a f ield of commutability, signifying differences. Thus, there can be 
several codes in a single language, and inversely a single code can manifest 
itself in several different languages (see Garroni’s book).
Garroni, by the way, goes further than me in this line of thinking. He 
adjudges that only languages are specif ic, and that codes are not: what is 
specif ic to the cinema is the combination of several codes, and this alone. 
And so each one of the codes can be found in other languages, and does 
not have specif ic links to the cinema.
I do not think it is necessary to go this far: I explained my views on 
this matter in an article (‘Spécif icité des codes et spécif icité des langages,’ 
Semiotica 1: 4 [1969], 370-396), which constitutes something of a reply to 
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Garroni, and which will be further developed in my next book Langage et 
cinéma (Larousse, 1971). Certainly, it is clear that many codes that appear 
in films are not specifically cinematographic codes: a f ilm carries along with 
it collective representations, ideologies, forms borrowed from other arts, 
cultural symbolisms of all kinds. But the cinema equally forges its own 
codes, for the cinema is an apparatus (a machine), and it is also a technique 
(the way the machine is used). There exist many figures – which are made of 
forms, and not pure matter – that the cinema alone is capable of realizing: 
dissolves, panning shots etc. (this list is longer and more complex than this).
Bellour: In this way, you have strictly redef ined the ambiguous notion 
of cinematic specif icity, by establishing a theoretical split between the 
material basis of the f ilm and the codes that nonetheless structure it, as 
if to mark that this codif ication is, more than the effect of an ontological 
pre-determination, the fruit of a historical process and a cultural logic 
which lead to the f ilm – as a means of mechanical reproduction – being 
the site par excellence of a f ictive language.
In this sense, the specif ic object of f ilm semiology would be – by means 
of a second, much more radical split between the codes themselves – the 
logical description of the set of codes that you recognize as being specifically 
cinematic.
Metz: This is indeed the object of film semiology. But it is not the object of 
the structural analysis of films. The latter is the singular structure of each 
f ilm taken as a totality: we must therefore take into account all the codes 
that appear in the f ilm under study, whether or not they are specif ic to the 
cinema. There are, it seems to me, two fundamental approaches, which are 
related, complementary, but nonetheless distinct, as they do not obey the 
same principle of pertinence. You can follow a single code across several 
texts, or you can analyze a single text in all its codes. The f irst approach is 
the study of codes (a code always appears in several texts), while the second 
is the study of texts (a text always includes several codes).
If I study the grande syntagmatique of which we have just spoken, I learn 
nothing concerning any of the particular f ilms in which it nonetheless 
imprints its form – this is a study of the code. Inversely, those who analyze a 
given f ilm must locate all the codes active in it, without the proper object of 
their efforts being any one of these codes, but only their unique combination 
in a textual system. This combination is the very movement of the text (its 
advancement, its concrete displacement), which is constructed on the basis 
of these codes, but equally against these codes. For it is a property of the 
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textual system – inasmuch as it aff irms itself through the text as the sole 
pertinent system – to actively push back into irrelevance the different codes 
on which (= against which) it constructs its development.
Bellour: Do you think, even if the proposition can appear a little utopian, that 
semiology, to the extent that it seeks to be descriptive, can and must proceed 
to an exhaustive inventory of those codes that are specif ically cinematic?
Metz: We can already carry out a similar project: highlighting specif ic 
elements, linking them with one another, beginning to organize them in 
codes and sub-codes (for example: depending on the period, individual 
f ilm and genre, there are different systems of opposition between the fade-
to-black and the dissolve). Certain f igures seem to me to be incontestably 
specif ic, as they are linked as forms to the material of expression by which 
the cinema is def ined.
Nonetheless, I do not believe that f ilm semiology, even if it were more 
advanced, could establish a closed and exhaustive list of specif ically cin-
ematic codes. There is, in fact, a fundamental to-and-fro movement between 
the code and the text: the text is constructed on pre-existing codes, but it 
still leaves behind the elements of new codes or new sub-codes. The list of 
codes could therefore only be exhaustive if f ilms were no longer being made.
Bellour: I understand your reservation inasmuch as semiology always inter-
venes after the creator, the code after the text. But is it not contradictory if 
you take a distinct historical f ield as your object? Must we invoke, in this 
case, the impossibility of an experimental verif ication of the corpus, always 
susceptible to offering new elements to the activity of codif ication, or is it 
more the case that exhaustiveness cannot, in and of itself, enter into the 
program of semiology?
Metz: We can always – we must always – strive to be exhaustive with respect 
to the partial task that we f ix for ourselves at each stage of our work. But 
absolute exhaustiveness (and here, I willingly adopt your own terms) does 
not, I feel, enter into the program of semiology. It cannot, and it must not. 
For, even if f ilms were no longer made (and even if the semiologist was thus 
presented with a closed text), nothing could achieve closure – which is, by 
the way, real on a smaller scale (when, for instance, the complete output of 
a dead f ilmmaker is studied). When applied more generally to the historical 
evolution of f ilm, which is the history of analysts just as much as it is the 
history of ‘creators’, the principle of inf inity is not only on the side of new 
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modes of writing [écritures], but also on the side of new modes of reading 
[lectures]. Film semiology would evolve even if the cinema stopped evolving.
Bellour: I would now like to ask you a few rather discontinuous questions, 
which are implied, in my opinion, by this series of statements on the status 
of the grande syntagmatique, the plurality of cinematic codes, the relations 
of structural analysis and semiological description. Can you, f irst of all, 
pinpoint some of the other codes which seem to support the very notion 
of cinematic specif icity?
Metz: There is, for example, the code which is traditionally designated 
by the name ‘f ilmic punctuation’ (fades, wipes, irises, swish-pans, etc.), 
with its different sub-codes corresponding mainly to particular periods. 
From one sub-code to the other, the total list of optical effects used varies 
considerably, and the system according to which they are opposed to each 
other varies even more dramatically.
There are camera movements: tracking shots, pans, crane movements, 
handheld cameras (in ‘direct’ cinema, for example), optical tracking shots 
(the zoom, the Pan Cinor). Here again, the code overlaps with numerous 
sub-codes: the forward tracking shot on the face of the hero thus functions, 
at a certain point in time (cf. Brief Encounter [1945] by David Lean) as the 
signal for an imminent passage to ‘interiority’: it was used to introduce 
so-called ‘subjective’ f lashbacks, in which the evocation of the past is not 
directly assumed by the subject of the f ilmic enunciation, but ascribed to 
a character remembering the events.
There is also a code (or set of codes) that is particularly important for 
organizing the relations of speech and what can be seen on the screen. This 
is an enormous problem, which goes well beyond the famous discussions in 
the 1930s on the ‘off-screen voice’ and ‘a-synchronism’ (Pudovkin, Balázs, 
Arnheim, René Clair, etc.). I am thinking of the large segments of f ilmic 
speech: sentences, sentence fragments, sometimes just words – and of 
the manner in which they are articulated with the image-track. For in its 
smallest segments (phonemes), speech – even f ilmic speech – has nothing 
cinematic about it: it simply refers to the language system in question.
Moreover, there are all the editing codes (or at least those editing codes 
which are truly specif ic to the cinema), all the types of relations between 
music and images (the experiments by Eisenstein and Prokofiev), etc.
Bellour: Thus when you say, with respect to the descriptive f ilmic seg-
ments, that two distinct shots or one single shot including a pan are 
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strictly equivalent as far as the act of description is concerned, I suppose 
that – independently of any stylistic connotation – the difference between 
the two constructions must be marked semiologically by the mediation of 
a second code: the code pertaining to camera movements.
Metz: Yes, absolutely. Here there is an interference between two codes, that 
of the grande syntagmatique and that of camera movements.
Bellour: On the issue of description, let us return to one matter in particular. 
The fourth syntagma that you have identif ied is the ‘descriptive syntagma’, 
opposed to the category of ‘narrative syntagmas’ (divided into ‘alternating 
syntagma’ and ‘linear syntagmas’) within the category of ‘chronological 
syntagmas’. Let us take an extremely frequent example, particularly striking 
illustrations of which can be seen in the Western. A man on horseback 
moves forward and discovers, at a bend in the road, a ranch that the Indians 
have ravaged and set ablaze. He approaches, framed initially in front of the 
incinerated house with his back to the camera, then frontally, alone, in a 
mid-shot. There then follow three shots: the f irst, static, shows a smashed 
fence, the second, equally static, a broken window, and then, in the court-
yard, a tracking shot progressively reveals a body with an arrow poking 
out of it. Finally, to cap off this ‘moment’ (what immediate perception 
calls a sequence), a forward camera movement with a slight pan frames 
the departure of the horseman.
These three central shots cannot truly said to be ‘subjective’, since 
nothing explicitly denotes (for example, through an alternation between 
seeing subject/seen object) that these are the visions of the character, but 
everything lets us understand that this is the case, through the ambiguity 
that the cinema shows so often in the interplay of looks.
These three shots, therefore, in your codif ication, would be noted as 
a descriptive syntagma, as opposed to the narrative syntagma, which 
is represented by the f irst and last shots of the horseman. Is there not 
something contradictory here, inasmuch as the very discovery (successive, 
syntagmatic) of the different shots must – as much as it can be seen as a 
description in the strict sense operated by the f ilmmaker (although even 
this notion should itself be interrogated) – be understood as the progressive 
discovery of the character (even if, I repeat, it is not directly subjective), and 
in this sense, as rightfully inscribing itself in the narrative process?
Metz: My attempt at a grande syntagmatique was carried out on a very nar-
row principle of pertinence, which deliberately leaves many things to one 
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side. This is where your objection is right. I have exclusively taken account 
of the diegesis, and not the points of view from which it is apprehended. In 
the case you cite, I would indeed code it as a ‘descriptive syntagma’. And 
yet, it is true, as you say, that this description is in a sense a narration, the 
narration of the perceptions of the character. But on the level of diegesis, it 
is impossible to say that the body is ‘after’ or ‘before’ the window; rather, it is 
to one side. In this respect, the difference between narration and description 
remains total, depending on whether the elements that are successive in 
the signifying chain are equally successive in the chain of signif ieds (= 
narration), or whether, on the contrary, they are simultaneous and spatially 
coexistent (= description).
Your objection still stands. But what exactly is its status? It seems to me 
that its aptness does not authorize saying that my descriptive syntagma 
would, at the same time, be a narrative syntagma – or at least, that the 
classif icatory axis on which it is descriptive should not be confused with 
the axis on which it is narrative. The point of view is temporalized, but the 
diegesis is not. I believe that we have two distinct codes here: the grande 
syntagmatique on the one hand, and on the other hand the code of the points 
of view and looks, which you yourself have superbly analyzed (I am thinking 
of your study of Melanie’s looks in 84 shots of The Birds by Hitchcock1).
Bellour: How do you envisage, on an entirely different level, the possibility 
of a codification of the soundtrack? In this respect I was struck by a seminar 
that attempted to describe Jacques Rozier’s short f ilm Blue Jeans [1958]: this 
presentation had the courageous, but somewhat imprudent, goal of applying 
your typology not only to the image, but also to the entirety of the narrative 
process, thus tearing apart both the autonomy and the intertwining of the 
different levels, as well as the particular diff iculty of logically analyzing 
sound elements.
Metz: These are very complex problems indeed, but we should have a stab at 
them. Simply put, I do not believe that we can use my classif ication to do so, 
since it is entirely conceived for the image track. Analyzing the soundtrack 
is a different task, and should be conducted as such (of course, although this 
is only a minor point, we can ask ourselves which of my image assemblages 
have sonic equivalents, and which ones do not).
In any case, it does not seem to me that the f ilmic chain divides into two 
(a visual chain and an audio chain). Rather, it divides into four: images, 
speech, music, noise (in addition to which there are, intermittently, written 
texts). Either we study each of these four series separately, or we try to 
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apprehend f ilmic discourse as a whole, that is, we try to directly locate 
the mixed assemblages (image-speech, speech-music, etc.). The notion 
of the ‘soundtrack’, which covers three of the four series, is particularly 
uncomfortable and problematic in the current state of research. It is already 
a composite ensemble, while still being partial.
Bellour: The very notion of sub-code, to which you often make reference, 
seems on the one hand to respond to a historical breakdown, at the same 
time as sanctioning other limits, whether in terms of genres (in the strict 
sense, like the Western, for example, or the musical comedy) or in terms of 
nations, schools or tendencies. Does this not, in your opinion, imply the idea 
of a partial overlapping, at the two extremes, between semiological descrip-
tion and structural analysis, with the former becoming more restricted to 
delimiting the circumscribed forms of language, and the latter widening 
its f ield, from single f ilms to broader cultural combinations?
Metz: Yes and no. Yes, for the reasons you have mentioned. No, because 
the overlapping you talk about only concerns the dimensions and the 
surface of the corpus (the respective principles of pertinence continuing 
to remain distinct). It is true that we can study a given sub-code specif ic to 
the classical Western, and that we can also study the classical Western as a 
vast continuous text, going beyond inter-f ilmic boundaries. In both cases, 
the corpus would be the same: the sum total of classical Westerns (or at 
least a representative sample of this genre). But the study would not be the 
same. In the f irst case, each of the f ilms of the ‘group’ would be examined 
separately, and we would only retain from it the traits that are realized by 
the sub-code under study: through the very proposition of the research, 
the group would see its unity shattered, in twofold fashion: f irstly, by the 
fundamentally enumerative approach presiding over the grouping process 
(an approach implying that the f ilms of the group only form a group from a 
very particular point of view, and for the mere sake of a very small number of 
their traits), and subsequently because each of the films of the group which, 
in the same movement, sees its unity dismantled (the codically pertinent 
traits being taken into consideration, by abstracting them from the rest of 
the f ilm). In sum, studying a sub-code still means studying a code, even if it 
does not relate to the entirety of the cinema. Inversely, a textual study, even 
if the text is longer than a single f ilm, remains pluri-codic and retains the 
pertinence of the concern for a singular totality (= combination of codes in 
a ‘textual system’). Anyone who undertakes the structural analysis of the 
classical Western will be interested just as much in its non-cinematic codes 
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(the concept of honour, the theme of the horse, etc.) as in its cinematic codes 
(long shots, treatment of wide open spaces, slow pans, etc.), and even more 
so in the manner in which the two are articulated with each other. Anyone 
who studies the cinematic sub-codes specif ic to the classical Western can 
only ever study them one by one, and by def inition they will neglect the 
non-specif ic sub-codes. For both these reasons, they will never (in spite 
of what the exterior contours of their corpus might suggest) deal with the 
classical Western as such, in its entirety, but only with a certain number of 
rather precise schemata, about which they will observe, in each case, that 
they are not at work outside of the limits of the classical Western.
When structural analysis involves more than one f ilm, it apprehends a 
group of films. When the study of a code becomes the study of a sub-code, 
it apprehends a class of films. On the one hand, we have a single and total, 
albeit pluri-f ilmic, text. On the other hand, we have a set of manifestations 
of an abstract, partial matrix.
Bellour: Do you f ind that semiology can reach, by pinpointing codes, what 
f ilm analysis can only encounter in its general undertaking to read an 
imaginary object: that which formally marks the place of the enunciating 
subject, and thus refers back to a symbolic order which can only, in the last 
instance, be articulated in the f ield of psychoanalysis?
Metz: There certainly exists, in f ilms, codes that relate to the enunciating 
subject – or more precisely to its mode of presence in the f ilmic discourse 
(for it is evidently not the person of the ‘author’ that is important per se). 
Like you, I think that Freudian psychoanalysis is the only possible basis for 
a serious study of codes of this order. But I am not sure that these codes (all 
of them) are specif ically cinematic. To a large extent, the configurations 
explored by psychoanalysis are located, more or less unchanged, outside of 
the cinema, and invest the most diverse cultural objects.
In this aspect, I am not opposed to the terms of your question, but to a 
widely held opinion according to which the film-object retains in its own 
right a relation with the mechanisms of the unconscious (and in particular 
with the primary processes) that is more intimate and radical than other 
forms of expression, such as the book. We are often told that a f ilm is like 
a dream, and that a dream is like a f ilm. We emphasize the visual nature 
of the f ilm. This idea has had a number of advocates in France during the 
time of the ‘avant-garde f ilm’ and surrealist cinema. Right now, it is seeing a 
revival (Lyotard, Green, Chasseguet-Smirguel), which assumes much more 
subtle and nuanced guises. Nonetheless, I remain somewhat perplexed as to 
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the connection suggested between the visual nature of a f ilm and a type of 
specif ic and supplementary coeff icient of ‘psychoanalycity’, which would 
distinguish cinema from other languages.
I have found all the ‘dream sequences’ that I have seen in films to be fanci-
ful and not overly true to life. Ordinary sequences, meanwhile, although 
they may be composed of images, seem to me to have no relation with 
the phantasmatic flux (I would, however, make an exception for certain 
passages in Buñuel, Fellini and a few others). Inversely, we can only be struck 
by the importance of the analytic level in written texts, musical works, 
etc. We could thus think that, to the extent that the analysis is structural 
in nature, it does not acquire a special force by the singular virtue of its 
material of expression (= visuality and motion).
I still do take into account that it would be absurd to deny the privileged 
relations uniting the image and the dream. However, I presently know of 
no text – at least in the domain of f ilm theory – that comments on these 
relations even in a somewhat convincing fashion.
Bellour: I wonder if, in spite of the reserves that any overly simplistic as-
similation between f ilm and dream, or between the mechanisms of the 
unconscious and the process of f ilmic discourse, can incite, the cinematic 
phenomenon is not susceptible – on the level of a specif icity linked more to 
the material of expression than to the nature of its codes – to being marked 
more directly on the side of certain structural categories in psychoanalysis: 
in particular, narcissism (through the implications specif ic to the moving 
image, as a mirror and a site of the visual reduplication of, and the fasci-
nation for, the body), and hallucination, doubly visual and auditory, and 
strengthened through this very relationship. But my excessively elliptical 
question in fact targeted something else.
I wanted to return to the cinematic problem of point of view in order to 
know if, beneath every systematization of a psychoanalytic nature (founded, 
for example, on the system of identif ications, as we can see very explicitly 
in the work of Hitchcock), you think that the interplay of looks can make 
the object of a specif ic code susceptible to, on the one hand, permitting a 
certain codification of the performance of the actors, and on the other hand, 
determining the syntagmatic links that mark the place of the enunciating 
subject in the image, in the same way that the linguistic paradigm does for 
grammatical ‘persons’.
Metz: Maybe not like the persons of a verb do in language systems. But in 
another manner, yes, absolutely. You have studied these problems very 
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precisely in analyses of f ilmic sequences in far greater detail than I myself 
have done. But quite so, your analyses are foremost among those that have 
me think that ‘point of view’, in the cinema, gives rise to extremely elaborate 
and largely specif ic constructions, of which we should formally take stock.
Bellour: In order to illustrate your grande syntagmatique, you have carried 
out an exhaustive inventory of the autonomous segments in Jacques Rozier’s 
feature f ilm Adieu, Philippine [1962], which comprises the third section of 
your book. In this sense, you have preferred to follow a code throughout 
a single f ilm rather than spread your description across several f ilms. Do 
you think it is possible and instructive to attempt – from within a strictly 
semiological perspective – this descriptive operation in order to somehow 
reduce the f ilmic material, by articulating, in a single f ilm, all the codes 
recognized as specif ically cinematic?
Metz: It would be really desirable, but I do not think it is currently possible. 
For, to do this, it would be necessary: 1) to possess at least a rough list of the 
specif ic codes; 2) for each of these codes, to possess a ‘model’ of functioning 
which, even on a hypothetical level, would be suff iciently precise to be 
either confirmed or repudiated by the analysis of a f ilm.
These two tasks are logically primary. If we do not have a preconceived 
idea of what we are looking for in a f ilm, we can ‘view’ it without seeing 
anything at all.
In contrast, each time a hypothesis reaches a certain degree of preci-
sion – even if relates to a single code – it is preferable to submit it, without 
delay, to the test of an entire film, or several f ilms.
Bellour: I would like, in conclusion, to return to the relationship that unites 
and divides f ilm analysis and f ilm semiology, which you distinguish in your 
upcoming book by the object that they determine: in the case of the former, 
film writing, in the latter, film language.
In a sense, everything, ideally, brings them together. We can indeed think 
of them as strictly intertwined with one another: with analysis resting on 
the acquisitions of semiological description, in order to recognize, in any 
textual system, the proper function of cinematic codes determined by the 
articulation of all the system’s codes – thereby returning to semiology a 
positive image, permanently enriched by its codes, in a f lawless logical 
reciprocity.
Alternatively, however, I wonder if the movement of analysis, and its own 
exigencies, do not fatally contradict this harmony: think of codic plurality 
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(which you have correctly insisted on), which necessarily inscribes the 
analysis of the f ield of human sciences, thus posing at each moment the 
prejudicial question of a unif ication of the epistemological f ield, primarily 
between linguistics, historical materialism and psychoanalysis. Or we 
can think, more modestly, of one of the immediate effects of this state 
of affairs, which leads the analyst, for the sake of the relations of desire 
implied by all analysis, to break up [découper] its own units rather than 
adopt those of semiology, even if it recognizes their rich, precise nature. 
In short, I wonder if, in spite of the essential and multiple areas of overlap 
that prohibit us from choosing one of the two movements without f inding 
ourselves immediately thrust towards the other, there does not remain a 
distance (presently almost irreducible) between them, which is marked 
both in the strict distinction maintained by you, as well as in the playfully 
transgressive indecision which enables Barthes to keep the wager of S/Z 
(Paris, Seuil, 1970).2
Metz: It is diff icult for me to respond to your question, for it has the fullness 
of an answer, and it is impossible for me to answer your answer, since I f ind 
myself in total agreement with what you say.
In other words: we cannot accept that the law is perpetually aligned with 
the fact, but nor is it desirable to always (and at all costs) forcibly align the 
fact with the law.
As long as the study of codes and the study of texts have not accomplished 
a real convergence, the former will retain a rather skeletal, emaciated al-
lure, while the latter will continue (in spite of everything, including its 
considerable internal progress) the old tradition of the explication de texte. 
This is why this convergence, to my mind, constitutes a (distant) objective 
of critical importance, the principles of which should now be posited as a 
major goal for future research.
But, in order for this convergence to be realized, both approaches must 
aff irm themselves, develop themselves and live. And for this, we must let 
them live. Research is not developed by applying programs, it needs to 
breathe.
You speak of the desire of those who study texts. We could speak just 
as much about the desire of those who study codes. Here there is much 
more than (and something other than) a sort of division of labour within a 
harmoniously organized ‘scientif ic collective’: this rationality itself – which 
is nowhere to be found – is a phantasm, the phantasm of the scientist.
Researchers have a kind of off icial morality, which is an ethics of 
knowledge. And yet, it is clear that the real motivations of scientif ic work, 
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like any other activity, are akin to drives, because researchers are people. 
This presence of the affective at the root of intellectual discourse is not 
something to be deplored: without it, nobody would have written anything.
Every researcher, at every moment, can only speak usefully about what 
matters to him as a subject (in all the senses of the word). One of the con-
sequences, among many others, is what we have just discussed: the study 
of codes and the study of texts have diff iculty in truly being articulated 
with one another.
But it seems to me to be indispensable to equally maintain, in principle, 
the demands of rigor and communicability – for they too can respond to 
personal investments that give them the opportunity to be realized in one 
form or another.
In sum, we must be capable of a certain kind of empathy. At one and 
the same time, we must make the effort to forge a path straight ahead, and 
accept that we must occasionally make a sideways turn.
Notes
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I – The Fiction-Effect
On the notion of ‘general issues’
Question: It seems to me that amongst your works on cinema, what primarily 
catches your attention is the f iction f ilm. Not a specif ic f ilm or a specif ic 
type of f iction but the ‘f iction-effect’ in general.
Metz: There are two things. First of all, I like the idea of general issues. 
I intrinsically enjoy them, for they become my object (and an object is 
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constantly linked to desire). Moreover (and this might be the consequence of 
the f irst point), I do not see them as general. If I call them that, it is because 
I am following the current trend. But in my opinion, they are immediately 
broken down into a set of specif ic issues. Speaking of camera movements 
rather than editing is exactly the same thing as speaking about one f ilm 
rather than another. I think we all have our own ‘concrete’ topics of interest: 
a certain f ield that is real. Anyhow, my intellectual affectivity should not 
entail the notion of the ‘general’. They are issues that I experience in a very 
precise and focused way.
Q: Do you prefer to tackle those so-called general issues because you are 
able to control them better, or is it a question of an unfounded drive?
Metz: It has become the unwavering direction my work follows, because 
with time you are more likely to accept your own working methods and their 
limitations. In the world of research, I think that we always have to play a 
(partly real and partly mythical) role regarding other research projects and 
in relation to other colleagues. But it seems that at the very beginning, ten 
years ago, my work was not so unwavering. This direction at the very core 
of research came from an urge, a drive and it remains that way. This drive 
is the relationship between the object and its theory.
The specif icity of theory, of course, is that it aims at enlightening ‘con-
crete’ and directly observable phenomena. But this is linked to the real. In 
the realm of the imaginary, it is possible to like theory in itself, otherwise 
there would not be such people as ‘theoreticians’. And it does not mean 
that their theories will be ‘groundless’. It simply means that at the root of 
theory lies a great interest in theory.
Q: You mentioned camera movements and editing. These specif ic f indings 
are constantly related to narration, which is another topic that interests you.
Metz: Let’s just say that ‘general issues’ regarding the f iction f ilm are my 
objects of interest (or have been of interest; in my latest work entitled “The 
Imaginary Signif ier,” I have tried to look at both f iction and nonf iction 
f ilms as part of an institutional apparatus [dispositif ]). But in so far as I 
focus, it is true, on the f iction f ilm (to ‘critique’ its objective and subjective 
conditions of possibility), I f ind myself dealing with two different levels. 
In terms of the general strategies of research, it seems impossible to say 
that f ilm semiology should only focus on f iction f ilms; that is why I have 
never said it. Semiology should also deal with non-f iction f ilms. On the 
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other hand, for my personal research projects, I have often chosen (and 
it may very well last; frankly, I can’t really predict it, I don’t know), I have 
very often chosen the f iction f ilm. It is because I do not feel obliged to 
personally cover, with research projects signed ‘Christian Metz’, the entire 
f ield of f ilm semiology. I do not feel obliged to personally complete the 
totality of the program I have been drafting in Language and Cinema for 
example. Fortunately, there are other researchers who can tackle these 
issues for me.
The main reason for this choice lies in my age and my generation. When 
I became involved with f ilm studies (it was during the Liberation), the 
f indings at the time around the deconstruction of the f ictional text, on the 
questioning of representation and other similar issues, did not exist: none 
of us had any idea they existed. The general cultural climate around cinema 
was that we all agreed that cinema and fiction f ilms were synonymous (this 
confusion can be read in my f irst articles). Loving cinema meant loving 
f iction f ilms. I actually really like the f iction f ilm, it is the one form that 
is biographically rooted within me (in my adolescent memories, which 
are irreplaceable) and I found a theory for this deep interest – everybody 
works that way but no one dares to say it – this liking came back to itself 
(or against itself) and was transformed into a theoretical choice: to study a 
certain type of cinema, a certain object.
And without any disapproval coming from my part (and I would like to 
clarify a frequent misunderstanding) towards those who chose to study 
another type of cinema. There is something very important in the world 
of research (something that is often forgotten): one should study what he 
wants to study. As a start, I apply this principle to my own work.
The importance of fiction, the challenge of deconstruction
Q: Don’t you think there is an issue with the method? If done in haste, the 
deconstructive process is incomplete, and it may very well leave space for 
the repressed to return in the classical narrative structure.
Metz: I do indeed believe that a real critical study of f ictional cinema can 
progressively help lead to the creation of non-f ictional cinema (it is a vexed 
area of expertise that cannot resolve itself with voluntary manifestos). I 
actually believe that non-fictional cinema does not exist. The ‘non-fictional’ 
f ilms that I have watched, and I do not want to generalize, either bored me 
(= a raw emotional reaction), or incorporated some f ictional aspects (of 
course, to various degrees).
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Q: Don’t you think that these two things come from cultural training? 1. You 
cannot enjoy a f ilm outside the realm of f iction. 2. You have the tendency 
to systematically f ind f iction where there is none.
Metz: Yes, I am definitely inclined to do so. But in this case, I do not think it is 
a personal trait. One of the main objective issues with non-fiction cinema is 
that it is immediately ‘reclaimed’ by the f ictional, because f iction is histori-
cally dominant. If I study f iction and the f iction-effect, it is mostly because 
of the dominant role it plays. In as much as they can be objectif ied, my 
motivations are markedly sociological: a majority of f ilms made nowadays 
are fiction films. I am not an historian per se, for I do not research the histori-
cal facts concerning the films that interest me, but I am very interested in the 
place of cinema in history. I essentially work with ‘longer’ historical periods.
When you look at it from this angle, one can only be amazed by the 
dominant and impressive presence of f iction in cinema. This observation 
needs to be clarif ied, irrespective of certain examples of f iction f ilms (there 
are so many that the very phenomenon can overwhelm us: the audience 
likes the f ictional formula because it responds to dominant forces). This 
fact also asks to be explained irrespective of f ilms that escape certain 
aspects of this formula – they constitute another historical force, currently 
in the minority, which would have no effect on the f irst one during that 
period. And, moreover, one should research this phenomenon regardless 
of the naïve attempts that signif icantly underestimate their adversary and 
who believed they have ‘revolutionized cinema’. (In Paris, such f ilms are 
screened every week.) Traditional cinema is an institution: it will change, 
but not in that way. The very concept of a ‘cinematic institution’ seems 
increasingly important for a materialistic study of cinema; it is progressively 
becoming the centre of my work.
There is also another factor that brings me back to what you men-
tioned before. The objective situation of cinema is not comparable to 
literature – which we often forget is far more ‘advanced’. This aspect of the 
issue was truly striking to me in a time when people tried to constitute a 
cinematic ‘Tel-quelisme’. There is a big difference between this movement 
and Tel Quel, one of which is that behind Tel Quel there is not another Tel 
Quel trying to imitate it. The literary tradition has been here for a thousand 
years, it is highly ‘cultivated’, it has acquired (but not in 80 years!) real 
metalinguistic tools, abilities to turn back and question its own processes. 
The question of deconstruction is deeply rooted. Moreover, there is the 
material of expression: the signif ier [of f ilm and literature] is not the same; 
this changes things a lot.
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The fiction film as mechanism of pleasure. The difficulty of displacing 
pleasure
Q: There was a time when, following a rather critical movement, a series 
of political and ideological deconstructive f ilms entered the f ilm market. 
These f ilms are often rather boring. Don’t you think that this is partly due 
to criticism’s – politically or ideologically founded – failure to take into 
account the spectator’s pleasure in watching f iction?
Metz: I think you are right – even if the term ‘deconstruction’ (or rather 
its referent) risks swaying our conversation. It is a very precise notion, 
with a very specif ic meaning in Julia Kristeva’s theory. Well, the f ilms that 
are currently on our minds, in the vast majority of cases, are creations of 
f ilmmakers who hardly know or have no idea about this philosophical 
movement, and these f ilms act on the desire (in a very romantic way) to 
‘renew’, to create a ‘different’ cinema. We should then agree to use term 
‘deconstruction’ in its loose and wider sense: this meaning really f its into 
what we are speaking about.
Coming back to your question, it brings me to my core idea on the meta-
psychology of the f iction f ilm. This type of f ilm has historical, ideological 
and psychoanalytic (= metapsychological) mechanisms to awaken the 
spectator’s pleasure. Like any other mechanism, it does not always work, 
but it can objectively trigger some pleasure, due to its mix of similarities 
and differences to dreams and fantasies.
In my opinion, the problem with non-fiction f ilms in the world of cinema 
was often raised in a superf icial manner, by an enthusiastic spirit of will 
and an avant-garde approach (aesthetic or political depending on the case), 
all wrapped up in the ambiance of the superego. One wonders if it was 
the ‘right way’ to make it work. But in order for a specif ic type of cinema 
to survive, there needs to be a fair number of spectators, not too small, to 
make it live, and consequently, to enjoy it. And not only meta-spectators, 
for the f ilmmakers’ close friends should also f ind pleasure in comparing the 
f ilm’s achievements in relation to similar f ilms. Of course, there can also 
be completely different audiences, civilizations, for whom the concept of 
pleasure does not make any sense to us. In the state of our society and many 
other societies that we know, the mechanism of a non-f ictional cinema 
would assume that the spectator renounces a signif icant amount of his 
pleasure, or displaces it onto something else.
This displacement is an important process, and is very often underrated 
and inconspicuous, especially if it relates only to thousands of spectators, 
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rather than all of them (here again, cinema is not literature: the link to 
distribution is not external to an art, but enters into its def inition).
Moreover, we often speak of the ‘rejection of the f iction f ilm’ with a force 
that always amazes me; people speak under the pretext that some traits of the 
narrative formula that have been put into question can be rather dubious. For 
example, a f ilm is said to be deconstructive because its chronological order 
is more scrambled than usual, another because the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’ 
are tightly interwoven, a third one because the f iction is criticized while 
it is shown on the screen etc… But one should really see what an entirely 
non-fictional f ilm would be (and you realize that it is hard to imagine what 
it actually is, that it is almost an impossibility): this f ilm should not present 
any recognizable object (not even a landscape, not even a piece of the sky…), 
this f ilm should not have any characters (whether f ictional or not), and no 
actors (the actor remains a powerful imaginary signif ier, before ‘enacting’ 
any characters). No more ‘non-actors’ (unqualif ied actors etc… another rip 
off of our times: they become actors by leaving their traces on the spectacu-
lar device which is the cinema screen). No logical relations of time, space, 
causality; they should be removed, leaving nothing except the signif ier in 
its materiality. In other words, no element should ever ‘create a diegesis’ etc.
Finally, without really going into details, non-f iction f ilms assume that, 
while consuming the f ilm (which would not be the case anymore), the spec-
tator takes real pleasure in knowing the mechanisms of its deconstruction. 
The spectator should be able to transfer his libido, a sort of metapsychologi-
cal conversion, from the cinematic pleasure as it always existed to a sheer 
sadistic pleasure of knowing, dismantling and controlling what is on screen. 
The pleasure of having a toy would be to eventually break it, and it seems 
rather unlikely to me right now [in regards to cinema]. Paradoxically, this 
very same operation is constitutive of its science, of the theory of cinema, 
and in this form it can function perfectly. This is actually well known. But 
the theory of cinema and cinema going are, and remain in our current 
culture, two different things. It is undoubtedly why the best deconstructive 
f ilms are those that keep the diegesis and play with it, or destroy it ‘from 
the inside’ (Eisenstein was in favour of this technique). They keep one foot 
in the pleasure of the tale and take advantage to rally us against it. This 
clever approach seems far more interesting to me than the direct attempts 
of destruction and tabula rasa. It is more interesting and more adapted to 
objective conditions and, in this sense, is more political.
Q: The sadism of the person who studies the f ilm can only kick in at the 
second viewing. It is very rare that it starts straight away, at the first viewing.
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Metz: Yes, I agree. It is because, in that specif ic case, there is a phenom-
enon of ‘the entanglement of the drives’, where sadism is closely linked to 
another pleasure which is on the side of the libido, a pleasure of bonding, 
of company: to become familiar with a f ilm, to stay a long time with the 
same object, and ‘court’ it (and yet, it is true, to dissect the machine). The 
two opposite impulses work together, and the pleasure is doubled, whereas 
in the real non-f ictional f ilm, the all-knowing sadism should take charge 
of the metapsychological cinematic viewing regime. And that, it seems to 
me, is where the real diff iculty lies…
II – Resistance towards the film as an object
The split between cinephilia / linguistic training
Q: You have never carried out any f ilm analysis until now. Why is that?
Metz: There has always been something rather problematic in my relation-
ship with my work. A sort of division – rooted in my work as a cinema 
semiologist – comes from two deeply engrained origins that are rather 
easy to articulate in terms of theory, but more diff icult to unify on an 
emotional level. On the one hand, since my f ilm buff teenage years, I 
have always loved f ilms, I loved going to the cinema, I supported the 
‘ciné-club’ movement during the Liberation and, on the other hand, I chose 
to study linguistics. The idea of f ilm semiology came with the encounter 
between these two sources. In principle, the operation is simple: it is 
true that, in order to establish f ilm semiology, one should know f ilms 
and therefore go to the cinema rather frequently. Moreover, one should 
also be acquainted with linguistics. The fact remains that in my life, my 
memories, my schedules, my personal phases, the two sources are clearly 
distinctive. When you bury yourself in tough and ‘technical’ books, like 
linguistics books, you should love them for what they are, otherwise it is 
impossible to continue. By doing so, you gain many things that will help 
you to study the language of f ilms, but it takes days and days of work 
in which you are immersed in another universe, phenomenologically 
remote from the world of cinema, a universe with its own logic, which is 
self-suff icient. In the way I imagine my work, there are two ‘series’, and I 
currently struggle (maybe I will always struggle) to join these two in my 
daily desire, and that is why I think that until now I have never carried 
out any f ilm analyses.
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This can seem strange since my work consists in joining the two strands 
together on a conceptual level. I do not think it is contradictory either. I 
even suppose that they should go together, at least when one chooses an 
object that is already dialectical and complicated, that is not the direct 
and ‘forthright’ outcome of enthusiasm. Don’t forget that I have chosen my 
current job quite late, in my thirties. Before, I was a High School teacher 
and I did not do any research. I did not f ind any path that suited me, so I 
waited and hesitated.
Desires and fears of textual analyses
Q: Are you reluctant to carry out a textual analysis?
Metz: In all honesty, I think I am. I think I am resistant, which I would 
actually like to overcome. In order to do so, I intend to analyze a short 
f ilm. First, because it is less daunting (= it is probably a mythical protec-
tion, but it matters to me, as they are often the most eff icient) and also 
because I would like to look at the concrete issues that emerge in the 
analysis of the ‘textual system’ of a whole f ilm, like the ones I mentioned 
in Language and Cinema. I am hoping (or I am probably deluded) that 
with a short f ilm I can manage, in terms of the quantity of elements and 
their relations to one another, to get a quick and more comprehensive 
grasp of its textual system. After that, I would like to analyze some of the 
f ilms I loved in my youth such as Citizen Kane [1941] by Orson Welles; I 
would like to analyze it scene by scene; it would certainly make a book 
and not an article.
I have remained on the theoretical level mainly for two reasons. The 
f irst one is that there are in the f ield of f ilm semiology, amongst my friends 
and students, a number of people who analyze f ilms, who enjoy doing 
it and are good at it, whereas there are far less people (the difference is 
striking) who are tempted to look into theory ‘head on’. Of course, what I 
am saying is a rationalization, an excuse in the face of my own diff iculties. 
But in terms of the distribution of tasks, this remains a real fact. In fact, 
fantasmatic distributions are in a way the most rational as everyone does 
what he likes.
And I also feel a real resistance towards the f ilm as an object; it is as if I 
was standing in front of a threshold that I was afraid to cross. It is probably 
due to the fact that I previously loved f ilm so much. The criticisms I have 
made against cinephilia and that are everywhere in my writing can only 
emphasize an old argument I had with myself. When I think about it, these 
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may be the only aggressive and polemic passages in my books. Nowadays, 
cinephilia is an attitude that I have left behind, that makes me laugh, but 
I must not have completely left it behind since I have to admit that I still 
hold a grudge against it.
In fact, in my current study, “The Imaginary Signif ier,” I touch upon 
this problem from a psychoanalytic perspective, by showing that the 
cinematic institution rests on a dual relation between the cinema-goers 
and the cinema as a ‘good object’. I think that it is that very same issue 
that explains my reluctance to analyze f ilms. If I were to try it, I would 
take on the role (at least partly) of the cinephile, stick to a specif ic f ilm, 
and continue to use a theoretical discourse (for I would like, of course, my 
analysis to be really semiological). I have never taken these two positions 
at the same time. The diff iculty is not in the intellectual synthesis of these 
two positions: a lot of people write these syntheses (or analogous ones), 
it is not beyond human abilities. The diff iculty lies in f inding the right 
balance in relation to desire, when I have been involved for years with 
so-called ‘pure’ theory.
At the moment, I would like to carry out a textual analysis. But I want to 
do it because I do not really want to do it, because I want to dialectize this 
resistance, to make it useful, to understand it, to come to terms with it (not 
necessarily by succeeding but by acknowledging the effort I have put into 
it). I truly believe in the importance of textual analysis, and even if I realize 
that it is a work I am not very talented at (here, once again, I have to try), 
I will continue to believe in it. Textual analysis, as I said in Language and 
Cinema, represents a good half of the work in f ilm semiology.
Q: Have you chosen to analyze a short f ilm for fear of losing yourself in a 
long f ilm, in a forest of codes? It seems that the reason explaining people’s 
caution towards Language and Cinema stems from the fact that, if you take 
the codes apart, it is very easy to lose yourself.
Metz: No, I think that choosing a short f ilm, as I mentioned before, is a 
magical protection against my resistance (also magical) towards textual 
analysis. It is not the length of the decoding work that scares me. My books, 
in another way, have required long and painstaking scholarship. The forest 
of codes does not scare me either, for that is the smooth and loveable part of 
the text. I do not feel any anxiety for completeness, the desire to unravel all 
the f ilm’s codes; this comprehensiveness seems unnecessary, it is not part 
of a semiological program, it would contradict its spirit. No, my resistance 
comes from the text itself.
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Cinema-‘object’, cinema-‘corpus’
And I have the impression that, compared to most people who study f ilm, 
close friends of mine included, my perspective is slightly different. I talk to 
researchers everyday and what they tell me makes me feel that their subject 
is truly cinema. For me, cinema is more of a corpus. Who says corpus says 
fetish. Cinema is my fetish, it is what establishes within me the power of 
my work, my drive to work. It is my reservoir of examples; it is what makes 
me speak about the things close to my heart. In summary, cinema is my 
‘subject’ [thème] rather than my predicate.
It does not make a big difference in practice, but it sometimes introduces 
a slight difference to the discussions I take part in.
For example, something strikes me: when I studied cinema from a 
linguistic perspective, the linguistic mechanism was the object of my 
intellectual passion. And now that I am more oriented towards a historical 
psychoanalysis of cinema as an institution, it is the Freudian adventure, 
psychoanalysis, that fascinates me. In a way, cinema has never really been 
my subject per se, but rather something I often talked about.
If we think about the objective results of this attitude, if we wonder how 
my cinematic interests may affect my other interests (and theory in general), 
then I think that my oblique relation to the object shows a specif ic mix of 
pros and cons. The cons are obvious: my work is quite often too ‘abstract’, 
not close enough to cinema, or at least to what I call in my own language the 
‘cinema-cinema’. There are a few issues, not all without intrinsic interest, 
of which I am not personally interested in and that I am unable to write 
about. These are points in which colleagues cannot expect anything from 
me. They reproach me for being abstract, of being ‘stratospheric’, and I reject 
this statement, sometimes rather dismissively, especially when it comes 
from a very low level such as f ilm criticism (the journalistic f ilm criticism) 
and I believe I am right to do so when the place of enunciation makes sense. 
But it happens that the same reproach (and it is not quite the same) can 
be made by people who work with me and that I value, people who are far 
from this anti-theoretical Poujadisme (or in Italian, qualinquisme). In that 
case, I accept it without feeling bitter because it is true, that is my limit, I 
do not have the brains for images, I prefer conceptual thinking.
The advantage of my position of desire, which is slightly skewed in rela-
tion to cinema, is topographic: I am in a good position to notice things that 
others have not noticed, or at least I am more sensitive to them. I am a little 
outside the cinema world and I am intensely involved in the intellectual 
world. I can see the object from another angle and I f ind it easier to turn it 
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around (that is, to turn f ilmic voyeurism back onto the institution itself). 
I hardly get attached to f ilms, even those I love. In my opinion, looking 
at cinema as a social event like any other, with as much relevance as any 
other, using the same general methods of analysis, is a painless operation 
that does not involve overcoming internal barriers.
For an ‘a posteriori’ allocation of work
Finally, I am deeply convinced that each of us has only one thing to say. If 
you have one thing to say, it is quite a lot already, as many have nothing to 
say. What I mean by ‘a thing to say’ is – the way I expressed it is not the right 
one – rather a single path to follow, a single set of interests to follow. The 
path may be winding, it can change every three years, and yet in another 
way it is the same path. If you do not take it, nothing changes.
I have an amazing example (if you can say that) with issues regarding 
Ph.D. theses. Institutionally, I have to ‘direct’ or supervise theses (‘direct’ 
is such an absurd term; it is a matter of discussing with the Ph.D. students, 
giving them bibliographical references and above all ‘transferring’ to them 
enough (goodwill, benevolence) to sustain – without too much personal 
damage (to me) – the mythological exploitation, i.e., projection – another 
transfer – they make towards me). In this activity (or passivity) that I actu-
ally enjoy a lot, I often see that students, especially at the beginning of their 
doctorates, choose a topic that does not interest them, that they are not 
really involved in. (It would be useless and even detrimental to tell them 
at once.) The student chooses a topic for its objective importance (as if this 
actually existed! It is just for the title), or for its genuinely semiological mat-
ter (as if a good non-semiological work was preferred to a bad semiological 
work), in any way that engages a scientif ic superego rather than a desire or 
drive. The student cannot write his thesis. What generally follows is that 
the student, when starting his f irst real work, takes some perspective in 
regard to his superego (and stops projecting it on to me, which is rather nice) 
or manages to make it pleasurable, to determine it himself: he changes the 
subject, the new topic appeals to him and the thesis can progress.
In the end, I only believe in assigning work-related tasks after the 
work is done (or not, which proves that it was not possible to achieve, at 
least not by the person who was doing it). Post-assignment of tasks can 
seem absurd, even contradictory, but I really cannot see how you can 
achieve scientif ic work with a predetermined program in association 
with someone else. A few practical requirements obviously necessitate 
meeting with others, but the less the better. And yet, I do not feel like 
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an anarchist at all; I do believe that tasks should be assigned, for they 
are useful: I call ‘objective’ those tasks that are created by oneself and 
that are imposed upon oneself (not by conscious intention, delusion, or 
bad faith). What I mean is that after a few years, sometimes months, one 
notices that for a certain type of work there are such and such persons 
who have the right dispositions and taste. These are people who know 
how to deal with the work, and that is when it is time to talk to them. The 
best service each of us can give to the ‘scientif ic community’, if it exists, 
is to f ind our own path (our own voice). The assignment of tasks is done 
only when the tasks are done. From this standpoint, I am in complete 
disagreement with a certain mentality in the world of research. We spend 
hours reformulating research when the principal point in common is 
that no common point exists. And at the same time, you realize that 
each researcher has succeeded in completing some work, or has written 
something that he has not mentioned during meetings, yet he really 
wanted to conduct it and it was worth it. During meetings, he was absent, 
he left the role to his superego, or his respect for the Institution, or his 
desire to not appear condescending to his colleagues, to be kind to them 
and show his good will.
Scientif ic work is very demanding, it tires us in the deepest places of 
our being, it takes a lot of energy (part of which can be found in the libido 
we experience for the object). It is schizophrenic work that you have to 
maintain against your everyday life (with which it is incompatible, even if 
you schedule your time, or become less obsessed with the tasks): it is not 
something you do out of good will; instead, you need to have a long lasting, 
strong and real desire. To speak here of pleasure and desire is not a luxury 
stemming from individualism, but is an objective condition without which 
research cannot take place, it cannot happen.
When I say ‘post-assignment of tasks’, I think about all this. And in my 
case, as someone who remained until the age of thirty in a rather unhappy 
and tortured relationship with my work, I was unable to do anything. I 
now have to be honest (and with a tinge of ‘fatalism’, I have to admit) that 
there are things that I will be happy to do and others, even within my 
own f ield, that I will not do. When colleagues tell me that these things are 
quite important, I do not deny it, but the subject no longer interests me, 
even more if I know that I will not be able to do it. I always feel like telling 
them, especially when they insist: ‘Do it yourself then!’ I have often given 
this answer. The fact that it is even been felt as aggressive rather than a 
natural statement says a lot about the alienating pathos going on in the 
world of research.
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III – The driving force of work
A desire to clear a space, to cover the territory
Q: It seems that there is in your work a quasi-obsessive determination to 
exhaust your f ield of study, to analyze its every corner. …
Metz: I do enjoy a certain type of work that also feels essential. In this regard, 
I am rather amazed to see that, in my current psychoanalytic research, I 
reproduce the same steps from the beginnings of my linguistic project in 
1962-1964. It is a certain ‘working method’, in which the driving force is a 
desire to overcome something (a problem, an inner question). It generates 
pleasure, or at least the feeling of achieving something; the feeling that a 
task, a period or a train of thought is ‘completed’. There are certainly feelings 
of control (and maybe a tinge of quiet, unyielding sadism), an obsessive 
fantasm for accuracy, of f illing f ield X, a f ield that I would rather be small 
but very ‘busy’. At the moment I have two contradictory feelings, or at least 
they seem contradictory to me, but deep down they are not: the f irst one 
is that you have to stop being obsessive regarding the completion of your 
work, for if it is f illed with too many doubts or compulsive revisions, it 
then becomes a burden. Yet, simultaneously, scientif ic work is at its roots 
obsessive: a stubborn perseverance, a meticulousness without which we 
would not have the courage to f inish what we started. And then there are 
the distractions of our daily responsibilities, the less sublime pleasures and 
constant storm of professional emergencies that present themselves to us.
What I like to do is to proceed slowly, to make steady progress and to 
place each development in its own separate section, which prevents me 
from making general, banal statements that are ‘almost right’ or only ‘partly 
accurate’. It is important to clear a space and attain something new for 
this discipline. This desire was already at the root of my rather long f irst 
article entitled “The Cinema: Language or Language System?” I wanted to go 
beyond the linguistic metaphor (but, at that time its form was not very clear 
to me, and Roland Barthes told me that this expression is not mentioned in 
my article). Yet, it is correct – linguistic metaphors exist in cinema (which 
is to say that cinema is a language etc…), it does not come from me, nor 
my fellow linguists, but belongs originally to f ilm aesthetics, and I really 
wanted to see what this metaphor held once we had taken seriously (like 
linguists do) the concepts of ‘langue’ and ‘langage’. I wanted to rip open 
this metaphor and look at it from the inside, and I’m not saying that in the 
sense developed by Melanie Klein, but rather to better understand certain 
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things (epistemophilia, voyeurism, and sadism, in their persecutory as well 
as their depressive aspects).
And now, if I think about one of my most recent articles (on the specta-
tor’s metapsychology in relation to the f iction f ilm [“The Fiction Film and 
its Spectator: A Metapsychological Study”]), I f ind the same dynamics in 
my work: to tackle a commonplace idea, but one that in my opinion had 
never been fully stated: that cinematic f iction is related to the spectator’s 
fantasy, that it is like a dream, that the spectator sees the f ilm as his object 
etc. … We have observed hundreds of times that the ‘f ilmic state’ resembles 
sleep but, exactly like the linguistic metaphor, we have not taken seriously 
this notion of sleep. Yet, sleep is a very specif ic state of psychic economy 
that has often been at the centre of Freud’s attention. I therefore wanted 
to look closer. What really makes me work is always the same thing: the 
drive to develop a scientif ic perspective on things that everyone thinks they 
know but in fact they do not, to unravel ‘ordinary’ social phenomena that 
are frequently hidden behind banalities. I am fascinated by the ordinary 
(far more than rarity, in fact), I f ind it extraordinary. I feel an urgent call to 
decipher and explore it.
The unsolved residue
Q: But it seems to me that the idea of f inishing is tied to the impossibility of 
f inishing, for you always return to and re-examine what you have already 
researched. For example, in your book Language and Cinema (in which you 
‘return’ to your previous research three times!) or in two books where you 
question again the concept of connotation, or more recently the impression 
of reality.
Metz: I believe that these two seemingly contradictory operations (to f in-
ish and the impossibility to do so, to return often) come from the same 
insatiable drive. I would like to ‘be over and done with it’, but I never wish 
to end it. Each time I f inish a work, this drive is rarely satisf ied. Like any 
desire, it is reborn from its ashes and begins again. Six months or three years 
later, I still feel dissatisf ied with my former research and I work on it again…
Q: What motivates you to do it again? From where to do you start? Your 
former research?
Metz: The trigger of this dissatisfaction is variable: it can come from criticism 
that was made and I found interesting, from reading colleagues’ works etc. 
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… But the real impulse is the constant dissatisfaction, the rereading of my 
former articles, this inner desire to understand.
Q: Aren’t we coming back to Freud’s text on knowledge, where he says that 
for each step we climb, there is an ‘unsolved residue’?
Metz: Certainly. We always advance on many fronts. On the one hand, we 
progress, which means that we have acquired enough objective informa-
tion and subjective desire to be able to move forward. And on the other 
hand, in the phase where issues are in principle resolved, there remains 
uncertainties, outstanding issues. Staying with Freudian metaphors, when 
most of the army is moving forward, at the back small detachments are busy 
getting rid of the remaining enemy forces. When I had just started my work 
with psychoanalytic influences, I was also interested in the relationships 
between perception and linguistic naming, and the study that came out of 
it (“The Perceived and the Named”) returns to classical semiology, which 
is not Freudian but returns to the notions of language and metalanguage. 
This was a small digression, and I wrote this article with great pleasure.
Long term commitment, or working in long phases
I also have to admit that I work in long phases (except for the overlaps that 
I mentioned a minute ago), phases that, if I can extrapolate from the past 
to the future, seems to last ten years each. These are periods in which I am 
particularly interested in something and then I move on to something else. 
What I call a ‘thing’ that serves as my ‘object’ is generally a method, or at 
least a mix of the two: a process, a new ‘approach’ (as we say) to cinema.
Q: Are there within those long phases any sub-phases?
Metz: Yes. I will spare you the smallest ones, which would lead us to the 
anecdotal, but I sense a spontaneous, volatile organization, divided into 
two relatively important sub-phases. First, there is an initial sub-phase 
which is very intense, in which I am completely invested in my work that 
involves a great amount of reading, and that is when the joy of learning 
emerges (and the fascination of hearing the thought of others; when you 
write, you forget the other, even if you quote him; and you continue reading 
important texts. There are obviously very few of them, and yet there seems 
to be quite a few of them. You rediscover this strange thing: the existence 
of others, his existence, and the fact that he can bring you something). 
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The second sub-phase is exploitation in its most industrial sense, for you 
have to make a prof it from what you have found (time flies very swiftly, 
things that we really know are very small, and the moments where you can 
intervene are few and far between). But there is more than that, there is 
more than this reluctance to feed the influx of scholarly Parisian papers. 
Other desires return, the desire to teach, to be an Other who people will 
learn from, the desire to write (following the drive to read – it does not have 
to be chronological, it is a deeper ‘post’ reading), the desire to undertake 
new problems, to come back to the pure theory of cinema.
In the second phase, I can feel that the passionate beginning has dimin-
ished slightly. Exhausted by the intense activity of the f irst phase, I often 
have the tendency to get tired from an excessive interest in this work. 
What follows is calmer, involving a process of clarif ication, based on an 
impetus that is probably residual and that goes on and on. It can last a long 
time – many years, which is enough for me to want to continue; it has a 
very specif ic affect, ‘to continue’, very different from initiating the work, 
but also very different from the desire to do nothing.
In my ‘linguistic period’ (a rather pompous name!), the only article that 
corresponds to the f irst sub-phase, created in a great burst of enthusiasm, is 
“The Cinema: Language or Language System?” The rest has been carried out 
under calmer conditions (with various degrees depending on the articles), 
which attempt to take this linguistic approach to its conclusion. Of course, 
I cannot unravel all the consequences of this hypothesis (my entire life 
would not be long enough, and other people have decided to do it), but 
there are many things I could say about it, based on my interest in this 
topic, until my desire wears out (except it will ‘return’ and be developed, 
as we mentioned earlier).
Disciplinary frameworks that enable one to work
Q: It seems to me that one could say that your thought on cinema is always 
linked to a kind of disciplinary framework rooted in fundamental and 
transferable concepts.
Metz. Indeed, the disciplinary framework matters a lot in my choice of 
work. The only insights that interest me (that motivate me – those that are 
discovering the similarities between linguistics and psychoanalysis) are 
well-established and incorporate a set of conceptual tools. Or, more simply, 
‘real’ disciplines (there are very few of them) that produce real concepts and 
do not just prolong common sense understanding (that is to say, ideology). 
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These disciplines have their own domain (not a ‘f ield’), a domain in which 
you must enter and where everything is logical. Hard disciplines, with strong 
hypotheses, that create their ‘own universe’, metalinguistic disciplines that 
give you at once a completely different perspective. These are the slightly 
‘technical’ disciplines, as we sometimes call them, but I think the word 
is not right, because the empirically-based American psycho-sociology, 
for example, which is a typical soft discipline, involves a lot of technical 
statistical work, and yet at its core it contains ‘common sense’ notions that 
do not work.
I enjoy working with these disciplines that break from current main-
stream views, that provoke a different way of thinking, that show the object 
in a different light. I f ind great pleasure in successively making them func-
tion around my body of work on cinema. Deep down, what annoys me (in 
its strongest term, it is most repellent), is all this omnipresent discourse 
surrounding cinema, a discourse that is reduced to such statements as: 
‘Cinema is a very important social event. … Nowadays, in the 20th century, 
there isn’t just verbal and oral language. … It’s not just an industry but also 
an art and if we think about it, as enriching as the other media. … And 
also, it is a new language that does not only reflect society but also the 
creative individual. … The form is as important as the content, in fact they 
are inseparable, etc. …’ I do not want to be mean but there a lot of books on 
cinema (not only newspaper article but books) that do not say more than 
that. As with other authors, there is in my work certain negative motivations 
(= aversions); for me, it is the desire to get away as far as possible from this 
literature.
It makes me think about Barthes’ observation on Michelet. He said that 
something is all the more interesting once it is far from our expectations 
(for Michelet, we expected him to write a historical and political book, 
but instead he wrote a psychoanalytic book). It is an informative criterion 
(= contrary to expectations), a maximum distancing criterion, a criterion 
of improbability. Such processes are very appealing to me. Talking about 
double articulation and morphemes in relation to cinema was, in 1964, 
unheard of. On the one hand, it is actually common: in principle, we write 
to deal with new things and not to repeat what everybody knows already. 
But there is something more specif ic, more ‘subjective’ (to speak simply), 
something directly linked to the desire to work. It is a certain attraction 
to a method, this conviction that the object seen through it will reveal 
something new. Of course, there is a risk of being disappointed, for the 
method can be less helpful than expected. But we are sure of not seeing 
anything without the method.
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The linguistic transformation → psychoanalysis. Return to the object
Q: Could you talk to us about your new direction, your decision to let go of 
linguistics and to embrace psychoanalysis? Was your change of direction 
due to the fact that your linguistic energy was exhausted, or simply because 
you desire to try out a new approach? Do you feel that you needed to get out 
of a coded or textual semiology that puts your object between parentheses 
(your object-spectator, if we remain in the f ield of cinema)?
Metz: At the moment, my work evolves and for two reasons. In terms of 
theory, I’ve always had the impression, even in the ‘linguistic’ work, that a 
real theory of cinema comprise three components: a linguistic component, 
classical semiology, inasmuch as the f ilm contains evidence of linguistic 
phenomenon, discourses, stories etc. …; a psychoanalytic component of vital 
importance, linking cinema to topics such as identif ication, voyeurism, the 
fetishistic splitting of belief (= disavowal), the apparatus [dispositif ] of the 
cinema room itself (material topography with its mental disposition); and a 
social-historical component, for cinema is in certain ways a socio-economic 
institution (= huge funding and the necessity to attract large numbers of 
spectators), with ensuing ideological consequences (ideology also lies in 
the f irst two aspects, it is not reduced to the content of f ilms). In the article 
I’m working on at the moment, I actually try to explain further how the 
interlocking of these three perspectives work. It also seems that the psy-
choanalytical input could join semiology, for there is a true psychoanalysis 
of codes; and on the other hand, this linguistic-analytic study of a certain 
type of symbolism is directly linked to a socio-historical enterprise for the 
signif ier is an institution.
I notice that choosing between these three perspectives is becoming 
less diff icult. The more I think about it the more I realize that, at a certain 
level, you can see them linked – and even intertwined – with one another. 
Until we reach that stage, it is the linguistic perspective that most interests 
me. And then there was some kind of driving force towards the intrinsic 
nature of cinema, and I found myself rushing to the second perspective. I 
like to turn the object by changing the method, and I have also felt that the 
object was turning in my hands by its force of rotation.
The second reason is more personal. I am persuaded that a certain domain 
of research can be momentarily exhausted (especially if this individual has 
spent a long time on it) without being exhausted from its scientif ic and 
collective perspective. In our work, objective importance and everyday 
life events, like the desire to change or weariness, often get mixed up. I 
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keep on encouraging good work on classical semiology, defend it in front 
of juries and even try to publish it. A lot has to be done in this direction. 
But, for me, I would like to do something slightly different at the moment. 
Slightly different: in spite of appearances – we always overestimate changes, 
it is a Parisian habit (it is also the structural principle of fashion). There are 
changes, but they are more connected than they seem; obviously not at the 
most visible level (what strikes me the most is the change of vocabulary 
and bibliographic references etc. … ); it connects somewhere else: in what 
I have to say on cinema.
Q: Did you feel that you could no longer leave Freud in the cupboard any-
more? You felt there was a lack somewhere. …
Metz: As I just told you, I thought about it but I did not really sense it. In 
reality, my encounter with psychoanalysis was made outside, not directly (or 
not f irstly) in my work. At the start, I was pushed into analysis for personal 
reasons. My ‘scientif ic’ and epistemological interest in psychoanalysis (or, 
my intrinsic interest in its method) came later, a few years later. At the 
beginning, the ‘patient’ that I was worried little about f ilm theory. There 
was a long period in which I was in analysis, whereas my work on cinema 
remained non-Freudian.
Q: Similar to linguistics, when you only realized you could work with the 
two afterwards. …
Metz: Exactly. Linguistics and cinema also remained separate for a while 
in my mind (it is a form of resistance). There is also a simpler reason that 
cannot be overlooked: to undertake a psychoanalysis of cinema, a personal 
analysis is not enough, you need to immerse yourself in books and it takes 
years (this is the same for linguistics, it is a disadvantage in regards to real 
disciplines).
Q: How do you see the spectator? As a psychological entity? As a libidinal 
economy?
Metz: Yes, like a certain type of economy, but historically-determined. And 
in a psychoanalytic approach, there isn’t just the spectator (you must be 
thinking about the seminar I presented in 1974). There is also the f ilmic 
text itself (= condensations, displacements, primal processes, etc. …). And 
f inally the institution in its foundations, in its conditions of possibilities, I 
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will say that it is the psychoanalytic constitution of the cinematic signif ier, 
of all the specif ic codes. At the moment, I am really looking into this in “The 
Imaginary Signif ier” and at this level everything is about the spectator, the 
f ilmmaker and the f ilm, it is the psychoanalysis of the cinematic apparatus 
itself.
I am not really interested in individual differences; I think they are an 
illusion. They exist empirically, and are of great importance in our practical 
and emotional life. But in order to understand them, you should not look 
at them, you should look under them. They are due to different forces, and 
these forces are not individual; they create a socio-psychological space. 
That space makes these variations possible. You have to study this space 
directly (or the different variations within that space). This space is the 
code, it is the metapsychological apparatus and it is also the technology 
of cinema.
IV – On Language and Cinema
The retroactive impact of psychoanalytic work on this book
Q: You are now looking at cinema through psychoanalysis – has it changed 
the functioning of codes for you, in comparison to when you studied them 
in Language and Cinema?
Metz: It really depends, for there are many different cases. Insofar as I am 
now studying the spectator’s metapsychology, it does not change the issues 
of codif ication in terms of classical semiology, for it deals with something 
different. I look at the relationship between the spectator and the f ilm. 
I am not studying the internal articulation of codes in a f ilm like I did 
in Language and Cinema. The change lies in an addition. At that time, I 
was only interested in f ilm from a so-called immanent perspective, rather 
traditional in semiology, whereas I am now interested in the spectator. If 
we were using terms from the semiology of communication, we would say 
that I have passed from the ‘message’ to ‘receiver’. I do not really believe, 
by the way, in such terms, I use them here to say that there is no retroactive 
interference with Language and Cinema. Apart from that, the ‘receiver’ 
that I am currently studying is not a kind of individual variable or a group 
variable, as it is often done (= different reactions on a f ilm according to 
different tastes, social and professional aff iliations, etc. …). For me, the 
spectator is not the real actual person, the person who goes to the cinema, 
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but a small part of that person who attends a screening. In order to function, 
the cinematic institution requires a certain psychological disposition, but 
only requires it during the screening. For example, in order for a f iction 
f ilm to be consumed as a f iction (and this is the same, more or less, for any 
audience from the same culture), it should not be mixed up with reality, and 
yet this is less so today: this process assumes a f ine-tuning of perception 
and belief, a psychological (or rather metapsychological) phenomenon, but 
a psychology related to the cinematic institution and not to its consumers 
as actual people.
We can say the same thing regarding the psychoanalysis of the code itself, 
of the cinematic-signif ier (not just the f iction f ilm) seen as a specif ic mix 
of the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary. And here again, there is no 
interference with Language and Cinema, but another addition (slightly nar-
rower than the study of the spectator). I start with the concept of ‘specif ic 
code’ and the ‘relevant traits of the material of expression’. I would like 
to show that these codes and traits, without modifying their meaning, 
presuppose the existence of an earlier stage (which I did not look at in 
Language and Cinema), a stage that I now call ‘the constitution of the signi-
fier’: the specular space of the cinema room, the presence of the photograph, 
the absence of the photographed object, the games of ‘identif ication’ and 
projections etc. … In short, all the social and historical processes without 
which the cinema could not exist and that psychoanalysis seems quite 
well suited to dismantle. It is the code’s condition of possibility, it does not 
change anything of its content.
On the other hand, there is something in my current work that retro-
actively reflects on Language and Cinema, and will necessitates further 
developments that are still unclear in my mind. I am referring to the 
psychoanalysis of the f ilmic text: rhetorical f igures (and which ones?), 
condensations and displacements, the emergence of primal processes 
and secondary revision, etc. In summary, it seems that all those processes 
happen on the level of the textual system, and that the codes are, on the 
contrary, on the level of existing and ‘hardened’ secondary revisions. Such 
would be its formulation with Language and Cinema, but it is only a general 
idea, far to general. I still need to work on it.
The difficulty of engaging with Language and Cinema
Q: I had the impression, when reading Language and Cinema and especially 
when I f inished it, of f inding an impressive apparatus that enables one to 
engage with textual analysis; a Tinguely-like mechanism,1 so fascinating 
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that it excludes everything with its perfectionism. There is a fantastic ef-
fort to explain, a frenzied policy occupying every inch of its territory, an 
excessively cautious progress, always careful of returning to its former 
positions, and when we try to be part of it, we feel a bit left out. We do not 
know how to employ this knowledge; we are left with fabulous tools but we 
do not know how to use them.
Metz: It seems to me that you overestimate and underestimate at the same 
time the tools in question. Firstly, this book does not claim to tell you how 
to carry out a textual analysis (I seldom do it), but only what the textual 
approach means in contrast to the analysis of codes. The book deals with 
cinema, not f ilm (hence the title), and the three chapters on f ilm aim at 
placing f ilm within cinema.
Q: In my opinion, it feels that we fall short of Language and Cinema. We 
may not be quite ready to see so many complications in cinema, and to 
take up this book and the analysis following it can be overwhelming. We 
are dealing with a very complex and immense topic, especially when the 
later concepts constantly rectify the former ones. When you delve into one 
code, it is always in a paradigmatic position with four or f ive others, and it 
is extremely diff icult to start working on that for we are never certain of 
what the f ifth one will mean.
Metz: I think there are quite a few distinct points in what you say. … First of 
all, you are saying that ‘we are not quite ready to see so many complications 
in cinema’. I think it is very true and it is a very important statement. The 
conceptual diff iculty that you are indicating, these ‘revolutions’ that others 
bring about via revision or new paradigms, often occurs in scientif ic books. 
If it was a linguistics book, nobody would be surprised, but since it is a book 
on cinema, people are not used to it and are somewhat panicked. There is 
an objective and historical factor that contributed to making this book 
frustrating and terrifying: adjusting to the expectations of various f ields 
or disciplines. In each f ield, we are used to reading in a certain way, with 
certain requirements, accepting a certain degree of restraint. Language and 
Cinema is surely a demanding book, a gloomy book (it is meant to be, it is my 
very own ‘private joke’2), but the conceptual torture is not pushed as far as 
in many other books. It is just that these books do not deal with cinema. Its 
‘diff iculty’ lies in the immaturity of the f ield rather than in the book itself.
In spite of this sociological obstacle, which is considerable, there are 
researchers, some dedicated to textual analyses, who have used the method 
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I proposed in my book. I can think of many works such as those by René 
Gardies on Glauber Rocha, Michel Marie or Roger Odin, or even Geneviève 
Jacquinot’s thesis on instructional f ilms. I can also think of very detailed 
essays (sometimes critical of my work) by Raymond Bellour in France, Ben 
Brewster and Stephen Heath in England, and Paul Sandro in the United 
States. I am very pleased with those interventions, not just for the obvious 
narcissistic reasons that we have the tendency to deny (who are we kidding?) 
but also because it highlights the start of a movement that, I hope, will 
develop: to teach writing on the cinema, open mindedness (rather new and 
fragile at the moment) at a conceptual level and level of precision that is more 
accepted elsewhere. Cinema as a social fact is not as simple as one may think.
Another problematic element is that Language and Cinema was not 
appropriately introduced to the public by critics and reviewers (with a 
few exceptions, but in very specialized magazines). In order for a book to 
be well received, critical reviews are extremely important but, to write 
them well, the authors should have been linguists and very knowledge-
able of cinema, which is very unlikely. Here again, the historical weight of 
‘traditional’ f ields and the division of disciplines had a real impact on the 
release of the book. Then followed a very strange situation: the book received 
many commendations, it has been mentioned everywhere and the unlucky 
journalist covering it did not have to understand what was at the core of 
the problem, the content of the debate. Most of the time, people settled for: 
‘Very important work, very new, it is a diff icult read but it is so worth it’. In 
summary, I sincerely applaud the reviewer who communicated to people 
his admiration and his terrif ied bewilderment.
The book’s distribution is also quite surprising: it is a well-known book, 
it sold well, is widely translated but it is also an ignored book, is not widely 
read (even if it is very visible on the bookshelves). This is understandable, 
for it is not the only example, there is a real issue in regards to publishing, 
and it makes the ‘applications’ more complicated.
Understanding the definition, not extrapolating it
Q: At the beginning, I had to struggle a little with the book but now, I feel 
more and more comfortable with it. I reread a chapter and I started to 
immerse myself in the book, to adapt it to my own ideas. Then, as soon as I 
wanted to study a f ilm, everything seemed unclear. … Because, you speak 
of codes, you say that there are codes (and we are well aware of that) but we 
only see their form, not their identity. It is like an aerial picture that does 
not quite help the explorer.
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Metz: First of all, if a lot of people now admit that f ilms are coded, do not 
forget that it is mostly because I insisted on it, because I have repeated it 
everywhere and in a great number of ways. Ten years ago, this idea was 
far less accepted, it was barely accepted. But, deep down, it is normal, it is 
what I would call the ‘scientif ic struggle’ (or an ‘ideological struggle’). We 
seek to conquer more f ields and change the intellectual landscape. There 
has never been a pure science, the influence of the times always mattered.
I completely agree with what you said before (it is actually clearly ex-
plained, if I remember well, in my book’s last page). Let me use your words: 
codes are def ined according to their form and not their identity. Ideally, 
there would have been two books to write about language and the cinema, 
two rather different books. The f irst one, the one that I wrote, would be on 
the status of codes, on the act of coding in the f ield of Film Studies where 
it has not really been explored. What is a code? Why is it cinematic? How 
‘present’ was it before the semiologist’s intervention? To what extent is it a 
construction? What makes it different to textual structures, etc.? In sum-
mary: what is the use of codes in an epistemology of f ilm analysis? I wanted 
to build a cinema-object as a scientif ic object and create a ‘rupture’ effect. 
I would, indeed, need a second book – I will hopefully write it one day or it 
may be written by someone else, I don’t know – that will list the codes. It is 
important to have a book that will list (even if it is incomplete) cinematic 
codes to categorize them and tell us which are the principal ones. This 
second publication would come very useful for researchers’ groundwork. 
There is a little of it in my book from page 171 to 175 [Language and Cinema, 
pp. 224-233] and, here you are right, it is very short and insuff icient. I think 
my book can be misleading, in terms of its listing of codes, it deals with 
something different. This book defines the understanding of all the codes 
and not their extension.
You never ‘apply’ anything
Your remark makes me think about something else, something that goes 
beyond Language and Cinema, which is related more to scientif ic advances 
in general. I am very skeptical when it comes to the concept of ‘application’. 
If you tell me: ‘I’ve taken this book, and for one of my f ilm analyses, I cannot 
put it into practice’. Well, for me, when looking further into this comment, 
I do not really see it as a criticism. I believe you can never apply anything. 
It has nothing to do with – despite its appearances – the phenomenon of 
‘influences’ I was dealing with before and that I actually f ind quite real. 
Influences come into play at the level of general inspirations, mind sets and 
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a few fundamental concepts, but not in terms of application. It is undoubt-
edly paradoxical since this book clearly aims at founding a theory and, 
consequently, will be seen as a work to put into practice. But the more 
informal and diluted ‘schools of thought’ are, the more realistic and lively 
they become: It would not, actually, be right to see them as schools. (This is 
a belief I hold everyday with my students. I accept influence, when it exists, 
but I do not accept control.)
In summary, it was necessary to develop this book as a ‘complete ma-
chine’, with all its inner workings, even the smallest ones, because it is 
only at this level of coherence that it corresponds to my conviction and can 
inspire others. At the same time, what will ‘remain’ of this book in future 
research (apart from a few people who decided to become my close students) 
will be the big ideas, some of the main parts, but only in a few cases.
Of course, some could say on this account, that I could have limited 
myself to the main ideas since they are most likely to ‘spread’ at a wider 
level. …
A necessary loss
… but in fact, it would not mean very much to say: the internal logic of a 
book’s fate does not coincide with this other inner logic that enabled me 
to write it. What I mean by ‘enabled me to write it’ is very concrete: the 
conditions without which the author would not have been able to write the 
book and, furthermore, publish it. Among these conditions is that the book 
becomes a complete object of desire that exhausts a topic of interest. We 
end up with a rather lengthy book, with a hundred or two hundred concepts 
(look at the index, at the back). And on top of this number, a dozen will 
be of use in certain research f ields: ideas such as ‘codes’, ‘textual system’, 
‘cinema vs. f ilm’, ‘specif ic vs. non-specif ic’, ‘pertinent traits of expression’, 
and three or four others. It is already quite a lot, I expected the level of 
understanding and support of this book to be close to nil. It is through 
these key concepts that the spirit of the book is conveyed. A book only 
becomes influential through its main outlines, not its details or specific f ilm 
analyses. It becomes popular through its broad appeal. And yet, in order for 
the book to gain in popularity, the author needs to think about the details as 
scrupulously as the main outlines. It seems that there is a ‘lost coeff icient’ 
(a little like ‘noise’ in computer science) that lies in the intrinsic conditions 
of communication, which consists for the most part of non-communication. 
What one remembers from a 300 page book is approximately 30 pages, but 
those 300 pages were necessary to assert those 30 perfect pages.
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In fact, this is not only relevant to the diff iculties of communication, to 
the rather low level of most f ilm studies essays, to the ‘broken’ and erratic 
structure of the scientif ic domain, to the high refractive index that must be 
calculated in advance and integrated into inverse coeff icient formulations 
(with all the consequences that follow and the profusion of misunderstand-
ings that we must prevent). There are also genuinely scientif ic factors: it is 
long and diff icult to explain oneself precisely, and especially with complex 
content. In a way, the whole work aims at explaining a few important 
achievements (those which have the chance of ‘passing’). The 30 ideal pages 
would be enough to outline them, which is not the same thing.
V. On Research. On Film Semiology
Research progresses in zigzags
Q: Nonetheless, I fear that certain terms are becoming quite popular even if 
we don’t quite know what they cover and what they mean. Due to the lack 
of a list of codes, terms are a little hazy, and I was rather astonished when 
reading several texts to see that the term ‘code’ was a bit of a magical word. 
We grasped the general idea but it did not go further than that.
Metz: You are talking about certain words becoming magical. There are 
indeed academic fashions where a certain amount of misinterpretation 
comes into play: an idea ‘resonates’, as if in an empty room, it multiplies 
itself but does not go further than that. If this is what you are talking about, 
this popularity, there is nothing we can do. All the sentences we write can 
have unsettling effects, even if those sentences are not related to the overall 
content. To write is to have our thoughts stolen from us, and (fortunately, 
not for all readers, but for many of them) it only becomes a canvas on which 
they create their desires: they wish they could have written it themselves. 
One should accept this situation or choose to live in silence.
But your question does not just deal with this. Your last words (= ‘it did 
not go further than that’) raise a real issue which is not related to fashion 
or popularity: how does research progress? What I want to say is –  if it 
progresses, how does it actually progress? I am convinced that, in a certain 
way, it does not progress by going ‘further’, which would involve a linear 
progression, but rather it progresses in zigzags. (It may be different in other 
f ields like maths or the exact sciences, for example, but I do not know that 
enough to develop this point.)
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By wanting to progress in a linear way, one is very likely to fall into a 
rather inhibiting individual or collective voluntarism. In the scientif ic 
(or technocratic?) mythology, there is a sort of ideal image: someone 
publishes a theoretical book, we then apply it and we can then improve 
and criticize the theory etc. … It is always represented in a linear manner. 
In reality, at least in my f ield, I have rarely observed research happening 
that way. For example, a book suggests a really diff icult concept, the 
concept of the code. On top of this, some people follow their own research, 
they carry out textual analyses or they write other books, other articles. 
Others will use the concept of the code from another perspective, but 
laterally, through a displacement or reframing of meaning. The problem 
progresses in an oblique and dislocated manner (like crabs!) and yet it 
surely progresses. Only an ideology of ‘eff iciency’ would be surprised 
or would denounce such a trajectory, but it is no better than the others. 
For example, a pioneering book’s input in the scientif ic debate can often 
be measured – among other inf luences – by the unease that it brings 
to other researchers, that pushes them to work and come up with new 
f indings. This pioneering book inspires the work of other researchers 
(which does not mean that they are conscious of this): in numerous cases, 
research begins with a feeling of unease, or other approaches. On the 
other hand, other researchers may choose another approach, based on 
scientif ic convictions and personal disposition, to explicitly ‘extend’ the 
pioneering book, therefore becoming a critical application or series of 
propositions to directly improve it. This is also a very important approach; 
both approaches are useful.
Against the official ideology of the research environment
I must say that in our world of research the image of knowledge is rather 
‘naïve’. It is as if our only aim in life was to do scientif ic work, as if this goal 
was not heavily overdetermined, as if we were a group of pure minded 
people constantly on the same level, whose work f its together perfectly 
and that we would all work in harmony.
In fact, other types of motivations come in the middle and you cannot 
keep them from interfering with the purity of scientif ic discussion. What 
I am saying is rather obvious and it is the same for other groups, but there 
is something quite curious (what I call ‘naïve optimism’): these factors can 
never be uttered, it is like a huge taboo or fear, and is in all cases denied. 
We should not talk about it. And yet, a rational policy of reorganization 
into teams, collective work, would be very different from what we usually 
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see. Of course, it is desirable to keep one’s cool and to keep the scientif ic 
debate in one’s own f ield. But in order for every participant to be able to 
make this secondary effort, one must make sure that there is no (or very 
little) resistance or emotional short circuit underneath and to pay minimum 
attention to it. For a start: acknowledge the existence of the issue and do 
not lie to yourself.
We will not be able to avoid strong antipathy between two people with 
different theoretical motives who will certainly start hours of confused 
and hopeless discussions. We will not be able to avoid that Mr. John Doe 
voices his opinion for nothing, because he has issues asserting himself. But 
this is not the aim of a discussion. A seminar, for example, is not a therapy 
group. It does not deal with the participants’ personal issues (there are 
other places for that). I am simply thinking of ways to improve research in 
its own environment, which takes charge of the emotional urges present 
in the background. That would help to avoid worsening some situations. It 
would be a good start if we think that the principal effect of most collective 
research organizations is to make things diff icult via their paperwork, their 
latent authoritarianism, the time and energy wasted in meetings, writing 
reports etc. …
In a way, the policy I am thinking of does not rely on much, but it is rarely 
acknowledged, let alone practiced: to be ready to speak to people (to listen 
to them especially), to give people space to talk about their research, to let 
them speak, give the freedom to choose one’s topic of interest, etc. … It is 
rather a ‘tone’, a general attitude, made of various approaches (but specif ic 
ones) and various refrains – all of this aimed at creating, not a scientif ic 
space (= that can only come afterwards) but a space where you can breathe, 
something that you rarely f ind (our research can only get better once we 
breathe): it is not enough for research to be created out of nothing, for we 
also need to f ind ways not to deny or reject it when a row takes place in a 
meeting.
Q: If you say that this naïve ideology exists and that research can only be 
done with desire – can it lead to misunderstandings (a few students come 
to mind), when they are aware that research is transferred, channelled 
through sciences, rigor and methods?
Metz: Yes, absolutely. … There is a group of students with whom I can only 
have a satisfying relation, a rather normal one, after a while, the time they 
use their initial miraculous scientism and they realize at once (that’s why 
I deal with personal relations) that I am a human being like any other. 
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There are psychoanalytical factors coming into play, rather obvious ones 
actually (= the position of the ‘disciple’ creates a Father Figure), and also 
institutional ones: we could say a lot about Ph.D. theses (Barthes actually 
talked about it quite well). It is a possible and impossible exercise, it is 
writing without writing, it not scholarly enough or too didactic. It really is 
a subtle adjustment.
When I am asked to be a Ph.D. supervisor, two things very often clash 
within the student: a real desire to explore object X, and the need to not 
acknowledge the object as it is (even though it is his best chance to do rigor-
ous work), a need to persuade himself in advance, on the level of labels and 
procedures (such as semiology) that what he is going to do is really scientific. 
There is also a real desire for limits, caution and safeguards. In certain 
cases, the demand borders on pure magic and puts me in a very delicate 
situation. I had candidates who, while looking anxious for my approval 
on their research project, were not satisf ied with my initial approval (for 
they suspected it to be based purely on politeness); they expected me to 
determine the genuinely semiological and scientif ic authenticity of their 
work that they had not even started. Or they thought that, when I told them 
that the topic they chose had to be of interest to them, they were afraid that 
it was a polite way of saying it did not interest me.
It is much harder than you think to make the candidate admit two is-
sues, the f irst one as signif icant as the second and yet so simple (I even 
failed to do so with certain candidates even if we had two hours of frank 
discussion): 1. That if the chosen topic was the one that interested me the 
most, I would have studied it or I would have started to get into it. 2. That 
the topic interests me as much, and I am glad to see that it is handled by 
someone who loves it more than I do.
Sometimes a super-egotistical projection is cast onto me (and I assume 
it is the same with all the rather famous researchers) and that can be quite 
alienating for the person who does that. Not only do they have to work in 
the same f ield as I do, making distinctly different contributions within the 
same f ield; they think that their desire should be mine (they seek for their 
desire an approved substitute). In the realm of the imaginary, I should be 
writing their book or they should write mine. It is an extreme case (in which 
the physical separation of individuals can be an issue), but it indicates a 
certain tendency. A tendency that can go as far as the sort of an attenuated 
hallucination such as when I hear ‘But you have written that…’ for things 
that I have never written.
Imprisoned desire is often the main issue of those who start their 
research. When you have many students, you observe certain patterns, 
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similar to the embryo’s development in successive phases, without even 
noticing that young researchers go through the same phases. When they 
come and see me at the beginning, their attitude is a mix of unjustif ied 
modesty and aggressiveness. And what is going to make our meetings 
easier and relaxed is that they will learn to know me in my everyday life 
through seminars or discussions, but what is important, most of all, is 
their f irst contact with real work, with their own work (or non-work, in 
the case of those whose ‘desire for doing a thesis’ was fundamentally an 
illusion). Then, little by little, they reorganize their work, and it becomes 
possible to talk about a ‘science’ without this stif ling defensiveness that 
they adopt at the beginning. For example, it is now possible to consider 
that the thesis will have certain semiological aspects but it will also be 
free to use other methods (I am not joking: this simple prospect is, at 
the beginning, sometimes experienced as a real heartbreak, as genuine 
anguish). The situation then becomes clearer and students then decide 
whether they want to carry on with their theses or not (it is a real choice). 
On a certain level, these two cases are very similar: it is assumed that the 
two students have reflected (without me) on their real interest on their 
thesis topic or their dislike for this type of thesis. Some of my best students, 
the most intellectually active, have not written a doctoral thesis, and may 
never do so. There are also some who decide to undertake it without really 
believing in it; it is, rather, a professional choice. This is again another lucid 
choice, real progress compared to the initial pathos.
In the same way, I have always been amused (and rather saddened, too) by 
the ready-made expressions that many students bring up: ‘I work with Mr. so 
and so’ (a well-known researcher). We all know what this often means: Mr. so 
and so, notoriously overworked, spoke to them twice for f ive minutes in the 
corridor between four phone calls. And yet, these students are not liars, they 
are not trying to impress their interlocutors, it is much deeper than that, 
much more sincere and unclear (quite serious actually): they are victims 
of the constant and stupid psychodrama of belonging and aff iliations, and 
without a ‘team’ (even imaginary, as they are 9 out of 10 times), they would 
not feel like a participant, they would not take seriously their desire to 
work on their interests. Once again we are dealing with imprisoned desire.
A folklore of mythical science exists (but it is waiting for its ethnologist); 
that is, an alienated scientif ic imaginary (for the scientif ic imaginary has 
another side to it, the one that intervenes in real research). A personal 
anecdote reminds me of this folklore: on several occasions, researchers 
who read my work without meeting me in person were surprised to see 
me on our f irst encounter because they imagined me to be an old and 
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austere gentleman wearing ties and black suits. (As a result, when I saw their 
reactions, it was as if they thought I was barely twenty. …) My writings do 
not give away anything about my age, my lifestyle, my taste in clothes, but I 
must say that my methodologies and problems are often rather austere. Here 
lies the projection made onto the author, a process that is much stronger 
than you think (it sometimes remains with me for quite a long time, and 
it is stronger than the visual evidence). It says a lot about people’s need for 
‘roles’: they f irst envisioned, like the scholastic disputations of the Middle 
Ages, a sort of entity (a physical person) and ‘f ilm semiology’. This would be 
a mere picturesque detail if, unfortunately, it did not go awry: that is, when 
the medieval entity serves only to interrogate itself, and when the desire for 
science, imprisoned by images, keeps you from working scientif ically. That 
is why I often avoid using the term ‘science’: it is not because we are remote 
from it in our f ield, but this word tends to have devastating psychological 
effects.
Quantitative misunderstanding
The alienation of this desire to work takes various shapes. I am in the right 
position to observe another one that I call ‘quantitative misunderstanding’. 
Over two years, more than two hundred candidates have applied to my 
seminars (and I could only accept a small number of them for I have already 
too many doctoral candidates). This situation, contrary to what you may 
think, is not very pleasant, or at least it becomes unpleasant rather quickly: 
once you have passed the pleasure of f lattery (quite silly, and that does not 
last very long), you truly understand the real nature of this request and the 
‘inflated’, unhealthy side of it.
If I told you that the University of Pau had received 200 applications for 
their only Master’s degree in Ornithology, you would think, everybody 
would think, that there is something wrong, something that has nothing to 
do with ornithology and that there must be in this f ield a sort of collective 
unease, whereas the real cause is elsewhere, and that creates a rush into 
the fabulous representation of this science.
In comparison to the world of research, all the disciplines, the courses, 
the work that I do or that can be done around me, represents a territory as 
tiny, as specialized, an intrinsic choice as ‘improbable’ as ornithology or 
other similar f ields. The only difference is that you cannot really see it, and 
here lies the misunderstanding. There are magical words such as ‘semiology’ 
(the new miraculous gadget for some) or ‘cinema’ that attract many people 
because it is ‘modern’: what a great reason!
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Cinema is one research topic among others, semiology is one way to 
approach it among others and I am a f ilm semiologist among others. (It 
is true that I am to some extent the initiator of this approach, and I have 
therefore apparently gained power that I do not actually have. That’s another 
misunderstanding: the desire to work with me, it is as if it could replace the 
work that everybody will have to do.) In certain cases, the misunderstanding 
is misplaced: there are many candidates who I cannot take on in my seminar 
but with whom I am ready to discuss work matters, as long and often as 
they need it; I tell them that but they remain dissatisf ied. Their real desire 
was to be part of the seminar, it was their goal.
I have caused real damage (and that really disturbs me, that’s why I’d 
like to talk about it) to some students I could not accept on the programme. 
What I mean is: imaginary damage that appeared to be psychologically 
real, at least at that moment.
If the misunderstanding has different shapes, it sometimes manifests 
itself in different ways. For example, some people visit me in an enthusiastic, 
indeed rather vivacious, frame of mind, yet they disappear three months 
later and never come back. It is in the second phase of their absence that 
a certain truth comes up: these people’s problems were elsewhere, they 
were interested in something else. But then, how did they come up with 
the (sincere and fervent) illusion that it was vital to undertake research on 
f ilm semiology? Moreover, to undertake it with me? It is another case of 
intellectual warping of desire.
In reality, I think that once we write, we raise a disproportionate amount 
of hope, hopes that inscribe within the reader (often momentarily, before 
they fall for another author) an unfocused ambition or expectation, a dis-
satisfaction that the goal is remote from what has been written: as much 
as we are trying to be precise in our writing, it is never enough. We are 
expected to know everything, to be able to solve unresolved and ancient 
issues, to answer questions to which we never had the key, questions that 
never crossed our minds. Here lies the gap, comical and rather annoying, 
between what the visitors expect from me and what I can provide them 
with: if I tell them that, in terms of their own confusion, I do not hold any 
specif ic key and that we could simply talk about it, nothing else, they do 
not really believe me; instead, they think that I want to turn them away.
Film semiology is similar to all other intellectual enterprises: there are 
very few researchers for whom it represents a real and long lasting choice. 
Simply for statistical reasons, there are a great number of other topics of-
fered to them. But it is part of one of those disciplines (it is not the only one) 
that attracts uncertain questions, that temporarily deals with uncertainties, 
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researchers unsure of their work. I must admit that it is rather diff icult 
to be a student or a researcher at the beginning (and there the real issue 
begins). I must also say that, in certain f ields, intellectual work is seen as an 
overrated ideology, a validation that verges on the grotesque (when there 
are so many different things we can do in life). I have noticed that there is 
strong pressure – and I could see it in certain distressed individuals who 
felt the need, often in a real panic – to write something, an intense search 
for something to write.
Semiology as a universal mill
Q: In regards to cinema, the rise of semiology comes with its frenzied ap-
plication in f ilm studies, and it tends to rely on exhaustive descriptions. 
It is the desire to differentiate itself from impressionistic criticism. And 
f inally, this elevated position comes down to a defence mechanism, of the 
sort: ‘At least, for me, no one will ever say that my work is not rigorous’ type 
of attitude that is leaning toward a scientistic approach.
Metz: I also f ind that there are no general conclusions to draw, when 
exhausting the f ilm becomes a goal in itself. That is what I call ‘slicing 
semiology’: we add everything to a universal mill, all the texts in the world, 
all the myths, all the novels and all the f ilms etc. … They come out cut in 
slices of different sizes, big syntagms, small syntagms, groups of second or 
forty-f ifth articulations. But in the end, we should not be surprised, it can 
only prove that there are bad semiological studies, just as there are bad 
historical studies, psychoanalytical studies and so forth. …
I also think that the answer is already in your question: in the f ield of 
cinema studies we have seen so many purely impressionistic and journal-
istic writings that, when semiology came into play, it brought more rigor; 
consequently, some have reacted by taking the opposite direction, a very 
common strategy in the history of all disciplines.
And you know, there are two histories in each f ield, parallel and yet 
also slightly staggered: the f irst one, with its own internal evolution, 
shapes actual research; and the other one, related to taste and desire, to 
the specif ic coeff icient of adulation, also obeys some sort of rules, like 
the rule of successive waves. The same persons, those who are lacking 
a topic, will take care of the succession of consecutive waves. To limit 
myself to a small spatio-temporal area, I notice that some have f irst 
fought with classical semiology, then semanalysis, and now with what 
Deleuze-Guattari and Lyotard have worked with. Each time, the work 
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is carried out with equal enthusiasm, followed by a painful process of 
questioning. I have deliberately taken the example of three approaches 
that seem important, that interest me and that inf luenced my work. But, 
to remain open to new contributions, to continue to work in a changing 
environment, and when we are convinced that there are things to change, 
we need to remain calm, form an inner resistance to those waves (to 
the waves, not the authors), an ability to put things into perspective, to 
determine for ourselves the intrinsic importance of certain tendencies 
and projects (this determination enables us to relate to them to a certain 
extent, but it keeps you from getting mixed up, keeps you from discredit-
ing everything).
Honestly, it is very diff icult for all of us to f ind our own approach in 
the midst of the turbulent intellectual life, especially in Paris. We should 
read what is published (otherwise we become fossilized) and at the same 
time not spread ourselves everywhere, or consequently there will not be 
anything for us to do. We need to stay on our own track, avoid unproductive 
aggressiveness, even if this path is long and winding, and even if at certain 
times you feel uncertain or hesitant (you should allow yourself to say ‘I don’t 
know’ without torturing yourself).
This process is the only one that suits my temperament. But the ques-
tion goes beyond my personal case and brings us back to what this inter-
view is about. The scientif ic activity corresponds to keeping a delicate 
psychological disposition (an economic balance), which cannot develop 
for some and which can work at the cost of persistent wounds, stresses, 
a daily suffering (there are shipwrecks on occasions). I am therefore 
convinced that one of the main diff iculties (not the only one obviously) 
lies in the confiscation of the desire I have talked about, a seizing made 
by scientistic chimeras, by the other’s desire (which is assumed), by the 
entire scientif ic universe and their stiff self-punitive inclinations, as a 
protection against ourselves. I have forcefully insisted, in my answers, 
on the importance of choosing a work topic that we love (and that f irst 
of all we have to make sure that we like scientif ic methods). It may be 
obvious but the entire scientif ic machinery tends to make us forget this 
fact. The dimension of desire has to be reintroduced (a desire that is 
rehabilitated, accepted), and it needs to be done explicitly, in the f ield 
of scientif ic work. We need to refuse this artifice that freezes our f ields 
and harms the most vulnerable of us. We must be simple and that may 
be the most complicated thing of all.
Interview tape-recorded in May-June 1974.
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Notes
1. [The interviewees are referring to the machine-like kinetic sculptures of the 
artist Jean Tinguely.]
2. [English in the original.]
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In this round table discussion, carried out after the conference ‘Film 
Theory and Research’ and published in Cinéma 221 (1977), the participants 
(Christian Metz, Michel Fano, Jean Paul Simon, and Noël Simsolo) reflect 
on the success of the conference and discuss issues such as the problem-
atic perception of f ilm as an object of study, the role of psychoanalysis in 
the study of f ilm, and the need to study f ilm sound.
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‘Théorie du cinéma. Table ronde.’ Christian Metz, Michel Fano, Jean Paul 
Simon, and Noël Simsolo. Cinéma 221 (May 1977), pp. 49-61. Reprinted 
with the permission of Jean Paul Simon and Michel Fano. Translated by 
Warren Buckland.
I. Challenging the traditional split between theory/practice
[Gaston Haustrate:] Last February [1977], the Off ice de la Création Cinéma-
tographique2 (Off ice for Cinema Creation) organized a conference called 
“Film Theory and Research,” which we briefly mentioned in number 219.3 
We wish to return to the organizers and some of the participants in order to 
identify more clearly their objectives, and hopefully to learn some lessons 
from them. Can you begin by addressing the f irst point?
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Jean Paul Simon: Our initial objective was to collate research using a loca-
tion we had available to us (UNESCO). With this in mind, our goal was to 
allow people, specialists or not, to meet and present progress reports on 
f ilm theory research, which we knew existed in several countries. But no 
gathering of this kind and on this topic had taken place before in France, 
nor, to our knowledge, in other countries. Admittedly, an identical idea 
had been put to the Off ice by Joël Farges who was, with Michel Fano 
and myself, one of the organizers of this conference. Its project was the 
organization of a meeting about f ilm theory research. We wanted to unite 
researchers and f ilmmakers from different countries in order to challenge 
the traditional split between theory/practice, and to compare different 
ideas.
Michel Fano: It is necessary to point out that there had been, in January 
1976, in Beaubourg, an experimental f ilm retrospective. By proposing this 
conference with the Off ice, I wanted to respond to the intellectual zealotry 
undertaken at this previous event. Indeed, an article in Le Monde had 
referred to the retrospective at Beaubourg as “The History of the Cinema,” 
trying to get people to believe that the history of the cinema was the history 
of experimental cinema. Admittedly, we were extremely interested in this 
type of cinema, but we think that between the non-narrative experimental 
cinema and the commercial cinema, characterized by Claudine Eizykman 
as N.R.I. (Narrative, Representational, and Industrial), there remains a vast 
range of cinema to research, in particular, Robbe-Grillet’s dysnarrative 
[dysnarratif ]. Therefore, without being able to cover everything in this 
new conference, we wanted to show that theory and research did not apply 
only to experimental cinema, and that it was false to limit the history of 
the cinema to it.
Noël Simsolo: As a spectator at this conference, I was struck by its serious 
approach. There was no hysteria, nor any sneering in regards to the various 
types of theoretical and practical research presented there.
Simon: By avoiding zealotry, in responding to the limitations of the Beau-
bourg retrospective in 1976, we also reacted strongly against the traditional 
unfounded reduction of cinema to the commercial sector. Economically and 
sociologically, dominant cinema is an important phenomenon that needs 
to be understood, yet the methodologies for studying it are not necessarily 
the same as those that drive the very important work on what we call the 
‘avant-garde’.
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Simsolo: Today, researchers realize that their work needs to focus just as 
much on the f ilms of John Ford or Marco Ferreri as much as the f ilms of 
[Jonas] Mekas, Michael Snow, or Stephen Dwoskin. This awareness struck 
me at the conference.
Simon: There are certainly different ways to study f ilm just as there are 
different types of f ilms made. But, by successively comparing these types of 
studies, we can begin to see the film as object, and determine how to def ine 
it descriptively. In a way, this conference wanted to be a beginning and to 
present a series of questions to be published later.
Fano: To be specif ic about one of our other motives: we wanted to em-
phasize research that seeks to show that cinema offers more interesting 
possibilities beyond f ilms that make the spectator work. After seeing 47 
f ilms at the last Cannes f ilm festival, I have noticed that the problem is not 
so much with the f ilms themselves as with the work spectators undertake 
in relation to the f ilm they see and hear. Also, one of the objectives of 
the conference was to try to listen attentively to f ilms because, to a large 
extent, criticism tends to ignore this type of work. I would like to see this 
conference as a point of departure for future research that could develop 
in this direction.
Christian Metz: I was not one of the organizers of this conference, but was an 
enthusiastic and actively engaged participant. In this respect, my question 
is: ‘Why this conference today?’ I have several answers.
First of all, what struck me is that this conference was timely, an historic 
opportunity in relation to my intellectual work on theory, this new tendency 
that I instigated and needed to call ‘semiology’ (a convenient if simplistic 
label).
This conference was timely because of what we had developed in our 
semiological ‘workshop’ in the past f ifteen years, where we stayed with our 
specialized research, despite the international dissemination of some of it.
It is true, an established fact, that this dissemination was limited, 
making our work inaccessible; but this was necessary in order to develop 
the discipline. It therefore seems to me that a dialectical interaction ex-
ists between the development of the discipline and this conference in 
February.
Within my area of ‘pure’ theory – an idiotic term simply indicating that 
I do not make f ilms – in this area, the discipline made the conference a 
success – and I insist: it was a success. …
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But in return the conference presented the discipline’s specialized 
research to a wider public. We can even say that, in terms of theoretical 
research, this conference was a landmark, a step forward, and it opened up 
the possibility of rich collaboration. This conference represented a major 
move towards the resolution of conflicts.
II. In general reflections on art, cinema does not merit a place
[Haustrate:] Before this event, there had been no equivalent attempt?
Simon: There have been meetings of the same importance but in areas other 
than cinema, and certain other f ilm events but of limited scope. Here, the 
event clearly established an international prof ile with, of course, French 
numerical advantage due to geographical and economic reasons (because 
our budget was insuff icient) that limited foreign participation, which is 
important for this type of work.
Simsolo: I would like to reconsider the idea of the spectator’s work about 
which Michel Fano spoke. I would like to say that the idea of work does not 
exclude the pleasure of seeing a f ilm. It is false to think that a researcher 
sees a f ilm in an oblique way, with a meta-perception that physically seg-
ments the f ilm, which would then become a simple object of immediate 
dissection. …
Metz: I can offer some personal remarks on this issue, since I am often 
labeled an ‘extreme theorist’ and ‘cerebral’. It turns out, for example, that I 
am an enthusiastic spectator of westerns; when the hero shoots the villain, 
I celebrate. I get ‘worked up’, if I want to, without that preventing me from 
maintaining a critical attitude while watching a f ilm and after watching 
it. We embody a naïve spectator [un spectateur de premier degré] within 
ourselves and, as Edgar Morin said more than f ifteen years ago, we are all 
black, we all carry in us our black heritage. The theorist is like everyone else. 
… Lastly, how could we speak about the social phenomenon of cinema if 
parts of it are not in us? …
Simon: If one were always located at the meta-level [second degré], one 
would not be able to study the cinema; and this is precisely why many 
theorists ignore the cinema.
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Simsolo: We can get pleasure watching a f ilm and wonder afterwards 
about the reasons for this pleasure. It can work for everyone. When a f ilm 
makes us euphoric, we wonder what elements, what type of alienation or 
which system, generates this pleasure. We are far from the stereotypes that 
caricature the theorist as a person who, with his head between his hands, 
seeks while watching a f ilm the reasons the principal actor has so many 
hairs on his eyebrows or in his nostrils. … It is necessary to f ight against 
this false image.
Fano: I would like to underline the difference in the general public’s ap-
proach to cinema and to the other arts. We reflect on music, we reflect on 
literature, we reflect on painting – it is even very fashionable – but the f ilm 
must f irst entertain, make us laugh or cry. For 95% of spectators, ‘the film 
as object ’ does not exist: the operation of its text, even less.
Metz: This type of position on the cinema is common. Personally, I am all 
the more conscious of it, for my books are labeled ‘diff icult’. If they had been 
books on linguistics, musicology or sociology, I would never hear this type 
of comment. It would seem that, in regards to f ilm, the general expectation 
was that one writes stupid stuff. In this depressing context, my books do 
indeed appear ‘diff icult’; in fact Language and Cinema, for example, is no 
more diff icult than any basic, serious book on musciology.
Fano: In this connection, it is suff icient to think of Beaubourg, which wants 
to promote popular culture, but the cinema scarcely holds any real place in 
it: at most a minor role. This shows that, in this idea of cultural dissemina-
tion, of reflecting on art, the cinema does not have a place.
Simon: Therefore, the basis of our conference was to create awareness of 
the existence of the cinema and of research that studies it, because we are 
still utterly illegitimate: a f ilm critic cannot – without being laughed at or 
without facing howls of contempt – use ‘complicated’ vocabulary; whereas 
for other arts, it is legitimate.
This absence of legitimation is found everywhere. If, for example, we 
examine how the cinema entered the university, we see that its legitima-
tion came from politics and not from cinema itself. The cinema is always 
perceived as secondary. It is placed within ‘Broadcasting’ or ‘Information 
and Communication’ etc. These labels legitimately justify the presence of 
the cinema in the university, as well as in other places.
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Simsolo: The nature of legitimation even covers theses on the cinema! One 
does not see a thesis on ‘the cinema according to Lang’ but rather ‘the idea 
of culpability in the work of Fritz Lang’.
Fano: Why a shot has a certain length, how it functions compared to others, 
or why something on the left of the screen passed on the right: these are is-
sues one never speaks about since one never speaks about the f ilm as object.
Simsolo: However, these are questions that arise in the work of any real 
director. Apart from the critical texts written by f ilmmakers, writings 
on f ilm generally ignore these issues. This is more than an anomaly: it is 
often incompetence. Generally, the critic of painting knows the object he 
writes about.
Simon: The art critic is or was informed by preliminary study of the history 
of art, of aesthetics, etc., whereas a number of f ilm critics simply improvise 
without any prior study at this level.
III. The urgency to produce real work on the way film functions
[Haustrate:] Where exactly do you locate the work of the theorist compared 
to that of the f ilmmaker?
Simon: The theorist endeavors to work from a scientif ic foundation, and 
his research in semiology overlaps with the f ilmmaker who works from a 
material and practical foundation. Their work is complementary.
Fano: I would like to focus more on what we said earlier and to make a 
statement. In the past I belonged to various commissions: festival selection 
committees, avance sur recettes,4 etc. In this f ield, the argument made in 
connection with f ilms or projects is never done on the basis of f ilm in itself. 
It is done on the basis of what the f ilm ‘says’. The members of these com-
missions evoke, for example, the psychological approach of the characters, 
interest in this or that situation, never the f ilm as object.
Simsolo: And look at the result! The lack of analysis is reflected in ‘politi-
cal’ f ilms, whose defenders call upon the represented ideas to praise the 
work, forgetting absolutely ‘how it is represented’. And because ‘how it is 
represented’ often transforms left-wing ideas into reactionary, alienating 
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f ilms, it is very serious. For this reason, the work of the conference, the work 
of Metz, and of Cahiers du Cinéma, is important. Other f ilm journals, in their 
way, are taking into account the specif ic nature of f ilm, and are beginning 
research in this direction. And, the investigation of f ilm as object becomes 
critical because the f ilm as object can distort the ideas in the script. Which 
proves, inter alia, that no f ilm exists without its f ilm language.
Fano: And one can readily understand how the problem becomes insoluble 
for political leaders: how to determine the value of a militant f ilm like 
October [Eisenstein 1928]?
Metz: Political cinema and militant cinema are not the same. This is the 
problem.
Simsolo: The opposite is the case for Hollywood cinema. Thanks to Raymond 
Bellour who refused, for example, to be limited to thematic research on 
Hitchcock in order to undertake an analysis of pleasure in the Hitchcockian 
f ilm as object, we know that the pleasure of being afraid when watching 
these f ilms was not only a question of social fantasies, but the result of the 
operation of images – their framing, their editing, and their duration.
[Haustrate:] In this connection, where do you locate the urgency? Is work on 
mainstream cinema today’s priority compared to work on the non-narrative 
cinema?
Fano: One type of f ilm is not more important than another. The urgency is 
to be able to listen to a f ilm: How do we practice this listening, how do we 
open f ilm to new readings, to be attentive to ‘other’ cinema, to different 
socio-cultural habits of today?
Metz: For me, the urgency is to produce valuable reflexive work in all areas. 
I am wary of making demands in terms of content because, even if we prefer 
not to, the demand quickly becomes extreme. And it is always speculative. 
The demand is to produce real work, as in Bellour’s research mentioned 
earlier. For years, we were told to attack, criticize, and expose Hollywood. 
This is true, but it was even more urgent to show how it worked. This is 
what Bellour achieved by dismantling its machinery and mechanisms, 
overcoming the manifest level, as for example in the complete denunciation 
of the dream factory, to show how this dream factory actually worked.
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Simsolo: This contributed to opening up different analyses of Hollywood 
f ilms. When Straub declares that John Ford is a Brechtian f ilmmaker, the 
analysis of the f ilm as object justif ies his assertion, because the f ilm as 
object can positively deform what a f ilm ‘says’. Certain Hollywood directors 
achieved this, unconsciously or not: Fuller, Tourneur, Lang, Hitchcock, Jerry 
Lewis, Billy Wilder, etc.
Simon: It is important to go beyond the simple denunciation of ideology, 
which says that the dominant cinema is the result of the dominant class. …
Fano: Let us take for example the case of Bach in music. … He was kicked 
out of his church several times when he merely composed masses and 
cantatas. However, it was felt – rightly – that his technique was untradi-
tional. Of course, what opens less conventionally than the St John Passion, 
for example? It affects the libido and the German priests of the time, who 
felt it instinctively.
Metz: The process of deformation of a work by its technique is very sharp, 
very acute and always very interesting to analyze.
IV. Yes, there is a psychoanalysis of the signifier
[Haustrate:] We noticed the prominence of psychoanalysis during your 
conference. How has it inspired you?
Simsolo: As a participant, I liked this prominence. Up to now, facing the 
signif ier on screen, the spectator took refuge in the signif ied to justify the 
nature of his pleasure or his impression of a f ilm’s quality. In analyzing the 
signif ier beyond thematic meaning or the screenplay, one realizes that it 
provides a certain amount of information connected to the new f ield of 
psychoanalysis. There, the image functions on another level, which it often 
tries to erase with an ideological fog.
Metz: This raises an important problem: the completely inaccurate and 
unbelievable image that many people have of psychoanalysis. People think 
that to speak about the psychoanalysis of the cinema is to talk about want-
ing to see buttocks. This is absolutely false. Psychoanalysis is a formidable 
instrument to analyze the signif ier and the relation between image/sound. 
There is a whole psychoanalysis of the textual operations on the one hand 
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and, on the other hand, the cinematic institution: a social institution 
and a cinematic institution. A social institution has its imaginary, its 
symbolic system, its diluted fantasies. … Yes, there is a psychoanalysis of 
the signif ier.
Fano: It is the only one that is interesting.
Simsolo: And it is also why it is interesting to analyze the relation between 
the spectator and a porn film’s images, rather than the content. The function 
of the image is often the only naturalism present.
Simon: Interestingly, it is the excess of naturalism that makes it dysfunctional.
Simsolo: Because the exaggeration of a code subverts that code. But in the 
psychoanalysis of cinema, there is also the spectator facing the f ilm. Every 
image is erotic.
Metz: Absolutely! The spectator’s look brings the f ilm into existence. And in 
terms of porn, Bazin noticed that the pornographic f ilm is content to play 
directly with voyeurism, not sublimate it: it offers an exaggerated version 
of all f ilm. All f ilm functions on voyeurism, but one should not limit the 
term to the fact of looking at buttocks. Voyeurism is the passion to see, to 
perceive; it is one of the foundations of the cinematic institution.
Simsolo: Walt Disney cartoons, for example, are pornographic, and the 
biggest porn f ilm is undoubtedly Psycho (Hitchcock, 1960) which, as Jean 
Douchet has demonstrated admirably, plays on desire, gratif ication, and 
frustration.
Metz: Psychoanalysis is nothing more than a tool. The frustration of the 
look, for example, poses the problem of the frame, the rectangular screen. 
Frustration, in the form of concealment, forms part of the scopic play, of 
voyeuristic play, including ordinary erotic exercises. Concealment, delays, 
and resumptions play on the scopic regime and on the f inal pleasure [ jouis-
sance], which Psycho indeed shows magisterially.
On this question, it is necessary to return, inter alia, to the research of 
Jean Paul Simon, [Pascal] Bonitzer, Roland Barthes, etc. They produced 
texts on the voyeuristic-fetishistic mechanisms at work in the frame, which 
argue that the rectangular screen has the form of a cut or division that 
fundamentally belongs to the operation of the fetish.
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Simsolo: See the perfection of the frame in the Hollywood cinema and 
the analysis that could be made – which would be exciting – between the 
distance produced by this perfection, and the process of identif ication with 
the Hollywood hero that tries to produce this N.R.I. cinema (which involves 
a play with frustration).
Metz: It is Bazin who said that, in The Blue Angel [von Sternberg, 1930], the 
sex of Marlene occupies the diagonal center of the screen in certain shots. 
It is useless to psychoanalyze Jannings or von Sternberg on this subject. It 
is the screen that functions as the place of tension and desire.
Simsolo: You spoke about porn but, in porn, there is a loss of spectatorial 
pleasure [ jouissance] because of the frame and the cinematic institution.
Metz: Precisely. The issue with pornographic f ilm is not in its content. 
Pornography is traditionally def ined in terms of content, forgetting that 
it is in the act of looking. The question of the camera’s point of view is 
never posed. This is not pornography, but a meat market [l’étalage de 
charcuterie].
Simsolo: There is no erotic pleasure without frustration and, as such, the 
cinema of Eric Rohmer is exemplary.
V. The ideological downplaying of the sound dimension in 
our civilization
[Haustrate:] On another level, do you think theoretical work on sound is 
important?
Fano: I think that the neglected sound dimension is what reaches the 
unconscious most directly. This dimension was expunged a long time ago 
by f ilmmakers who worked exclusively on the image. For sound, one estab-
lished a system of reassuring clichés which one always f inds: for example, 
what is usually called ‘f ilm music’ [la ‘musique de film’]. That avoids conflict.
Simon: Remember that Godard’s soundtracks were regarded as obscene.
Simsolo: Even amongst technicians, there is always this idea of ‘clean sound’ 
and ‘dirty sound’.
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Metz: It is a defensive strategy. In the past, when leaving a screening of Lola 
Montes [Max Ophüls, 1955], there were epic f ights on this subject.
Fano: The result of this idea about loud sound leads to one not hearing the 
sound in the cinema. The projectionists seldom adjust sound to a normal 
level. One hears f ilms at 25 decibels, i.e., connecting to the visual source 
and not to the ear.
Simsolo: That started when f ilms were screened in Broadway theatres or 
the Royal Palace. This clean sound is aberrant because it also gives a false 
idea of the theatre.
Metz: One of the roles of theoretical work is located there. Between 1927 
and 1933, this question of sound was frequently discussed. There are numer-
ous accounts of this problem involving Rudolf Arnheim, plus Eisenstein, 
Pudovkin, and Alexandrov’s ‘Manifesto for Orchestral Counterpoint,’ the 
Pagnol-René Clair polemic, the theories of the ‘asynchronism’ and ‘non 
coincidence’ of image/sound, the reflections of Balázs, etc.
Fano: Curiously, the “Manifesto for Orchestral Counterpoint,” a signif icant 
theoretical text signed by Alexandrov, Pudovkin, and Eisenstein, was hardly 
applied thereafter by Eisenstein who, with Alexandre Nevsky [1938], con-
tributed to the design of ‘f ilm music’. This difference is surprising.
Simsolo: As a result, the viewer of Robbe-Grillet or Carmelo Bene is furious 
not hearing clean sound to which he was accustomed. Not to mention that 
the majority of viewers see f ilms dubbed.
Metz: Dubbing horrified Bresson: “His (untrained) voice gives us his intimate 
character.”5
Simon: The cinema creates codes of reading and codes of pleasure, with the 
result that any attempt to do something else is perceived to be a violation, 
a transgression. …
Simsolo: … Or iconoclastic, which is symptomatic of a self-protective 
strategy.
Metz: This is not a problem exclusive to f ilm, this downplaying of the 
sound dimension in our civilization. It is a historical and ideological 
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phenomenon, which is everywhere, including in our own group and 
inside theoretical work. Except for Lacan and [Guy] Rosolato, no one 
really speaks of the ‘invocatory drive’, the mother’s voice and the fear 
of this voice. In psychoanalysis, work on the voice is far behind work on 
vision.
VI. Not working according to an absurd conference ideal
[Haustrate:] Certain participants in your conference pointed out that opera, 
theatre, the comic strip, were rarely mentioned. Why was this?
Simon: We wanted to, but we were delayed by other things.
Fano: And our organizing work included various tasks that were taking our 
time: transport, handling, advertising, administration. …
Simon: Because we were with UNESCO, we believed that we would benefit 
from its rich, substantial infrastructure. But there was nothing.
Fano: Most of the work was carried out by Jean Paul Simon and Simone 
Raskin. … Moreover, we had problems such as Customs blocking f ilms 
brought in by Annette Michelson. Of course, this conference had flaws. It 
is true that opera was not mentioned, although this popular spectacle is 
precisely what cinema replaced. Alban Berg had understood this; before 
his death, he planned to make a f ilm of [his opera] ‘Woyzeck’. He began 
the découpage just before he died.6
Metz: Wasn’t Diderot’s great dream a total art that would include opera?
Simsolo: The popular novel, the comic strip of the Thirties and its relation 
to adventure Hollywood f ilms, or the Italian comics of today that directly 
influence popular Italian cinema in terms of eroticism and violence, were 
never mentioned. The same with theatre.
Simon: There is the issue of animation. We wanted too many things.
Metz: There was also the problem of the large number of important presenta-
tions, which left insuff icient time for general discussion.
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Simon: That said, the many discussions after the presentations demonstrated 
the positive aspect of the conference.
Metz: Some people criticized the chaotic aspect of the conference. I do not 
agree. I am a veteran of conferences in various disciplines and, generally, 
others were much more disorganized than this one. Those who made these 
criticisms spoke of an ideal, perfect conference, which has never existed.
[Haustrate:] How did the working groups function?
Simon: Only one really functioned, the one organized around Noël Burch 
and Jorge Dana. They analyzed the implicit norms of f ilm production, using 
a television program and a new f ilm: Solemn Communion by Rene Féret 
[1977]. They worked on this f ilm and on the f ilm’s unedited footage with 
the technicians and the director. This group will continue its analyses.
[Haustrate:] How do you see the future of this conference?
Fano: It would be necessary to envisage a new conference in two years in 
order to f ill the gaps of this one. We would focus less on new media because 
research is very slow in this f ield. We should direct the conference towards 
research that advances rapidly, by widening the approaches in order to 
avoid criticisms we received.
Metz: Taking these reservations into account, we can say that this confer-
ence marks a step forward in the maturity of the general level of discussion 
on f ilm. For f ive days, we heard discussions on the cinema and on f ilms 
where, of course, we spoke about linguistics, psychoanalysis, theories of 
ideology, etc. It is not necessary to fetishize it, but this is in fact the work 
that we do today.
VII. What would contribute to the popularity of theory?
[Haustrate:] How do you explain the fact that your conference received little 
coverage in the press in general and by f ilm critics in particular?
Fano: I believe that the absence of coverage in the press was to be expected 
for reasons referred to above (working specif ically with f ilm); many of 
your colleagues [f ilm critics], who are to some extent a ref lection of the 
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public, did not feel concerned. The majority did not come to this confer-
ence so that they would not have to write on something they still barely 
comprehend.
Metz: I f ind this quite harsh. I say this calmly, that I often suffer from fatuous 
attacks or silence from critics. But we should consider the professional 
constraints specif ic to this job: seeing many f ilms, working quickly, often 
under bad conditions. Consequently, to be open to advanced thinking 
means hard work for many people. Rare are those who can carry it out 
(there was Bazin, in particular …).
[Haustrate:] It is true that f ilm criticism is practiced under poor economic 
conditions. But it is also true that 90% of our colleagues’ work remains, 
due to intellectual laziness or neglect, a thematic or psychological form 
of f ilm analysis, which completely neglects [theoretical] writing, whereas 
their inf luence could be great in regards to popularizing theory. Why 
this gap? Why is there a gulf between high-level theory and routine work 
in organizations like the IFACC,7 for example? What solutions do you 
recommend to reduce this disparity and expand our respective areas of 
activity?
Simon: These questions are too important to be settled quickly. This gap 
is also an effect of f ilm’s lack of legitimacy. It is also important to avoid a 
moralizing critical attitude: the defense of a non-legitimate object always 
leads to strategies of defense and recognition, which leads to innumerable 
presentations on f ilm as art, passing through types of analysis found in 
other disciplines (literary analysis, theatrical) that is, thematic analysis (a 
f ilm will be interesting for its important themes, there exists an implicit 
catalogue of ‘good themes’).
Again we are faced with the same problem: the idea that cinema involves 
a specif ic type of work, yet access to documents and equipment is still not 
generally accepted. The result is to carry out work in piecemeal fashion, 
and without sharing information. Or working in organizations like the 
IFACC also means, although differently, a break, a gap vis-à-vis usual modes 
of thinking and working on f ilm. Moreover, experience shows that some 
theories deemed diff icult work remarkably well for non-specialists under 
certain conditions, as shown in Alain Bergala’s experience teaching audio-
visual media in secondary education (see Alain Bergala, Pour une pedagogie 
de L’audio-visuel, Paris: Editions de la Ligue française de l’Enseignement et 
de l’Éducation Permanente, 1975).
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Metz: In this matter as in others, I do not believe we should expect an 
all-inclusive solution. Some f ilm critics work under pragmatic conditions 
that exclude theory; they lack the minimum level of intellectual training. 
Sometimes we also come across active ‘resistance’, a deliberate rejection of 
modern theoretical advances, an aggressive attitude that comprises a fear 
of loss. Moreover, these various factors can add up; these are cases where 
one cannot do anything.
But there remains (fortunately) other cases. Here, it is not hopeless. 
Instead, a problem – a big problem, but which is a normal obstacle to 
scientif ic progress, and which is not exclusive to f ilm studies – a problem 
of disseminating the methods and concepts of recent research.
I do not have a miracle cure. No solution, I am sure, will avoid a dual 
approach, an effort and real work on both sides. Critics must read and study, 
take time to reflect, remain up to date, take new courses. But theorists, on 
their side – and this is one of our objectives at the l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 
already partially fulf illed thanks to the efforts of those who work with me, 
such as for example Geneviève Jacquinot, Michel Marie, Guy Gauthier, 
Bernard Leconte, Alain Bergala, etc. – the theorists must regularly and 
frequently get involved with associations and training courses. They must 
agree to devote part of their time – because this is one of their specif ic 
perennial tasks – to write high-level introductions to contemporary f ilm 
studies research. It is not exactly a question of ‘popularizing’: this word 
has an unequal, contemptuous nuance that I do not like. It is a question of 
teaching, dialogue, real circulation of knowledge. What is called ‘theory’ is 
not a sanctuary reserved for great minds; it is nothing more than a require-
ment of rigor and precision, a certain way of posing problems. It is a thing 
that one learns (as with everything else). It is enough to want it. And to 
put it to work.
Remarks collected by Gaston Haustrate.
Notes
1. [At the time of this interview, Jean Paul Simon was in charge of the research 
department of the Office de la Création Cinématographique.]
2. [A public entity set up by the Ministry of Culture.]
3. [“Ephemerides,” Cinéma 219 (March 1977), p. 3.]
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4. [An ‘advance on earnings’, or government subsidy/loan awarded by a 
commission to a selected number of films, which is paid back only if the 
film goes into profit. The funds are managed by the Centre National de la 
Cinématographie, a public body.]
5. [Both Simsolo and Metz use the term ‘post-synchronisation’. Metz’s quota-
tion from Bresson is from Notes on Cinematography, translated by Jonathan 
Griffin (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), p. 36. I have followed Griffin’s trans-
lation. Bresson calls dubbing ‘naive barbarity’ on p. 25.]
6. [Découpage can mean planning a film (breakdown of the script into shots 
prior to filming) and the editing of the finished film. Michel Fano is refer-
ring to the planning stage.] 
7. [Institut de Formation Aux Activités de Culture Cinématographique.]
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In this interview, carried out for the journal Ça-Cinéma in 1979, Christian 
Metz looks back over his research (published in the two collections The 
Imaginary Signifier and Essais Sémiotiques), the changes his work has 
undergone, and mentions the latest developments in his research, includ-
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“Conversation sur Le Significant Imaginiare et Essais Sémiotiques.” Jean 
Paul Simon, Marc Vernet, and Christian Metz. Ça-Cinéma, 16 (January 
1979), pp. 5-19. Reprinted with the permission of Jean Paul Simon and 
Marc Vernet. Translated by Daniel Fairfax.
1. Analysis, the cinema and the lost ‘object’
Jean Paul Simon: We often hear that ‘semiology makes its object disappear’, 
but this phrase seems to rest on a dangerous confusion between the object 
of common sense as it already exists, and the object as it can be produced 
in a model of intelligibility by semiological analysis and theory. What is 
more, it also expresses the idea that any methodology whatsoever can take 
a pre-existing object and that, at the end of the process, this object will be 
closer to what it was in ‘reality’.
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Christian Metz: When f ilm semiology is accused of making its object disap-
pear, the term ‘object’ derives from the traditional approach to the object. 
And it is quite true that, up to a certain point, semiology sidesteps this 
object (but it also opens up a different f ilm-object).
Common discourse deems it self-evident that the cinema is nothing other 
than a collection of ‘works of art’ – some successful, others failures – which 
one discusses in aesthetic or journalistic-impressionistic terms. Semiology, 
of course, will never encounter this cinema. But it is not the cinema. In its 
definition there already enters, surreptitiously, a good dose of methodology, 
even if the method, in this case, is rather soft and feeble.
Simon: Another version of the question above is: ‘but where is the cinema 
in all this?’ Most of the time this presupposes the existence of f ilms that, 
by their very nature, are excluded from semiological approaches.
Metz: I am convinced that what we have here is an additional misunder-
standing. It is correct that certain f ilms have been analyzed more often 
than others from a semiological perspective, or according to the various 
procedures of ‘textual’ study: whence the relatively widespread impres-
sion that there are f ilms that are intrinsically ‘semiological’, and that they 
are (rightfully) more accessible than others to rigorous decomposition or 
structural analysis. We sometimes hear this about experimental f ilms, 
which are supposedly ‘non-semiological’ (but inversely, let us not forget, 
other experimental trends, such as ‘structural f ilm’ or the Werner Nekes 
tendency, conceive of their productions as being cognitive, self-reflexive 
and metalinguistic in nature; so the problem is complex even within non-
narrative cinema).
Nonetheless, it remains true up to the present, and it would be dishonest 
to deny it, that the semiological method has been applied more often to 
f ilms of a largely ‘classical’ nature (which does not mean that they are banal, 
or commercial: the list of f ilms most often studied from a semio-textual 
standpoint includes North by Northwest by Hitchcock, Muriel by Resnais, 
October by Eisenstein, etc.).
In my opinion, it is purely a matter of circumstance, of the chronology 
of semiological research, which began, quite naturally, with more or less 
narrative objects – that is, objects that are socially more common (this is 
important, to the extent that all semiologies involve an element of sociology, 
a project of socio-historical critique), as well as f ilms that are ‘easier’ to 
analyze (to once again speak hastily); easier, that is, at least initially, for an 
approach that is still in its early stages.
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Today, before our eyes, things are already beginning to change. A true 
semiology of experimental cinema is in the process of being developed. 
I am referring, for example, to the research carried out by Dominique 
 Chateau and his colleagues, the work done by Thierry Kuntzel, or the work 
of Bernhard Lindemann in Germany, who has just dedicated an entire book, 
based on semiology and textual analysis, to experimental cinema (= Snow, 
Lawder, Frampton, Emshwiller, Un chien andalou by Buñuel, Entr’acte by 
René Clair, Ballet mécanique by Fernand Léger), titled Experimentalfilm 
als Metafilm (Experimental Cinema as Metacinema), published in 1977 in 
Hildesheim, by the Olms publishing house.
This evolution is ref lected in my own preoccupations. Experimental 
cinema interests me more than it used to. Whence the long supplementary 
notes on this subject that I have added to older texts reprinted in my Essais 
sémiotiques (cf., above all, pp. 167-168 and 172-173).
Marc Vernet: In your latest work, you insist that the more semiology ad-
vances, the more narrowly it focuses in on its object, only looking at a small 
part of a f ilm, a small part of a text.
Metz: This is true, but it seems to me that this is the flipside, or the inevi-
table corollary, of any deeper undertaking and rigorous study. In a recent, 
short review of my books, you yourself speak, humorously and f ittingly, 
of the virtues of myopia… We cannot study something in depth if this 
something covers, at the same time, an immense area. This restriction is 
not specif ic to semiology, it imposes itself on any serious reflection on any 
object whatsoever.
Vernet: Here, there is a bizarrely pleasurable process: I launch myself into 
the analysis of a f ilm that pleased me, I imagine that my analysis will tell 
me why and how the film is pleasing, but I can only study one small segment 
of the f ilm – one code, for example, among the multitude of codes that 
compose the f ilm – and so I cannot really grasp this pleasure. …
Metz: I readily agree with you, but on the condition of adding this point: 
the pleasure of analysis is qualitatively different to the pleasure of viewing 
a f ilm, which f irst establishes itself at the level of the whole f ilm (or more 
exactly of the f ilm in its entirety, even if certain parts were not especially 
‘pleasing’ to the spectator) – by this I mean a certain type of affectivity, 
which sustains cognitive functions (this does not entail falling back into 
an opposition between the intellectual and the emotional, which is absurd 
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and populist [poujadiste]). The pleasure of analysis derives from the act of 
dissecting a f ilm (then synthesizing it), from the impression of understand-
ing, examining and clarifying it. This is why this pleasure (a different type 
of pleasure) can be fully felt with a segment of the object or problem being 
studied, at the moment in which this segment has truly been ‘mastered’.
2. Cultural illegitimacy and its perverse effects
Simon: Does this not engage the status of this f ilm-object as it is com-
monly understood (but also what it can represent for the imaginary of the 
researcher), in terms of its relationship with the legitimate objects that we 
do or do not feel the need to study?
Metz: I believe that this deficit in the cultural legitimacy of the cinema (in 
Bourdieu-Passeron’s sense of the term) raises three kinds of perverse effects 
that are triggered in a chain reaction, one after another. Each effect is the 
equal and opposite reaction of its predecessor, over-compensating for its 
drawbacks.
The f irst perverse effect of this illegitimacy (and the most quantitatively 
widespread of the three) is the idea that the cinema is not a serious subject. 
Serious people do not bother with it, and they leave the job to others who 
are willing to tackle it. An example is f ilm criticism in the daily newspapers 
(with, thankfully, a few exceptions).
The second perverse effect resides in those pathological forms of 
cinephilia. The cinema arouses, among certain individuals, feelings of pas-
sionate love, leading to an overestimation of the object (as Freud would say), 
and an imaginary, effusive, excessive allegiance to it. These are inseparably 
linked, by a dialectical reversal, to the cinema’s status as an unrecognized 
art form (= it has to be vindicated). This is the source of a certain type 
of fanatical discourse, which we have all heard. Between weak-minded 
discourse and fanatical discourse, it is not all that easy to speak of the 
cinema in a rigorous manner, or even simply in a calm and precise manner. 
A possible def inition of semiology, or at least good semiology (which is not 
the only type, far from it) is this: calm discussion of the cinema. The aesthete 
attacks semiology with fury, because the semiologist does not return his 
object to him: the aesthete’s object, which the aesthete calls ‘cinema’.
The third perverse effect: semiological fanaticism in all its various forms: 
delirious semiotizations, loose approximations claiming to be Lacanian, 
heavy platitudes, pseudo-linguistic studies, etc. In a word: leaden discourse 
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[discours plombé] (which is, by the same token, dispiriting [plombant]). This 
is an awkward, somewhat pathetic attempt to react against the discourse 
of derision (= level 1) and against the discourse of illumination (= level 2). 
Semiology thus becomes a miracle remedy, the gadget of the century, the 
key that opens every door, the raft that rescues us from all shipwrecks. 
But in reality this discourse is the shipwreck of semiology itself, for what 
def ines the true spirit of semiology is the very opposite of this arrogant, 
philistine imperialism. Semiology is a modest approach, very slow-moving, 
patient, constantly open to external relations and constantly placed under 
interrogation.
Vernet: With the third perverse effect we have a double lover: the lover of 
semiology and the lover of cinema. …
Metz: The former risks being doubly mistaken.
3. Linguistics and psychoanalysis as detours
Vernet: There is a double restructuring in your work: a restructuring of semi-
ology, insofar as it must f irst pass through a certain number of disciplines, 
which represent detours and sites of investment, and a restructuring of the 
cinema, which can no longer be envisaged in the framework of a partial 
approach. …
Metz: By speaking of investment and detour, you make me think of some-
thing else, a point I have not developed very far, and where the situation, 
too, has not changed much for ten or f ifteen years. There was a time when 
I thought that, in order to do semiology, we had f irst to pass through a 
considerable linguistic detour, to really learn linguistics, dedicating several 
years to the project. Later, I had the same feeling about psychoanalysis. But 
today I feel that if, for me, these two ‘detours’ were indeed very important, 
then this is because I f ind linguistics and psychoanalysis very interest-
ing in and of themselves, and not because a rather strong dose of these 
two disciplines would be truly indispensable for f ilm research. It is not 
an unimportant matter to rectify this point, because an overly weighty 
‘recycling’ of disciplines external to the cinema can justifiably frighten away 
or discourage certain young researchers whose objective is the cinema itself. 
This is why I have become ever more careful about speaking of a linguistic 
(or psychoanalytic) ‘inspiration’ rather than a ‘method’.
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When it is said that semiology owes a lot to linguistics and psychoanaly-
sis, this is quite true, obviously, in comparison to other types of discourse on 
the cinema, which owe nothing to these two scientif ic f ields. It is also true 
when it comes to the guidelines of the semiological method, its founding 
principles, its major inspirations (I am using this word again, and not by 
chance), and, I would almost say, its state of mind (and this is of major 
importance, undoubtedly).
But in another sense, it is false. It is false because, among all the linguis-
tic and psychoanalytic notions and procedures, only a small fraction of 
them are usefully exportable to f ilm studies (otherwise there is the risk of 
transplanting, which is the worst of all forms of semiology). Only the great 
foundational texts of these f ields are of use to semiology (but in these cases, 
one must really know the texts).
In my individual journey, which is not a model for anybody because it is 
linked to a unique biography and temperament, two quite distinct things 
have been confused: my adoption of two tutor-disciplines in order to renew 
f ilm studies, and the very strong attraction these disciplines exerted on 
me by their very nature, beyond any preoccupation I might have for the 
cinema. At the École des Hautes Études, before commencing my seminar on 
the cinema, I taught ‘pure’ linguistics (to which, even recently, I dedicated 
an article in Essais Sémiotiques and several sections of the other articles 
in my book). Another example of this: in The Imaginary Signifier, when 
I talk about metaphor and metonymy, a relatively long passage consists 
entirely of proposing a new theory of censorship [pp. 253-65]: this is a purely 
psychoanalytic problem, which does not specif ically concern the cinema 
(psychic censorship applies to all of social life).
But those who have the goal of studying only the cinema, even from an 
authentically semiological point of view, do not have to make a linguistic-
psychoanalytic journey as long as mine, because my journey owes much 
of its length to extra-cinematic preoccupations.
Simon: With respect to this relatively old article from Essais Sémiotiques 
where you say that semiology must be linked to linguistics, would you now 
tend to think that it is suff iciently autonomous?
Metz: Yes. It is, in any case, more autonomous than it was when I wrote the 
article you are speaking about (the one called ‘Les Sémiotiques,’ written in 
1965 [Essais Sémiotiques, pp. 9-30]). Within this question of the linguistic 
(or psychoanalytic) detour, we touch on another factor, one that is distinct 
from my personal tastes: the objective evolution of the f ield over the last 
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15 years. Film semiology, whatever its worth, has undergone development; 
it is a little more sure of itself, it has less need of being vouched for by 
tutor-disciplines; it continues to borrow from them, but more freely and 
with less rigidity. I found it striking that the most robust research on 
cinematic codes and texts are from writers who do not claim any special 
knowledge of linguistics (e.g., Raymond Bellour) or psychoanalysis (e.g., 
Michel Marie).
There is also something else, which is that linguistics and psychoanalysis, 
for their part, have in the meantime pursued their own, autonomous, in-
creasingly technical development, one in which cinematic preoccupations, 
as far as I can tell, are playing a weaker role. The f ilm semiologist who 
wishes to really ‘follow’ all these recent developments runs a great risk of 
exhaustion, even if only because of the amount of reading he would have 
to do. Let us take the case of linguistics: three-quarters of present-day 
research is situated in transformational generative theory, or research 
that extends and supersedes it, like generative semantics, the grammar of 
cases, sociolinguistic variation, etc. We cannot wait for all semiologists to 
become well-versed in this research (even if it is exciting), because it is so 
diff icult. Only a few semiologists are keeping pace with it, those who chose 
to apply these precise procedures to their object, like Dominique Chateau 
and Michel Colin in f ilm studies.
That said, I still feel it is impossible to study seriously a social practice of 
signif ication like the cinema without a minimal knowledge of linguistics 
and psychoanalysis. It is with respect to the exact size of this minimum 
(which should not be too minimal!) and its quantitative determination that 
I have modif ied my evaluations, by ‘lowering’ them.
Simon: I had the impression for a while that ‘strictly’ cinematic preoccu-
pations were quite frequently excluded from your seminar. Many people 
thought that it was not useful to go to the cinema; what mattered was the 
acquisition of linguistic or psychoanalytic competence. The investment in 
a complete object is transferred to theory and not to the cinema.
Metz: I too felt this about my seminar, but I believe that it was an evolution-
ary phase, the ‘negative moment’ if you will: a reactive period where we 
opposed the dominant aesthetic discourse. At some point, however, we 
bent the stick too far in the other direction: we stopped speaking about the 
cinema and semiologists took themselves for linguists, or psychoanalysts, or 
theorists of ideology and the ‘Ideological State Apparatus’. Since then, things 
have changed, and, I feel, for the better: the participants in my seminar have 
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retained the (salubrious) habit of speaking about a bit of everything, but 
they are also beginning to speak about the cinema again. Bit by bit, things 
are being put back into perspective.
In one’s personal development, you also f ind reactive phases. Thus, in the 
initial period of my project, from 1962 to about 1970, I went to the movies 
less often than I did during my cinephilic, ciné-club youth. I did still go 
to the movies, but not very often, about once or twice a week. And then, I 
started going again. At present I watch four or f ive f ilms a week. It is also 
not really a question of the number of f ilms, because this can vary due to 
external factors (one’s work schedule, the neighborhood one lives in, how 
overworked one is, etc.). What I mean to say by all this is that, once again, 
I love going to the movies.
Simon: Is there not, alongside this reactive position towards cinephilia, an-
other attitude that involves the desire to acquire competence in linguistics 
or psychoanalysis, without feeling the need to go to the movies?
Metz: You are right, but there is, I believe, something else that comes into 
play, and that distorts the problem, which is that competence in a formalized 
discipline and competence in a non-formalized discipline are two very 
different things. In principle, an apprenticeship is necessary in both cases, 
but between the two the type of apprenticeship needed is so distinct that 
we almost have two autonomous def initions of the word ‘learn’. Learning 
a non-formalized discipline, like the history of cinema for example (or 
staying up to date, even in great detail, with contemporary cinema as it 
evolves), merely involves recording factual data and general impressions. 
That is, it involves f illing your head with material, but not changing your 
ideas. On the contrary, someone who starts off without any knowledge of 
linguistics (or psychoanalysis, which is formalized in its own way), and 
who sets out to gain knowledge of the f ield, even if only at a basic level, is 
obliged to go through a genuine process of apprenticeship: they, too, must 
ingest factual data (= dates, books, authors, etc.), but in addition to that they 
are led to modify their mental universe, their habitual ways of reasoning, 
and to acquire, even if only in summary form, an authentic ‘education’; it 
is not enough for them to gather information, they must change their way 
of thinking.
This, in my opinion, goes some way to explaining the ‘reactive’ period 
we just spoke about: many semiologists, in this period, dedicated their 
energies to ‘real’ apprenticeships, everything else was shunted into the 
background.
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4. On classical film theory
Simon: ‘[Classical] f ilm theory’, it seems, is of great importance to your work, 
yet at the same time it is relatively absent from it. It is present because it is 
so often cited, but absent because it does not intervene anywhere.
Metz: In the early stages of my work, traditional f ilm theory was of great 
importance; I am thinking of some of my initial articles, like, for example, 
“Cinema: Language or Language System?” or my two long texts on Mitry. I 
spent several years reading the major theorists, and they ‘resurfaced’ in my 
work, not only in the form of ritual footnote references, to spice things up, 
but also because they truly nourished and enriched my own outlook. Film 
theory was one of the major sources of semiology (by the way, I already said 
this very clearly; see pp. 92-93 of volume I of my Essais sur la Signification 
au Cinéma [Film Language, pp. 90-91]).
But a kind of backlash has also taken place, relating to the very exist-
ence of semiology, and more generally modern thinking on the cinema. 
These approaches are more rigorous, more detailed, more conceptually 
elaborated and more in step with contemporary science than was classical 
aesthetic theory. The latter had, therefore, by force of circumstances, found 
itself somewhat devalued, obsolescent – which, by the way, is a common 
phenomenon in the history of all disciplines (for example: the mere exist-
ence of generative linguistics has dealt a heavy blow to structural and 
distributional linguistics). This effect, of course, is not retroactive, except in 
the eyes of hurried, muddled minds who merely follow fashions. Eisenstein, 
Balázs, Arnheim, Bazin, etc., still retain their interest, which is considerable. 
Nevertheless, it is no longer possible today to write a book ‘à la Balázs’, or 
‘à la Epstein’.
Simon: Are we not falling back into the same problem we had before regard-
ing f ilm ‘culture’ – with the exception that, in spite of everything, f ilm 
theory is more apt to be formalized?
Metz: Quite true. In this respect, [classical] f ilm theory occupies an interme-
diate stage. Unfortunately, among the various ‘f ields of knowledge’ [savoirs] 
we have been talking about, it is by far the least favored, in my seminar and 
elsewhere, and in practically every country (it strikes me), apart from Italy. 
There are people who know linguistics, who know psychoanalysis, who 
know f ilms, but there are few who know classical f ilm theory, or who even 
have an inkling of its richness and breadth.
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Simon: Has there not been, in your work, a phase that we can locate in other 
developments in semiology; namely, the phase of critical re-evaluation, 
which consists of taking earlier texts as a basis for a more ‘modern’ reflection?
Metz: To tell the truth, in the current phase of my work, I am less often 
concerned with classical f ilm theory than I used to be, but this is the normal 
evolution of every author constructing their own discourse. And there 
remains the fact that, throughout my writings, I have spoken about it rather 
often.
There is also a remarkable thing (I am departing from your question a 
little here): certain detractors have accused semiology, or have accused me 
personally, of giving short shrift to classical f ilm theory. And yet they use it 
in their own work much less than I do. In certain cases, they are hardly even 
familiar with it, like the thief who shouts out: ‘Stop, thief!’ For instance, who 
speaks about Rudolf Arnheim today? As far as I know, only three people in 
the entire world, all three of whom are semiologists or ‘fellow-travelers’: Keiji 
Asanuma in Japan, Emilio Garroni in Italy, and myself in France. Another 
example: among those who claim that semiology makes a clean sweep of 
the past, who has undertaken the work of ‘rereading’ it patiently and at 
length, to the same extent as I have with my work on Jean Mitry’s two major 
volumes? [Esthétique et Psychologie du Cinéma (1963, 1965)]
In truth, one of semiology’s contributions has been to return classical 
f ilm theory to the agenda, or at least it has done everything possible to make 
this happen. Even today this theory is poorly known, but 15 years ago it was 
almost totally ignored.
5. From one logic to another
Simon: It seems to me that there is another source that constantly nourishes 
all of your texts, namely ‘logical competence’. An example of this is your 
text on connotation in volume II of Essais sur la Signification au Cinéma t. 
II.1 There is a whole section of the text (which you have not included) that 
is an analysis of the preceding logics of the notion of connotation.
Metz: Yes, this is true.
Simon: However, in Essais vol. II the only part of this text that is reprinted 
is the part that is directly linked to the semiological analysis of f ilm. Can 
you give an account of this publication (or work) strategy?
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Metz: I think that the f irst part of my seminar on connotation (which was 
held in 1971-72, I believe), the part that I did not reprint in the published 
text, was didactic in nature, rather than a personal research project. It 
thus had a place in the context of a seminar (which allows room for both 
new research and historical review), but not in a research book, which by 
def inition excludes the latter (it would only have been publishable in a 
textbook).
But to respond to your question on a more general level, yes, indeed, a 
certain logical horizon is always more or less present in my work.
Simon: This is very clear in Essais Sémiotiques. …
Metz: Yes, and to tell the truth this comes from the fact that the linguistic 
approach and the psychoanalytic approach both constitute kinds of logic. 
Modern linguistics is close to logic, and it is becoming ever more so, notably 
with generative semantics (see the notion of ‘natural logic’). Psychoanalysis, 
with its concept of primary and secondary ‘processes’ – particularly in 
its Lacanian orientation – also becomes, so to speak, a logic of mental 
trajectories, or a logic of the ‘illogical’.
Simon: All your texts in Essais Sémiotiques are very strongly marked by 
the role of logic, for instance, in the way in which you discuss the work of 
Hjelmslev and Prieto, who enter into this framework via the logic of sets and 
problems of formalization respectively. You are probably the only person, 
along with E. Veron, to try to combine these two f igures.
Metz: As a matter of fact, it seems to me that we should make the effort to 
combine the two aspects: on the one hand, ‘secondary logic’ with linguistics 
and logic properly speaking (the logic of logicians), and ‘primary logic’ with 
its condensations and displacements, its ‘f igurability’. … This is all the more 
necessary because the primary is constantly present beneath the secondary. 
They are not truly dissociable from one another.
6. Semiology of communication and semiology of 
signification
Vernet: What, for you, are the consequences for analysis of the distinction 
between a semiology of signif ication and a semiology of communication?
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Metz: To tell the truth, I think that the problem is posed with less acuity 
today than ten or f ifteen years ago. In this respect, the situation around us 
has changed a lot. At a certain moment, these two forms of semiology – the 
semiology of signif ication (marked by the decisive influence of Roland 
Barthes) and the semiology of communication – appear as two options 
of equal importance; they divide the f ield in half. The semiology of com-
munication had, for its part (and still does have), important works: especially 
Bussens, Martinet, Mounin and Prieto. But it has barely gone beyond these 
works, whereas, in the same period, the semiology of signification developed 
very rapidly.
Today, the semiology of communication has become a kind of sub-section 
within semiology tout court: a clearly demarcated domain, which I f ind 
very interesting, but which has clearly become a minor tendency. This does 
not mean that it is ‘dead’: in the case of iconic studies, for example, Michel 
Tardy’s doctoral thesis, Iconologie et Sémiogénèse (Strasbourg, 1976, 2 vol.), 
which I am trying to have published at Klincksieck, is a recent example of 
an excellent work in the semiology of communication.
Simon: To what extent, however, does the development of this second semiol-
ogy – where meaning is conceived of as an operation – render completely 
inadequate this distinction between signif ication and communication? 
The communicational model, as you present it, referring to Julia Kristeva, 
fully inscribes itself into a semiology that has the ‘communication’ aspect 
as one of its outputs.
Metz: We are increasingly reaching the point of conceiving of communica-
tion as an output, occupying the level that transformational generative 
grammarians call the ‘surface’, the ever-provisional effect of a deep level 
of signif ication, which is a production and not a product. It is always 
possible, and of great interest, to learn about the total process of signif ica-
tion through one of its end-points, where an emitter and a receiver are 
in agreement on the meaning of a given static unit. Hence, everyone in 
France would recognize that the words cheval (horse) and jument (mare) 
are divided along the axis of sex. But this is only the end of a long signifying 
journey, because it already supposes, in advance, the entire system of 
gender in French.
In all domains, including the cinema, we will f ind surface units that 
are codif ied (I mean codif ied in the ordinary sense of the word, since for 
me everything is coded). A semiology of communication can grasp them, 
enumerate them, classify them – this is important work. It is clear, for 
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example, that certain f irmly established f ilm ‘genres’ – like the classical 
Western, the musical comedy of the inter-war period, or ‘f ilm noir’ in the 
1940s and early 1950s – offer the analyst a genuinely real catalogue of stable 
and recurrent f ilmic configurations.
7. Signification as deixis
Simon: In fact, the semiology of communication presupposes symmetry 
between the level of the signif ied and that of the signif ier. At one point you 
said, citing Prieto, that there is asymmetry between the two levels. Is this 
not what allows history to be reintroduced, for the discrepancies [décalages] 
between the two levels must be taken into account? At the same time it 
enables us to determine what is primary and what is secondary?
Metz: Yes, in a passage from my book The Imaginary Signifier, pp. 282-84, 
and 313n3, I focused on Prieto’s article, which was already dated (1957-58). It 
was one of his f irst texts, which he himself entitled ‘D’une asymétrie entre 
le plan de l’expression et le plan du contenu de la langue.’ He convincingly 
points to this asymmetry: only the signif ier is concrete, manifest, directly 
accessible. But it seems to me that we can go further (today) and draw from 
his work an argument for a semiology of the signifier. The signifier – which in 
the cinema consists of images and sounds – is the only instance on which the 
analyst can hold a factual, completely verif iable discourse: a given camera 
movement lasts three and a quarter minutes (but, by contrast, what does 
it ‘express’?), a given motif recurs 19 times in the f ilm (but what does this 
assertion ‘mean’?).
I do not speak about the ‘signif ied’ much (except in the case of f ixed 
surface units: the punctuating fade to black, the shot/reverse-shot in 
dialogue scenes, etc.). I have increasingly come to prefer expressions like 
‘signif icatory pressure’, ‘signifying circuit’, etc. We can never truly know 
what the signif ied is. It is akin to a spatial direction, a line of f light, a 
vector. This is not to say that it is ‘vague’. It is precise, in its own way, but 
it is precise as an orientation, not as an emplacement. In this orientation, 
the path is open to all overdeterminations, signif ication is always deictic 
in nature.
Vernet: We must then insist on this idea of signif ication and deixis as far 
the cinema is concerned, for what is designated is not the real, the referent, 
but only a line of f light of the signif ied.
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Metz: What you say makes me think of a line of poetry that I will cite from 
memory without any guarantee of accuracy. I do not even remember who 
it is by anymore, who wrote it, nor who, in the discussions between Lacan 
and Lyotard on metaphor and metonymy, cited it and commented on it. 
This line, therefore, in my memory (or in my imagination), is as follows: 
‘…medusas [jellyf ish] of the dream in flowing robes…’.2
This is a good example of a signif icatory pressure. This is obviously a 
metaphor: medusa/woman. And also a condensation, because the metaphor 
is tendentially concentrated into a single image (= flowing robes). None-
theless, the line does not mean that medusas ‘are’ women, nor that they 
‘resemble’ women, nor that their bodies are ‘like’ a robe. This line functions 
more as a monstrative gesture: it indicates to us a dream space, a path along 
which the f igure of the woman and that of the jellyf ish can be associated 
with one another or superimposed on one another in a hundred different 
ways. And all this, at the same time, is very precise: we have a genuine logical 
operator, the word ‘robe’, which is the logical lever of a phantasmatic drifting 
[dérive]. Classical rhetoric would recognize, in the element ‘gown’, a tertium 
comparationis. This is, to a degree, what I call the circuit of signif ication, 
this mixture of the logical and the phantasmatic. …
8. The problem of cross-classification
Vernet: One thing that strikes me in The Imaginary Signifier: the articles it 
includes are very often imprinted with what you call ‘cross-classif ications’. 
Does this not represent the abandonment of a purely taxonomic activity, 
where things would be monolithic, with a correspondence between a ‘nice’ 
name and a ‘nice’ phenomenon, in favor of the aff irmation that everything 
is mixed, which was already apparent in Language and Cinema?
Metz: It seems to me that we are of necessity arriving at cross-classif ications 
and formalizations presenting a certain degree of entanglement, for this 
alone responds to the complexity of facts, the f ilmic material itself. A very 
simplif ied example, but one that is at the heart of the problem, is that of the 
combination between two distinctions, paradigm/syntagm and metaphor/
metonymy. I see no other solution than cross-classif ication (with, as a 
consequence, in this example, four major types of f igures), for the simple 
reason that the two axes do not coincide: if the link between two elements 
of a given f ilm is of a metonymic nature, there remains the fact that these 
elements can both be present on screen (= metonymy, syntagmatization), 
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but also that one of the elements can very well be the only one expressed in 
the f ilm, evoking the other element which remains implicit, in which case 
we will have the same metonymy, but this time in the form of a paradigm. 
How can we do otherwise, given that the two ‘entries’ (metaphor/metonymy 
and paradigm/syntagm) are independent of each other?
Simon/Vernet: But is there not a risk that the inattentive reader will believe 
that as a result of an excessive desire to classify things, everything ends up 
becoming mixed up?
Metz: Like you, I have indeed noticed this type of reaction in seminars 
and other discussions, which proceeds from a frustrated expectation. 
Some listeners would have preferred a simpler, more brutal, more easily 
applicable and thus more reassuring ‘grid’. But I cannot give it to them, 
for it would be utterly false. Some would have found it more gratifying for 
me to decree a general coincidence between the axes, which would have 
permitted assimilations by entire series. Deep down, I know very well, from 
the numerous discussions I have had with very diverse audiences, that 
what anxious readers expected was for me to say: ‘On the one side, we have 
metaphor = paradigm = condensation = découpage, and on the other side 
we have metonymy = syntagm = displacement = montage’. The only thing 
is that this does not hold water, it is a caricature of semiology. …
This said, my cross-classif ications are nonetheless less complicated than 
people sometimes claim. When we f ind ourselves before a specif ic f ilmic 
moment, we situate it successively on the different axes, we have no need 
of keeping everything in our heads at the same moment. I have tried to 
show this with respect to the lap-dissolve, in pages 274-80 of my book The 
Imaginary Signifier. The only, singular place in which, by def inition, we 
must mentally ‘keep together’ all the threads in the tangle of notions, is 
my book itself.
Vernet: You say somewhere that there is a possible way of speaking didacti-
cally about things, which sheds light on one point while obscuring another. 
And yet it seems that this is an attitude you refuse in The Imaginary Signifier, 
where you strive to hold all the elements together.
Metz: I have tried to be as clear as possible, since for me it is a question of 
honesty, or even, I would almost say, of professional morality vis-à-vis the 
reader. The more the material is complex, the more we should strive to give 
a clear exposition of it.
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However, I do not believe that this effort from me has been able to 
completely annul the effect of an objective law, which you have alluded to, 
and which I speak about on page 268 of the same book: in order to shed light 
on one aspect of the problem, we are sometimes forced to obscure another 
aspect. In every book that is densely constructed, even to a moderate degree, 
and in any discipline, the successive chapters, at the same time as they add 
to one another by mutually clarifying each other, also destroy each other. 
There is nothing we can do about it, it comes from the fact that the signif ier 
of written discourse is linear. It also relates to the fact that nobody’s minds 
are unlimited places: the chapters ‘follow’ each other, and it is diff icult for 
everybody to think of the whole work simultaneously. For some people 
it is even impossible. In the latter case, it can happen that the feeling of 
inferiority in the reader is transformed into aggressiveness. This is one of 
the sources – but not the only one – of the hostility towards semiology.
9. The primary and the secondary in language – The two 
‘depths’
Simon: Finally, what is the current status of the cinematic signif ier, viewed 
both from linguistic discourse and psychoanalytic discourse, via Lacan’s 
theories of linguistics? How are the pairings verbal/iconic and primary/
secondary imbricated with one another?
Metz: This problem is obviously rather complicated. On the one hand, there 
is Freud’s position on ‘thing-representations’ and ‘word-representations’: the 
unconscious only knows the former, whereas the pre-conscious incorporates 
both. Language [langage] would therefore be clearly on the side of the 
secondary process.
Lacan hit upon this point, arguing that the unconscious is itself struc-
tured like a language. At f irst glance, of course (and people have been 
ready to exploit this fact), the two positions seem contradictory. But as 
soon you explore a bit more deeply, I am convinced that they are much less 
contradictory than they would seem.
Firstly, something that everyone forgets is that ‘language’ for Lacan 
consists of processes, sequences of movement, and not necessarily ele-
ments, that is, representations. The latter can be verbal, but also iconic, or 
even ‘mixed’ (= ideograms, hieroglyphs, etc.). Nothing is opposed to images 
associating with one another following trajectories that are more or less 
linguistic in nature.
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Subsequently, and above all, when Lacan is accused of this type of 
anti-Freudian coup de force that would (it is claimed) consist of making 
the unconscious secondary by treating it like a language, this is because 
language itself is considered to be secondary (otherwise the objection makes 
no sense). And yet, if anybody considers language to be secondary, then it 
is Freud – among others – but certainly not Lacan, to such an extent that 
it is diff icult to see an internal contradiction in the latter. For Lacan, the 
unconscious is structured like a language but (and these two things go 
together) language is largely primary. Moreover, it is not by chance that 
the Lacanian notion of ‘lalangue’ (in a single word) groups together the 
most secondarized aspects of language (that is, the language system [la 
langue] in two words, that of the positivist linguists) than other, ‘deeper’ or 
‘overdetermined’ phenomena, like metaphor and metonymy, which are as-
sociative trajectories that do not come within the rubric of ‘pure’ linguistics, 
but which are much more closely tied to rhetoric and poetics (or an enlarged 
linguistics, which would in fact take the primary process into account).
In other words, what induces an error in many readers is the fact that 
Freud and Lacan do not have the same linguistics ‘behind’ them. Lacan is 
the f irst to have noted this, on page 676 of his Écrits [trans. Bruce Fink (New 
York: Norton, 2006)]. Freud had a relatively poor and restricted conception 
of language, in accord with the linguistics of his day, which was much less 
developed than today. Lacan has a wider, richer vision of linguistics, which 
excludes any reduction of the language-phenomenon to a secondary status.
Vernet: You should then clarify what you mean by deep language, or the 
depth of language. Are they operations that must be realized before we can 
even arrive at a def initive formation?
Metz: Yes, precisely. For example, the work of metaphor or metonymy (like 
we say the ‘dream work’ or the ‘work of mourning’) is a work that takes 
place in the history of the language system. It is the history of the language 
system; it is a work which displaces words, leading them to change meaning, 
and which consequently precedes a given, provisionally f ixed, signif ied.
Simon: Is there not the possibility of confusion between the metaphoric 
sense of ‘depth’ as the site of something hidden that we need to reveal, and, 
on the other hand, depth in the sense given to it by generative linguistics, 
where we have a certain number of rules and transformations to carry out? 
It seems to me that sometimes, in “Metaphor/Metonymy,” there is a certain 
fluctuation between the two meanings of the word ‘depth’.
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Metz: In terms of whether or not there is in my book any fluctuation between 
these definitions of ‘depth’, this is not for me to judge, but is up to the reader. 
There is f luctuation to the extent that I have not been clear and rigorous 
enough.
By contrast, I can give you an answer as to what was, in this respect, my 
objective (which in practice was attained to varying degrees). ‘Depth’ in the 
f irst sense you mention (= the hidden, the buried, etc.), and depth in the 
second sense (= the ‘deep structure’ in a generative logical process), which 
you correctly distinguish from the f irst, may well be two very different 
things, but they still have a relationship with each other. And in particular, 
if we want to try to understand and analyze depth number 1, we will end 
up proposing dispositifs of knowledge, which bring about depth number 
2. It was in this spirit that I conducted my study of the lap-dissolve in the 
book. So as to better distinguish its multiple overdeterminations, I tried to 
situate it at the intersection of several logical matrices (syntagm/paradigm, 
metonymy/metaphor, etc.).
It goes without saying that I do not use the words ‘generate’ and ‘deep 
structure’ here in the technical sense that they have in generative linguistics, 
but there remains the fact that, even in their broader sense, they designate 
operations of a logical type. In sum, the reciprocal interlacing of the primary 
and the secondary does not only characterize text-objects, but also the very 
approaches taken by the analyst.
Conversation tape recorded in December 1977, and subsequently re-worked 
by the three participants.
Notes
1. [“La connotation de nouveau,” Essais sur la Signification au Cinéma t. II 
(Paris: Klinksieck, 1972).]
2. [The line (originally ‘Les méduses du rêve aux robes dénouées’) comes from 
Victor Hugo’s poem ‘Dieu’. See, Victor Hugo, God and The End of Satan/Dieu 
et La Fin du Satan: Selections: In a Bilingual Edition (ed. and trans. R.G. Skin-
ner, Swan Isle Press, Chicago, 2014), pp. 34-35. Trans.]
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“The Cinematic Apparatus as Social Institution: An Interview with 
Christian Metz.” Sandy Flitterman, Bill Guynn, Roswitha Mueller, and 
Jacquelyn Suter. Discourse, 1 (Fall, 1979), pp. 1–35. Reprinted with the 
permission of Wayne State University Press.
Question: Do you feel that psychoanalysis is a necessary component of 
historical materialism when one attempts an analysis of the complex 
structure of the social formation? If you agree with this assertion, as 
put forward in the Screen introduction to your “Imaginary Signif ier,”1 
do you also agree that the Oedipus Complex, and its essential moment, 
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castration, is central to the formation of the unconscious? Do you feel 
that there might be a contradiction in the fact that historical materialism 
and psychoanalysis view different categories as central (For historical 
materialism, labor is the primary category, while for psychoanalysis, it is 
the Oedipus Complex)?
Metz: Well, some analysts think that the Oedipus Complex is a very general 
feature, common to all cultures; some think not. I think not. I think that it 
has to be studied case by case, culture by culture. In any case, the Oedipus 
Complex in its classical form, the one which has been studied by Freud 
and elsewhere within the f ield of psychoanalysis, seems to be obviously 
related to the concrete social structure in which Freud lived. That is, the 
Oedipus Complex is connected to specif ic historical phenomena, such as 
the restricted nuclear family, the bourgeois family (the mother, father, and 
children) as opposed to many other possible – not only possible, but really 
attestable – forms of family life, or of non-family life. It would be unthink-
able for me that the Oedipus Complex and castration had no relation with 
this very precise, restricted (temporally and spatially), cultural form that 
the nuclear, bourgeois restricted family is. The relation between the Oedipus 
Complex and the social formation seems to me to be very close.
Q: Then, once we locate the Oedipus Complex within the specif ic historical 
instance of the bourgeois nuclear family, do you agree with the theory of 
Jacques Lacan that the phallus is the primary signif ier by which the small 
human being enters the order of culture and of language?
Metz: You know, I am not a Lacanian. There is a misunderstanding about 
my position, because I borrow some concepts from Lacan’s work. I use 
three or four words taken from Lacan, and I am considered in some places 
as a Lacanian, but I am not. To be a Lacanian in Paris means a very precise 
allegiance – it is a formal group. What was interesting for me was to take, 
within Lacan’s work, certain concepts which I think are helpful for me 
in studying cinema and studying such phenomena as metaphor and me-
tonymy. The point whether I am faithful to the deep thinking of Lacan or 
not is not a problem for me. I think that ideas have no owners when they 
are published, they are common property. And so, I think I have a right 
to take certain ideas in Lacan – very few, in fact, when compared with 
the total number of Lacanian concepts. I really think Lacan is a genius, 
and certain of his ideas do concern me very closely: metaphor, metonymy, 
Imaginary, Symbolic. But these are certain ideas, as opposed to the major 
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part of Lacan’s writings, which in fact I didn’t use. In Paris, no one would 
consider me a Lacanian.
Q: To follow up the question about the nuclear family: do you think that in 
societies where the objective familial structure has changed (for example 
in communes which have tried alternative forms of child-raising) the 
fundamental psychic structure has been altered?
Metz: Oh yes, but of course it depends on the duration of these kinds of 
experiments. They have to last a very long time before they can deeply 
change the structure of the ego. It’s a question of time. But nevertheless, if 
such experiments would last a very long time, I am convinced that it could 
deeply change the psyche. But it takes a great amount of time to interiorize 
the objective, exterior conditions.
Q: Do you think that f ilm has some specif ic function in this? Or, more 
broadly, is cinema as an institution2 capable of changing certain social 
patterns?
Metz: Not the cinema specif ically, but all cultural forms. But I don’t see any 
reason for the cinema as such to be specif ically involved in such a process 
more than t.v., the novel, or theater.
Q: In your talk at the Alumni House (U.C. Berkeley, May 1978) you stressed 
that the cinematic institution has three aspects: the semiotic, the economic, 
and the psychoanalytical. How are these three instances to be articulated? 
How does one relate the objective, concrete reality of the social relations 
of production with a theory of the subject as it is produced in the cinema?
Metz: Cinema studies – not exactly the cinematic fact – has three kinds 
of main entrances: the linguistic one (cinema as a discourse, history, or 
story, editing patterns, etc.); the psychoanalytic one; and the directly social 
and economic one. And perhaps on this point I could add something: the 
relation is not the same, not completely parallel, between these three kinds 
of studies. It seems to me that it’s easy – at least possible – to work out some, 
or many, articulations between the linguistic studies and psychoanalytic 
studies – because both are sciences of the very fact of meaning, of signif ica-
tion. While the articulation with the socio-economic bases is much more 
diff icult – I don’t say it is non-existent, but much more diff icult to work 
on. It is a very practical problem. It is possible to have a certain degree of 
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competence in linguistics and in psychoanalysis – it is possible but it takes 
a lot of work. But to have, on top of that, a real background in economics – is 
a science; économie politique, I would say, is a science and very, very separate 
from the humanities. The only way to seriously study this one aspect is to 
be an economist. You have to study the statistics: how many people go to 
the cinema, how much money it makes – it’s very specialized, otherwise 
you are only talking generalities. Cinema is a commercial industry, but 
this fact is not very elaborated. You have to be a real economist, like, for 
instance, Mercillon in France.
Q: Nonetheless Comolli makes an attempt to articulate these kinds of things 
in his study of the history of monocular perspective.3
Metz: With technology rather than with economics.
Q: Do you think there’s a possibility of articulating the type of study that 
people like Douglas Gomery and Russell Merritt are doing on the economic 
history of the development of the industry with the metapsychology of the 
spectator?4
Metz: Possible, yes. Diff icult, surely! The existence of the relation between 
the base and superstructure is certain, but very hard to study accurately. If 
you take a specific instance, how can you demonstrate precisely that certain 
relations of forces of production, of investment, or of a given country’s 
economic development has this or that influence on this or that editing 
pattern, or on the flashback? That would be a study of the relation between 
the elements. And so, you realize the diff iculty.
Q: One way of relating them is not in terms of economics but in terms of 
social structures, such as the family.
Metz: Oh yes. Certain relations, such as the point of circulation of money 
within the cinema industry and the problem of the motivation in the 
spectator-motivation to be willing to pay to enter the cinema. …
Q: This brings up the metapsychology of the spectator, which relates to a 
point that we mentioned before – the question of the relationship of sexual 
difference to spectatorship. If Freudian and psychoanalytic theories chart 
the development of the subject in language and culture, and if that subject 
is male, what are the forms of viewing available to women? As a further 
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question, how does the notion of sexual difference become inscribed in cur-
rent theories of the cinematic spectator as a viewing subject? Is ascendancy to 
the Symbolic order based on recognizing a position in relation to castration?5
Metz: My answer would be “yes.” Yes, insofar as sexual difference is, to some 
extent, a physiological problem – to this extent only. But sexual difference 
doesn’t mean sexual inequality, it is not necessarily tied in to the form of 
sexual difference we are living in our society. But I think it would be neces-
sarily tied with some kind of sexual difference – difference – that would be 
the general idea of my answer. I don’t see any means of escaping the very 
fact of sexual difference. But I do see means of escaping the form of sexual 
difference – and not only difference, inequality – that is the feature of our 
society; that is no longer a physiological problem – it is a fully sociological 
problem. I think that the subject in Freud and in psychoanalysis in general 
is a very strange mixture of really human features and of male features. This 
is a diff icult point. According to the social and historical context within 
which Freud’s discovery was made, he was not able to distinguish between 
certain features which are proper to the male and other features which are 
proper to human beings in general. And so I feel that the very diff icult point 
that we have, and especially the feminist movement has, is to make this 
distinction which is totally unclear in Freud. The problem always remains: 
which part of what Freud attributed to human beings is, in fact, male, and 
which part is really human? It’s an open problem, an open book. I think that 
it’s up to the women’s movement … I think it would be to some extent … 
how could I say … unfair, dishonest, when a man takes a very publicly and 
openly and overtly feminist position, because men have no right to speak 
for women, at their place.
Q: What you seem to be saying is that this kind of concern wouldn’t inform 
your work on the place of the spectator. You feel that such a position would 
involve a male appropriation of feminist issues and that it would be dishon-
est to attempt to def ine the role of the female subject in the audience, 
because you can’t put yourself in her place.
Metz: Yes, that’s the problem. It’s really diff icult for a man to take a feminist 
position here; not exactly ‘feminist’, rather feminine, because man is not 
woman.
Q: But it’s not a question of what your personal situation is, it’s rather a 
matter of scientif ic understanding. One thrust of the argument about 
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psychoanalysis is that it gives you tools to overcome the determinations 
of your own sex.
Metz: Yes, but it is also a personal question. In every kind of analytical study, 
you have a sort of auto-analysis within it, or it’s not serious.
Q: But then, once you recognize the fact that every ideological /critical 
position must acknowledge one’s own psychic position, you still have to 
deal with the question of sexual difference in relation to spectatorship.
Metz: You know, certain features of the situation are clear; many others are 
not. What is clear, for instance, is that in the majority of f ilms being shown 
in cinema theaters, the place of the enunciation, the place of the ‘look’ is a 
male one – that is very clear. But it’s not the whole of the question.
Q: This question of the ‘look’ brings up certain parallels you make in “The 
Imaginary Signif ier,” equating the fetishistic situation with the cinematic 
apparatus.
Metz: Oh no, no, I don’t equate. What I was saying in “The Imaginary Signi-
f ier” is simply that the cinematic situation has in it some features of what 
Freud has described under the name of ‘fetishism’. But it’s not an equation. 
I took two features: disavowal (the structure of je sais bien, mais quand 
même), the structure of disavowal as re-analyzed by Octave Mannoni,6 the 
problem of belief/disbelief – but it is only a part of the problem of fetishism. 
And secondly, I took another feature of the fetishistic situation, that is the 
apparatus itself as a kind of substitute for the penis. These are only some 
features of fetishism. The problem of fetishism in Freud is much wider.
At this point, I should like to add something which I hope could clarify 
our discussion, something about the psychoanalytic fetish in general. It 
is not exactly the substitute for the penis, but for the absence of the penis 
(or of the phallus, in Lacan’s formulation). The point which is common to 
women and men is castration, is that both do not have the phallus: hence 
anxiety (for both), hence the diff icult access to desire, hence the diff iculty, 
for each of us, female or male, to f ind out within herself/himself the things 
which really interest her/him, etc. But it still remains a difference between 
the sexes: they do not have the same way of living, of experiencing this 
common absence of the phallus, and here the socio-political factor (I mean: 
the objective oppression of women) plays a determinant role. The ideologi-
cal pressure makes it possible for men to imagine, to hallucinate that they 
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have the phallus, whereas this illusion is more diff icult for women. Of 
course, the ideology of inequality between the sexes makes use of pretexts, 
alibis, false ‘reasons’ borrowed from ‘nature’, or ‘anatomy’: men have in 
their body a physical organ which can be hallucinated as being the phallus. 
But the reality is much more social: there are different organs in men’s 
bodies and in women’s bodies which could be hallucinated as being the 
phallus, and society arbitrarily reduced them to one organ of the man’s 
body.7
Q: This brings up another question in relation to Freud’s theory of fetishism. 
In Freudian terms, the fetishistic situation as a substitution for the penis 
has to present specif ic objects, like a foot or fur. How do you relate this to 
the different levels of primary and secondary identif ication?
Metz: Primary, as far as the apparatus and the love for the apparatus is 
concerned. In my terms, at least, all these problems of falling in love with 
the apparatus itself would be related with what I call primary identif ica-
tion – the identif ication with the apparatus itself as a fetish.8
Q: So, you are broadening Freud, then, in terms of the variety of things that 
could substitute for a penis?
Metz: Oh yes, I think it has to be broadened because fetishism means, at 
least, two things. You have a quasi-medical def inition of fetishism, and in 
this case it was a foot or a shoe. It’s fetishism as nosography. And you have 
fetishism in social life and everyday life which is much wider, and which 
has no reason to be restricted to the shoe or such accessories.
Q: You are speaking of fetish-as-process rather than fetish-as- object.
Metz: Yes, exactly. A process which can extend to very different objects 
insofar as they become substitutes for desire and not necessarily tied to 
certain objects (a very restricted number of objects) because Freud was 
dealing principally (not only) with fetishism as a nosographical fact, or at 
least, as characterologic. He was treating a very precise type of conduct, not 
necessarily pathological, but directly erotic conduct. And of course if you 
switch to cinema problems, the fetish can become a very different object.
Q: Just another question to follow up on this: In Freud, fetishism seems to be 
connected with castration anxiety – how does that relate to your definition 
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of fetishism on the primary level? On the primary level of identif ication 
with the cinematic apparatus does the spectator experience anxiety?
Metz: Oh, yes. The feelings (whether in the spectator or in the f ilmmaker) 
devoted to the apparatus are related to the very fact of the image – the 
image is a present print of an absent object.
Q: So that would necessarily cause anxiety in the spectator?
Metz: A kind of anxiety, yes. Not necessarily a conscious anxiety, of course. 
But it has to do with the very fact of the image – the image is something 
very strange – it’s a mixture of presence and absence. And so, it re-plays 
the game of castration: “to be or not to be,” death, anxiety. I think that the 
image is very important for a particular status, precisely because it is a 
specif ic mixture of fulf illment and lack.
Q: Are you saying that this doesn’t necessarily depend on a signif ied of the 
image, but on the very fact of the image as a signif ier?
Metz: Exactly. And, of course, the precise nature of one image or several im-
ages can be a re-doubled form of fetishism. I think if you have directly erotic 
sequences or pornographic sequences, in such cases, the content of the 
particular images redoubles the whole process. But in ordinary sequences, in 
the very fact of the image itself, you have an obvious fetishism already. The 
process, in fetishism, is disavowal, and the object would be the fetish itself.
Q: But there is a distinction between identification with the operation of see-
ing (i.e., with the camera) versus seeing an object on screen that is fetishized. 
When you referred to Thierry Kuntzel’s article, ‘Le Défilement,’9 you seemed 
to make a distinction between latent process, which we assumed was the 
identif ication with the operation of seeing, and the manifest materials, 
which are conspicuously placed on screen as the form of the fetish or the 
phallus. Would you comment on this?
Metz: Yes. I think what I would call the process, in fetishism, is the whole 
problem of belief, disbelief, splitting of belief – in a word, ‘disavowal’, Ver-
leugnung in Freud.10 And what I would call the object is the fetish itself, some 
substitute for the penis – not exactly for the penis, for the lack of the penis, 
for the absent penis. And so, you can have in a given scene or sequence a 
precise filmic object which takes the place of the secondary fetish – fetish on 
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the level of secondary identif ication. For me, then, you have the process, the 
object, and inside the object you can have the primary object of fetishism 
and a secondary object of fetishism, according to whether this fetish relation 
applies to the fact of the viewing spectator (to the cinematic apparatus 
itself, i.e., primary object) or applies to a precise object being viewed – being 
shown within the f ilmic given.
Q: To shift the terms of the discussion a bit, earlier we pointed to the fact 
that if certain structures (like the nuclear family and the relations of the 
means of production) were changed, the f ilmic image would still be the 
present print of an absent object. The structure on which the apparatus is 
built, or in which the apparatus is completely interlocked, would remain. I 
take it that when you said that the phenomenology would remain the same, 
you meant that the kind of process that goes on between the spectator and 
the spectacle (the f ilm) would remain the same in spite of changes in the 
social formation.
Metz: I think so, but it would no longer re-activate the same past – the 
same childish past, the same memories. It would not re-activate the same 
situation, the same background. So, even if the phenomenological aspect 
of the thing remained unchanged, what it does re-activate would be 
changed – deeply. And a second point: in my opinion, social and familial 
changes would actually change, in the long run, the apparatus itself, the 
cameras, the ways of using them, etc…, and, hence, the psychical relation 
to this apparatus.
Q: I would like to continue the discussion of the image as a presentif ied 
absence. Both the theater and the cinema operate on a process of disavowal. 
What characterizes the particular type of disavowal specif ic to each mode 
of representation? If all f iction making can be seen as an oscillation of 
belief/disbelief, how do you differentiate f iction in the cinema from f iction 
in the theater?
Metz: The difference lies, I think, in the balance of forces between the two 
aspects of the split. Whenever you have a split, you have two sets of forces, 
because a split means that the subject is in some manner divided into 
two parts, two subjects. I think the difference between the cinematic and 
the theatrical situations lies in the relation of forces between these two 
agencies, or, more precisely, the balance of forces between the material 
of the representation – the material of the signif ier – on one side, and the 
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specif ic strength of the signif ied, what is being represented. Fiction is a 
very important historical phenomenon and can be dealt with by a great 
many different signif iers. I think you have two elements in every f iction: 
the very fact of action, and the different signif iers which are able to take 
in charge the f iction. You have a f iction in the novel, a f iction in the f ilm, 
a f iction in the theater: a real material – the material of the signif ier – is 
utilized to represent something else.
And this “something else” is the represented, the diegesis.11 And in 
terms of belief, I think that the balance is not the same in the cinema 
spectator, because the material of the signif ier in the theater is completely 
real. The material which is used to depict the diegesis in the theater is 
real persons actually present during the performance. In the movies, the 
actor is absent during the screening of the f ilm; he was present during 
the shooting of the f ilm, but no longer. So, the material of the signif ier in 
the theater is part of reality: real space, binocular space, the same space 
in which the spectator is at the same moment. In the theater you have a 
very real signif ier which is busy (if I may put it so) imitating, representing 
a diegesis – representing an unreal. While in the cinema, you have the 
impression (and that is dream-like or fantasy-like) of being faced with 
that unreal itself, because the material of the signif ier is no longer a 
completely real one. It is no longer a present actor – it is an absent actor, 
and a monocular space. The material of the signif ier in the movies is 
much more unreal, which makes the diegesis much more real in terms of 
belief. I would say that the balance of forces between representation and 
what is represented leans much more to the side of the representation in 
the theater, and much more to the side of the diegesis – the imaginary 
presence of the unreal – in the cinema. Is that clear? For me, it’s a matter of 
the balance of belief and disbelief, a question of economics in the Freudian 
sense: relations of forces.
Q: What about the role of diegesis in psychoanalysis? I’m thinking of Freud’s 
case histories: the patient comes with a sort of jumble of phenomena which 
can’t be put into temporal order, and the process of analysis is the construc-
tion of an explanatory diegesis. How would one articulate the relationship 
between the role of the diegesis of the f ilm, or theater or novel, and the role 
of diegesis in psychoanalytic therapy?
Metz: There is one main difference, I think, between diegesis in the cure 
itself and diegesis in f iction. It is a difference between the texts. In a cure, 
the text has no boundaries. The text is being augmented, is being built, 
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constructed; it is being led further during every session of the cure. It has 
no existent boundaries – it’s not a closed text the way it is in a f ilm.
Q: But that’s only if the analysis is interminable.
Metz: Yes, but Freud means terminable in a very relative sense. In fact, all 
cures are interminable. I really think it is part of the very def inition of the 
cure to be interminable. Of course you can make a distinction – and Freud 
made it – between so-called terminable cures and so-called interminable, 
depending upon to what degree you meet the problem of castration. In any 
case, there is an essential difference, a second one, between diegesis in the 
cure and diegesis in the f ictional arts. When an analyst begins to work on 
the diegesis in a work of art, the work of art is already f inished. So, its literal 
manifest content is predetermined, it precedes the work of the analyst. 
Whereas, on the contrary, when the analyst begins the work in a cure, he 
has an actual influence on the very literal content of the text – text of the 
cure. And he has a real subject who is able to react, to respond to the fact 
of the cure, while the literary or f ilmic text doesn’t respond to the act of 
the f ilmic analyst. It’s a huge difference.
Q: Perhaps we could talk about the articulation between the Imaginary and 
Symbolic axes. There are two ways in which the Imaginary and the Symbolic 
can be seen to intersect: in the spectator’s relationship to the f ilm and in 
the analyst’s relationship to the f ilm. What interlocking relationships of 
the Imaginary and Symbolic axes come to the fore when f ilm is analyzed 
in terms of these concepts? Some theories of spectatorship in the cinema 
deal with the situation in the Imaginary which is reconstructed – the 
Mirror Stage, the specular relationship, the duality – in the f ilm viewing 
experience. And yet, cinema – the f ilm – is a Symbolic construction – it’s a 
discourse, and it is understood because the spectator/subject has acceded 
to the Symbolic. There’s a complicated relationship between these two 
regimes.
Metz: But I think this complicated relation is not part of the cinema alone. 
It’s the very problem of the imbrication of the Symbolic as such and the 
Imaginary as such. The Imaginary doesn’t properly exist without a prise 
en charge [assumption] by the Symbolic. In Lacan, the Symbolic is nothing 
else but the prise en charge of the Imaginary. It is the distinction between 
levels of functioning, not a distinction between several facts. You never 
f ind the Imaginary without the Symbolic prise en charge, certainly not in 
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cinema nor anywhere else. The Imaginary has to be told, has to be com-
municated – hence the status of language. I think this complicated problem 
in the movies is not more so than in everyday life.
Secondly, if you can see those links in the importance of the reactivation 
of the Mirror Phase (Mirror Stage) in the movies, you have, nevertheless, 
the difference between the mirror properly speaking (the mirror of the 
child), and this kind of second ‘mirror’ which the cinema screen is. The 
difference is that the cinema spectator is an adult, so he has already gone 
through the real Mirror Stage, and the Symbolic already functions in him; 
while in the child, it has yet to be constructed. In fact, it’s a difference of 
age (that is of degrees of socialization), simply, but it counts. That would 
be the very point – the only one, I think – on which I would disagree, to 
some extent, with Jean-Louis Baudry.12 I think he has underlined very 
smartly the likenesses between the Mirror Stage and the cinematic situ-
ation, but that he has underestimated the differences between the mirror 
stage and the cinematic apparatus. One difference is very important: the 
cinema spectator doesn’t look at his own body’s image. Exactly as in the 
question of fetishism, I think that the cinematic situation has only certain 
features of the Mirror Stage. But, you know, more generally, the idea of 
equating the cinematic situation with anything is impossible. You can’t 
equate things – you can only f ind out that certain features of the cinematic 
situation have something to do with the Mirror Stage, the Imaginary, the 
Symbolic. A kind of socially imposed under-motricity (lessened motor 
activity) and over perception devotes all the spectator’s forces to seeing, 
watching, and hearing.13 So, over-perception and under motricity – these 
two features are common to the cinematic situation and the Mirror Stage. 
But a third feature: I mean the presence of the spectator’s own body’s image, 
which accompanies the real Mirror Stage, is not available in the cinematic 
situation. It’s a big difference.
Q: If the Symbolic register is a prise en charge of the Imaginary, it would seem 
that this process would vary according to the degree to which a discursive 
model re-played the imaginary coherence of the Mirror Phase. More specifi-
cally, if a discursive model departs from conventional narrative structure 
and editing modes (which suture the spectator/subject univocally into the 
signifying chain)14 would this model be an intervention on the primary 
level of identif ication?
Metz: I think that the process of suturing involves primary and secondary 
identif ication at the same time. Perhaps the best example would be the 
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character who is looked at by another character who is off-frame. This 
off-character is a kind of substitute for the spectator, because part of the 
definition of the spectator is to be off-frame. And so the character-off shares 
a given ‘off’ position with the spectator. In this way, then, the process of 
suturing has to do with the primary identif ication, because the character-
off is really a substitute for the spectator. He is a spectator – a spectator 
within the spectated. But in these shots, you also have characters who 
are not off, but who are looked at by the character-off. And so you have a 
secondary identif ication at the same time.
Q: Some theorists have argued that ruptures in secondary identif ication 
can break down the pure specularity of the spectator-screen relationship 
and displace it onto relations which are more intra-textual. In this instance, 
the spectator’s primary identif ication would be broken down and dispersed 
between the relationships among the shots. So, the specularity of the im-
age would vary according to the range of different possible identif ications 
available to the spectator at any given time. Could you comment on that 
kind of movement?
Metz: I would answer “yes” and “no” to this question. Yes, insofar as a 
breakdown of secondary identif ication would change a lot, of course, in 
the concrete functioning of the primary identification, because this primary 
identif ication would no longer be ‘blocked’ – given a massive character. 
On the other hand, I would answer “no” because I really think that there 
is a danger in experimental f ilms in that the quasi-vanishing of secondary 
identif ication can, as a result, raise or augment the primary identif ication. 
Secondary identif ication is then disappointed by the absence of characters 
to identify with – disappointed by the sudden breakdown of a whole part of 
the imaginary fulf illment. So – you have a phenomenon of disappointment, 
and all these forces within the spectator or f ilmmaker which no longer meet 
their secondary identif ication goal can reinforce primary identif ication. 
Hence, the possibility of a sort of idealistic aesthetic in certain avant-
garde experiments. It’s not a criticism against people who try this way of 
f ilmmaking, but I think that they have to be very aware and conscious of 
this problem. How is it socially possible – in our circumstances, now – to 
break down the secondary identif ication without falling in love with the 
apparatus itself, without reinforcing the stages of the apparatus as a fetish? 
It is a question of the equilibrium of forces. If you weaken one of the forces, 
it’s diff icult to avoid reinforcing the other one, because there is a balance 
of forces and because the desire remains. It’s diff icult, but not impossible.
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Q: Do you think that a f ilm like Jeanne Dielman [1975] is successful in the at-
tempt to articulate a new discursive structure without reinforcing primary 
identif ication?
Metz: Yes, no problem. I strongly appreciate this f ilm.
Q: In extreme examples of the breakdown of secondarized identifications (such 
as Peter Kubelka’s Arnulf Rainer [1960]), what often happens in the practical 
viewing situation is that the spectator simply walks out. Thus, this decision 
would seem to indicate that the spectator has a certain degree of control over 
his/her desire to be a complete ‘seeing’ subject. Do you see a problem here?
Metz: This problem of the spectator walking out seems to be a very simple 
matter. Most people are simply bored and they walk out. The fact is that 
you have two different kinds of people: those who walk out and those who 
work with the f ilm. And the danger I was speaking of in reducing secondary 
identif ication concerns only the people who work with the f ilm.
Q: But you seem to imply that, by de-emphasizing the secondary identif ica-
tions, primary identif ication would somehow be reinforced, and that there 
would be a psychic process that would satisfy the desire of the spectator 
who is there. Are you saying, then, that it’s not possible for a given spectator 
who is unaccustomed to a milieu of experimental f ilms to change the kind 
of desire he/she has?
Metz: Yes, the kind of spectator who walks out has a different internal 
functioning. His secondary wishes and secondary expectations are strongly 
disappointed, and so he is no longer able to maintain his primary wish-
fulf illment. But you have another type of person, who we all know, who 
is very enthusiastic about experimental cinema and does not have the 
same reaction. And for this second kind of person, there is this danger of 
what I call idealistic aestheticism. But a danger does not mean that you 
automatically fall into this danger.
Q: You’re pointing, then, to a non-recognition on the part of certain abstract 
theorists and f ilmmakers. They deceive themselves into thinking that they 
are disrupting something when they are actually reinforcing it.
Metz: Yes, the danger of this non-recognition exists, but it doesn’t mean 
that the reaction of the people who walk out is better, by any means. I only 
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mean that nothing can be done (at least in the short run) about those who 
walk out.
Q: But it does point to a very important factor which is the viewing contract 
(an idea advanced by Jean-Louis Comolli).15 If the viewing contract does not 
take place or is terminated, then the whole thing doesn’t even occur. If some-
body walks out or if somebody doesn’t see the f ilm, then neither primary 
nor secondary identif ications are set in motion in any sense whatsoever. 
The notion of a contract is central, because it places very def inite limits on 
the workings of the cinema.
Metz: I agree completely. And I think that this notion of a viewing contract 
is very important.
Q: If you accept the premise that knowledge is also a function of desire, and if 
the object of desire is a fantasmatic lost object, what are the epistemological 
implications?
Metz: I think the searcher is trying to f ind or to re-f ind (hence, the lost 
object) a kind of security by the very fact of giving a very precise description 
of the given, by a pathetic attempt to master the material. And so I am 
convinced – not only am I convinced, I feel it in my close relation to my 
work – that it’s a kind of internal endeavor to re-f ind some sort of very 
ancient security, even if illusory. And so, yes, I think that knowledge has 
much to do with the search for the lost object, but in a very transformed 
way.
Q: You are talking about the knowledge of the intellectual for whom pursuit 
of knowledge is a profession (the scholar, the student, the critic, the analyst). 
What about knowledge of the spectator?
Metz: Ahh, in the spectator it’s very different. I think in the spectator the 
lost object and the search for, the re-f inding of the lost object, has more to 
do with voyeurism. On this question, I would agree nearly completely with 
Melanie Klein’s position, according to which epistemophilia is a transformed 
form of voyeurism. And I think the only difference – a very small difference 
in fact, and a very important one at the same time – between the spectator 
and the scholar is that the former occupies a more privately voyeuristic 
position, while in the latter the voyeuristic position has been transformed. 
‘To know’ is a transformation of ‘to see, to look’.
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Q: You have spoken of the notion of drives at a distance: the scopic drive 
(the desire for pleasurable looking) and the invocatory drive (the desire for 
pleasurable hearing), and of their special relationship to representation. 
Would you speak some more about this?
Metz: First, you have the very important difference between the biological 
instincts or biological needs and the drives. The difference is that, with the 
needs, there is a very strong relation with the object. Hence, the absence of 
sublimation, or the absence of real ‘repression’ in the analytic sense. Drives 
have a much looser relation with their object. According to Lacan, that is 
one of the points of definition of drives. The object can be replaced through 
the process of displacement, through substitution, which is impossible 
when you are hungry – if you are hungry you have to eat. The drives can 
be repressed – hence, the very possibility of repression – without putting 
into immediate danger the life of the subject. Point two: among the drives 
themselves, some drives, it seems to me, the ones which are related to the 
senses at a distance, have this sort of mise en scène: a spatial invocation, 
a spatial designing of this loose relation to the object, which doesn’t hap-
pen with other drives which are related to the sense of contact. The best 
example, I think, would be the anal drive or the oral drive, which are based 
on the sense of contact: the distinction between the goals or aim of the drive 
(to use Freud’s words) and the source organ tends to disappear, because the 
very aim of the drive is to obtain some pleasure on the level of the source. 
While in the other drives, such as the drive to see or the auditory drive, 
you have a spatial mise en scène. In the arts, painting, theater – in all arts 
which are related to the senses at a distance (seeing and hearing) – you have 
this spatial gap, this mise en scène of the distance. The very fact of looking 
implies a distance. If you are too close to an object, you no longer see it. 
The very fact of hearing implies a distance. So, I think that all drives are 
based on this loose relation with the object. With certain drives you have a 
concrete spatial mise en scène of this loose relationship. With other drives, 
related to the sense of contact, you can more easily have the illusion or 
impression of another kind of relation with the object. You can more easily 
have the impression of fulfillment of the gap between object and subject with 
the senses of contact; even if it is an illusion, it’s more easily producible, 
while it’s more diff icult to produce even the illusion with the sense at a 
distance. Personally, I would add that the difference between these two 
kinds of drives plays a very important social role by the very fact that the 
main arts, which are socially accepted, socially legitimate as art, are based 
on the sense at a distance, not on the senses of contact, which are socially 
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illégitimes, as we say in French, which have a weaker social estime, like the 
art of cooking, for instance, or the art of perfumes.
Q: So far our conversation has emphasized the psychoanalytic aspect of 
‘new semiotics’. Does your current work constitute a major break with 
your previous work in linguistics? For example, how do you see the work 
of primary and secondary processes in f ilm analysis?
Metz: The central notion in psychoanalysis is not so much a sort of simple 
binary opposition between two terms (primary and secondary), but rather 
the notion of the degrees of secondarization. It seems obvious – obvious 
and, hence, not so interesting – it’s obvious to notice that the unconscious 
is more primary than the conscious discourses or the conscious conducts 
in life, like language, f ilm. In fact, Freud already said it, for instance, when 
he emphasized that the dream has no syntactical markers, no separators to 
indicate an opposition, a consequence, a cause. The dream has no separate 
words to express, to carry the logical relations between the elements in 
the images. The dream expresses these relations by the very dispositions 
of the images themselves, not by separate markers. The whole level of the 
cinematic discourse is secondary, or has a high degree of secondarity (to be 
more exact). And on this level of relative secondarity the linguistic notions 
are operational. But on the other side, the more primary roots of the f ilmic 
discourse, the primary sources of the f ilmic discourse, remain behind it, 
being an initial point of departure for the forces, importantly affecting the 
forces involved in f ilmic discourses. I see no contradiction here, because one 
of the def initions or features of the primary is that it never appears. It ap-
pears only through its more or less secondarized forms. It can be established 
or guessed at or incited only through more or less secondarized material. 
I see no reason why it would be contradictory to use, at the same time, 
some linguistic notions and some analytic notions in the study of cinema. 
What I think is even more general: it is the same situation in the study of 
other f ields. You could use linguistic and analytic notions to study spoken 
language, to study everyday life, to study all kinds of institutions. For me 
it’s not a choice, because both are operational. You can study the game and 
the functioning of metaphor in cinema, and metaphor is already a very 
secondarized process, but behind metaphor there is condensation, which 
belongs to primary process.
Q: In his book, The Dynamics of Literary Response, Norman Holland dis-
cusses the concept of the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ and suggests that 
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if the reader thinks that a text speaks the truth he/she will check it for its 
verity, as in the case of non-fiction. But if it’s presented as f iction, the reader 
will not even consider the text’s verity. In other words, it is precisely our 
knowledge that we are dealing with f iction that enables us to experience 
it more fully because we do not feel that we have to test its verity. Do you 
agree with this analysis?
Metz: Yes, I agree totally with this point of view. I think that is another form, 
a precise sub-form (which I personally did not study, but a very interesting 
one) of the phenomenon of the splitting of belief. It’s always the same ques-
tion, this balance of forces in the splitting: security about ‘it doesn’t have 
to be checked’. And so, you can put a lot stronger belief in f iction because 
‘it doesn’t have to be checked’.
Q: In the case of cinema, is not the process of identif ication affected in a 
similar fashion when the spectators assume that they are viewing some 
version of social reality in the form of the documentary or docu-drama, 
as opposed to spectacle as f iction? Doesn’t the verif iable nature of the 
referent in the case of the documentary and the docu-drama prevent 
the screen from becoming the mirror that it does in connection with 
spectacle?
Metz: My answer would be yes, it does, to some extent. And perhaps I 
should explain this “to some extent.” The main problem, with respect to 
this question, is that the f iction regime, in many cases, remains dominant, 
inclusive within non-fiction films, because people are used to it. Fiction is 
not only certain f ilms, as opposed to non-f iction f ilms; it is not only the 
nature of the particular f ilms. Fiction is also a socially coded regime of 
viewing, of looking, the internal economic condition of the spectator. And 
so, in many cases, the f iction regime remains dominant in non-f iction 
f ilms, because of the way they are consumed. And, in some cases, even 
because of the way they are constructed by the f ilmmaker himself. Even 
if you wish to break with f iction, it still remains that you have to do it 
from within, and it’s always a problem. I am struck by the many cases 
in which, for instance, a documentary f ilm remains constructed in the 
main patterns of editing exactly as a f iction f ilm. The main diff iculty 
for me is the very presence of the dominant f iction regime within the 
non-f iction f ilm. There’s always this very important difference between 
wishful thinking – a wish to break the f iction regime – and achieving it 
in making a f ilm, or in viewing a f ilm.
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Q: In terms of this breaking of f iction, the project of the avant-garde seems 
to be directed against the Imaginary or against belief in the diegesis in order 
to shift the balance of forces toward knowing. Is your objection to aesthetic 
idealism that the avant-garde identif ies with technique primarily?
Metz: It’s not exactly that, it’s a danger within this orientation. A danger these 
people have to be aware of. But not an objection; on the contrary, I think they 
are bright. They are courageous, but they have to be aware of this problem.
Q: A f ilm like La Cecilia (Jean-Louis Comolli [1975]) is criticized because it 
doesn’t point to its f ictionality in an obvious way, whereas a f ilm, say, like 
Tout Va Bien (Jean-Luc Godard [1972]), which actually inserts posters and 
direct address – a certain battery of techniques – is considered by some 
people as a radical f ilm. In your view such a f ilm would actually be less 
radical because it would maintain the f iction with a greater hold.
Metz: I am not sure I understand the second part of your question, but in 
fact, I disagree with the beginning of what you were saying. I think that 
in the precise example of La Cecilia it is a big mistake to miss the marks of 
enunciation16 because they are not obvious. That would be the real problem 
with La Cecilia for me: the marks of the enunciation process are not obvious, 
but they are there, very subtle, very sophisticated, and certain people miss 
them. And so they condemn the f ilm as not radical, whereas I think it is.
Q: That’s why I used that example – I think you misunderstood me. I was say-
ing that at an obvious level, it is criticized for appearing illusionistic when, in 
fact, it is working at a more subtle level in terms of the contradictions it poses.
Metz: You have different forms of radical f ilms. A f ilm can be radical in its 
very concrete and punctual commitments. You can shoot a f ilm of a strike 
and it can be a really radical f ilm. But a f ilm which would be radical in the 
sense you mean would be a discourse with the marks of enunciation in 
evidence, in La Cecilia, for example, the way the sound is used and the way 
the spatial relationships are organized within the static shot.
Q: But does the ordinary spectator observe these very subtle marks?
Metz: I think you have a real, directly political problem with the radical 
f ilms. If you try to shoot a radical f ilm in the sense of inscribing the marks of 
enunciation with the enunciated, you have no audience. And so, in another 
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sense, the film is not radical. I think that a real choice has to be made by each 
person, each f ilmmaker. If a given f ilmmaker wants to have an immediate, 
practical influence, he has to know what kind of audience is the target, 
and to use the editing devices and the lighting devices according to the 
expectations of this precise audience.
Q: Do you accept the critique of naturalistic reproductions of reality as 
being misleading because they presuppose that the world can be discovered 
by just looking at it? Would you accept, for example, that a documentary 
of a strike could be misleading insofar as it assumes that knowledge is 
unproblematic and on the surface?
Metz: If the f ilm has a very precise, political, immediate aim; if the f ilm-
maker shoots a f ilm in order to support a given strike, for example, and if 
the f ilm actually supports the strike… what could I say? Of course it’s O.K.
Q: I think it’s a question of levels of complexity. If a f ilm produces a particular 
effect for a strike, if it mobilizes workers to support a strike, then I don’t think 
that theorists who are involved in more subtle levels of f ilm analysis are go-
ing to denounce the f ilm. But I think that they are not going to stop working 
on those other levels in their own work. What concerns us, however, at this 
point is to correlate your theory with the practical task of f ilm criticism.
Metz: Perhaps I could take a concrete example: the f ilm by Barbara Kopple, 
Harlan County [1976]. A very, very good f ilm – I loved this f ilm. It was a big 
hit in Paris – a real success – three months in two cinema theaters – thou-
sands and thousands of spectators. It is the kind of f ilm that has nothing 
really new on the level of primary/ secondary identif ication, but it’s a very 
good f ilm. I could f ind no reason to criticize the f ilm or to say “oh well, you 
know, it doesn’t elaborate the secondary identification.” This is obviously not 
the purpose of the f ilm. It is unfair, in a sense, to call a f ilm into question 
on terms which are not within the f ilmmaker’s purpose. She intended to 
make a … I don’t know whether you would call it radical . . . but she intended 
to support the strike and she did it. It’s a marvelous f ilm, and I support it.
Q: Am I correct in saying that your work is not oriented toward values, 
ethical or aesthetic, but toward description, exposition and a science?
Metz: Oh yes, a science, except that science is a big word. You know, in physics, 
in chemistry, the people who are really informed are not sure that what they 
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are doing is science. So, how could I be sure that what I am doing is science? 
Science remains the goal, but I would hesitate to use the word science except 
as a very far away target – a direction of mine. Personally, I would prefer to 
put it another way – to say: “I try to be precise; I try to be rigorous.” Only 
that, that would be enough. It has something to do with science, but … .
Q: But your project is not so much polemical or critical; rather it is a work 
of clarif ication, precision, description of ‘what is cinema?’ From my past 
reading I know that you work on codes, on the spectator, but your recent 
lectures on figuration seemed to center on the actual generation – the actual 
mental processes that generate what cinema is. Is that accurate? Have your 
interests extended to the actual generation of the cinematic text?
Metz: To some extent, yes, my interests have switched to the spectator, in 
which I was not interested in the beginning of my work f ifteen years ago. 
It has switched also to the process of … not exactly generation … perhaps 
f iguration of the deep processes of … .Yes, generating in a sense – not in the 
precise sense of generative grammar in linguistics, but in some sense… . 
For instance, the problem of condensation and displacement as deep 
matrices – generating in this sense for the textual linking – textual links 
between two images in the f ilm. So, in this sense, yes, generative.
Q: There are many operations at work at different levels in a single figure. For 
example, what mental processes produce a lap dissolve? In your lectures you 
gave extensive example of analyses of the different axes of these processes 
of f iguration: metaphor/metonymy, primary/secondary, condensation/
displacement, paradigm/syntagm. I think you mentioned other work on 
camera angles, close-ups, and other aspects of specif ically f ilmic codes to 
which you had applied this kind of analysis. Is that correct?
Metz: Yes, that is correct, if you mean by that that, in my long article entitled 
‘Métaphore/métonymie ou le référent imaginaire,’17 the idea of a single 
surface f igure as being the terminal result of several mental processes 
(more precisely four: metaphor/metonymy, condensation/displacement, 
primary/secondary, paradigm/syntagm), this idea is applied not only to 
the particular case of the lap dissolve, but also to several other f igures in 
different f ilms, or in advertising posters, or in poems by Victor Hugo, etc.
But if you mean that I have in preparation, in this moment, another 
article on this kind of problem, the response is: no. When I f inished the long 
article we are speaking of, I temporarily stopped – not working, I am still 
200 Conversations with Christian Metz 
working – , but I temporarily stopped writing, because in a scholar’s life (or 
in everybody’s life) you need from time to time periods of rest, of reflexion, 
on non-immediate production. Probably, I think, I will begin my following 
book (or long article?) in the middle or end of 1979, and I do not yet know 
on which topics. And so I have no secrets, I have nothing in my pockets. All 
is available in my last two books (or in the previous ones).
Q: It struck me, though, that if you continued, if you analyzed f igures along 
these different axes and analyzed not only lap dissolves and some others 
but all sorts of other specif ically f ilmic codes, that you would have the 
other book that you were talking about – that you would have not only the 
comprehensive book of cinematic codes, but the extensive book.
Metz: Hopefully! But if I write this book, it will be a lot of work. So I feel 
unable to promise that I will write it. I don’t know.
Q: We understand that you have been working on Peirce in your seminar at 
the Ecole des Hautes Etudes this year, in February and March 1978.
Metz: Yes, I am very interested in Peirce. I think that Peirce describes three 
levels of signification, or three semiosis to use Peirce’s word, rather than three 
different kinds of signs.18 I really think that Peirce was very often misunder-
stood and was forced into a very positivistic interpretation, mainly by Charles 
Morris. The very famous distinction between symbol, icon and index – the 
famous tripartition – is very often interpreted as a distinction between three 
separate materials, separate kinds of signs. Between three sets, in terms of 
the set f ield, which would be exterior to each other. So you could put one sign 
into one box (index), and another sign into a second box (icon). I’m really 
convinced … and there are a lot of remarks in Peirce’s writings which very 
clearly indicate … . For instance, when he speaks about photographs – it is an 
example that Peirce takes very often, and he says it explicitly – he asserts that 
photographs are, at the same time, index and icon. Index by some features of 
the photographic process; icon by other features of the same photographic 
process. And so I think that the interesting way of using Peirce is not a ty-
pological one – the need for making boxes and a typology of signs. Peirce is 
generally considered a typologist of signs. But I think the more interesting 
way of understanding Peirce is to consider that he tried to describe three 
levels of every act of signification. And that is what he f inally intended to 
say: in each semiosis – each signification act, signification event – you have 
a functioning level which is indexical, a functioning level which is iconic, 
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and one which is symbolic – symbolic in Peirce’s sense, that is totally socially 
coded, without contiguity, without a basis in contiguity index, without a basis 
in any similarity which would be icon. And so, I think that Peirce can help a 
lot and has already helped a lot in film studies. In Peter Wollen’s studies,19 for 
instance, and Gianfranco Bettetini’s in Italy. Bettetini wrote a whole book 
(Gianfranco Bettetini is an Italian cinema semiologist) called The Index of 
Realism devoted to the so-called realistic f ilms: Nanook [1922] by Flaherty 
and Greed [1924] by Stroheim, which he describes as being, to some extent, 
indexical. And obviously, I think Peter Wollen’s work is very important in this. 
But the main point for me is that Peirce is not a typologist. And if you read 
Peirce carefully, he did explicitly say so, but people have forgotten this aspect 
of Peirce. He was forced into a positivistic typology of signs with three boxes.
Q: Would you like to make a closing statement?
Metz: Yes. That I like speaking with people and making communication, 
and so I am very glad for this conversation between you and me.
A number of people participated in this interview in its various stages. The 
major work was done by Sandy Flitterman, Bill Guynn, Roswitha Mueller, 
and Jacquelyn Suter.
In addition, our thanks go to Margaret Morse, Ann West, Bertrand Augst, 
Barbara Freeman, David Miller, Francia Friendlich, Joel Fineman, and Tom 
Andrae.
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Metz also mentions that he is beginning a new study, a psychoanalytic 
analysis of the joke.
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206 Conversations with Christian Metz 
Thompson: Tonight’s guest is Christian Metz. Professor Metz’ new book 
has just arrived in Australia. It is called Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The 
Imaginary Signifier. I think it would be appropriate to begin by asking 
Professor Metz about the current direction of his work – I understand there 
has been rather a signif icant change in the direction of your work at the 
moment: perhaps you could speak of that?
Metz: I would say rather a signif icant intermission in my cinematic work. 
I’m just now in the process of writing a book on jokes, on wit (witz). I started 
this book two years ago and I think it will take me another one and a half 
or two years. After that I intend to return to my cinematic interests which 
still remain active, but I felt the need to change the subject-matter, if not the 
method of my work, because when you have worked for a long time – twenty 
years in my case – on the same subject, you are in danger of repeating 
yourself. Very often people expect you, or invite you to repeat the same 
thing, and so I felt the necessity to, let us say, break with myself momentar-
ily, and to produce a semiological and psychoanalytic book on another 
subject-matter, namely ‘wits and jokes’, starting from Freud’s book, 1905 
[ Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious], and criticising and developing 
it in a more elaborate way.
Well that is the f irst answer I can give before receiving other questions.
Thompson: You have been at the centre of both the f irst semiotics and the 
second semiotics; could you summarise your views on the state of French 
semiotics at the moment?
Metz: Yes. The current state of semiotics in France now is characterised 
mainly by a sort of hollow period. A coming down which is not neces-
sarily a decline – I cannot predict the future – but what is sure is that 
we are inside the hollow period. This does not mean that semiotics has 
disappeared. The situation is somewhat different in France from other 
countries; in France semiotics has already become a part of the general 
culture and education so that it is a part of all sorts of studies – painting, 
literature, cinema, and it can remain very strong, in a sense, inf luencing 
all kinds of studies without remaining a separate school of semiotics as 
such, as we had in the beginning of the sixties. At the beginning things 
take the form of a school, very formal, and then it becomes more informal 
and diffused.
There is an exception, an important exception. There is one person 
in France who is continuing the semiotic undertaking as such, general 
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semiotics which has a vocation for replacing all the previous sciences, the 
knowledges, which is Greimas. Greimas is a very important semiotician 
with whom I don’t agree, but he is continuing a school of general semiotics 
as such with a number of disciples, and he is continuing with the idea of 
semiotics covering the whole f ield of knowledge. So he has sub-groups in 
seminars, at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, in the semiotics of painting, of 
semiotics of music and so on. The idea is to cover all things. Personally, I 
don’t stand for this imperialist conception of semiotics because I am sure 
that semiotics cannot replace the other kinds of knowledge – but can only 
collaborate with them and bring its own enlightenment as a part, as one 
method among others.
Thompson: Can we open for questions?
Freiberg: In what way do you mean that semiotics is in a state of decline?
Metz: I’m not sure it is in a state of decline – it could be, I don’t know, but 
I was speaking only of a ‘hollow period’ and what the future will be I am 
frankly unable to answer you. To some extent I’m sure that a certain number 
of basic concepts will remain because they are obvious – when we speak, 
now, in 1982, of signif ier, signif ied, connotation, denotation, code, system, 
text, etc., it’s no longer semiotics, it’s obvious, we cannot do without them. 
They were brought in by semiotics in the sixties, so this part will remain, 
I’m sure, because everyone uses it and needs it.
Rohdie: While they have become part of the common speech they have also 
become less precise …
Metz: Yes …
Rohdie: … so that their analytic strength – I can’t say is less than void, but 
in one sense is very confusing. Words like ‘text’ or ‘the textual’ are used 
very loosely now, whereas at one point there were attempts to specify not 
only what those terms meant, but also they had a polemical and politi-
cal edge attached to them. Notions of ‘text’, for example, were not simply 
descriptive notions, but brought a certain purchase on the way in which 
you conceptualised works, on the way in which you analysed works, and 
so on. Once that language of semiotics – and, indeed, at some prior period 
the language of psychoanalysis – became a common speech it also became 
de-natured and almost less useful.
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Metz: Yes, I agree, it is a danger every time something diffuses. I see no means 
to avoid such a danger because it is the other side of ‘working out’, you know, of 
success. Except when you are a serious writer, a serious researcher, to make 
precise in every case that I am taking ‘text’ in the sense used by Hjelmslev, or in 
the sense of Kristeva, and so on, you can do that and it is better so. Nevertheless, 
when a notion diffuses there is a danger that it becomes more vague.
Rohdie: On the other hand the terms themselves are by no means fixed and as 
you said there is ‘text’ according to Hjelmslev and ‘text’ according to Kristeva 
and, indeed, most of those terms are subject to considerable debate depending 
on what theoretical position you might take, either towards various objects 
like the cinema or painting or various critical positions you might take with 
regard to semiotics. The terms on the one hand might be denatured but there 
is no fixed sense to exactly what they mean or what they refer to – or is there?
Metz: What is the danger exactly, in your opinion?
Rohdie: It is not exactly a danger. When one speaks about semiotics and if 
I think of a lot of your work, which has been concerned with def ining, to 
a large degree, terms and concepts and f ixing them in their relationships 
with each other, from the point of view of, say, cinema studies, teaching 
the subject or relating to your own work, I often feel there is an impulse 
towards a scientif ic description, and a setting aside of those terms, outside 
the polemic. From other positions the terms you seek to f ix are the subject 
of quite serious debate and some kind of polemical edge. I was not implying 
any danger but responding to that question about semiotics in decline. The 
terms are by no means clear within the subject itself, but are also used in 
a sloppy and unclear fashion in an ordinary sense.
Metz: I am unable to answer you about the situation here or in other coun-
tries, but in France they are to a certain degree f ixed and are no longer so 
controversial. There were very important controversies, but not now. This 
is for the very good reason that the notions of semiotics can be used by its 
enemies for their own purposes to the extent that the terms are formal ones 
and can be used for different political intentions.
Rohdie: Is that a notion that somewhere there exists a space in which the 
terms and concepts of semiotics are clear and precise, and another space 
where enemies and friends are using these terms for various battles – is 
that the sense you are suggesting?
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Metz: Yes, but that you cannot avoid. It is not confined to semiotics. …
Rohdie: Perhaps one could take the position that the terms have no f ixity, 
and that the assertion about their f ixity is a political position, and they have 
to be seen, for example, to have a certain lack of f ixity. In so far as there is 
a debate about those terms, you seem to be saying that there is some space 
in which they are clarif ied and precise.
Metz: Yes, there is some space, but it is not much. It seems to me you are 
confounding two different things. On the one side to propose a f ixed defini-
tion for those terms, and on the other side to demand from everyone that 
they take the terms in this very sense. It is quite different. I have devoted an 
important part of my work to conceptual def initions but I do not demand 
from any of my students that they take the term in this sense, only that they 
def ine in which sense they use it, in order to make things clear. It is not the 
same thing to propose a f ixed definition as to impose it. The whole thing 
is about proposing/imposing.
Flaus: Let me offer you a possible example for your jokes. I am hearing 
you using the word ‘defusion’ and I think you are intending the word ‘dif-
fusion’ – diffusion, a spreading, and ‘defusion’ a taking away of meaning 
by force?
Metz: I was thinking of diffusion with an ‘i’.
Flaus: I am hearing you also as de-fusion, taking the explosion out of it. Let 
me ask it this way – diffusion of the usage of the term, that it is passing from 
a smaller elite to a larger, less privileged …
Metz: Oh, it is not at question, the beginners …
Flaus: … once the terms become accepted in the intellectual life of a com-
munity then they have passed from being in the sacerdotal domain, that is 
belonging to the priests and acolytes and they are then passed down to the 
faithful – and I understand that is what has happened to those terms – but 
I understand there to be a diffusion in the users and not a diffusion in the 
terms. Would that be so? It is not that the number of things they may be 
said to mean has increased but the number of users?
Metz: I do not understand what you mean by ‘users’.
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Flaus: In the sense that we say ‘usage’, users of any language, any system of 
communication. The number of users has increased which amounts to a 
diffusion of the usage, but not of the terms. Correct me if it’s not what you 
intended, but in the distinction that Lévi-Strauss makes between nature 
and culture, that terms such as the ones you mentioned, let us say ‘text’, 
has passed from being seen as part of culture and it is now accepted as 
part of nature.
Metz: I would not agree. It has passed from a section of culture to another 
section of culture but it still remains social: the whole story remains social.
Rohdie: I wonder if I can ask one thing concerning the previous issue. If I took 
a set of terms which were now part of a semiotic, psychoanalytic, linguistic 
vocabulary – things like fetishism, sadism, scopic drive, or the signif ier, and 
I looked at a work like S/Z [Roland Barthes, 1974] that employed those terms, 
and I looked at your own work, which also employed those terms, I would 
be very hard put to construct any kind of meta-language in the case of S/Z 
because the terms within that semiotic vocabulary would shift, within the 
work, as I was reading it; they would not have any secure place within the 
work itself. In the way that they were used I could not f ind some model 
which I could take out of the work and f ind meanings for. When I look at 
The Imaginary Signifier and the earlier ‘f irst stage’ semiotics, the more 
linguistically oriented semiotics of Language and Cinema, the impulse is 
towards constructing a meta-language of the cinema. They are not exactly 
def initional, but there are terms which form themselves into relational 
complexes so that you can speak of the cinema semiotics of Christian Metz 
as a system of constructed terms that can be re-applied and used.
Rohdie: When I was suggesting that there was something of a polemic, there 
is obviously a different impulse in the use of semiotic terms which in the 
end lose all their stability to one that is concerned with their stabilisation. 
If I compare one with the other there seems to me to be a whole position, 
not only about semiotics, but about their use, about texts and their function, 
and indeed about the function of the cinema. It would not surprise me to 
hear you argue that there is a systematic relational place for terms within 
a cinematic semiotics – but some would argue that there is not, that these 
terms cannot have any f ixity, argued from similar positions to you. For 
example, they might argue it from their reading or understanding of Lacan. 
In so far as writing would involve them with desire the signs and signif iers 
they use would necessarily shift their meanings, change and alter.
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Metz: Yes – you know, what I took from Lacan was only a general inspira-
tion, very little. I have been reproached for using many psychoanalytic 
terms – whereas, in fact, I have taken from Lacan only four or f ive ideas – the 
Mirror Stage, metaphor as condensation, metonymy as displacement, only 
very well-known concepts. In Paris no one would call me a Lacanian – no 
one.
In my opinion we have a whole range of semiologies, more or less scien-
tif ic, more or less literary. Roland Barthes’ semiology was literary – he was 
a writer, a great writer, so the way he uses semiological concepts in S/Z, is 
arbitrary and this book is impossible to apply – but why should we apply it? 
That would be my question. It is a wonderful book and why should someone, 
anyone, apply it? Why should there be things to apply? I am very sceptical 
about the very notion of ‘applying’ because we are not in the domain of the 
physical sciences where you can really apply something.
I think that even the scientif ic side of semiotics is only an attempt to be 
more rigorous. In my books if you notice, I never use the word ‘science’ or 
‘scientif ic’ – only the French word ‘rigorous’ – so I am very sceptical too, 
about semiotics being able to be a science because it is confusing to say 
‘science’. When we say ‘science’ we think of physics or chemistry where the 
degree of precision, of accurateness, of fullness or predictivity have nothing 
in common with semiology.
So we have many semiologies, some of which are more literary like S/Z, 
which is impossible to apply; some of which are applicable, such as my f irst 
books – if people wish to apply them. But – they were not written to be 
applied. They were written to clarify some problems and notions of cinema. 
This notion of applicability is possible only when the discipline has reached 
a very high degree of scientif icity, then you can apply them.
Davies: Could I take this a little further and suggest that, at some level, you 
do seem to apply Lacanian theory to the study of the cinema. Maybe you 
will say that you only picked out what you need to?
Metz: Yes, exactly.
Davies: It is what you picked out that I f ind very interesting because this 
has been a problem for a number of years in understanding your intel-
lectual development. For example, in Film Language, the f irst book of 
yours that I read, there was a very convincing argument against taking 
the iconic sign as being ‘similar’ to the linguistic sign – an argument that 
can be used just as convincingly in, what to me, is a battle between Freud 
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and Lacan. This seems to hinge over the one word ‘pictogram’ – whereas 
Freud thinks the pictogram is the initial way the primary processes 
become inscribed in the unconscious, Lacan seems to need to translate 
‘pictogram’ in a linguistic sense; he really wants to call it a ‘hieroglyph’, 
and that very arguable hinge obviously cannot be open to any scientif ic 
or perhaps conceptual argument. Lacan is then able to later claim that the 
“unconscious is structured like a language” and we get a very linguistic 
view of the whole theory that traces its path back to Freud. If I am right 
in suggesting that Freud may well have been more correct than Lacan 
in that the initial inscriptions on the unconscious are iconic, only later 
to be transposed into some form of language, that seems to have grave 
implications, in, for example, how we see a f ilm. I wonder why you found 
it necessary to import Lacanian theory – only “f ive or six concepts from 
Lacanian theory,” but they are integrated concepts which back each other 
up all the time – they come out specif ically in The Imaginary Signifier, I 
think fairly uncritically on that point about iconic inscription. I wonder 
if you would like to comment?
Metz: There are at least two points in what you said. There would be a 
whole discussion about the relations between Freud and Lacan – it is a 
very complicated issue. Freud thought that the language system – not the 
language but the language system – was inscribed in the preconscious 
and that the unconscious had only icons, images. Whereas Lacan seems 
to say that the language – not the language system is the unconscious. 
What Lacan means by that is no longer the language system but what we 
call the ‘deep language’ – the language of poetry for example. We could be 
referring to the unconscious even in Freud because he very often speaks 
of word representations translated into thing-representations which is the 
equivalent in Freud of the Lacanian theory of language. Am I making myself 
clear?
So I am not sure – it would be another discussion – but as to the fact that 
Lacan and Freud disagree on this problem of language, I’m not really sure. 
I think that Lacan is confusing because of his presentation, his language 
which is very diff icult to understand, but I’m really convinced that Lacan 
is totally a Freudian – behind each line of Lacan you have a sentence by 
Freud. Of course the style, the words, all is changed – it is hard to recognise 
and it takes much study.
On the disagreement about the level of language – whether precon-
scious or unconscious – I think that in reality both agree, but not as to the 
presentation.
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Davies: There is another difference, I think, between Freud and Lacan 
concerning the exact boundary between the conscious and the unconscious 
which has implications on your later work. The way I characterise it Freud 
sees the unconscious/conscious boundary as a semi-permeable membrane 
through which concepts may pass via dreams, hypnosis or free association, 
whereas for Lacan it seems to be a much firmer juncture through which only 
desire can penetrate with meanings. You talk a great deal about the power of 
desire in terms of the cinema, especially in the latter part of The Imaginary 
Signifier. What would happen, for example, to instinctual identif ication, in 
a f ilm that does not really address the concept of desire specif ically, let us 
say, in a f ilm that only addresses the instinctual forces of aggression? Can 
we do the same kind of thing for aggression that you have done for desire?
Metz: Oh no, it is not so. For Freud it was desire – it was no longer libido, 
but it was still desire.
Davies: Is not, for Freud, aggression still an instinctual drive?
Metz: Yes, it is.
Davies: So can we not, in theory, have a f ilm that talks about aggression 
rather than desire?
Metz: I do not understand ‘rather’ because aggression is a desire. When you 
desire to aggress somebody … or perhaps I misunderstand you?
Davies: So the model we have is of desire, as the boundary, and after that 
we have desire in its sexual form and in its aggressive form?
Metz: I am not convinced, you know. I feel the opposite – that the borderline 
between conscious and unconscious is stronger in Freud, which is natural 
because Freud began, and so he was thinking in stiffer terms, whereas Lacan 
explicitly says that, roughly translated by me, that ‘behind each conscious 
phenomenon or action or discourse you have the active presence of the 
unconscious’. I think, on the contrary, that in Lacan the borderline is more 
flexible. It is not an obvious point, you know, you have to study the text of 
both, but I feel so.
Routt: The goal of psychoanalysis is a cure. One psychoanalyses a patient 
and the idea is that something will change and there will be a cure. The 
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language and the method has been derived towards that goal. What happens 
when one takes those concepts, those ideas and begins to apply them to 
something else – or – is there a patient to be cured in the analysis of cinema 
that you propose?
Metz: Yes, that’s a very central point – an interesting question. Firstly, what 
you say represents, in my opinion, the limit to applying psychoanalysis 
to cinema, because psychoanalysis was conceived mainly in relation to 
therapy. Applying psychoanalysis to cinema has its limit, like everything. 
Secondly, you can apply psychoanalysis to f ilm in many different senses. 
You can attempt to analyse – to psychoanalyse – the f ilm-maker, it is a 
possible research. I am sceptical for the reason that you mentioned, that the 
f ilm-maker is not in therapy and he cannot answer, he cannot react to what 
the analyst, in this case the f ilm analyst, says. You can apply psychoanalysis 
to the f ilmic text where it becomes easier, but this also has its limitations 
because the text cannot answer, as you said.
What I am doing is a third kind of research which is to apply psycho-
analysis to the code – to the social institution of the cinema. So it depends 
on where you apply psychoanalysis – to the f ilm-maker, to the f ilm, to 
cinema, to what?
Routt: To the institutional object, is there the possibility of some kind of 
therapy?
Metz: Oh no, there is no answer.You have the limit which was my f irst 
point – except when experimental f ilms, for example, inspired by this kind 
of theoretical research begin to change the cinematic institution itself.
Rohdie: There is surely something of an answer because, as I understand it, 
one impulse for using psychoanalytic terms and in particular, Freudian and 
Lacanian terms, has been to see the subject as being formed and constructed 
by language, in this case, perhaps, the language of the cinema or within 
representation. There are places, for example there was at some period in 
Screen an impulse to demand a change in practices of representation in 
order to shift the position of the subject which had ideological and political 
implications, so that psychoanalysis was to a degree a political weapon 
aimed at a transformation, both a transformation of representation and of 
people’s relation to that representation. Now, it might be stretching a point 
to think of that as a cure – it is not exactly covered by those categories that 
you presented – it is a slightly different impulse.
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Metz: Yes, it is.
Rohdie: Both semiotics and – it is hard to say f irst stage and second stage 
of semiotics – but both linguistic concepts within semiotics and psycho-
analytic concepts within semiotics have been used in part as a kind of 
descriptive discourse – not perhaps scientif ic, but it has been used as a 
weapon in different times and within different cultures. I think within that 
notion of it as weapon there is some notion of it as a cure involved. At least 
if not cure then at least change – and not simply as description?
Metz: Yes, but to start with, you were saying that psychoanalysis teaches 
us that the subject is formed within language. I would not say so. I would 
say that psychoanalysis teaches us that the subject is formed within so-
ciety. This is how I understand psychoanalysis. The subject is formed by 
Oedipus – to make things simple, too simple – which has an obvious link 
to the restricted family and the restricted family has a very obvious link 
with certain periods in the economic evolution of the world, so for me – you 
have sentences in Lacan which are very clear – for me, psychoanalysis is 
the study of the imprinting of society in the person. You have the exterior 
society, the society proper, and you have the society imposed by force within 
the inner constitution of each person, and that is the very meaning of the 
Oedipus complex. Oedipus complex is a kind of symbol – for Freud it was 
too – a symbol that means that society imposes its patterns within the 
mentalities, the feelings, from childhood on. Of course, I know that many 
analysts in different countries – in the U.S.A., all; in France, many – who are 
convinced that the Oedipus complex is eternal and universal. But simply 
they are wrong – because it is impossible to think that Oedipus complex 
can have no relations with the social organisation of family structures.
Rohdie: But how do you know they are wrong?
Metz: Because it is obvious. How could you have an Oedipus complex – at 
least in the sense that has been described by Freud – in a community where 
the children are raised by several parents?
Flaus: There is research on this in Oceania where the function of both 
the repository of affection and also the administration of discipline is 
carried out by the brother of the father and in a matriachy, where one 
f inds that families were organised and the State similarly, that such 
complexes would be absurd in relation to the mother. That is not to 
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deny the system which claims that one of the manifestations of it in our 
societies is universal. I do not think you were saying that the notion of 
complex as a system is untrue, but that its application in our society as 
a universal is untrue?
Metz: Yes. It depends on the conventions you adopt when def ining the 
Oedipus complex. Whether it is a different pattern, but still Oedipean, 
depends on the conventions. In all cases when society changes over a long 
time the Oedipus complex changes or it could disappear – I do not know 
the future. If the family disappears in the long run Oedipus complex would 
disappear – or, perhaps, deeply changed.
Flaus: I understand that this was the root of the disagreement between 
Freud and Adler?
Metz: Yes, yes.
Flaus: Can I return to something else that was asked in relation to the 
question on psychoanalysis and cure. When we say cure we make certain 
kinds of judgements from the centre of the culture in which we live and 
perhaps ‘adjustment’ is a less committed way of describing that. We have in 
the literature of American psychoanalysts the work of Robert Lindner – who 
is perhaps known to the Cineastes here because he wrote Rebel without 
a Cause, even though they bought the rights to the book, used the title 
and threw the text away, that Lindner argued, in Prescription for Rebellion 
that ‘adjustment’ is the goal of so-called successful psychoanalysis and 
the notion of cure ought to be applied to the society rather than to the 
patient. I ask this question – and I’d like to think of it as an example of 
metaphorical thought – that perhaps there is a cure. This is where I would 
support Sam, in the notion of application, that if we can say that we apply 
psychoanalysis to the study of a particular f ilm or f ilm-maker, is every 
hermeneutic exercise itself an attempt to make a cure – because there is 
an area of disturbance or maladjustment between the knowledge held now 
and the knowledge we believe can be acquired. Each exercise to explicate 
is itself impelled by a need to cure – in other words, a cure is acquiring the 
knowledge not now held.
The awareness that there is some knowledge as yet unidentified, in which 
the search to f ind it and the f inding are like an analogue of a cure – and in 
that metaphorical usage, yes, there is a cure going on in the psychoanalysis 
applied to f ilm.
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Metz: Yes, I agree with your second point. As to your f irst point, the question 
of the therapy, the cure being a kind of adjustment, it depends a lot on the 
countries – that is the American way of doing things. It is not the French one. 
It is the very reason why Lacan was ejected from the International Society of 
Psychoanalysis – refusing the adjustment – and in France this notion of the 
adjustment of the patient – so-called patient, he is not a patient – is foreign 
to a great number of analysts. In Lacan’s school, and around it, recovering 
itself is considered as a ‘secondary gain’ (incidentally, it is a danger, the 
opposite one). But, is it because of poor adjustment that a person in the 
audience is unable to follow the action on the screen?
Flaus: That’s a point about the process of perception, within identif ication. 
In the last decade or two we have seen a semantic shift in the word ‘empathy’ 
where ‘empathy’ and ‘identif ication’ have come to be the same thing.
Metz: Absolutely, yes, we too, use the word ‘empathy’ but mainly in relation to 
‘the cure’. It becomes close to ‘identification’, but nevertheless not synonymous.
Rohdie: Do you mean any polarity with the term ‘projection’ which [Edgar] 
Morin uses almost with projection?
Metz: Yes, yes, I know – no, in Morin’s theory, which is very interesting, 
and a pioneer work, ‘identif ication’ is opposed to ‘projection’, but not in my 
theory. Only that this identif ication – to use the word – has both aspects 
and I make them precise, the introjective one (in Klein’s sense) and the 
projective one. That would correspond to Morin by bi-polarity.
But to turn back to the question of an articulation between semiotics 
or psychoanalysis and the social or historical dimension, I think that the 
diff iculty is that this linkage, this relation is very mediated, through many 
stages. Let us take an example – it is very easy to make a relation between 
sociology and semiology, at a trivial level. If you say, for instance, that f ilms 
of the bourgeoisie have a bourgeois content (you have many books which 
say only that) – it’s very easy. But if you study ‘crossing-up montage’ or ‘fades’, 
‘dissolves’, precise things in the f ilmic chain and if you think how to relate 
these fades, dissolves and wipes with the bourgeoisie – well? There is a rela-
tion, but the chain is long and indirect and mediated – that makes it difficult.
Flaus: As a model for this, if I might suggest, we could study the shift from 
harpsichord to piano and the relation between this shift and what was the 
incipient bourgeoisie of the late eighteenth century, there is a model for 
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us to follow that has not been applied to the cinema – in works which are 
accessible to us in English, anyway.
Rohdie: If you only look at the articulation between linguistics and psy-
choanalysis as opposed to the articulation between cinema studies and 
economics, or linguistics and sociology, I guess it has probably come about 
through – as you say, unconscious forces. There were certain problems set 
within semiotics generally and also within the concentration on language, 
coming from Lacan, which brought one to the necessity for psychoanalysis 
in order to solve a particular set of problems. Psychoanalysis will continue 
to be used so long as those problems seem important and so long as psy-
choanalysis continues to yield the kind of results one wants. I would have 
thought there are reasons why linguistics and, say, for example, sociology 
or linguistics and economics have not been articulated with one another, as 
opposed to its articulation with psychoanalysis precisely because the way in 
which problems have been developed have not required that move. Perhaps 
the lack of this articulation requires an explanation, not of unconscious 
forces – or is it? – in such a large group of people? It seems quite clear that the 
articulation between linguistics and psychoanalysis is far from accidental. 
There were certain crucial problems within semiotics as well as attempts 
to – subvert isn’t quite the word – it’s too strong, but some way in which 
one could dismantle certain problems within semiotics. Psychoanalysis 
undercuts (by introducing notions about the subject and desire) much of 
the logical problematic that linguistically-orientated semiotics presented by 
introducing notions about the subject and desire. As soon as you presented 
the ‘subject’ and ‘desire’ representation took on a very different look. I am 
to a degree surprised when I read The Imaginary Signifier for, on the one 
hand what seems to me the maintenance of a semiotic project consistent 
with that of the earliest works concerned with specifying the cinema and 
defining its terms, and, on the other hand, a kind of language which is more 
rhetorical, more metaphoric, more self-referential, playful, and not exactly 
aligned with the project – the language is apparently there to explicate. If 
the language is to give certain rigorous clarity to specif ic notions about 
the cinema it avoids – I’m not saying that the language is not rigorous 
or clear – but it avoids some of that categorisation precisely because it is 
rhetorical, metaphorical and playful. It is not the language of Barthes but 
it is not the language is of an earlier Metz, either.
Metz: It is hard to answer. First, I have the right to change my language ! – I 
know I am joking – but this book, The Imaginary Signifier, is composed of 
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four articles and they are not on the same level. The three other essays are 
more rigorous and, I hope, more scientif ic, – at least they were written with 
this intention, especially the study on metaphor and metonymy. The f irst 
one is conceived in a more playful and ‘literary’ way – you are quite right.
Davies: I wonder if you would like to comment on the notion that, at least 
on one level, the choice of psychoanalytic theory was not an accident or a 
phenomenon of the collective unconscious but was a fairly decided political 
step because it presented people with a materialist analysis of the psyche 
alongside what had up to then, hoped to be a materialist analysis of the 
social sphere of the cinema.
Metz: You mean that it was not accidental in that it provided us with a 
materialist theory of the psyche – yes, in this sense, yes.
Davies: I think that might have something to say about a materialist analysis 
of jokes – is that what you are doing now?
Metz: Oh, I do not know if it is materialist – we’ll see.
Flaus: May we ask, is it mechanist?
Metz: (Laughs) Hopefully not!
Davies: I said materialist, there, because I was thinking of another work 
that re-runs Freud’s book on jokes by Timpanaro [The Freudian Slip: Psy-
choanalysis and Textual Criticism, New Left Books, 1976], the Italian, who 
has a particular and possibly quite different def inition of materialism to 
the one that’s accepted within semiotics. I f ind it incredibly complicated 
to delineate where these two views of materialism come from – sometimes 
‘materialism’ seems like a portmanteau word to cover the interests of Marx-
ist theory.
Metz: I don’t think so. The diff iculty is that materialism is often being 
confounded with Marxism, whereas Marxism is one very important form of 
materialism. For me, exactly as for you, there is no doubt that psychoanalysis 
is a materialist conception of the psyche. Freud was explicitly materialist, 
he thought that all so-called psychological phenomena were ultimately 
derived from the body. He took his ideas from Fechner – it was mechanistic 
materialism.
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Davies: The problem then is how Timpanaro can write a profoundly anti-
Freudian book about Freud’s conception of jokes and still call himself a 
materialist and – it seems to hang together, too.
Metz: An anti-Freudian book?
Davies: It’s not a critique of Freud’s materialism but it is a critique of Freud’s 
paths by which he arrives f inally at the joke, the parapraxes. In other words 
we have a ‘slip of the tongue’ and a materialist conception of how to analyse 
that, while ‘the slip of the tongue’, itself, according to Freud, is overdeter-
mined. Therefore, you can get to it through linguistic analogies, through 
geographically similar names, and so on, through many different paths – and 
the path that Freud chose is not the only path – Freud, in fact, says this quite 
often but forgets this after a while, and it becomes a single slip, slip, slip to the 
final joke. He was, of course, more interested in the system being constructed 
than the f inal punch line. I do not know how you handle that in terms of 
materialism, because Timpanaro’s other book available in English is about 
his particular viewpoint on materialism [On Materialism, New Left Books, 
1975] – or whether its inherent in the kind of pathways, the choices of multiple 
pathways in the unconscious to arrive at the single symptom that comes out.
Metz: But you have not multiple pathways in a real situation of therapy, of 
cure – you have no choice. I was seven years on the cure. You have choices 
in books. There is a materialism of the signif ier – there is, a very strong 
one. Theoretically, you have two paths. One of the two paths produces no 
result – no result at all, while the other path makes you upset immediately 
and produces a heavy symptom – so you have no choice, and no hesitation 
about the right one.
To turn back to the f irst part of your last question, the articulation 
between linguistics and psychoanalysis. I think it was rather easy, many 
reasons which we have heard  –  I would add one more, both sciences, 
linguistics and psychoanalysis, share the particularity which is very rare, 
unfrequent, to be involved with the very fact of meaning and it alone. To 
be involved with, let us say, the ‘meaning of meaning’ – to use the title of 
a famous English work – they are the only two sciences (we have no third 
one) which are involved only and directly with the very fact of the meaning, 
as such. I think this is a further reason which made this articulation rather 
easy, and even the main reason, by far.
Rohdie: I have a quote to ask you about …
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Metz: Please do …
Rohdie: It is from Christian Metz – I am not quite sure I understand it.
Metz: Perhaps neither do I?
Rohdie: It comes from The Imaginary Signifier, I shall quote it to you: “Phe-
nomenology can contribute to knowledge of the cinema […] in so far as it 
happens to be like it, and yet it is on the cinema and phenomenology, in 
their common illusion of perceptual mastery, that light must be cast by the 
real conditions of society and man” [p. 53].
Metz: Ah yes – that was my personal Marxist revolution. (Laughter). I 
mean by that to take Hegel and put him on his feet, you know? Yes, but 
seriously, I was thinking of Bazin, when he speaks of the cinema as a kind 
of cosmo-morphism, a revelation in a nearly religious sense, a revealing 
of the world, a kind of cosmophany, so the revealing of the real world, 
which we do not see in our real life and all-day perception, but when 
watching a f ilm we see it – that was Bazin’s theory. That can, perhaps, 
explain the sentence. I think that when we are screening a f ilm we have 
the impression of perceptive mastery, and it was precisely that impression 
of mastery that Bazin felt, and expressed, but in fact he was victim of a 
kind of lure, a deception, a delusion because this impression is the very 
mechanical, materialist result of the functioning of the objective, of the 
apparatus.
Rohdie: There is also a notion there of making strange too. There are f ilm-
makers that he would champion, like Bresson with those who use the 
cinema to make things strange.
Metz: Yes, but it was impossible not to support Bresson – obviously so 
important. Bazin was very, acutely intelligent and he was able to support 
f ilm-makers very different from his point of view because he knew that 
they were important.
Routt: Is this ‘casting a light on the illusion of perceptual mastery’ part of 
the sadistic project of the f ilm theoretician to which you refer once or twice, 
but do not really go into much detail about that aspect of f ilm theory? You 
say it is a form of sadism, once or twice playfully, but perhaps it is worth 
saying more about it?
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Metz: The theory is sadistic? Of course it is, yes (laughter). I mean by that 
when you analyse something, f ilm or literature, you are pushed by the desire 
to take apart the object, of de-mounting, de-constructing the object – the 
word of Kristeva, ‘de-constructing’, is very expressive in this sadistic sense. 
It is not my idea – it is the idea of Melanie Klein – epistemophilia is linked 
to voyeurism, and voyeurism is linked to sadism. I think she is obviously 
right, in some sense, because in an imaginary way, to analyse an object is to 
destroy it – even if you do not destroy it physically, of course, but it means 
to destroy it phantasmatically.
Rohdie: What about playing with it?
Metz: Another way of dealing with it.
Rohdie: But would that be sadistic?
Metz: No, no, it would be the other drive, love drive, libido –
Rohdie: But it could also produce knowledge?
Metz: Oh yes, yes. But not exactly analyse, you know? To analyse is to take 
apart, to divide in two parts, to cut. If you think, what I mean is very simple. 
To analyse is to cut, to divide, to hurt, to symbolically destroy the object. 
Analysis is not the only form of knowledge, but it is a kind of sadism. The 
Greek word ‘analyse’ means to destroy, in Ancient Greek, to dissolve (verb: 
Analuein). You know in chemistry to analyse a given substance means, very 
precisely, to destroy it.
Flaus: Yes, in literature, Wordsworth said “we murder to dissect.”
So when you turned Bazin upside down, you were suggesting to us that 
Bazin’s claim that what we are getting there is the pleasure of being pos-
sessed by something greater than ourselves – that is the form of masochism. 
In other words, Bazin’s way of seeing what the cinema does to us is the 
pleasure of being taken over?
Metz: Yes, in reality. But what we feel is the imaginary pleasure of mas-
tery – it could be an unconsicous masochism. Masochism is linked with 
sadism, so it would be compatible, but the point is: the sadistic level is 
conscious while the masochistic level is unconscious – in this case. In other 
cases it is the opposite.
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Martin: I would like to ask you, when you look back on The Imaginary 
Signifier whether there is a strong link – or the possibility of a link – between 
Lacan with Althusser, with certain kinds of Marxism and linguistics. Now, 
do you think that move is so strong? I am thinking about the critiques of, 
say, Lyotard, Deleuze, Guattari and Baudrillard. Do you think they have 
affected the intellectual climate in which you work?
Metz: Oh yes, inevitably.
Martin: Is the status of that marriage between psychoanalysis and Marxism 
so strong now? What position do you think it is in?
Metz: It was never very strong – it is an illusion of perspective. It was never 
so strong because it is diff icult to link up everything, but it is true that 
this move has weakened now. Among other causes are the effects of these 
critiques that you mention, they were important.
Flaus: Not so much a marriage as an affaire?
Martin: Do you think this has greatly affected f ilm criticism and theory?
Metz: Not especially in f ilm criticism. It has a consequence – and a happy 
one – in f ilm practice, in f ilm-making. It has been responsible for the small 
beginning of experimental French cinema with the influence of Lyotard, 
and with people such as Claudine Eizykman and Guy Fihman. Experimental 
cinema was very undeveloped in France, and it really progressed with the 
influence of Lyotard – a very positive influence.
Flaus: How recent was that, please, we do not hear much about French 
experimental cinema at this distance?
Metz: Oh, very recent, within the last f ive years. Cinema has to manage with 
the demands of the f ilm industry, which needs to have paying customers. It 
has to rely on the money circuit of the bank, the producer, the distributor, 
and so on, the most important of whom is the spectator, who pays to enter 
the cinema. If he has to pay, it means that he wishes to see the f ilm, he 
has the desire to see the f ilm, and so, here, you have another example of 
a meeting point, a crossing between the psychoanalytic problem and the 
social, economic problem.
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Rohdie: How do you see those articulated? The social and economic situ-
ation, during the history of the cinema, would have altered considerably. 
For example, you have a period when there is no sound and another period 
when there is; a period when the construction of the cinema is basically 
artisanal, another when it is highly capitalised; you have another which goes 
through the crisis of the depression and another in which there are world 
wars and fascism. I am not sure how the narrative codes of the cinema, 
through, say, the twenties and thirties and f ifties, could be articulated with 
socio-economic circumstances within this structure. You are right to say 
people are paying for their pleasure and desires. …
Metz: It means that the affective, psychoanalytic machine is part of the 
f ilm industry, that is very essential.
Rohdie: Yes, but it is still unclear how, beyond that, those socio-economic 
issues are articulated with that area that is ideological. That is the area 
of the position of the spectator and the pleasures which the spectator 
receives, in exchange for payment. When you talk about a socio-historical 
critique of the cinema in which it is necessary to concern oneself with 
economic, social and political structures, it is not clear how the articula-
tion works – because in practice, though one asserts that the concepts are 
social and therefore subject to historical investigation and we use semiotics 
that involve linguistic and psychoanalytic representation, most analyses 
of the cinema in that area have not articulated their discussions of the 
spectator and questions of representation with those social, economic and 
class structures. Is it because it is impossible? Are the kinds of expertise 
required to make an analysis of economic structures at the same level 
of ideological structures, and to articulate them, are so vast no one can 
do it – or is it involved with something about the current analysis of the 
cinema, which genuflects towards the need for socio-historical critiques, 
but fails to practice them?
Metz: Yes, you know it is so. This lack of socio-economic study of the cinema, 
in certain works, is so by definition, because, as you said, we are not sociolo-
gists, we are not economists. I never pretend to study the sociology of the 
cinema. You have others who are sociologists of the cinema. You are correct, 
but it is so for the good reason that the articulation is extremely diff icult 
to realize, intrinsically.
As to economics, there is something to add. Economics is science, real 
science that you need ten years to study. There are such studies of the 
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cinema, very good ones, Mercillon, for instance. You have sociologists, such 
as Sorlin in France.
Rohdie: Yes, but within your particular concerns, you can presumably set 
problems which you, yourself, cannot answer, for sociology or economics?
Metz: Yes, that’s right.
Rohdie: What would those be? If, for example, I think of works within that 
area of semiotics that might genuflect towards the necessity for further 
articulations with other structures, if they want to explicate something 
within the cinema they always have their own terms, within a structure of 
ideology, for answering problems. They never pose any questions outside 
this infrastructural route. They never pose any questions to economic or 
social practices. It seems utterly self-suff icient. They say they need articula-
tions elsewhere yet there seems to be no need for them, in many of the works 
from, roughly speaking, a semiotic point of view, because the answers and 
the problems mesh with each other. You don’t need to ask questions about 
social practices outside the very specif ied realm of the cinema – they never 
enter into it.
If one says they ought to enter into it – and I am not pretending to be 
a sociologist or an economist – presumably one would be in a position to 
say that there are certain limits, there are certain problems that I cannot 
answer and yet need to be answered, need to be articulated with other 
structures – that does not seem to occur?
Metz: Yes, but you know, it’s not my fault. We semiologists achieved some 
work in the last ten or twenty years, in France, while the sociologists of 
the cinema did not follow. So it’s up to them – I cannot do it all by myself.
Rohdie: You might, for example, f ind over a long historical period in the 
cinema that narrative codes have remained relatively stable, and you seek 
the reasons for that stability. …
Metz: Oh yes, I know the reason. The reason is that the f ilm has had to re-
conquer by its own specif ic means of expression, the flexibility, the spatial-
temporal f lexibility, the ubiquity of the classical novel of the nineteenth 
century. It has to reconquer the favourite art of the bourgeoisie – that is 
clear. But semioticians have studied that, not the sociologists, they don’t 
care. From this point on the sociologists have to take the relay, the historians 
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have to pick it up, because I have no competence to go further. In the absence 
of the necessary competences, the wish for articulations becomes wishful 
thinking.
Routt: To focus on one example, it would seem that French cinema before 
the war there was a certain currency of representation in the working class 
and it seems that after the New Wave that begins to disappear. A number 
of explanations might be offered; I would be interested, if you would care 
to hazard an explanation based on your topographical analysis of f ilm 
pleasure, based on the notion of the richness of the diegesis based on the Id, 
and so on. I don’t know whether I am pushing you into something too large?
Metz: No. My explanation would be – I have made no precise research, so it is 
only an opinion – that the objective achievement of the New Wave in France, 
without knowing it – unconsciously – was to conquer the bourgeoisie for 
f ilm. Before the war the French bourgeousie did not see many f ilms – it was 
rather a populist entertainment – and so, as the diegesis became more subtle 
and rich the bourgeoisie became interested. The plots, the subject-matter of 
the f ilms deeply changed – it was no longer a question of the working class, 
the Prévert, the Carné, they disappeared. Then there begin the stories on 
an executive who is divorced and who fell in love with a second woman, 
and so on. At the same time all the diegetic details became more subtle, 
more elaborate, so it was more appropriate to an educated audience. The 
audience has shifted.
Routt: What would have been the unpleasure of the pre-war audience for 
that kind of cinema, what would have been the source?
Metz: Ah, the ‘false theatre’ – it was a kind of cinema which remained very 
theatrical, but this impression works only for people who are used to going 
to the real theatre, that is the point. Whereas for the workers, for whom 
theatre is too expensive, they did not notice anything special – it was their 
theatre, and it was cinema.
Flaus: In a study of American drama, the observation, say with the rise of the 
tele-film there is a much narrower range of styles, the codes that are used are 
purer and simpler, the problem of the diegetic exercise is less pleasurable, 
to us anyway. The point where the cineaste would stop would be the point 
where he or she would say that economic pressures in the television industry 
require that budgets must be one-tenth of what might be spent as a theatre 
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release. As a tele-f ilm, the budget would not only control the questions of 
casting, which reflects on the box-off ice, but that rehearsal times are much 
shorter, directors must use close ups and intercut between close ups instead 
of wide angle, long takes, and so on. The result of this narrowing down can be 
stated, by cineastes, to be a return to lower-budget tele-films, and it would be 
left there. The cineaste would say ‘right, economists and socialist audience, 
f ind the data for us and put it together’. In my practice that would be a matter 
of economies – but I do not presume to go any further into that investigation.
Metz: Yes, I agree.
Rohdie: But you might start from the position of a loyal semiotician, and 
you pursue certain loyal semiotic projects, and you f ind that it does not 
answer your questions. You have to f ind out about other things because your 
desire to know a specif ic thing is not served by this collection of theories 
or concepts.
Flaus: That is where your f irst question came in, Sam, why is this not being 
done or is it impossible? Perhaps the gathering of the data is so diffuse.
Rohdie: I think it also has to do with the statement of what the problems are. 
The problems are stated in such a way that they are only soluble within the 
discipline, and the professional academic then says ‘I can’t go any further, 
this is the end of my expertise’, rather than take a political position.
Metz: It is, it is.
Rohdie: But while your expertise might end, the problem might continue. 
You might have to say ‘Well, I’m not going to be an expert any more, I’m 
going to take a risk’. Go somewhere where no one has been before because 
the problems require one going further, rather than taking a stand which is 
basically a particular kind of professionalism which says ‘I don’t know any 
more’ but it is also saying ‘I don’t choose to know any more’.
Metz: It is not so, Sam, you know. In my life I have learned linguistics, semiot-
ics, f ilm theory and psychoanalysis and I can tell you that I am tired. I can’t 
go further, it’s the human capacity that has a limit.
Freiberg: But why chose psychoanalysis rather than say, sociology or 
economics?
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Metz: Oh, that is the problem of human choice, you never can say ‘why’. It 
is a deep choice made by the unconscious.
Flaus: Yes, why chose one lover rather than the other?
Metz: Yes, if I had chosen the opposite you would have asked me the opposite 
so … (laughter).
Freiberg: I would like to continue this point, though, because at one stage 
early in your career you did try to specify what was essentially cinematic 
or f ilmic, what was the specif ic domain of f ilm studies, and in doing that, 
it would exclude some of these other areas. In doing that you went on to 
concentrate – or validate, the area of psychoanalysis.
Metz: Oh no, I don’t exclude anything. I say: ‘For me, I study this and that, 
but other people can study other things’. In all life you have to make 
choices – but excuse me, I interrupted you?
Freiberg: Some of your previous comments about the French New Wave 
vis-à-vis the ‘thirties’ suggest that you do have some interest in sociology –
Metz: But of course, but interest and research, which takes thousands of 
hours, are two different things. Of course I have an interest, yes.
Freiberg: Do you think sociology has a signif icant contribution to make to 
f ilm studies?
Metz: Oh yes.
Routt: It was said that one place where semiotics and psychoanalysis came 
together at the moment around the time of “Imaginary Signif ier” appeared 
in English [1975], was that it provided the possibility of a theory of the subject 
in cinema. I was wondering if this was part of your conscious project in that 
paper, or whether it has been a by-product? The f irst time I read it, it seemed 
to be a traditional example of the cinema object in which the subject slowly 
becomes more paramount – one discovers one cannot discuss one without 
the other. I wondered how far you intended the theory of the subject in the 
cinema to be the central aim of this work – as it has been taken to be, in 
English and American circles?
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Metz: Yes. This part of my book was conscious. It was a conscious project, 
because I was thinking about my former research and its lack of a theory 
of the subject – that had to be tackled. You have to deal with the problem 
of the subject, with the spectator; in my earlier research the problem of the 
spectator was too absent, it went too far. That was the beginning of my book 
and then the rest came less consciously.
Flaus: The Pleasure Principle stated in terms of the Reality Principle?
Metz: Yes, exactly.
Martin: I’d like to ask a question about a detail in your article, “The Imagi-
nary Signif ier,” where you discuss the nature of identif ication in the cinema 
and their types. You distinguish between secondary types of identif ication 
that would include identif ication with a character and primary cinematic 
identif ication which is identif ication with the camera. It also seems to 
me you are arguing there is an identif ication with the f ilm system as a 
whole – the f ilmic system.
Metz: That would be the primary one, part of the primary one,
Martin: If one considers the model of the spectator in the cinema, would 
one always talk about the spectator as in a position of identif ication? For 
example, if one thinks of a model of a game where one was a spectator, 
where you are following the game, would you say one identif ies with the 
game or sport in order to follow it? If one does not, maybe one does not in 
relation to the cinema, and it is more like understanding a set of rules by 
which one can follow a set of discourses.
Metz: Yes, I agree. In your example it is quite possible that the spectator 
has no secondary identif ication with the football game – if he is not at all 
involved with ‘footy’, if he does not know the rules of the game. You have 
the precise conditions which can frequently make this impossible. Only 
the primary identif ication is inevitable.
Martin: Why would one want to call that identif ication, and what is one’s 
def inition of ‘identif ication’ under those circumstances?
Metz: Because you have to identify – I speak now of the primary one – your 
own personal look, your eyes, your watching, with the camera, with the 
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projector, with, f inally, the whole cinematic apparatus. If you don’t, you 
no longer understand what is going on. It is an objective condition of the 
subjective possibility of screening – is that clear?
Flaus: I think the problem is that we don’t use the term ‘identif ication’ in 
that sense normally in English.
Metz: Ah you mean, perhaps, identif ication would be only with persons? 
It is not the French meaning of the term you know? ‘Identif ication’ means 
to confound oneself – or one’s self-look or self-hearing with something, 
anything, a person, an object, an apparatus, a political regime. That makes 
it diff icult to understand. I meant by that the fact that you are identifying 
your look with the cinematic apparatus – and most of all with the camera 
and projector.
Thompson: I am sure we would all like to thank Professor Metz for a most 
interesting and enlightening session, and, perhaps, continue to discuss some 
of these issues more informally. Thank you very much.
Transcribed at a seminar held in the Media Centre, La Trobe University, 
27 April, 1982.
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1.
Hors-Cadre: The Imaginary Signifier discusses the cinematic signif ier by 
using concepts from psychoanalysis. Do the analyses you carry out modify 
the psychoanalytic concept of the imaginary? In particular, does the ap-
plication of Lacanian concepts to the cinema lead to a certain number of 
displacements in the analytic domain?
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Christian Metz: On the whole, I do not think that my psychoanalytic study of 
the cinema has had a significant retroactive impact on my understanding of 
psychoanalysis itself, nor has it displaced such concepts in my mind. In any 
case, for me, the effect is more general: as f ilm theory is less advanced than 
many other theories, it can be enriched through contact with them, without 
the opposite being the case. (I am not talking about initial impressions or 
question setting, which the cinema and the image have in abundance; I am 
thinking of reflections that have already been developed.)
An example that plays an important part in my book is the role, and the 
modalities, of voyeurism for the f ilm spectator. If we admit that my descrip-
tion is correct and useful for understanding the functioning of the film, 
then we must ask what it can contribute – apart from, perhaps, a modest 
change – to the very notion of the scopic drive in psychoanalysis, founded 
on a substantial and already long-established accumulation of observations 
and research, which, nourished by the fundamental contribution of clinical 
analysis, takes things back to their embryonic roots, and which, even when 
it is problematized, does so in the name of arguments and contributions 
situated in this f ield. The fable of the lion and the mouse1 does not apply to 
all domains of knowledge, because each domain is not equally applicable 
to other domains.
Subsequently, I do not believe in interdisciplinarity, in exchanges, in the 
frequently promoted activity of borrowing. This emphatic declaration may 
be surprising, coming from a researcher who has spent his time applying 
linguistics and psychoanalysis to the cinema. But this is precisely where 
the misunderstanding lies: I have not applied anything, I have positioned 
the study of the cinema within more general concepts, which fully involve 
the cinema just as much as they involve other objects: the general processes 
of signif ication (whence the use of the term ‘denotation’, etc.), or of the 
imaginary subject, with concepts that have come from psychoanalysis 
but that are today, as with their predecessors, circulating far beyond their 
place of origin. In short, I wanted to place the cinema in the conceptual 
spheres it already belongs to, and which for a long time have only been kept 
separate from it by the fanatical or ignorant isolationism of its proponents, 
who are themselves guilty of the same imbecilic and arrogant contempt in 
which the intellectual Establishment held the cinema. After all, what is so 
extraordinary about observing that the cinema depends (to a large extent) 
on scopic passion, that it pushes this passion to a very high degree, and 
that we should therefore take a look at the only science that has reflected 
on this passion at length? And what does it mean to claim that the cinema 
‘is’ psychoanalytic, which, by the way, does not mean anything? Does it 
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not, as it happens, possess many other characteristics? And are there not 
many other characteristics that give prominence to scopic passion? Will we 
say that the human being is ‘chemical’ because we are governed (in part) 
by (some of) the laws of organic chemistry, that also apply to numerous 
animals? Well, my work can certainly be related to organic chemistry. It is 
applied, and sometimes more than one would like. We never apply anything.
But I shall return to your question, or at least to something you said: no, I 
do not have the impression that my work on the cinema has ‘modif ied’ the 
psychoanalytic concept of the imaginary. As you know, in Lacan’s thinking, 
it is closely tied to the concepts of the ‘symbolic’ and the ‘real’. It has a 
distinguished history in psychoanalysis itself, and its influence reaches 
everywhere within the f ield. In order to displace it, more will be needed 
than my book. Although I had no particular desire to use the concept, 
I found it to be entirely satisfactory. It helped me to understand better 
the fundamental seduction of the spectator’s position in the cinema, and 
enabled me to ‘make progress’ (?) on one of the two fronts that were present 
(namely, the f ilm); I could not and would not do so on both fronts at once.
But I begin to understand the reasoning behind your question, especially 
if we apply it to concepts other than the ‘Imaginary’. In the last text of my 
book, ‘Metaphor/Metonymy, or The Imaginary Referent’, which occupies 
half the volume, there are passages that belie the preceding remarks. Either 
they no longer treat the cinema, or they only reach it at the end of the 
road, after the core of the ‘work’ is over, in order to draw didactic illustra-
tions from it. These passages tackle the ‘internal’ discussion of properly 
psychoanalytic problems. Thus, we f ind propositions for a new theory of 
censorship, conceived as the very gap between the secondary process and 
the primary process, and not like a barrier or dyke separating them. Yes, it 
is true that this idea is born from my work on cinema, where the supposed 
barrier is particularly intangible, the oscillation of the primary processes 
are unstable. But the same text also speaks of language systems, etymology, 
rhetorical f igures (overused and fixed, or, on the contrary, more or less new), 
and directly interweaves the two aspects in its very composition, in such a 
way that it is not always easy – even (or especially?) for me – to know what 
has displaced what.
Your question also leads me to think about the ideas I developed in the 
same section of the book on the subject of the famous homology between 
metaphor and condensation, and metonymy and displacement. In Lacan, 
there is a kind of f lash of brilliance, a quite astute intuition, which he 
has not developed, clarif ied, or ‘followed up on’. And yet, when we look 
at it in detail, we encounter diff iculties relating to the very nature of the 
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signifying material, in particular the danger of confusing those relations 
that are specif ic to the referent (metaphor and metonymy) and those that 
are specif ic to the discourse (paradigm and syntagm). Most frequently, the 
latter disappear and are ‘merged’ into the former. Thus, we often speak of 
a simple syntagm as metonymy. In fact, however, metonymy, when it truly 
does arise, can take the form of either a syntagm or a paradigm, based 
on whether its two terms are explained, or whether one of the two terms 
is left to mental association. I have tried to shed light on these different 
cases, as well other diff iculties of the same type, in order to respond to the 
meticulous and obstinate demands of textuality, which is not content with 
two major axes, in order to draw out from Lacan’s homology some of the 
consequences about which it is silent.
At the end of the day, I believe that something of my work is re-inscribed 
in the psychoanalytic f ield. But this something is rather small when com-
pared to the set of psychoanalytic concepts I had available to me. And 
then, is it really necessary to speak, as the agent of this re-inscription and 
this partial displacement, of my ‘work on the cinema’? It is more general; it 
is also my work on the f igural, my linguistic reflections and, at times, my 
direct interventions in the psychoanalytic f ield. And yet, all this is done 
in the framework of a book on the cinema. The weight of the cinema has 
certainly played, for me, a driving force at once more diffuse and more 
permanent than what I am clearly aware of. At bottom, your question has 
slightly ‘displaced’ my initial impression…
2.
Hors-Cadre: What exactly does the term ‘imaginary signif ier’ refer to? To 
the imaginary character of the material base and/or the perceptual regime 
that the cinema imposes on the spectator? Does this Imaginary Signif ier 
suppose the ‘Imaginary Referent’ that you define by analytic and linguistic 
categories, or would it admit a different type of referent? And which one?
Metz: For me, your question is very central. In effect, I chose the term 
‘Imaginary Signif ier’ because I found in it the merit of referring to both 
traits that you indicate, the imaginary characteristic of the material base 
and the perceptual regime that the cinema privileges in the spectator (I 
will not adopt as my own view what you say: ‘imposes on the spectator’).
Hence, the regime of belief is influenced by the nature of the signif ier. 
But it is also dependent on other factors, because the f ictional target, the 
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consensual credulity, the ‘temporary suspension of disbelief’ of Anglo-Saxon 
literary theory, can also appear in the reading of a novel or in a theatrical 
scene. Fundamentally, the phenomenon is always identical: a mix of belief 
and disbelief, a split in perception, vividly evoking what psychoanalysts 
call fetishistic disavowal (“I know very well… but all the same…” [Octave 
Mannoni]). The attitude of the f ilm spectator is also partly modeled on 
the Western (Aristotelian) tradition of art as imitation (the imitation of 
everyday life, or of a mythical universe). On the other hand, we see that 
this psychic splitting, which def ines f iction as such, takes substantially 
different forms when we pass from one f ictional practice to another. We are 
not astonished when a room has three walls instead of four in the theatre, 
nor when objects in the cinema are made out of light and shadow. This 
is how the characteristics of the signif ier currently work, and they have 
been fully internalized by the public (the Signif ier is social and historical). 
Thus, in each narrative and f igurative art, the exact proportion of belief 
and disbelief is different, as is the line of demarcation between them. We 
accept the immobility and the silence of photographed characters; we are 
more likely to protest against their being out of focus.
It seems to me that if the cinema frequently tells stories (in good or bad 
f ilms), then this is for three principal reasons: 1. The great cultural tradition 
that I have just spoken about, which represents an enormous pressure. 2. The 
exceptional wealth of the signif ier in its indices of reality: sound, move-
ment, color, the capacity to record practically anything whatsoever. 3. The 
ostensibly imaginary character of all this wealth. The ‘imagic’ is denounced, 
exploited, and only made possible by the act of montage. Whence its power: 
we cannot ‘edit’ the real, but what we do edit in f ilm truly resembles it. The 
imagic, in one fell swoop, turns everything into narrative, and transfers to 
its credit the guarantees of reality that it employs. Otherwise, for example, 
the theatre – where the signif ier is even richer in its allusions to reality, 
because it consists in a portion of the real itself – should have a stronger 
belief effect (I have in mind, of course, the belief in the story, not the belief in 
the spectacle; they are inversely proportional). The mode of cinematic belief 
has, as its essential trait, this double and remarkable movement: to make 
the real function to the benefit of the imaginary, to weave from compelling 
likenesses the very thread of the fable, and to thus awaken our old desires, to 
awaken the enchanted child who wanted to be told stories in the evening.
The cinematic signif ier is imaginary because it is photographic. It is an 
imprint, a duplicate, a ‘reproduction’, the reflection of something else, the 
necessarily unreal correlative of a given referent. We have here one of the 
great diff iculties that experimental f ilm encounters in its experiments, to 
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which I pay more attention now than I did before. Even if it abolishes all 
narration, which happens a lot, its frames continue to represent something 
(even if this something is greatly diminished): reflections, rapid and illeg-
ible editing, long, immobile, empty shots. It must reckon with the weight 
of the dispositif, which single-handedly sketches vague narratives at every 
moment. There is, of course, as in all of these problems, cases that border 
on the limits, which we still do not know if we should class as cinema – at 
least in the ordinary sense of the word. Examples include f ilms made 
by directly scratching the celluloid (when they do not reconstitute, by 
this very means, a f igurative picture), the camera-less f ilms of Giovanni 
Martedi, etc.
As for the imaginary referent which your question raises, it is the (imagi-
nary) bloc of reality the spectator supposes that the story has been taken 
from. ‘Suppose’ is not the right word; it is more a case of a diffuse but potent 
feeling that presents itself as an obvious truth. Literary theory prefers to 
speak of referential illusion. In Combray, there is a man named Legrandin, 
and Proust relates some (but not all) of the episodes of his existence: this, 
in effect, is a veritable inverse illusion, because, in reality, Legrandin has 
no existence other than a textual one, and he in no way ‘transcends’ the 
novel, the only thing to speak about him. But this illusion is also a fun-
damental intellectual and affective need. ‘Later’, we will say, ‘Legrandin 
became incapable of hiding that he was a snob’: but the principal function 
of this ‘later’ is to cover the text’s momentary silence on Legrandin and 
his disappearance from the page, to make this hiatus resemble those in 
life, by mentally interpolating into the text the passage of time that would 
have elapsed. Every narrative proposes that, in some elsewhere, the things 
narrated have really existed. Here, the referent is an effect of narration, 
and the f ictional narration (even if there is another one) does not escape 
it. Certainly, it leaves us (by def inition) very divided as to the reality of the 
referential real, but not as to the existence of a layer of deduction – one that 
is still, however, imaginary – which is indispensable to the comprehension 
of the simplest sequence. If we see the heroine at the top of a stairwell, and 
then, in the following shot, at the bottom of the stairs, we suppose that, in 
some enigmatic (and familiar) temporality, she has descended the stairs and 
that ‘we have only been shown’ the beginning and the end of the action. We 
reason as if this woman had an existence beyond her f ilmic existence, an 
existence authorizing inferences analogous to those of everyday life. This 
effect also plays a major role in the emotions provoked by f iction f ilms, 
when they provoke them. We are not attached to characters in the same 
way we are to flesh and blood creatures; nor, however, do we see them as 
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mere creatures of celluloid. They are more like those beings that appear to 
us in a memory or a dream – the unreal real.
For me, the domain of the ‘f iction’, ‘narrative’ or ‘diegetic’ f ilm (I am 
provisionally employing these terms as equivalents) is not reduced to a 
completely linear narrativity (closed in on itself, depending on the story and 
on it alone), nor to ‘chubby’ or rounded [mafflue] narrativity, as Dominique 
Noguez humorously puts it. I do not see why narrative should become 
a synonym for merely narrative. Eisenstein’s f ilms are diegetic, those of 
Ruiz and Straub are also partly diegetic. In this problem, there are two 
common reactions I have diff iculty understanding. Firstly, if a story is 
disordered, erratic, unraveled, when and how does it cease to be a story? 
Take Détective [1985] by Godard, for instance: four different narratives, 
all curtailed; but there is the grand hotel, the aviator and his wife, the 
prince and the young girl, etc. In short, a place, a time, and characters. 
Evidently, the f iction is not sutured, not ‘f illed’, the f ilm plays on its gaps 
and defective links. Its imaginary referent, it is true, is less complete and 
consistent than in a commercial f ilm; it is weakened, assaulted. But it is 
there. In a more general way, I have the same impression when watching 
the f ilms of Bergman, Resnais, Antonioni, Eisenstein, Welles, etc. – that is, 
f ilms of a self-aware, emancipated, ‘intelligent’ type. Often, the ingenuities 
of enunciation, montage, recurring motifs, complex layering, etc., make us 
forget the story to a signif icant extent. But it has not disappeared, it is even 
indispensable to everything else. In short, to answer your question, it seems 
to me that the domain of the ‘imaginary referent’, of the f iction, is much 
vaster than we sometimes say, when we reduce it to the model known (God 
only knows why) as Balzacian. For me, it does not correspond to a type of 
writing [écriture] but takes numerous, diverse forms. It translates a general 
tendency of the cinema, unevenly aff irmed by the f ilms.
Is this equivalent to saying that the cinema (and, by extension, the 
imaginary signif ier) never escapes narrative, and that the nature of the 
‘medium’ determines that of the product without any leeway? No. There 
are, f irstly, variations that I have just mentioned, and which are important. 
Filling a f ilm with a diegesis varies enormously, even when the f iction 
is strong. A narrative f ilm like Citizen Kane [1941] says at the same time 
plenty of other things; it is not overwhelmed by its story. Very often, it is 
‘from within’ that f iction f ilms escape from the f ictional regime, even in 
the classical American cinema, which ‘works’ more than we say it does. 
And there have also been, with Anglo-Saxon experimental cinema (the 
London Film Co-op, Michael Snow, Hollis Frampton, Ernie Gehr, etc.), radi-
cal attempts to compromise the very functioning of the referential illusion, 
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thanks to the Franciscan, minimalist impoverishment of the profilmic, or 
by disrupting the process of f ilming. The f ilm is reduced to a flicker effect, 
or to a panoramic to-and-fro movement on a banal, unrecognizable object. 
In order for the diegesis to disappear entirely, it would be necessary for the 
f ilm to show nothing (certain f ilms by Peter Gidal are not far from this). In 
general, there nonetheless remains something and, as I said a short time 
ago, the phantasy of the spectator – both the desire of the narrative and the 
need to understand – can take a hold in order to enlarge and embellish it. 
Films also become f ictional (more or less) through their reception. Here, 
we encounter the problem of social demand: experimental f ilms, in spite 
of their interest, may well be condemned for a long time yet to minuscule 
audiences. In any case, they show that the imaginary signif ier is capable of 
completely ridding itself of the imaginary referent. The f ilm itself becomes 
the referent, with all its techniques commenting on the act of f ilming. These 
films are self-referential, or ‘comparative’ (if you like) when they allude to the 
procedures of conventional cinema by re-presenting and deforming them.
In sum, if you ‘add’ radical f ilms and the ultra-narrative operations of 
narrative f ilms, you will perceive that my ‘imaginary referent’ leaves a lot of 
room around it. But at the same time – a minor paradox – it is omnipresent, 
for everything else is almost always articulated around it, since its role (even 
on a manifest level) is considerable in the great majority of f ilms, and also 
because it corresponds to a socially dominant regime of reading.
3.
Hors-Cadre: What is the ‘imagic’ and how does it favor the functioning of 
the imaginary?
Metz: The imaginary does not have an unlimited choice from among the 
sensory organs susceptible to using it. The so-called proximal senses (touch, 
smell, taste, if we adopt the categorization currently used) are strongly 
attached to reality, to the oral and anal drives. They give rise to poor, un-
focused ‘images’ that technology has not undertaken to reproduce, at least 
not on a major scale. So, we are left with the superior senses classif ied as 
‘distal’: hearing and sight. The cinematic imaginary largely rests in these 
two senses. However, for reasons that do not apply to the cinema, the visual 
register seems closer to the phantasmatic realm than the auditory register, 
except, of course, in the case of spoken language. The dream, although 
populated with spoken words, is above all a succession of images, as is 
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daydreaming. Ardent passion passes through the desire to see (nudity is, 
by the way, a state without any acoustic expression, a purely visual notion), 
while the innumerable games of exhibitionism and voyeurism do not have 
equivalents on the auditory level. Perhaps it is necessary to attribute this 
striking discrepancy to the fact that the eye is much more precise than the 
ear and depicts objects better to us, as is the case with erotic representa-
tions of phantasies. The acoustic register – in everyday life, as well as in 
modern technology – has the misfortune of being caught between two 
extremely powerful neighbors, both capable of exact expressions and not 
only impressions: namely, the image and the language system [langue]. 
All this is, incidentally, only a difference of degree (see the importance of 
Lacan’s invocatory drive); similarly, the cinema frequently has recourse, 
not always imaginatively, to the resources of sound.
There is another factor, specif ic to the cinema and to it alone. Sonic data 
are reproduced with all their phenomenal properties. If the sound engineer 
has done a ‘good job’, nothing distinguishes the sound of an airplane in 
the cinema from its equivalent on an airf ield. ‘Sounds have no image’, said 
Balázs, referring to sound cinema. Filmic sounds are not reproductions 
but real sounds, or, if you prefer, reproductions, secondary productions 
of the same perceptive nature as the primary productions. The image, on 
the contrary, is immediately demarcated from its model by the absence of 
the third dimension. It records a permanent phenomenological def icit in 
comparison to the object which, due to this fact, it can only ‘imitate’. It is an 
effigy, whereas sound is not. It is thus the most apt to lead the entire f ilm 
toward the imaginary, the tale, the narrative. It is a very lifelike imaginary, 
one which is furnished, ‘realized’ earlier, but to which the specific coefficient 
is selectively absent. And it is through this ‘default’ that all the powers of 
the dream and desire come into play.
In short, the ‘imagic’, for me, is the adjective that, contrary to the ‘imaged’, 
corresponds truly to the image, with the same force and the same polysemy.
4.
Hors-Cadre: You insist on the importance of substitutional pressures in 
the psychic functioning of the spectator. Would the specif ic function of 
the cinema in this domain not be, under the force of the imagic f lux, to 
exacerbate these substitutional pressures by prohibiting them from being 
f ixed at any moment? Would you go so far as to speak of f ilm as a support 
for desire, which could also mean a corset, substitute or third leg?
240 Conversations with Christian Metz 
Metz: Yes, I think that f ilm can play the role of a support for desire, when 
desire is def icient in those who go to the cinema because they do not know 
what to do. It can equally exacerbate a desire that is already strong, which 
would just about def ine cinephilia: this is your third leg…
The cinema is much less suitable than photography at fixing desire, or 
more exactly the phantasy of desire. As you recall, projection – the con-
stantly changing audiovisual flux – renders the emergence and stabilization 
of a fetish diff icult, a role that the photograph, by contrast, easily assures. 
The specif icity of the cinema lies in fetishistic activity: modif ications of 
framing, camera movements, etc. Change counts more than control, as 
when erotic passion impatiently delays its own satisfaction.
But f ilm, which is mobile, is also f ixed: f ixed in relation to the spectator’s 
phantasy. It is this f ilm, and not another one, that we cannot change. We 
cannot lengthen by a tenth of a second the troubled gaze of the character, 
or add a little gray to the overly vivid color we feel assailed by. The f ilm 
might be a dream, but it is somebody else’s dream. There is thus always a 
distance, one that stands in relation to a f ixed point: the f ilm in itself (which 
switches over to the side of the real). On this basis, there are several – or 
at least two or three – possibilities. If the distance is too great, there is 
rejection, boredom, f ilmic displeasure. If, on the contrary, it diminishes, 
identif ication and projection can make up for this, at least during the 
f ilm: the spectator is as ecstatic as he would be if his own phantasy were 
being told to him. Without going quite this far, he can receive and sustain 
exchanges with his own images, a foreign but sympathetic daydream, or 
can intermittently project himself into the f ilm, or only in certain of its 
motifs, etc.
In sum, if the f ilm ‘f ixes’ the phantasies of us all, it confronts us with 
a phantasy that is now f ixed. Fixed but mobile. This is why everything 
depends, as in friendship, on the relationship of forces in each singular 
encounter. Depending on who the spectator is, the moment, the f ilm, the 
imaginary of the cinema can be a prison (or a corset, as you put it) or a 
springboard, or it can play these two roles at once.
5.
Hors-Cadre: What relation does the imaginary have with the image of the 
ego in the interpellation of the spectator? Does the spectatorial imaginary 
only develop through the ego-image? More broadly, what is the status of 
the signif ier in the imaginary of the spectator?
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Metz: The signif ier is inscribed in the imaginary of the spectator with 
signif icant force. It is fundamentally important, and this occurs on at least 
two levels: the signif ier of the cinema, common to all f ilms (= Jean-Louis 
Baudry’s ‘dispositif ’), which, as if to answer you in advance, I call the imagi-
nary, and which I will not discuss at present. And then there is the work of 
the signif ier in each f ilm. Spectatorial reception is all the more permeable, 
all the more vulnerable if it is not aware of this work. Textual analysis 
unearths a part of it, but at the same time it creates a new frontier and opens 
the way to inf inite analysis, which is, incidentally, the most beautiful of all 
things. We will never know that what has moved us in a particular on-screen 
face, which we declare to be ‘harmonious’, is, in reality, the combination of 
framing and lighting. If the beautiful shot of a landscape we speak so much 
about had lasted 40 seconds longer, we would not have spoken about it. A 
particular shot/reverse-shot, banal at eight frames, becomes patently leaden 
on the ninth frame. Our imaginary is happy to record the effect, and it is 
the sum of these ‘details’ (which are mentally tied to the diegesis, that is, 
fictionalized [romancés]), which is very largely responsible for our overall 
reaction to the f ilm.
Certain f ilms, including the most admirable works, seek to inscribe 
these effects, rather than abandon them to secrecy and manipulation. 
But since the procedure of inscription is itself an effect, nothing has been 
fundamentally altered, apart from the fact that the augmented complexity 
of the dispositif offers an intrinsic interest.
In my book, the ego-image is given as absent. I describe the f ilmic screen 
as a specular space where we can see everything except our own image. 
This, of course, only applies to the physical appearance of the subject. As 
for the image of the ego in the psychic sense, it is a point that, until now, I 
have barely discussed. But it seems to me, in fact, that the f ilmic imaginary 
can only be developed in close relation to the ego-image of each spectator. 
The ego-image is deep down the only thing I bring to the screening (along 
with my own phantasies, but there is no real difference between the two). 
We have other strong images, like those of beloved people or places, but 
they do not stay with us. The ego-image is the only one that walks along 
the street with us (as in Lady in the Lake [Robert Montgomery, 1947]), the 
only one which is directly (and continuously) sustained by that of which it 
is an image, even if it is to restore a somewhat distorted event. It is also the 
only analogical instance we have to follow what the on-screen characters 
are doing. For example, from what other source could we draw any kind 
of knowledge on what it means for a character to cry? How to understand 
the acts of the villain, if not by mobilizing our own real or virtual evil side? 
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This option is most often unconscious; we encompass it in the very notion 
of understanding. It relates, I should stress, to the ego-image much more 
than the ego (we do not truly know ourselves), unless we define the ego, in 
the spirit of Lacan, as a flight of images [ fuite des images]. This is also why 
the same f ilm can be interpreted in an inf initely diverse manner: each one 
has assembled major pieces of its being, which itself escapes into multiple 
images…
Note
1.  [In Aesop’s fable, the small mouse is able to help the mighty lion.]
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Abstract
In this wide-ranging interview published in 1990, Christian Metz speaks 
about his early work on f ilm semiology and discusses his more recent 
work on impersonal f ilmic enunciation, and a future project, a study of 
jokes. He also makes a series of positive remarks on Gilles Deleuze’s two 
books on f ilm (The Movement Image and The Time Image), books usually 
regarded to be at odds with Metz’s semiological and psychoanalytic 
approaches to f ilm.
Keywords: Christian Metz, f ilm theory, enunciation, Gilles Deleuze
‘Entretien avec Christian Metz’, Michel Marie and Marc Vernet. Iris, 10 
(1990), pp. 271–296. Translated by Daniel Fairfax.
I. Semiology and Film Theory
1. On the Conference
Michel Marie: The conference ‘Christian Metz and Film Theory’ has finished. 
I would like to know what impression you have had of it.
Christian Metz: I really liked the atmosphere of this gathering, and I consider 
you to be largely responsible for it: the organizer of a conference, who has 
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worked on it for a whole year before proceedings even begun, has a major 
influence on the style of the discussions, even if this is only due to the tone 
he adopts when talking about the simplest matters, like when the meal 
breaks are. In this case, you had a tone that was both serious and ‘cool’, 
not without humor, an imperturbable and amusing tranquility, in short, 
a good mix. And then there were the relatively short sessions, allowing 
plenty of time for conversations, and downtime. All this resulted in a certain 
spontaneity in the interventions and discussions during the sessions, and 
the absence of this stodgy and verbose theater that permanently threatens 
meetings, even interesting ones.
I am also persuaded that the opening address by Raymond Bellour, due to 
his intellectual generosity, his agility and his refusal of hackneyed clichés, 
also greatly helped to get the conference off to a good start.
Marie: It is also due to the place, and the format. The participants were 
present for several days in a row and were far from Paris. So we had the 
good fortune to be shunned by the professional conference-goers, who 
make remarks just for the sake of it.
Metz: In fact, I noticed that all of the ‘speakers’ talked about what they 
were actually doing, what was in their hearts, and also that they had all 
worked on their ‘papers’ – either well beforehand or (for those who kindly 
replaced absentees at the last minute), right here, in the château, and 
losing sleep in order to do so. In short, we escaped from those talks where 
the speaker is simply showing off. What is more, the level of discussion 
was very high, and remained high from start to f inish: this should be 
noted, because, in general, having a large number of talks gives rise, 
through sheer probability, to uneven talks that are facilitated by being 
drowned out by the others. I will also take advantage of this interview 
to thank all the participants for having consistently maintained this 
high quality. The organizers (once again) have notably played a part 
here: by dedicating an entire session to each paper (or at the very least 
half a session), you allowed them to be genuinely listened to, something 
I observed with pleasure and surprise, and which ‘obliged’ everyone to 
give their most.
In a sense, of course, I could not avoid being satisf ied with this confer-
ence, because it focused on my own work. But this personal, narcissistic 
aspect had a potential counter-effect: it made me more sensitive, because 
I was directly concerned; it made me desire a ‘perfect’ encounter, of a sort 
that I could just as well have been very disappointed with it.
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Marie: Do you think that there were real debates, exchanges between 
researchers coming from different horizons?
Metz: Completely different? No, because the topic and even the title of the 
conference already indicated a specif ic orientation, and not a 360-degree 
general survey. Of course, empiricism and positivism, for example, were not 
represented, neither was ‘salon’ criticism, etc. But there were diverse points 
of view, and sometimes they were reasonably distant from my own point 
of view, despite indisputable common areas. I am thinking, for example, of 
what was said by Marie-Claire Ropars, Asanuma Keiji and others.
Marie: Do you think that the contract presented by the title, the confronta-
tion between your works and f ilm theory, was respected in this diversity?
Metz: I wouldn’t say all of f ilm theory, because today it is a very large 
machine, but a notable part of it was, yes. Unfortunately, as with every 
international gathering we should also make note of the researchers we 
were counting on who were prevented from coming for practical reasons: 
Mary Ann Doane, Kaja Silverman, Edward Branigan, Stephen Heath, Yuri 
Tsivian, Gábor Szilágyi, Dana Polan, Eliseo Veron.
2. Semiology and Other Disciplines
Marie: In the last twenty years, f ilm theory has seen a rather remarkable 
expansion, albeit very uneven in certain domains. Semiology, semio-
pragmatics and narratology have been signif icantly developed, but this 
is much less the case for historical and sociological approaches, what I 
would generally call the human sciences – the non-literary, non-linguistic 
disciplines, of a somewhat ‘harder’ type, or a little less soft, than the habitual 
discourse on literature. These approaches do not seem to have adopted the 
cinema as an object of study, to have really taken stock of it, in particular on 
the institutional level. How do you explain this uneven development? This is 
also a question that, roughly speaking, poses the problem of the relationship 
between semiology, theories of cinema and their interdisciplinarity.
Metz: Firstly, on the fact itself, I would be less absolute than you. In the domain 
of history, there is the work of Ferro, Sorlin, Janet Staiger, Douglas Gomery, etc.
As for the causes, I do not have an explanation. Nobody does. Everything 
that is presented here or there as a cause is, in reality, a circumstance, which 
sheds light on the issue but does not explain it.
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To start off, this question should be asked of historians and sociologists. 
I would simply say, limiting myself to what I know, that, in France, toward 
1963, there were circumstances favoring semiology, which had no equiva-
lent for the other approaches: namely, the presence around Barthes (and 
Greimas, in a different way) of several young researchers, in a landscape 
that also contained Lévi-Strauss and Benveniste.
In any case, in order for a genuine history of the cinema to be created, 
somebody has to start. That is how it worked for semiology, and that is 
how it works for everything. It is possibly only the immediate cause, as it 
would be necessary to understand why this somebody began something 
at a certain time. But it does not prevent this from being the eff icient 
cause.
Marie: Yes, but, at the same time, there is the formidable expansion of the 
‘new history’ movement. And yet, this produced practically nothing on 
the cinema…
Metz: What about Marc Ferro? Is his work not a typical product of the new 
historians? He was the secretary of Revue des Annales for a long time…
Marie: Yes, but his work on the cinema remained very peripheral, while 
his books on more strictly historical subjects, such as his recent work on 
Philippe Pétain, are of an entirely different scope.
Metz: I would not say ‘peripheral’, but, this aside, I have observed something 
that confirms your remarks: namely, that, for us at the École des Hautes 
Études, among the so-called Annales historians, there are fewer specialists 
on the twentieth century than there are for earlier historical periods.
Marie: How has it come about that literature departments, in the very 
general sense of the term, have been more open to teaching f ilm, and not 
history departments? I can suggest an initial answer: I believe that ‘modern 
literature’ represents a discipline with vague contours and an unrestricted 
methodology. It is a disciplinary f ield that differs greatly between the dif-
ferent campuses, above all if we compare it to linguistics or history. And 
so, there was a certain permeability and openness.
Metz: As far as the institutions are concerned, you are right. It is true that 
there are advantages to the amorphous nature and elastic consistency 
of ‘modern literature’ – a little bit like French classes in high school, or 
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English departments in the United States, or ‘comparative literature’ pretty 
much everywhere – and that it permits innovations to overcome traditional 
resistances, which presuppose a hard, even dumb kernel. But this does not 
explain the uneven development of research, to the (manifestly provisional) 
advantage of the galaxy of semiology, psychoanalysis, etc., at least for the last 
25 years or so – which is a long time as far as a dominant idea is concerned, 
but very short in terms of the history of the world…
Marie: I have a complementary element to propose: I believe that, for the 
disciplinary institution of history – its professors and research teams – the 
cinema is a futile, frivolous object; it comes within the domain of f iction and 
does not represent very serious material. This sentiment remains strong: 
historians study garbage bins, refuse, because they can learn a lot about 
consumption and living standards, but the cinema, even less noble than 
refuse, does not seem to teach them anything about society, or at least a 
lot less. Historians seem to judge that its mediatic importance and the set 
of discourses to which it gives rise are disproportionate to its real place in 
the economic circuit, in the evolution of contemporary societies. For them, 
it is merely a vast simulacrum to be demystif ied.
Another aspect, which, alas, plays a decisive role in France, is the inac-
cessibility of the archives (in terms of both f ilms and written documents). 
Students who have supervisors that point them toward the archives 
often f ind a closed door, even when it comes to written sources. In the 
United States, most of the major production companies have deposited 
their archives in university departments. This attitude is inconceivable in 
France, because the production companies are still dominated by a secre-
tive mindset, protecting their sources, or even destroying large swathes of 
the traces of their past. This is the case with Pathé, for example: it is very 
diff icult to study the f irst twenty years of its existence, when the company 
had a dominant position in the global f ilm economy.
Metz: This is unfortunately true. But the closely-guarded archives also could 
have deterred our pals in modern literature…
Marie: Not entirely, since academics in literature can work at length on a 
single f ilm, whereas the historian needs whole series.
Marc Vernet: It is true that, in relation to other countries (the US, the UK, 
Belgium), scholarship in France is distinguished by the inaccessibility of 
the archives. That said, there are some encouraging signs, like the openness 
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offered at the Arsenal by Emmanuelle Toulet, or at the Archives du Film 
by Frantz Schmitt (who has unfortunately just been dismissed from his 
post), or at the Centre National du Cinéma by the Councillor of State, 
Théry, who has opened the dossiers of the Commission de Contrôle for 
the f irst time. But all this does not amount to a general policy. They are 
individual initiatives, and when the individual moves on, you have to start 
from scratch.
Marie: The paradox is that it is academics like you, me and Marc – that is, 
scholars with more of a background in literature – who encourage and set 
up teams of historical research, while very few professional historians have 
done so before us, with a few rare exceptions (including Marc Ferro and 
our friends from the Association Française de Recherche en Histoire du 
Cinéma, where the non-academic researchers are by far the most numerous). 
In France today, there is still a genuine ostracism of f ilm studies among 
historians of the contemporary era, which explains the role played, in spite 
of themselves, by literature academics in embarking on historical research 
on the cinema.
Metz: I would add one remark, somewhat oblique with respect to your 
comments.
The pre-eminence of the sciences almost makes us believe that the ideal 
preparation for a f ilm scholar lies in the École Centrale, or a f irm grasp of 
mathematics. We willingly forget that there is something common, beyond 
the mere word itself, between the humanities and the human sciences: how 
can we fail to see that the grammar of foreign languages – rhetoric laden 
with examples, reading comprehension as a sensitivity to the signif ier and 
the acts of construction, narratology frequently practiced in the study of 
novels, art history and the commentary of great paintings – that all this, 
and plenty else, directly pref igures the various kinds of modern ‘scientif ic’ 
analyses, which include the semiological enterprise? This last wants more 
solid and, above all, more explicit theoretical bases, but it speaks about the 
same things.
Of course, all research, as Jacques Aumont reminded us at Cerisy, 
when responding to me, deserves the name ‘scientif ic’, to the extent that 
it is neither a novel, nor a poem, etc.: if you use the term in this sense, 
there is nothing to discuss. But I prefer to speak of ‘research’ without an 
adjective, since this mirage of science, in our f ield, is the source of too 
many illusions for certain people, and of too many impostures among 
other people.
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3. Writing – The ‘Crisis of Theory’
Vernet: It is often said that theory, especially in Europe, has run out of 
steam, and that the major bodies of theoretical work have disappeared into 
obsolescence. For my part, I think that this is wrong. Simply put, theory is 
being developed along new axes, and possibly, above all, in new forms, new 
ways of writing. You yourself have known at least three different writing 
regimes: that of the Essais, that of Language and Cinema (which you specifi-
cally sought to be consolidated into a technique, from A to Z), and f inally 
that of The Imaginary Signifier, with a much more literary, fluid, sometimes 
almost transparent style. What is your position today on this matter?
Metz: I agree about my three ‘ways of writing’. As far as theory running out 
of steam is concerned, I do not believe this any more than you do. We are 
often fooled by the spectacular side of things (all the more so when, in this 
case, it is inf initely sad): the disappearance, one after the other, of several 
major f igures: Barthes, Lacan, Foucault, the Althusser tragedy. Of course, 
this results in a huge void. But if you direct your gaze elsewhere, you will 
notice, for example in our domain, that there has never been such a large 
amount of interesting and solid work being done as there is today. When we 
speak of ‘theory’, we have in mind, as the expression indicates, a corpus, a 
set of research areas, and not only one or two giants (this is why my response 
would be totally different if you asked me about the major personal œuvres).
Another element has changed: theory, today, is no longer in fashion. But 
this tells us more about fashion than it does about theory.
Marie: What is in fashion now is the theme of the crisis of theory… (laughter).
Metz: As far as new ways of writing are concerned, they seem to trace a 
rather clear evolution over the last thirty years or so. The idea of the human 
sciences may well stretch back to the nineteenth century, but their actual, 
socially visible development dates primarily from the Libération. In the 
end, this is quite recent. At the beginning, it was implicitly admitted that, 
since a text was scientif ic, it could accommodate a rather rough or relaxed 
writing process, or even give a technical sense to every word used, so that 
this was all that was needed to express oneself. People took themselves for 
chemists, they sketched out formulae. (I note, however, that the ‘greats’, as if 
by chance, wrote beautifully: especially Foucault, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, and 
Barthes, but this was not a concern shared by everyone.) And then, as the 
social sciences gradually established themselves, they were also subject to 
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a common process. Researchers once again became sensitive to the basic, 
prejudicial demands of intellectual exchange: texts that were too poorly 
written, devoid of the minimum amount of skill and style, began to bore us, 
to leave us with a feeling of carelessness or shoddiness. A striking corollary 
is that authors, on the whole, write better than they used to. Either they have 
evolved without being aware of it, or they have a conscious will to respond 
to expectations. Of course, it is not that writers have become better, but 
that they have a greater respect for the reader.
Vernet: In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a unity at the École 
des Hautes Études that included Barthes, Genette, Bremond, and yourself. 
Today, this unity is no more, and yet there still seems to be repercussions 
of this past history. I wanted to know what your feelings about this are.
Metz: To the names you have just cited, we should add, for that point in 
time, the names of Ducrot, of Todorov, and of Kristeva (outside the École 
but not outside of our group), and of Julien Greimas, who, back then, seemed 
to us to duplicate or refract, in somewhat enigmatic fashion, the f igure of 
Barthes. You are right to speak of a quite strong unity: this is what hap-
pens in situations that bring together a mentor with young researchers, 
who are yet to have real autonomy. Subsequently, in classic fashion, there 
was a diaspora – everyone chose their own path. Some of us really did 
part ways, such as Ducrot and Kristeva, or, later, Bremond and Todorov. 
Greimas and Barthes distanced themselves from each other. Then Barthes 
died. But it seems to me that of this geography dating from 1963, which 
lasted a further four or f ive years, there remains a partial aff inity between 
Genette’s work and my own, for example surrounding the notion of diegesis 
or narratological problems. By the way, Genette’s approach, like my own, 
has something obsessive about it: in book after book, he calmly charts 
the terrain of poetics. I am, like him, not very permeable to those absurd 
‘important’ or urgent matters (formerly ‘ideological’, now ‘epistemological’), 
which we are incessantly deafened by, and which change every morning.
Vernet: In her intervention at Cerisy, Marie-Claire Ropars1 interrogated you 
on the relationship between semiology and its ‘outside’. Can we imagine 
semiology establishing relations with other disciplines and movements?
Metz: I have yet to study Marie-Claire Ropars’ intervention in its written 
form. At Cerisy, I was struck by several points in which I was in agreement 
with her. In any case, I will give you my answer. Firstly, semiology, which 
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is itself ‘interdisciplinary’ without shouting this out from the rooftops, 
has already established relations with other f ields: ideological critique, 
psychoanalysis, feminism, textual analysis, structural history (see Jens 
Toft2), education sciences, etc.
As for more profound relations, like the notorious ‘articulations’ that 
people comically insist on researching, I do not believe in them. It is normal 
for semiologists to do semiology, for critics to do criticism, etc. If they man-
age to do their own work well, this is already a lot, and it does not happen 
that frequently.
It is true that the outside of semiology is immense, just as the outside 
of history or any other f ield is immense, for the simple reason that these 
disciplines are numerous, and the ‘outside’ of each one is constituted by 
the sum of all the others. Real competence, the formation of the mind, 
mental know-how can only be acquired within a disciplinary framework, 
because, as their name indicates, disciplines correspond to formations and 
not objects. Interdisciplinary undertakings can be interesting when each 
person involved suff iciently knows both disciplines in question. Otherwise, 
we bear witness to methodological psychodramas or metaphysical duels, 
as we all know well: the two approaches intensely stare into the whites of 
each other’s eyes, and question each other on the place from which they 
are speaking. Interdisciplinarity must be above the respective disciplines, 
and not below them.
Marie: These last ten years have been characterized, during your relative 
silence, by the sensational appearance of Gilles Deleuze’s two books on 
the cinema, which are now very much in fashion among certain academics 
and large numbers of students. Deleuze has often reaff irmed his numerous 
misgivings about semiological approaches, or those inspired by linguistics, 
but paradoxically he frequently refers to Peirce. How do you perceive his 
work? Is a dialogue, or a bridge, between your current project and his ap-
proach possible? Deleuze cites a large number of f ilms, and reiterates the 
major classif ications dedicated to the history of the cinema, which you 
rarely do. What do you think of him?
Metz: Firstly, the reference to Peirce. It is not really a reference, because 
many of Peirce’s concepts are (avowedly) distorted from their original mean-
ing, or even retroactively invented (and noted as such: see the ‘rheume’ 
[reume] supplanting the ‘rheme’ on page 80 of the f irst volume [Cinema 1: 
The Movement Image, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1986)]. Deleuze could have written the 
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same work without invoking Peirce. He had no ‘need’ of him (it is a different 
matter for Bergson). But it is common to bring up Peirce when you want to 
attack Saussure; Peter Wollen already did it in his f irst book, Bettetini did 
it, Eliseo Veron is still doing it.
As far as the numerous films and ‘schools’ that the book comments on are 
concerned, this is one of the qualities that make it such a rich and interest-
ing work. It is also quite normal, if you think of what Deleuze himself said 
about his books. Deleuze clearly stated that he wanted to write a ‘natural 
history’ of the cinema. His objective immediately led him to f ilms (the 
great, hallowed f ilms), schools, f ilmmakers, etc. In a way, it is a vast f ilm 
society of legitimation, with a dose of talent added: an almost Bazinian 
return to the cinema as amorous totalization. For my part, I will willingly 
go along with it.
Moreover, contrary to what I sometimes hear, I in no way think that his 
book is a war machine [machine de guerre] against semiology. Of course, 
third parties have used it for this purpose, but that is another matter. And 
of course, Deleuze is opposed to semiology and psychoanalysis – and he 
says this explicitly. But I fail to see where the war machine is. The work 
has nothing polemical about it; it is not a ‘coup’. On the evidence it is very 
sincere, it is an endearing book where the author says what he thinks 
without bothering with other people too much. This is why it was somewhat 
meteoric.
Marie: And yet he cites a lot of journal articles, and not always the most 
interesting ones. He also creates a total impasse, not only with respect to 
semiology, but also to the great f ilm theorists like Arnheim, Balázs, in short 
all of f ilm theory.
Metz: Of course, but this is clearly a fundamental choice for him, and 
not a maneuver or a mark of sloppiness. It is easy to discern that he has 
decided to refer only to texts that speak directly about f ilms. Moreover, 
he does not force us to make use of them. He does not adopt the posture 
of a specialist, even though he has seen a lot of f ilms. He does not hide 
the fact that he has carried out a kind of ‘raid’ (and a raid of great scope 
for that matter).
His way of thinking is profoundly foreign to my own (there is no bridge 
between us), but I found his work to be very beautiful, a work of extreme 
intelligence. My ‘response’ is a warm esteem. I have never understood why 
books should have to ‘match’, because people in everyday life never match, 
and they are the ones who write books.
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4. The ‘Semiological Regime’
Marie: You just spoke of Roland Barthes as a mentor. This is a role that you 
have always denied or refused for yourself. And yet, if it is true that you enjoy 
the exterritoriality of the École des Hautes Études, this does not prevent 
you from lending consistent support to your old students.
Metz: It is the least I can do! I do not see any connection between helping 
people out and playing the role of mentor. It is a deformation of our profes-
sion to see subtle scientif ic politicking when it is often just everyday acts 
like helping a friend in need.
Marie: So, I will ask you a somewhat brutal question that other people have 
also asked, like Guy Hennebelle for example: is there a semiological regime 
within the university institution?
Metz: Of course, semiology has a certain (modest) influence, as is the case 
with any movement that has caught on. But it is funny to take umbrage 
at it, when you think of the massive, overwhelming power, in the same 
institution, of disciplines like English, History, Physics, etc. The university 
is a big house, very old and very complex, and becoming familiar with it is 
diff icult. ‘Power’ does not lie in books doing well, but in the committees, 
the budgets, the hallways.
To return to the small upsurge of semiology, for the most part it has been 
beneficial, because it has contributed, along with other factors, to assuring 
(after many tribulations) the position of an entire generation of scholars, 
those who are about forty years old today. It has also contributed to f ilm 
studies being admitted into academia (we had already tried this before, but 
without success), and not just semiological f ilm theory, such that others 
have also benefited, which is good for them.
Now, on the crux of the matter: I never wanted to establish a School, or 
even to personally edit a journal, which would have immediately put me 
in the position of a boss. I do not wish to deny the reality of my position, 
the symbolic effect attached to my books, my notoriety abroad, and, above 
all, perhaps, my seniority (I was the f irst to take this path, and I am also 
the oldest member of the group). Of course, I had an intellectual and moral 
influence – as soon as you start writing, this is the risk, whether little or 
big. But it does not oblige you to act as a mentor, to tyrannize everyone, 
to condemn the work of others, to be haughty, to drape oneself in a stuffy 
solemnity.
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Marie: Who, then, in your opinion, are the scholars directly extending your 
work?
Metz: At Cerisy, in my ‘speech’ on the last day, I proposed a threefold parti-
tion, which I have since reconsidered. But I would still adhere to it. There are 
the scholars outside of semiology (in its many forms), for example Jean-Louis 
Leutrat and Jacques Aumont, who are of great importance to my pluralist 
temperament, because they show that my enterprise has in no way clogged 
up the landscape. There are the ‘other’ semioticians – the non-Metzian 
semioticians, shall we say – like Marie-Claire Ropars or John M. Carroll in 
the United States. Finally, there are those who, more or less beginning with 
my propositions, have opened up new paths. I will not speak of the fourth 
group, those who are content to recapitulate my ideas while twisting them 
in all directions (at one point there were a lot of them): they are supposedly 
my ‘disciples’, but I recognize myself more in the third group. Moreover, I do 
not like the notion or the word disciple, which is reductive for the disciple, 
and burdensome for the ‘mentor’.
II. The Unpublished Works
Vernet: While you have not published any books since The Imaginary Signi-
fier in 1977, since that time you have worked on two major objects: the f irst 
is on the joke [mot d’esprit], for a book that remains unpublished because 
unfinished; the other is on enunciation, for a book which you are in the 
midst of completing.
Metz: Yes. But f irst a few clarif ications. As far as the joke is concerned, 
my book is in fact ‘f inished’ but, in its present form, it does not satisfy 
me. It was refused by two publishers – Seuil and Flammarion – after 
contradictory discussions between several readers, and, re-reading it, I 
appropriated this hesitant and f inally negative judgment, which relates 
not to the subject matter but to the structure of the work (= useless digres-
sions, awkward delineation of the chapters, etc.). So I put it to one side, 
with the idea of resuming it in this perspective, possibly in two years, 
when I retire.
Now, for my current book, it is true that I have written about two thirds 
of it, but I have had a lot of projects blocking its path, so I still need a year 
or eighteen months to complete it.
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1. On Jokes
Vernet: What motivated your passage, after The Imaginary Signifier, to a 
purely psychoanalytic work on jokes?
Metz: To tell the truth, it is just as much a linguistic work (and even phonetic, 
for those quips that play on sounds). It is not a work that relates to the 
cinema, but only to written or spoken jokes. And also on Freud’s famous 
work on the Witz, for which I have a profound admiration, along with various 
objections.
In spite of appearances, this manuscript is situated as a direct extension 
of The Imaginary Signifier, or at least the second half of that book, the very 
long text on metaphor and metonymy, where I was already quite distant 
from the cinema.
Each of the patterns of thinking (what Freud calls ‘techniques’) that 
produces a series of quips of the same mechanism, consists of a ‘psychic tra-
jectory’, a ‘symbolic path’ that is primary in principal and then made more 
or less secondary. For example, following Freud, and in partial disagreement 
with him, I study the technique he calls ‘deviation’ (Ablenkung) – deviation 
of thought, of course. It gives rise to an immense, very widespread family 
of jokes and funny stories: a painter introduces himself to a farmer and 
asks if he can paint his cow. Answer: ‘No way! I like her as she is!’ At the 
airport, a woman asks how long the Paris-Bombay flight takes. Consulting 
his schedule, the desk clerk says, ‘Just a minute, madam’. Satisf ied, the 
woman answers: ‘One minute? That’s great. Thanks a lot!’ Two friends are 
chatting. The f irst one says: ‘Did you know that in New York someone has 
an accident every ten seconds?’ His buddy says: ‘Oh, poor guy! What rotten 
luck!’, and so on.
All these quips relate to slippages, to displacements in the Freudian sense. 
These slippages are absurd, preserving something of the primary process 
(whence our laughter), as well as being made true-to-life, domesticated 
in order to accede to social exchange and become capable of passing into 
language. To this end, the invention of a joke allows for a kind of turnaround. 
For example, the double meaning of ‘to paint’ [peindre]: ‘to represent on a 
canvas’ and ‘to daub with color’ (it is thus necessary to be in accordance 
with the resources of the language in question, or in other cases with the 
discourse). Along with the turnaround, the joker needs to ‘play’ on two very 
uneven, unbalanced probabilities: in the context, the only acceptable mean-
ing is ‘to represent on a canvas’, to the extent that the listener does not even 
think of the other meaning (this is what the joker is counting on). Thirdly, 
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we must f ind a phrase that, while remaining simple and plausible, has the 
effect of resuscitating the meaning that had been implicitly excluded, or 
merging the two meanings. Thus, these familiar tales, outwardly facile, rest 
on sustained and precise abstract operations. I have studied about f ifty of 
them, roughly thirty of which had already been discussed by Freud, from a 
corpus of about a thousand examples. In all instances, they are itineraries, 
typical pathways of thinking between ‘plots’ put into place by the joke itself. 
They are often similar to metaphor, metonymy or synecdoche in the broad 
sense of the terms (as def ined by Jakobson and then Lacan). For example, 
lexical double meanings (‘Tous les sots sont périlleux’)3 exhibit in a nearly 
pure state the work of condensation: two different ideas fuse into a single, 
identical audible syllable.
Vernet: Could you give some indications why you are opposed to certain 
aspects of Freud’s book?
Metz: Yes, two things. In detail, many of the clarif ications are marked by 
numerous contradictions, linguistic errors, approximate definitions, textual 
slip-ups, etc. (Freud is sometimes very slapdash, very hurried). Additionally, 
something more central: this very f ine book was written in the wake of The 
Interpretation of Dreams and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, when 
Freud was still struck by his major discovery, the unconscious. Hence, he 
is not always attentive to the discrepancies in the degrees of secondariza-
tion (even though the idea, on a basic level, is his), and he exaggerates the 
proximity of mental thought with the dreamwork. He does not take into 
account the tremendous constraint exerted on the joker by the waking 
state, socialization and the ‘linguistic state’, where one is dependent on a 
non-psychological machine. It is language, as much as the joker, that creates 
quips. The unconscious manipulates it, but within certain limits. Without 
the polysemy of the word ‘peindre’ in the French lexicon, there would be 
no joke about the farmer’s cow. The primary process only creates humor 
if it partly quietens down. Freud does not say the opposite, but he hovers 
uncertainly over this important point.
Vernet: Do you think that a real enrichment of psychoanalytic reflection 
through a better knowledge and understanding of linguistic mechanisms 
is possible?
Metz: No, I do not think so, although it is an obsession for French psy-
choanalysis. We should make an exception  –  which is actually pretty 
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obvious – for the psychoanalytic study of objects that are linguistic, like 
the written or spoken joke, literary works, etc., that is, a certain f ield of 
study of applied psychoanalysis. But in psychoanalysis proper (which we 
always forget about), therapy, the process is more language-based [lan-
gagier] than linguistic in nature. In order to ‘understand’ the words that the 
analysand produces, it is clear that a theoretical knowledge of the syntax 
of the language or its phonological system is not what matters. It is more a 
matter of sensing, through the process of transference/counter-transference, 
what is functioning in the Freudian slips, contradictions, stammering, or 
the overly-assured phrases of the patient. This is still language, but it is 
not that of the linguist (Benveniste said this emphatically, and very early 
on). In a word, it is ‘lalangue’, in the Lacanian sense, and not language 
as we commonly understand it. The former digs its twisting tunnels, its 
warrens, in the density of the latter, but they remain profoundly different, 
as if they were foreign to each other; their constant proximity does not 
lead to any resemblance. Moreover, psychoanalysis is intended to heal 
people – whatever the (Parisian) great minds may say – and, on this ter-
rain, it is subject to the harsh competition of the striking progress made in 
neuropsychiatric chemistry, which it is absurd to denounce. Rather than 
be burdened by linguistics, or permanently sacrif icing itself to the Desire 
of Literature, psychoanalysis would do better to reflect on its probability 
of surviving beyond the year 2000, and on the new role that it can play 
alongside medication, if it possesses the wisdom to accept this.
Vernet: Does your work on the joke have anything to do with the Lacanian 
formula according to which the unconscious is structured like a language?
Metz: Yes, plenty. But on the condition of avoiding an excessively fre-
quent misunderstanding of this formula. The ‘language’ it invokes is 
‘lalangue’, which I just spoke about. Lacan utterly refuses any, let us say, 
iconic, f igurative conception of the unconscious. The unconscious, in his 
view, is relational, ideographic, its space is like that of the rebus or the 
grapheme, not that of the photograph or the image, whence the reference 
to a ‘language’. All the same, it does not resemble a language-system 
[langue], with a clear exposition and diurnal logic. Lacan is thinking 
of the depths of the machine, where poetry, Freudian slips and the ab-
racadabra of dreams reside. Conversely, those who considered Lacan’s 
formula as outrageous and provocative have unwittingly shown that they 
had turned language (in the eyes of linguists, and everybody else) into 
a particularly threadbare conception, entirely reduced to the secondary 
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process, because they judged that the unconscious differed from it in 
such a radical and self-evident fashion. However, the study of metaphor 
and metonymy, in my work on the ‘imaginary referent’, has permitted 
me to measure the importance of the primary part that remains active 
in the most common f igures, and in the very constitution of the basic 
lexicon, reputed to be non-f igurative but whose terms often owe their 
meaning (their specif ic meaning) to an old f igure that was then ‘used 
up’, as traditional linguists are fond of saying: this ‘using up’ strongly 
resembles the progressive secondarization of what was initially a rather 
disruptive outpouring.
Hence, to reply to your question, jokes all result from a twisting of 
lalangue on and with language [la langue], and it is the various possible 
imprints of this minor convulsion, this ‘smiling scar’, that I have tried to 
study, after, with and sometimes against Freud. Lacan’s formula can serve 
as an extension of this work, even if, in the joke, the unconscious motion 
only acts, for the most part, in its preconscious state. Since Lacan, certain 
psychoanalysts willingly present puns as pure products of the unconscious 
to the fourth degree, targeting depth and manifestly crafted with great 
lashes of culture and labor. But this difference concerns the psychic ‘milieu’, 
more or less close to the primordial haze, and not the specif ic design of 
typical trajectories, like for example the ‘turnaround’ I just mentioned. As 
a characteristic itinerary, each one of them can be realized to various levels 
of secondariness; this is why, as we can see, jokes are not all absurd to the 
same degree, although they necessarily must have an ounce of absurdity 
in them.
2. Filmic Enunciation
Vernet: As for your current work on f ilmic enunciation, I would also like 
to ask you what motivated this transition to this object, which is in the 
framework of what we today call narratology, and which has precisely 
been developed while you were working on the joke. Genette has already 
indicated the manner in which narratology was the extension of semiol-
ogy, but what interests me today is to better understand how this term 
can designate reflective thinking on relations between pairs of concepts, 
concepts that we sometimes consider as f inalized (often when we take 
them in isolation), but which, for the most part, are really diff icult, because 
matters are still not resolved. The f irst pair is ‘history/discourse’, the second 
‘enunciation/narration’, the third ‘conversation/projection’, and the last is 
‘deixis/configuration’.
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a. History/Discourse
Vernet: In his Nouveau discours du récit,4 Genette said that he would have 
done better to sprain his wrist the day that he had hastily interpreted 
Benveniste’s formula, which claimed that ‘history seems to tell itself’, by 
misjudging the importance of the world ‘seems’. Are you carrying out a 
similar revision today? Do you think that Benveniste’s formula has been 
applied too brutally? And if this is the case, does it not also imply that 
we again reflect on the position of the spectator, which would look both 
at history and discourse, and would thus show itself to be less aff ixed to 
the imaginary, and more devoted to the “belief in the spectacle,” to adopt 
the expression you use in an interview with the journal Hors-Cadre? [see 
Chapter 9].
Continuing in this relationship with the double-barreled term ‘history/
discourse’, I am struck by the fact that narratology has not worked on the 
position of the actor, despite the fact that we see actors throughout the 
entire f ilm.
Metz: There are multiple aspects to your question. Firstly, narratology. My 
study of enunciation significantly overlaps with this enterprise, but departs 
from it at other times, because I am also concerned with non-narrative 
f ilms, experimental f ilms, television news, or historical programs, etc. I 
will return to this point later.
Secondly, my motivation. Without realizing it, you have answered your 
own question: while I was elsewhere, immersed in Freud, many interesting 
and solid works were published on narration and enunciation. Jean-Paul 
Simon began work on this matter very early, as the title of his book on the 
comic f ilm does not indicate.5 There was issue number 38 of Communica-
tions, in 1983, which you are well placed to know, and many other studies. 
After having surfaced and familiarized myself with this research, I set 
myself the task of systematically studying how far behind I was, what I 
had read too quickly, a bit like someone who goes through the newspapers 
upon returning from a distant country. I spent an entire year familiarizing 
myself with these analyses, and I found them interesting, I wanted to enter 
into the debate. Therefore, it is not the logic of my earlier work that led me 
to this new study, it was the work of others.
Now, ‘history/discourse’. There is, f irst of all, the position of Benveniste 
himself. I am persuaded that he truly thought that history did tell itself (phe-
nomenally, of course, not really). It was through simple prudence, to avoid 
lazy misunderstandings, that he added the verb ‘seem’. It does not, however, 
settle the question, for we are not forced to think like Benveniste. As for 
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me, in a text entitled ‘Story/Discourse (A Note on Two Types of Voyeurism)’ 
and published in a collective work dedicated to Benveniste [republished 
in The Imaginary Signifier, pp. 89–98], I go in the same direction: “it is the 
‘story’ which exhibits itself, the story which reigns supreme” [p. 97] (= the 
f inal words of my article). The context indicates that we must take the idea 
in a psychoanalytic direction; just before that, I had described f ilm as “the 
seeing of an outlaw, of an Id unrelated to any Ego” [p. 97]. The entire text, 
incidentally, has a lyrical and strongly ‘personal’ character, it is a form of 
prosopopoeia (at least that was the intention) of cinematic transparency, of 
the classical American cinema that I loved so much, that I exalted in, whose 
character I magnif ied without going into details. Nonetheless, I recognize 
that this article, if readers do not contribute a dose of f inesse and sensitivity, 
or if they dispense with comparing it to my other writings, can indeed lead 
to confusion, because it does not clearly abstain from being a scientif ic text. 
As for what I have said elsewhere, it is that, very regularly, history is also a 
discourse, or that it has a discourse ‘behind’ it, etc.
Marie: So you no longer believe in transparency at all?
Metz: Yes, I do believe in it, but as being itself a type of enunciation, in which 
the signif ier actively works at effacing its own traces (in this spirit, I have 
dedicated an entire passage of The Imaginary Signifier to it). In the same 
sense, my article on special effects, which dates from much earlier, recog-
nized two different forms of pleasure (here, I am in entirely in agreement 
with what Marc [Vernet] has just said): the pleasure of immersing oneself in 
the diegesis, and the pleasure of admiring a nice toy, to rhapsodize before 
the cinema-machine. Whence those self-contradictory but very common 
reactions, like for example this strange phrase: ‘What a great effect, you 
can hardly see it’. Whence also my idea of a ‘belief in the spectacle’, which 
Marc has just recalled.
Today, I think that enunciation is an instance with which we must always 
reckon, but that sometimes it is only ‘presupposed’ (= implied by the exist-
ence of the utterance), while it is itself ‘enunciated’ (= inscribed in the text). 
I have borrowed this distinction from Francesco Casetti without changing 
a thing, I think it is excellent.
However, the term ‘marker’ [marque] suggests a localized sign, which 
would for example be in the top-left corner of the screen, whereas what 
‘marks’ the enunciation is most often the construction of the combination 
of image and sound. This is why I have spoken about ‘configurations’ (apart 
from motivated exceptions) rather than markers.
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By way of example, here are some of the enunciative conf igurations 
that I have distinguished: the on-screen voice talking to the camera, the 
look-at-the-camera (the two often go together, as Casetti and yourself, Marc, 
have observed and commented), the written address (through a title-card), 
secondary screens (doors, windows), mirrors, the f ilm in the f ilm, the laying 
bare of the device, the numerous forms of subjective images and sounds (the 
semi-subjective image, perspectival sound, the notion of the ‘underneath’ 
that you defined…), the character’s I-voice [voix-je], the oriented objective 
image (an equivalent to the ‘intrusions of the author’ in literature), etc., 
etc., without forgetting the neutral image, which, by the way, does not 
exist, but which, like the number zero in arithmetic, is indispensable for 
placing other enunciative regimes in perspective. In fact, we have not asked 
often enough that they should all be def ined in a negative manner, like 
deviations from a point of reference that would be, precisely, neutrality: to 
consider off-screen sound as notable (which everybody does do) equates to 
implying that on-screen sound is in some way more normal; to isolate the 
look-at-the-camera as a particular f igure is to consider that it is less striking 
for the character to look in a different direction.
In sum, enunciation is everywhere. Simply put – and this is where we 
come back to ‘transparency’, which it is absurd to deny as a spectatorial 
impression – it happens that this instance is done very discreetly, it asymp-
totically tends toward ‘neutral’ images and sounds, or at least neutral for a 
given period and genre.
Marie: So you are in radical disagreement with Bordwell, when he says that 
in classical f ilms, there is no enunciation?
Metz: He says that for all f ilms, not only classical f ilms.
No, I am not in disagreement with him. He rejects the concept of enuncia-
tion for the mortal sin of linguisticity, but he adopts the concept of narration 
which, when the f ilm is narrative, designates exactly the same thing (we 
will return to this matter). Whence my resolute assent to many of Bordwell’s 
propositions and analyses. The ‘disagreements’ of this kind are chimeras 
that are deliberately exaggerated in order to occupy positions. I have never 
liked these labeling games, which only serve to mask real convergences 
and differences.
Vernet: So it would be a disagreement about the terms used? What strikes 
me when listening to you is that enunciation tends to be a much vaster 
territory than what was initially attributed to it. And that, in fact, in the 
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past, the semiological and narratological work on enunciation owed much 
to a sort of nostalgia for the notion of the author. Through the work of 
the structuralists, we told ourselves that there remained a personal point 
of origin, and we in fact attempted, by studying enunciation, to recover 
something from this point, whereas your current position transforms it 
into a much more diffuse instance, which must be understood on two levels 
at least: what Paul Verstraten would call diegetized enunciation and, in 
contrast, the origin of the f ilm-utterance [énoncé-film].
Metz: Yes, except that the former is merely one of the manifestations, or 
one of the avatars, of the latter: the origin of the utterance is diegetized by 
the f iction (in both senses of the word).
It is true that, for me, enunciation has little to do with the author, or even 
with any kind of ‘subjective’ authority, regardless of whether it is a real or 
imaginary person, a character, etc. Enunciation, as the suff ix indicates, is 
an activity, a process, a doing. I have never understood why narratologists, 
after having banished the author with unnecessary violence (when it was 
necessary to keep the author as a concept, because it is the source of style), 
conceive of their so-called textual authorities in a perfectly anthropomor-
phic model: implied author, narrator, enunciator, etc. One could say that the 
author, ejected through the door, has come back in through the window. Now, 
it is either one or the other: in terms of Reality, it is the author and the author 
alone (the true, empirical author) who has created the work. And within the 
work, that is, in terms of the Symbolic, you only f ind enunciation. If the work 
depicts the f ilm’s director, as in Intervista [1987] by Fellini, it is once again 
this doing that does it. Enunciation is at work in each segment of the f ilm. 
It is simply the angle from which the utterance is enunciated, the profile 
it presents us with, the orientation of the text, its geography – or rather its 
topography. The f ilm can be presented – and always by means of f iction, 
even in documentaries – as being told by one of its characters, as being told 
by an unnamed voice, as gazing upon its diegesis from below, as itself being 
gazed upon by someone else, as containing another film, as ‘really’ addressed 
to the public by means of a title-card in the second person, etc. Enunciation 
is a landscape of creases and hemlines across which the f ilm tells us that it 
is a f ilm. It says only this, but it has a thousand ways of saying it.
Vernet: Has narratology not forgotten an element of the cinematic institu-
tion: a narrative f ilm is not only made to produce a story, but also to produce 
an ‘author’, an image of the author as a f igure of the artist in whom we 
trust. Every director of f iction f ilms seeks to assure both the progression 
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of the story and the progression of his career, by assuring that he can make 
another f ilm.
Metz: I am skeptical, as I have just explained, about crypto-authorial 
authorities (whether enunciative or not), and even more skeptical when 
they are multiplied. There is nothing between the author and the act of 
enunciation. But there is something alongside them, an extra-textual au-
thority that is not, however, ‘real’ (narratology sometimes confuses the two 
things), an imaginary author, or more exactly an image of the author that 
the spectator creates on the basis of certain qualities in the text refracted 
by their phantasms, their external knowledge about the f ilmmaker, etc. 
Edward Branigan is right to allude to this, and also to note that a text, 
strictly speaking, gives no indications about the author: it is situated in 
another world, in another ‘frame’, and if it contains (for example) fervent 
confessions in the f irst-person, only a knowledge about what is external to 
the text [le hors-texte] allows us to decide the strategy or spirit of sincerity 
in which these confessions are made.
By the same token, f ilmmakers can only make their f ilms by fashioning 
an equally arbitrary image of the spectator ‘for’ whom they are working.
As for the f ilmmakers targeted by your question, they are guided by a 
concern for combining textual indices that they sow here and there with 
the character of the spectator that they have dreamed up, in the hope that 
the former will lead the latter toward the imaginary author that they wish 
to embody… And it is true that this case is very frequent.
Vernet: Before moving on to other matters, there was one f inal point in my 
question, concerning the position of the actor.
Metz: I must say, f irst of all, that nobody, to my knowledge, has spoken of the 
actor from the perspective of enunciation, except for yourself in the last part 
of your article in Iris no. 7 on the f ilm character.6 Theorists, because they 
are theorists, are used to seeking more or less subjacent structures. If they 
do not adequately perceive the actor, this is because the actor is too visible. 
He is dissimulated to them by an authority that has the advantage of being 
invisible, the character, who both conceals and is ‘represented’ by the actor.
As far as enunciation is concerned, it seems to me that there are two 
major types of actors, with, of course, intermediate or mixed cases. If the ac-
tor is unknown, he will necessarily function to the benefit of the character, 
because the spectator cannot detach him from the character in order to 
associate him with other characters, or a private life talked about by the 
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gossip magazines – in short, he is not associated with anything else. So he 
‘sticks’ to the present character, he has no other reality.
Marie: There are very fine things said on this issue in the article by Jean-Louis 
Comolli on La Marseillaise [Renoir, 1938],7 counter-posing Pierre Renoir, who 
plays Louis XVI, to the almost unknown actor (Edmond Ardisson) who plays 
the young Marseillais Jean-Joseph Bomier.
Metz: When the actor is well-known (with the star being the limit-case), 
he imposes on the spectator the need to interrogate the reasons for his 
choice, reasons which are sometimes obvious and sometimes enigmatic. 
A f ilm with Danielle Darrieux immediately orients us in two directions: 
it is going to take place in ‘society’ and it is going to be ‘French’. And then, 
another result of enunciation, which Marc has spoken about in his article, 
is the fact that the well-known actor – that is, and I will come back to 
this, well-known elsewhere – will import into the f ilm the echo of other 
f ilms he has played in, he will instill his character with a multiple, virtual, 
f luctuating quality, he will make it vacillate, sometimes to the point where 
his identity is questioned. In Les Bas-fonds [Renoir, 1936], for example, who 
is Louis Jouvet? Can we really believe he is a Russian baron bankrupted 
by a passion for gambling? Is it not obvious that we are in the presence of 
genial, superlatively French thespian called Jouvet, who is neither a Baron 
nor bankrupt?
Vernet: This is what Michel has also shown for Le Mépris [Godard, 1963]. 
The actor, like the auteur, must have an imaginary status for the spectator.
b. Enunciation/Narration
Vernet: To turn to the pair ‘Enunciation/Narration’, Genette, if I recall cor-
rectly, sees a sort of equilibrium between the two. Narration relates to the 
mode, enunciation to the voice. In my work, I follow this division somewhat, 
with narration on the side of the nature of the story (the regulation of the 
delivery of information about the diegesis), and enunciation referring more 
to an extradiegetic authority, to the status of the text itself more than the 
diegesis. In your work, it seems the enunciation ends up single-handedly 
invading the entire terrain, dividing itself between a diegetized enunciation 
and an enunciation tout court.
Metz: No, I do not think it is like that. For Genette, the voice and the mode 
both relate to narration, whereas enunciation only concerns the idiom that 
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is the ‘basis’ of the novel. For me, there is no such thing as enunciation tout 
court, or else it is permanently ‘tout court ’. But it is true that it is expressed 
through f igures that can be diegetic, extra-diegetic, juxta-diegetic (like the 
I-voice), etc. (this list is not f inal).
Jacques Aumont has clearly formulated one of the great ‘challenges’ 
of narratology: to study the explicitly narrative construction of the text. 
But in a narrative f ilm, everything becomes narrative, even the grain of 
the f ilmstock and the timbre of the voices. This is why it seems to me 
that, in stories, enunciation becomes narration, provisionally abolishing 
a more general duality. Actually, I would def ine enunciation as a discur-
sive activity (this is the literal meaning of the word: act of enunciating). 
Consequently, in a scientif ic documentary, scientif ic enunciation is at 
work, in an activist f ilm militant enunciation is at work, in educational 
television didactic enunciation is at work, and so on. But, for narrative 
enunciation, whose anthropological importance is exceptional and 
whose social diffusion is vast, there is a special word whose homologue 
is absent everywhere else, the word ‘narration’. We thus dispose of two 
nouns, and we have a tendency to look for two things, forgetting that for 
all non-narrative discourses, we do not even pose the same question. 
Before a geographical documentary, we do not attempt to distinguish the 
enunciation of some kind of ‘geographization’. This is because this latter, 
in fact, does not have any social existence. So we say (very reasonably) 
that enunciation is geographical.
We also forget something, which is that the terminology was principally 
established in reference to linguistic narration, in particular, novels. There, 
the narrative codings are superposed onto a primary layer of strong rules, 
those of language; it is for them that we speak of enunciation, because the 
term is a linguistic one. Conversely, as an effect of this we can, if necessary, 
reserve ‘narration’ for the higher level. But the narrative f ilm does not rest 
on anything, it does not pile up on some equivalent to language; it is itself, 
or rather it manufactures everything that, in it, would come within the 
term ‘language’. Just as enunciation becomes narrative, narration takes 
responsibility for all enunciation.
To sum up, I think that enunciation is distinguished from narration in 
two, and only two, cases: in non-narrative discourse, which is nevertheless 
an enunciating instance; and in written or spoken narrations, where it is 
permissible to consider as ‘enunciative’ those narrative mechanisms that 
relate more to the idiom in which they are conveyed. (But the problem 
reappears: their usage inevitably conflates enunciation and narration, as 
we see with the deictics of novels.)
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Marie: I think back to what Marc said earlier, that the spectator took pleas-
ure in the tale related and in the narration as a narrating instance. For 
me, ‘enunciation’ designates the general dispositif, valid in any production 
of messages, and ‘narration’ designates the specif ic part of this dispositif 
concerning narrative messages.
Metz: Yes, except that narration, when there is one, mobilizes the entire dis-
positif. We should, in any case, be precise: ‘inasmuch as there is a narration’, 
because there are partially narrative f ilms, partial to varying degrees. But 
this changes nothing in our debate: in a means of expression that does not 
involve language, narration, on the patch of terrain that it occupies, assures 
the totality of discursive regulations. Moreover, when we think of the figures 
that everybody considers as enunciative, we notice that frequently they are 
also inseparably narrative: the diegetic narrator, the non-diegetic narrator, 
the character’s look to the camera, the off-screen voice, etc.
But it is still true that ‘enunciation’ is more general, because the term 
(and the notion) are also suited to multiple non-narrative registers, and 
consequently to the dispositif itself, before being specif ied.
Marie: What also deceives us, and what we tend to forget, is that for literary 
narratology there is a homogeneity in the material of expression, of such 
a kind that the character who narrates speaks with the same words as the 
book. For there to be such a reduplication in the cinema, the character would 
have to be f ilming the scene. If he speaks or writes, the textual functioning 
is no longer the same.
c. Conversation/Projection
Vernet: The other narratological pairing is ‘Conversation/Projection’. Perhaps, 
it is true, one cannot measure the gap between the conversation situation 
described by Benveniste, which is the basis for his theory of enunciation, and 
that of the spectator faced with a film to which he cannot respond, and which 
is not supported by anybody. Conversely, however, is the manner in which 
Benveniste represented the conversation correct, and as simple as he says it is? 
It was critiqued in two of the talks at the conference, by Marie-Claire Ropars 
and Roger Odin.8 The latter argued that, in conversation, we do nothing but 
hold discourses, which never have an enunciative source. Marie-Claire Ropars, 
meanwhile, asked if, by denouncing the mirage of the enunciation in cinema 
(= the quest for an author-character), you are not taking it outside of the film. 
What is your position, today, with respect to what could be an imperfect link 
between the conversational situation and the situation of a f ilm screening?
interview with Christian Metz 267
Metz: As far as conversation is concerned, what I believe above all is that we 
have not suff iciently been aware of the specif ic and ‘exceptional’ character 
of this situation. Specif ic by its nature, by its status, and not, of course, 
by its frequency (it is precisely the latter that obscures the former). With 
Benveniste and Jakobson, the theory of enunciation is narrowly constructed, 
it is a configuration that is not generalizable. A great number of pragmatic 
situations are ‘monodirectional’ in Bettetini’s sense of the term: reading a 
book, listening to the radio, a lecture, a seminar, watching a play or, better 
still, a f ilm or television program, etc. In all these cases, the discourse is 
more or less prefabricated (sometimes integrally), more or less immutable 
(sometimes entirely), and the reactions of the addressee cannot ‘feedback’ 
on the machinations of the ‘addresser’: in sum, it is the exact opposite of a 
conversation.
Now, you say, could the conversation reveal itself to be more complicated 
than in Benveniste’s descriptions (already not all that simple)? Yes, certainly. 
Do we not exchange discourses? That too, certainly; I said something along 
these lines in issue no. 1 of Vertigo.9 But as complicated as we may suppose 
it to be (and psychoanalysis would rightly make it complicated), it does 
not modify the quality that radically opposes it to monovalent discourses, 
and it does not suppress the alternation between the I and the you. It also 
does not prevent the verbal tenses from being evaluated on the basis of the 
speech act. If my interlocutor declares ‘I was ill’, it is because this illness, 
in his view, is prior to the phrase uttered; by the same token, ‘I will come 
back soon’ informs us of a return that will come after the information act. 
On the contrary, the f irst effect of f ilm – solely due to the fact that nobody 
can respond to it, and that it can be projected at times and places that 
are inf initely variable – is to ‘unhook’ all these terms from their strong 
meaning, and to limit their action to a f ictional, de-situated space-time. The 
deictics, for example, in spoken words or on-screen texts, become ‘weakened 
symbols’, to use Käte Hamburger’s terms. Hence, enunciation, for me, has 
nothing to do with the I, and the spectator has nothing to do with the you.
The f irst studies of enunciation, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, carried 
out research on the role of deictics. This is also what linguistics was doing, 
before pragmatics revealed the omnipresence of enunciation, which goes far 
beyond grammatical persons (enunciators and enunciatees). It was normal 
and necessary to initially explore this path; you cannot skip the stages.
In any case, as far as ‘primary’ research is concerned, I think that we 
must recall that enunciation has given rise to two kinds of explorations, 
which are, at the end of the day, quite separate: enunciation in the ‘techni-
cal’ (or pragmatic) sense, which was the great subject of the 1980s, and 
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enunciation in the psychoanalytic sense (= identif ication, scopic regimes, 
divisions in belief, the male gaze and the image-woman, etc.), which was 
foremost in France during the 1970s and which is now only being studied 
by Anglo-Saxon feminists, who have carried out very important work in 
this f ield.
Vernet: You have just cited Käte Hamburger. What is your relationship to 
her thinking, and to her book?10
Metz: It is a dual relationship. On the one hand, I have diff iculty in tolerating 
the brutal and arbitrary aspect of her work. For example, her aff irmation 
that the cinema is part of literature, under the sole pretext that it is f ictional, 
and without even thinking that it is not always f ictional. Or her claim that 
her whole book is based on linguistic notions, when there is not even a 
shadow of linguistics in any of it. Thus, her def inition of the utterance as 
the act of a subject saying something about an object is extremely vague, 
and even comes close to being trivial, as her study of lyricism shows clearly, 
where we see an ‘object’ that is both present and absent. She also has the gall 
to aff irm – in 1957 and once again in the 1968 edition – that linguists have 
shown little interest in enunciation, whereas Benveniste’s classic articles 
(which she did not know about) appeared between 1946 and 1959.
But what intelligence this wild woman had! What strength there is in her 
thought, notably in the definition of epic f iction! And then, to return to our 
domain, I essentially f ind her manner of situating the cinema (narrative 
f ilm) between the theater and the novel perfectly just. Film is described 
as a mixture: characters accede to f ictional existence through their own 
words, as in the theatre; but they are images, thereby escaping the all-too 
real limitations of the stage, and are capable of showing everything that 
the novel can describe, of being able to do without characters and speech 
for long passages, such that the f iction is also materialized outside of the 
protagonists, through an exterior intervention. I had sketched out somewhat 
similar ideas in a Spanish article, then at some lectures in Australia, and I 
will now re-open the question, this time with the ‘help’ of Käte Hamburger 
(and several others), in the context of an upcoming seminar where the enun-
ciative regimes of the novel, the theater and the poem will be contrasted 
with each other, considered from the point of view of the cinema, and, so to 
speak, ‘from’ the place of the cinema. In sum, it will be a comparative study.
Vernet: Do you agree with this idea of a false enunciation, and of deictics de-
flected from their primary usage in narrative, or, more precisely, in f iction?
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Metz: Yes, what Käte Hamburger says about these matters is enlightening. 
She shows that the preterite does not express the past, but the present of 
f iction: ‘He was sad’ signif ies that, at this moment in the story, he is sad. So 
this ‘past’ is accompanied by an adverb in the present tense: ‘This evening, 
he was sad’. I think this is very strong.
d. Deixis/Configuration
Vernet: The last pair in narratology, or in my primitive typology of narratol-
ogy, is ‘Deixis/Configuration’. Whereas deictics had occupied a decent share 
of the work done on narratology or ‘enunciatology’ (?), I note that you now 
speak of ‘weakened deictics’, and also of ‘enunciative configuration’, as if 
we have passed from a study of taxemes to a study of expositions, of more 
diffuse networks and heterogeneous constructions rather than units f ixed 
in a kind of lexicon.
In this perspective, has the work of Edward Branigan been of any im-
portance for you, and has the passage of deictics to configurations led to 
revising notions of the text and the impression of reality, insofar as the 
spectator who feels this impression operates on an enunciative material 
that is more complex and labile than the view, the image, or the visual 
f ield would be?
Metz: What makes the deictic conception of enunciation diff icult is, to 
begin with, a fact that has often been noted but whose importance has 
not been adequately taken stock of. At the stage of transmission there is 
nobody, there is no person, there is only a text; the enunciator does not 
exist, it is a f igure that is constructed on the basis of the text. At the stage 
of reception, on the contrary, there must be a person, a virtual spectator 
(much as Genette rightly talks about the virtual reader), a spectator who 
will become real through (at least) one other person, the analyst, or in any 
case, someone who has seen the film, because without him the very instance 
of reception disappears.
If someone at the pole of reception is necessary, this is because there is 
no text there, and if the pole of transmission can do without a symmetrical 
human presence, this is because the text compensates for it. We do not 
go to see the f ilmmaker, we go to see the f ilm; but this we who goes to 
see it is not another f ilm, it has to be somebody. The pairs of symmetrical 
terms, like ‘narrator/narratee’ and all the others, refer in reality to the 
conversation (again!), and they are more deceptive for the f ilm or for the 
book, because they mask this basic, inaugural dissymmetry: the artist 
transmits his work to its place, while the spectator, who has nothing to 
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emit, is himself displaced. There is no exchange. On the one hand, there 
is an object that removes the person; on the other hand, there is a person, 
present, deprived of an object.
I will add one thing. In my opinion, we should not cede to a perma-
nently threatening latent confusion between textual pragmatics and 
experimental (psycho-sociological) pragmatics. The former furnishes 
no indication of the various empirical audiences. If we want to know 
them, we must go to see them, and thus leave the text (we must also 
leave semiology, which cannot do everything by itself). It is dangerous, 
even if it is partly a matter of words (see Francesco Casetti), to speak of 
the enunciative instance as an ‘interface’ between f ilm and the world. 
Textual analyses will tell us, for example, that in sequence seventeen, the 
f ilm ‘positions’ its spectator in such and such a location. This is true in 
the symbolic order (= of the f ilm). But the spectator in the movie theater 
can position himself wherever he likes, he is the one who decides, and 
the f ilm ignores this choice entirely.
In a soliloquy, the enunciation, dissociated from interaction, can only 
mark itself out by a metadiscursive path, that is, by unfolding the utterance 
in order to say that it is a discourse. It seems to me that the metadiscursive 
register contains two major variants, reflection and commentary. Reflec-
tion: the f ilm mimes itself (screens within the screen, f ilms within the 
f ilm, showing the device, etc.). Commentary: the f ilm speaks about itself, 
as is the case with certain ‘pedagogical’ voiceovers about the image, to 
use Marc’s expression, or in non-dialogue intertitles, explicatory camera 
movements, etc. You are right to note that the notion of the text is displaced, 
or reworked, at least in relation to what it was in Language and Cinema, 
where I still presented the text as a rather smooth surface, even if I admitted 
that analysis could striate it along several axes. But at present it is the text 
itself that appears to me to be permanently stirred, crumpled up and torn 
into two by its own production.
It is indeed true – I will come back to your question, which has spread 
out even more – that enunciation, for me, ceases to be ‘aff ixed’ to privileged 
and relatively narrow textual zones (whence my hesitation about the term 
‘marker’), in order to be diffused over the entire discursive network. Deep 
down, enunciation is the text, but the text considered as production, not as 
a product. Alternatively, it is the text considered in everything that, within 
it, tells us that it is a text. This idea appears in the work of Marie-Claire 
Ropars, Pierre Sorlin, François Jost, and maybe some other people who I 
have momentarily forgotten. In my work, it has become the backbone for 
all of my reflections on the matter.
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Now, for your question on Branigan. Yes, I am interested in his work, 
and our ‘theses’ overlap on several points, notably the idea of narration as 
an activity without an actor, or as having a status as metalanguage with 
respect to the narrated object. It is not by chance that I referred to his work 
not too long ago.
On the impression of reality, f inally, I cannot give you an answer because, 
although it is one of my favorite topics, I still do not know if is affected by 
my new ideas on enunciation.
For Roland Barthes
Metz: Out of friendship, and f idelity to myself, I would like to f inish up, as 
we did at Cerisy, with some thoughts on Roland Barthes, who was my only 
true mentor. This declaration will perhaps be surprising, for (alas) my work 
is not very similar to his. Linguists, f ilm theorists, and even (later) Freud, 
have more visibly influenced me. But to have had a mentor is something else, 
it assumes a proximity in the daily exercise of the craft, an almost physical 
contagion, lasting many years, of a certain number of practical attitudes, 
ways of acting, and this is something that no book can do.
Roger Odin, in his contribution, remarked with much f inesse that, 
although very concerned with theory, I was not that attached to theories, 
that I changed them according to my needs, without even pausing to think 
that they could be competitors. This is one of the traits that I share with 
Roland Barthes, with its effect on one’s conduct, one’s way of ‘handling’, we 
might say, the works of others.
This practical philosophy, which he transmitted to me more than taught 
me, is a kind of ethics; it is the will to set up, in the midst of carrying out 
research, an amicable, tolerant space. This is rather rare, for intellectuals 
are no more intelligent than other people, and they are often tense with 
each other. With Roland Barthes, his tolerant, unaffected manner was due 
to the quite unique combination of kindness (which everybody noticed in 
him), an attentiveness to other people, and a total freedom of mind with 
respect to established ideas, often borrowed from the physical sciences, 
that guide our f ield, such as Methodology, Result or Research Coordina-
tion. In this regard he was incredibly tranquil; he knew that there were 
misunderstandings, distortions and bluffing in the expeditious commodity 
of the great disciplinary divisions – ‘post-modernity’, ‘structuralism’ and 
their ilk – or even in the guerrilla war of projects that aim to oust each 
other when, so often, they are not responding to the same question and are 
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in reality unrelated to each other. He saw different languages there, more 
or less apt in each case to speak about such and such an object. There was 
nothing discouraging about his skepticism, rather, he expressed a calm and 
confident belief that we could work differently.
I owe to him this level-headed conception of our profession, as he was 
an example of it before my eyes. I have constantly taken inspiration from 
it, or at least, I have constantly tried to. I am not the head of a school or the 
‘Pope of the audiovisual’ (!), as the stupid stereotypes, without having read 
me and without knowing my work, sometimes have it. On the contrary, I 
am very wary of the imperialist forms of semiology, of those formalizations 
that are more complex than the object that they are ‘explaining’. Semiology, 
for me, must remain one approach among others, well-adapted to certain 
tasks, but not all of them. Moreover, a concern for people, helping them 
out in the profession (there are minor distresses, and sometimes major 
ones), a meticulous respect for the expression of their thinking when citing 
them – in a word, amiability – founded on a constructive agnosticism and 
real (that is, modest) advances, all this seems to me to be more beneficial 
to research than any epistemological or proselytizing rigidity, even in the 
case of semiology. This is what Roland Barthes ‘taught’ me, without ever 
saying as much. And today, to pay back the favor, I cherish being able to say 
this to other people, to all those who would like (to re-use a turn of phrase 
that he liked) to understand me beyond my words.
Conversation recorded on September 23, 1989.
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In this short interview, published in 1990, Christian Metz praises his 
mentor, Roland Barthes, but also points out the problems and issues 
associated with being a mentor. He also discusses the role of theory in 
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Since the late sixties, Christian Metz has enriched f ilm theory with major 
works including Essais sur la signification au cinéma, Langage et cinéma, 
and Le significant imaginaire. From 7 to 13 June [1990], a conference on 
early cinema will be held in the city of Quebec, thanks to which Christian 
Metz will make his f irst trip to the city.1 To mark this long overdue visit, 
we publish this interview with Metz by theorist André Gaudreault (Du 
Littéraire au Filmique2), conducted during another conference held in June 
1989 in France, focused entirely on the work of Metz.
24 Images: You mentioned in your closing remarks at the end of the Cerisy-
la-Salle conference that Roland Barthes was your mentor. What was your 
relationship with Barthes? Moreover, what do you think now that this 
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relationship is reversed, where you are the mentor of other researchers? 
And what do you think, in general, of this famous relation to ‘the mentor’?
Christian Metz: A multi-part question. … Barthes was indeed my mentor, 
and he was also a friend. So it is a little complicated. Yet, in practice, it was 
very simple. He was very kind and extremely considerate with everyone, a 
famous man with the complete beginner, as I was when he recruited me. I 
received only good things from him, great loyalty in friendship, indispen-
sible support for my career. My memory of him, even today, is vivid. When 
he died in 1980, I had a nervous breakdown that led me to the hospital.
Now, the reversal of which you speak, in which I am, in my turn, the 
mentor. I will not deny that it has pleasant aspects. But that is obvious. What 
is generally less well known are the very substantial downsides. First, the 
increase in demand with all its consequences (overwork, mail, etc.); also, 
the mental stress: some people turn you into a Superman, a burdensome 
image that is not pleasant (the exaggerated praise sounds like mockery); and 
then we are called to intervene at any moment, we must coddle everyone, 
etc. Second disadvantage: the position one occupies subjects us to attack 
without provocation, by third parties who simply do not tolerate our fame, 
or are not happy, etc., and do not shrink, on occasion, from insults or lying. 
It does not happen to me often, but it is very unpleasant.
More generally, I would say that there are two different things. ‘Being’ 
or not being a mentor, that is for others to say, it is not up to us. But to play 
the mentor, to adopt an authoritarian attitude, etc., that depends on you, 
no one is forcing you. If we do it, then we can be held responsible. I f ind 
this type of conduct detestable.
24 Images: You have answered two parts of my question. There was a third. 
I have not suff iciently stressed your student relationship to Barthes, and 
your situation as mentor in regards to your own students. …
Metz: These two types of relationships are not comparable. Barthes was my 
teacher in an important but limited area: how to behave in the day to day 
part of the job, in the workplace, how to conduct a seminar, talk to students, 
to support a hypothesis, instill conf idence in anxious young researchers, 
etc. But he was not my teacher with regard to research, except in terms 
of some very general methods (or, rather, attitudes of mind), which were 
very valuable. The only thing that really interested him was literature. 
He had little taste for cinema. He knew it better than people said he did, 
but not as a specialist. This did not prevent him from considering it an 
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important area requiring investigation. He was waiting for someone who 
could take it on. That is how I started in 1963, working with the small group 
preparing the Communications journal’s fourth issue.3 He often repeated 
in meetings or thesis defenses that, apart from the literary f ield, which 
was favored because of its established tradition, f ilm semiology was the 
only semiology that really exists; it forms a ‘f ield’ in which people meet, 
complement each other, criticize, have a certain degree of autonomy, etc. 
But ultimately, he taught me, above all, the importance of ‘friendliness’ and 
civility in working relationships, and their importance, too, for the research 
itself, which is an intellectual activity whose conditions of possibility are 
non-intellectual. Controversy, bitterness, and arrogance can derail the 
work itself.
24 Images: You have influenced people, but how have you influenced the 
development of theory itself? Your own, of course, but also future scholars?
Metz: In the f ield of cinema, which is traditionally a bit insular (or pe-
ripheral), it is true that I have some influence. I can see it in invitations I 
receive to distant conferences, in the fact that my texts have been translated 
into 21 languages, etc. Raymond Bellour explained this influence at the 
beginning of the [Cerisy-la-Salle] conference better than I can myself.4 I 
will summarize approximately what he said: the important thing is not the 
theses I supported (f ilm has no double articulation, it has no equivalent; 
enunciation is impersonal rather than anthropomorphic, etc.), because 
those who support the opposite view belong to the same world as me, to a 
world in which such questions are asked. And conversely, for a traditional 
f ilm critic, double articulation is neither present, nor absent, it does not 
exist as an issue. In short, my ‘influence’ is not in what I said, but the fact 
that I was the f irst to speak in a certain way, which also allows others 
to argue with me. I placed discourse on cinema, which was still ‘under-
developed’ despite some brilliant exceptions (Eisenstein, Bazin, etc.), in 
the sphere of the social sciences, as well as the humanities (which differ 
less than is claimed), but also within an approach constantly focused on 
precision, rigor, and level-headed thinking. There is nothing else, but that 
is enough. Of course, one can say that I brought together linguistics and 
psychoanalysis. But they were only catalysts for renewing discourse, the 
vectors of culture.
24 Images: For you, what is the future of f ilm studies? Do you think it will 
decline or grow?
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Metz: Grow, probably (I speak of research), since it has constantly done so 
for several years, and it is still a ‘young’ discipline that has not yet reached 
its zenith. It follows that new areas of f ilm theory, created pretty much 
everywhere in universities, will produce researchers. Of course, this says 
nothing about the quality of the work, or its orientation. We see emerging 
today major strands mobilizing many people, narrato-enunciative pragmat-
ics, the construction of a theoretical history, early cinema, but I think, 
frankly, we cannot draw any conclusions about the future.
24 Images: Now, a question that is perhaps impossible to answer: In your 
opinion, what is the signif icance of f ilm studies for the cinema?
Metz: My answer is simple: no signif icance. Cinema can work very well 
without us; it has done so for decades, and continues to do so in 99 cases 
out of a hundred. We are theoreticians, which implies a way of thinking 
and a type of culture that is foreign to the world of cinema, which often 
instinctively hates theory, without understanding it. It is almost a problem 
of elitism. I never believed in the clichés about the enrichment of f ilmmak-
ing by theory, etc. Of course, when I look back at the conference, I see that 
a f ilmmaker such as Alain Bergala, who has long followed my seminar and 
Barthes’ seminar, etc., ‘placed’ in his f ilmmaking many things that emerged 
from those seminars. But what do we make of all the Bergalas, who are 
marginal f igures in the cinematic institution, which is a big business, with 
stars, ‘power’, etc.?
24 Images: So, the purpose of f ilm studies lies elsewhere.
Metz: It is located in knowing, in analyzing, in the effort to understand 
how things work. (To speak pretentiously: it is located ‘in the realm of 
knowledge’.) When studying Greek mythology, its purpose is even less, for 
studying it only serves to know Greek mythology itself. It is not true that all 
disciplines can be ‘applied’, and it is pure demagoguery to say so. Some can 
be, like chemistry with medicine, and others not, such as f ilmology (and 
many others: philosophy, literary history, music, etc.). We must demand 
the right to disinterested studies; that is to say, to refuse mind-numbing 
technocracy.
24 Images: You will soon come to Quebec for the f irst time. Is there some-
thing in Québécois culture that interests you in particular? Or in Québécois 
cinema?
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Metz: I am not really in a position to reply. I know the same Québécois 
f ilmmakers everyone knows: [Michel] Brault, [Pierre] Perrault, Claude Jutra, 
Gilles Groulx, Denys Arcand, Gilles Carle, the French speaking part of the 
ONF [NFB: National Film Board of Canada], etc.
24 Images: Which Québécois f ilms have you seen?
Metz: Many, inevitably, during the 42 years I have been going to the 
cinema. But recently, Un pays sans bon sens! [Perrault, 1970] (I missed it 
on its initial release), and also Le déclin de l’empire américain [Arcand, 
1986]. I loved Perrault’s f ilm for its way of intermingling f iction and 
documentary, and also for its humor. For example: the failed matura-
tion of the small Québécois mice, the Québécois people’s ‘genetic gift 
of the gab’, etc. There is also a lot of poetry: toward the beginning of the 
f ilm, when the biologist and a friend go to see the ducks that populate a 
protected area in their thousands, at the seaside (or St. Lawrence?), and 
they evoke their childhood, their memories tied to this place. Images of 
snow, and of large ships slowly moving up river, Jacques Cartier’s journal; 
all this is beautiful. The f ilm is also very joyous, and made me laugh 
throughout. The mosaic construction worked well, and is very convincing. 
As for Denys Arcand’s f ilm, which wavers between a live theater act and 
a brilliant creation, it is nevertheless an irreplaceable record (even if 
it exaggerates), a record that is both intentional and unintentional on 
many things: the chatterbox, intellectuals, sex, relations between men 
and women, between teachers and students, remnants of fashionable 
modernity (in this case Susan Sontag, [Fernand] Braudel and [Barthes’] 
A Lover’s Discourse). We would appreciate a little more tact, but the guy 
has a real force. On the other hand, the f ilm awakens (for the French) a 
fairly common misunderstanding. We are shown obvious errors such as a 
university professor who has a property worth (back home) three or four 
million francs; his French counterpart earns 20,000 francs per month. The 
Québécois debate (ten or f ifteen years ago) was freely self-deprecating, 
whereas for us, it is a rich country, while ‘English’ Canada (as Perrault said 
amusingly, because they are not English but Canadians) is even richer. 
Obviously, I know that this is relative: my Argentine friends think we are 
rich in France, and rightly so. …
24 Images: The main reason for your trip to Quebec in 1990 is your par-
ticipation in the DOMITOR symposium on ‘Early Cinema and Religious 
Institutions’. What do you expect from this conference?
280 Conversations with Christian Metz 
Metz: I think the DOMITOR initiative is very important. I was the f irst, as I 
learned later, to submit my application form and my membership dues, at 
the founding of the Association. Early cinema, at one time called ‘primitive’, 
was rarely studied, and mostly studied badly. The factual data, the basic 
information available to us thanks to inspired enthusiasts such as [Georges] 
Sadoul, [Jean] Mitry and others, are very often false. The DOMITOR project 
will enable us to learn more about early cinema, and also about the cinema 
itself, because early cinema marks for the f irst time the birth, genesis, and 
self-definition of an art. This is the only time where f ilm history has merged 
with theory; you have written an article to explain this merging (thinking 
back, I also said something rather similar at the beginning of my article 
on the impression of reality in the cinema5). The beginning of an art, or 
a means of expression, is the time where theory is created in conjunction 
with its history; thereafter, both begin to separate.
As for the f inal paper that has been asked of me for this conference, I 
will do it from my perspective, that of a theoretician and semiologist. I am 
not a specialist of early cinema, which is a genuine profession that cannot 
be improvised; it is historical scholarly work based on the numerous and 
detailed viewing of f ilms. To me, who is outside of this f ield and who has no 
desire to feign an imaginary competence in it, what is interesting is to say 
to early cinema specialists what they bring to other areas of research; for 
example, to the issue of the shot – a single shot f ilm or a f ilm with several 
shots where each functions autonomously, etc. Also, what do they bring to 
the theory of montage, editing, and narrative? That is what I plan to do after 
watching the f ilms. I am very pleased to participate in this large gathering.
NOTE: The International Association DOMITOR aims to lay the founda-
tions for genuine cooperation between researchers in order to promote the 
development of a rigorous and documented historical understanding of 
early cinema. The symposium entitled ‘An Invention of the Devil: Moving 
Pious Pictures’ will be held at the Museum of Civilization in Quebec June 
7 to 13 [1990].
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In this interview published in 1991, Christian Metz looks at the last 
quarter-century of a discipline that he made a signif icant contribution to 
founding. He successively examines the role of linguistics (which is not to 
be confused with f ilm semiology), the reactions raised by the emergence 
of semiology, the relationship between cinema and cinéphilia, and the 
question of research and teaching. He then distinguishes three groups of 
researchers in semiology, only one of which is directly descended from 
semiology, before speaking about his current work and paying homage 
to his only mentor, Roland Barthes.
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André Gardies, ‘(Vingt-cinq ans après. Un bilan). Une éthique de la sémi-
ologie. Entretien avec Christian Metz’. CinémAction 58 (1991), pp. 76–94. 
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André Gardies: 25 years later, how do you, as a founder of the f ield, perceive 
the evolution of f ilm semiology, and how do you situate your own work with 
respect to this development?
Christian Metz: You have just used the word ‘founder’, but I would prefer to 
say ‘initiator’, because there existed, well before my intervention, approaches 
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which, although they were not semiological, manifested rather similar 
preoccupations. I am thinking of the Russian formalists, Eisenstein, etc.
But I will answer your question. It seems to me that the issue of f ilm 
semiology, even today, after 25 years, is sometimes poorly posed from the 
beginning. It is often understood as, or purported to be understood as, an 
application of linguistics; this then becomes a point of contention, a kind 
of blockage that holds some people back. It is also a flagrant distortion of 
the truth. Applying linguistics to the cinema would entail treating it as a 
language system [langue] or as analogous to a language system. However, 
my f irst in-depth article, from 1964, generally considered as the point of 
departure for my work,1 said exactly the opposite: the cinema is not a lan-
guage system (whence the title of the article). So we are not concerned with 
‘application’ but with taking into consideration some elementary concepts 
like ‘syntagma’, ‘code’, etc. These concepts, incidentally, are for the most 
part not even truly derived from linguistics (I will come back to this point). 
Hence, notions like ‘prefix’, ‘declension’, ‘optative’, and many more, specific to 
language systems and them alone, have never been invoked in my studies of 
the cinema. I have only retained the most general concepts, and consequently 
the least linguistic concepts. This is what is sometimes poorly understood.
Gardies: But do semiologists of written or oral texts not encounter the same 
problem in discursive analysis? Was there not, at a given point in time, a 
conjunction of problematics, which, while referring to different f ields, have 
ended up somewhat abusively becoming confused with each other in their 
common attempt to escape the linguistics of the sign?
Metz: I agree. The semiologists of the novel, for example, or of speech, were 
in an even more diff icult position than we were, because the materiality 
of their object was linguistic in nature. The Soviet researchers were clearer 
on this point, with their distinction between ‘a primary modeling system’ 
(= the idiom) and secondary modelling systems like mythology, folklore 
(in fairy tales), the rules of literary genres, etc. Every poem, for example, is 
inscribed in a given language, but superposes on it an additional structural 
level. This bipartition is a little brutal, a little simple, but it was useful in its 
time, it helped us to escape from the minor awkwardness that you evoked.
On the same topic, I would like to once again say that the expression 
cinematic language is neither my own invention, nor that of any other 
semiologist. It comes from f ilm critics and journalists, who also speak, in 
the same way, of ‘musical language’, ‘visual language’, etc. I found the word 
in critical articles from the 1920s, and it subsequently became widespread 
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(it was the title, for example, of books by both Marcel Martin and François 
Chevassu). As for the ‘arm-twisting [ forcing]’ on the term language, which 
some people attribute to me, it was provided by the f ilm vocabulary around 
me and before my time.
I tackled the problem from the other side of the coin: because everybody 
used this formula, which links film and articulated language, I wanted to get 
to the bottom of the metaphor (the expression comes from Roland Barthes, 
when he commented on my undertaking), to measure its exact importance, 
to explain how the cinema resembled language and how they were different. 
And the differences, of course, were far more prevalent. But to know how and 
to what extent they differed, we need a minimum of linguistic investigation. 
We cannot compare two things by remaining ignorant about one of them.
Linguistics: A Stubborn Misunderstanding
Gardies: Was there not, at the same time, another form of pressure: the 
pressure exerted by the cinema’s normative approaches, such as attempts 
to establish ‘cinematic grammars’?
Metz: Certainly. If we restrict ourselves to France, there was Berthomieu’s 
‘grammar’, Robert Bataille’s, and still others. But I cannot say that they 
exerted any pressure on my project. They were a little puerile, they never 
had much credibility.
Gardies: Indeed, but in several manuals on f ilm language from the 1950s 
and 1960s we regularly f ind aff irmations like: ‘The low-angle shot expresses 
domination’, ‘The close-up translates the feelings of the characters’, etc. 
This kind of norm, which tends to f ix meaning, nonetheless belonged to 
the language of the era.
Metz: In this sense, yes, I was caught between a rock and a hard place. On one 
side there was the spontaneous, libertarian ideology of certain f ilmmakers 
and critics, for whom creation did not allow any constraints, organization, 
or plans (and who even became irritated at the activity of analysis itself, 
regardless of its content). On the other side, a false linguistics, which sought 
the cinematic equivalent of the imperfect subjunctive, and which closely 
followed the model of scholastic normative grammars, arbitrarily refer-
ring to a tiny number of languages (French, Latin…), and alien to modern 
research in linguistic science.
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I thus found myself the target of reproaches for ‘transplanting linguistics’. 
This may have been abetted by a material circumstance that produced the 
misunderstanding: shortly after my f irst publications, in 1966 (and up to 
1972), the École des Hautes Etudes, my ‘employer’, asked me to deliver a 
course in general linguistics. This course, which was also called ‘linguistics 
for non-linguists’, responded to a strong demand at the time (which today 
has diminished, as you know) from students and researchers in other disci-
plines, and our institution at the time only had very ‘specialized’ linguistic 
seminars (Chinese syntax, etc.).
I certainly do not make any mystery of my intense interest in linguistics, 
but you can love something without ‘applying’ it to something else. When 
I speak of the cinema, linguistics becomes, in my view, a comparative tool, 
a kind of support, nothing more (and nothing less, for in this very limited 
role, it is irreplaceable). Through the search for common features and, above 
all, differences, it clearly illuminates certain aspects of the cinema (I insist 
on saying ‘certain aspects’: one cannot speak about everything at once).
Gardies: I believe that the strength of your work lies in the fact that you 
were able to choose the key concepts, the most productive concepts, on 
which a theoretical construction was possible. You chose the most pertinent 
concepts.
Metz: It is not for me to say, since then I would be both judge and defendant. 
What I can discuss, because it is not self-evident, is the great parsimony 
of my linguistic harvest. Linguistics is a rich, pluralist, respected science; 
it wields hundreds of concepts. And yet, I have only retained a handful of 
them, while the researchers who followed me added only another handful; 
we only have to look at the number of entries f iguring in the excellent 
lexicon in your special issue.2
This little toolkit is rather modest if you think about what other disci-
plines of modern research assemble. I understand that people could take 
fright at it, but this does not mean that we are more ridiculous, merely that 
we are not familiar with ‘scientif ic’ approaches in general.
Furthermore, there is the slippage I just spoke about: notions like ‘para-
digm/syntagma’, ‘text/system’, ‘code/message’, ‘diegesis’, etc., are of interest 
to general semiology, that is, the sum total of signifying phenomena. There 
is nothing especially linguistic about them.
But linguists (and others) have often provided definitions of them: this 
is the source of potential confusion, even though linguists themselves 
declared that some of their concepts, far exceeding the scope of studying 
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language systems, were not linguistic: this, for example, is the explicit, 
unchanging attitude of Hjelmslev (and it is already present in Saussure).
Now, this changes everything, because although it is understandable 
that people have wanted, so to speak, to ‘distance’ the cinema from the 
sphere of language systems, I do not see how it can be excluded from the 
sphere of semiology, because it is quite obvious that the cinema is a means 
for transmitting – and above all creating – meanings.
Gardies: Was the fundamental questioning of the sign also a source of 
confusion? The sign was on the frontline during the f irst battles waged 
by f ilm semiology. It was vociferously attacked, was it not? And yet, your 
work has convincingly shown that meaning in the cinema was not only 
the work of the sign.
Metz: I do not know if I have shown this well, but my voice has become 
hoarse saying it. I already did so in my 1964 article, with the assertion 
that the cinema is not a system of signs. Then, in 1971, also an early date, 
in Language and Cinema, with the ‘critique’ of the sign and the refusal 
to prejudge the size of the units, their form, the very presence of a f ixed 
signif ied. I have not changed my outlook since then. I could summarize my 
work, on this point, with a quip: “Signif ication does not signify the sign.”
Gardies: It would be interesting to undertake historical research on how such a 
distortion came about: what led to this narrow-minded reading of your work?
Metz: Sometimes the reading is worse than narrow-minded: it can happen 
that people have read the opposite of what I wrote, notably on the question 
you raised: the book patiently explains that there is no such thing as a 
[f ilmic] sign, and yet I am reproached for having said that there are signs; 
if needed, they will show you very seriously that there is no such thing…
Nonetheless, this blindness was not universal, for if semiology has 
sometimes been poorly understood, it also won over numerous adherents 
almost immediately…
Gardies: Yes, but since the misunderstanding, at a certain point in time, was 
so widespread, it is not simply a case of inadequate interpretation. Were 
there other events at play?
Metz: I have the beginning of an answer, or rather several beginnings. Firstly, 
to go back to the misunderstanding: it was not as generalized as you say; 
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I feel you are exaggerating its scale a little. Of course, my writings were 
the target of some bitter attacks [boulets rouges], but this is the fate of any 
well-known writer, it is almost automatic, and largely independent of the 
content. It is a social mechanism. On the other hand, the confusion you 
spoke about did not arise among scholars, nor did it surface in journals 
like Image et Son (as it was called at the time) or Cahiers du Cinéma, etc.
That said, I agree that the lack of understanding was very common. 
There are malevolent people everywhere. There are also fools, who do not 
understand what they are reading, or who get everything muddled up. These 
factors are often forgotten due to their triviality, but this does not prevent 
them from being pertinent, for us just as for anybody else. To this extent, it is 
the very success of semiology among certain people that prompted attacks 
from others (a classic phenomenon), and which has also attracted those 
who, not being well prepared, choked on it – like a potion without much of 
a magical effect – whether this was with an unruly, frightened sympathy, 
or with the unruly feeling that it was a must. My ‘emergence’ [apparition] (!) 
provoked enthusiastic and animated support, which left me stunned. My work 
generated a feverish hope (= finally, we will understand everything about the 
cinema, now that we have a miracle-gadget!), and sometimes even a genuinely 
‘groupie’-style behavior – which was quite embarrassing if you are not inclined 
to play the part of an Elvis Presley. This is the inverse aspect of your question, 
but it refers back to the same reality, which is the immaturity of the field.
Nevertheless, this is not the main thing. I believe that within the semiologi-
cal approach there is something profoundly unusual, something that confronts 
old habits. When we speak of studying the cinema, everybody thinks of the 
biographical details of the great f ilmmakers, of the content of f ilms and their 
plots, of a knowledge about technical credits and dates, of the evolution of 
the film industry, etc., but nobody gives a second thought to the mechanism 
of signification, without which all the rest would not even exist. It is just like 
everyday life: we are concerned with what people say, but not the machine, 
with its rules and inventiveness, which allows them to speak. Psychologically, 
socially, ideologically, the metalinguistic attitude (the attention paid to the 
how of signification rather than its concrete content) is always deviant, a little 
transgressive, and spontaneously unpopular. It sets you apart, makes you ap-
pear to be something of a fanatic. If you add to this the ‘technical’ difficulty (or 
austerity?) of semiological writing, and taking into account the almost elusive 
‘flimsiness’ of the object of study (that is, meaning), rather than focus on the 
apparent growth of linguistics, then I think you can understand that f ilm 
semiology has only been understood by a fraction of the public. In any case, 
this is how things are for all theoretical movements in their initial moments.
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A Demand for Rigor and Precision
Gardies: Yes, of course, people could have not listened to you, but they did 
listen to you, because you often had your own words thrown back at you, 
but in a deformed way…
Metz: I see in this deformation a kind of minor hallucination. People project 
onto your text what they have in their own heads, they make you say what 
they would have said in your stead, or even, depending on their emotional 
disposition, what they would hate to hear. Furthermore, you should not 
forget that the reader of a book simultaneously ‘reads’ the other books of 
the same type – namely, all those books that were grouped into the same 
basket called ‘structuralism’. Even if I did say (without being the only one 
to do so) that the sign was not the most important issue, the whole debate 
at the time revolved around the sign, the word itself kept on recurring, and 
therefore that is all that the inattentive reader would recall, without specifi-
cally remembering whether it was discussed in a positive or negative light.
This is the consequence – a ‘warped’ consequence, but a consequence 
all the same – of what we spoke about at the beginning of this interview, 
that is, the attention paid to the contribution of linguistics. This was a 
common trait of the era, of course, but all systems of ideas are inscribed in 
history. By means of this new orientation, semiology targeted something 
else, something that rather resembled (from afar) what Cohen-Séat’s 
f ilmology had earlier attempted to achieve – but without truly attaining 
its goals, and using a method that I f ind both admirable and yet too 
scientistic.
As far as this group of precursors is concerned, I would like to honor 
the memory of Ed Lowry, an American scholar who died at a very young 
age, around thirty, a delicate, sensitive man, to whom we owe the only 
serious book dedicated to French f ilmology, a remarkably researched and 
intelligent work.3
Semiology, therefore, through this refocusing of attention, demanded 
of f ilm theory precision, culture, rigor, and nuanced restraint – in short, 
sophistication; from which, on the whole, it was very remote, despite the 
André Bazins, Jean Mitrys, Edgar Morins, some journal articles, etc., which 
pointed the way, and from which I have drawn sustenance. I wanted f ilm 
texts to have the maturity to link up with the whole of contemporary 
scholarship in the other sectors of what we somewhat abusively call the 
‘human sciences’, or the ‘social sciences’. What seems abusive to me is the 
word science, for we are not (or not yet?) at that stage, and I have never 
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claimed I was either. I would simply speak of serious, or rigorous, research. 
This is already a lot, if you can imagine how provincial and unenlightened 
a lot of f ilm writing was, how it was marooned on an autarkic island that 
the major currents of thought avoided.
Gardies: Was it not precisely in the wake of all this that the fundamental 
project was initiated, which was to constitute the cinema as an object of 
study? That is, to free it from an empirical, pragmatic vision, dominated 
by journalistic discourse, for example? As far as your own approach is 
concerned, when reviving for your own purposes the distinction introduced 
by Cohen-Séat between the f ilmic fact and the cinematic fact, in order to 
question this distinction, is there not the declaration to constitute the 
cinema as a scientif ic object, so as, in effect, to articulate a discourse on it, 
at the same as this discourse constitutes it as an object?
Metz: I would not have thought of formulating it the way you do, in particu-
lar in the last thing you say, but hearing you out, I agree. As for the word 
‘scientific’ (I will come back to this), you use it in a provisional sense, in order 
to designate a goal, rather than a result that has been happily attained. In 
that sense, I could also use the term, and indeed I occasionally do, even if 
only to distinguish analytic essays from literary works. What exasperates 
me is the use of the word ‘scientif ic’ in an exclusive, totalizing sense, in 
order to pronounce excommunications.
Conversely, I will latch onto your allusion to journalism in order to 
express an opinion which, coming from me, may well shock those readers 
who are beholden to stereotypes: namely, that journalistic discourse, 
which on a concrete level very often turns out to be mediocre, is in no 
way despicable in and of itself (there is also, indeed, plenty of mediocre 
theoretical writing). The ‘format’ of the newspaper, its rhythm, the speed 
that it induces, can give rise to remarkable writing (I am obviously think-
ing of Serge Daney here) and texts that most scholars, not least myself, 
would be incapable of writing. To put it simply, journalism and scholarly 
writing are two different things, two discursive categories that do not 
have the same demands. Each has its own specif ic utility (I already said 
this in 1964, when speaking about newspaper f ilm reviews). Among my 
friends, a few scholars are also good journalists, or have the potential to 
be, including: Raymond Bellour, Jean-Louis Leutrat, Dominique Noguez, 
Francis Vanoye – perhaps I am forgetting one or two others, but not a 
large number.
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The Reproach of Zealotry
Gardies: In sum, under the common appellation ‘cinema’, we speak about 
different things. Semiology should thus constitute its cinema-object.
Metz: Absolutely. But I insist on repeating my wariness toward hierarchies 
that consider genres en bloc, like ‘journalism’ or ‘science’. Every category 
has its good and bad side, which is a different problem entirely…
Gardies: Not totally, perhaps, because semiology has been so frequently ac-
cused of zealotry, of wanting to monopolize f ilm discourse while despising 
other approaches, that this fact needs to be questioned. I believe there is also 
a kind of misunderstanding. You, yourself, willingly recommend moderation 
and courtesy; you have never, whether in your public speeches or in your 
written work, formulated a phrase that could be mistaken for zealotry. So 
it may be shocking that semiology has been put on trial like this. In your 
opinion, is there any justif ication for this? Apart from yourself, were there 
any attempts at zealotry, or was this the tenor of the period? Here, I am 
thinking about the militant discourses published in the journal Cinéthique.
Metz: I do not think that we should exaggerate the importance of this ‘trial’. 
Reactions were divided, they varied widely, and changed all the time. Ciné-
thique, for example (because you bring it up), considered me to be the only 
worthwhile scholar in the f ield, but at the same time vigorously critiqued 
me on the political level.
Nonetheless, it is true that semiology was often accused of zealotry. You 
ask me why. Well, an important element to my answer would be that I do 
not know everything that is done and said in the name of semiology, and 
perhaps even in my own name. There are ‘zealots’ in every movement. It 
can be supposed without much risk of error that during the period that 
semiology was in fashion, it must have given rise, just as other theories do, to 
little local chieftains who spoke ineptly. The initiator of a movement is often 
less excited, more relativist, because he has found a certain appeasement 
in advance, by the very act of ‘creating’ the theory. All the same, it is quite 
true that I have never attacked anybody. I f ind polemics sterile, particularly 
when they become violent. When I was attacked, even insulted in some 
cases, I never replied. This is a principle, as well as being an advantage of my 
position. And when I lost my temper in public (this happened to me three 
times), I immediately regretted it and gave my apologies.
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To return to what astonished you, there is another element that could 
explain it, which I have directly borrowed from Roland Barthes. It is an idea 
that courses through his entire œuvre, the idea that every position that is 
even a little bit intellectual or intellectualist, every objectifying position 
that is detached from ‘lived experience’, provokes violent reactions express-
ing a kind of populism [poujadisme], or even, to use the Italian, a kind of 
qualunquismo. We are reproached for not speaking like the ordinary man 
(not, of course, Jean Louis Schefer’s ordinary man4), of not speaking ‘just like 
everybody else’. This is a profoundly demagogic position. It forgets that the 
virtuous indignation of the ordinary man on the street magically disappears 
when confronted with the extravagant gibberish of sports reporters, whom 
nobody would dream of accusing of ‘jargon’, or even when they come across 
the hundreds of rare words that blacksmiths and carpenters use to designate 
their tools and techniques.
The Discreet Passion for the Cinema
Gardies: This specialized vocabulary is, in fact, linked to a spirit of rigor 
and precision. I think that a number of scholars working close to you, or 
even at a distance from you, owe a lot to this essential quality: the demand 
for rigor and precision. This is where you have been completely successful.
Metz: Well, it is not for me to judge whether I have been successful, but it 
is true that they are the values I believe in. As for the result, I would not, 
for my part, employ the word ‘completely’. Perhaps I have succeeded in 
infusing a certain number of f ilm scholars with this taste for precision, 
and this number may not be negligible – far from it – but it is not immense. 
There are, of course, important extensions of my work in other countries 
(my texts have been translated into 21 languages), but in each country they 
reach a rather specif ic public…
Gardies: Perhaps it is the fate of research groups to be numerically quite 
small…
Metz: I agree. What I said was an observation, not a regret. I cannot see 
myself whipping crowds up into a frenzy…
Gardies: What is more, your influence in f ilm studies has, I feel, far exceeded 
the sphere of the semiologists. I think that, through your exemplary concern 
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for rigor, through your manner of observing the f ilm-object, describing it, 
taking stock of it, constituting it, you put lazy researchers in their place, 
so to speak.
Metz: As far as my indirect influence on other tendencies is concerned, I 
would like, if you will, to return to this matter at a more leisurely moment, 
because your insistence on the idea of rigor makes me recall, through the 
association of ideas, what I would call an exemplary lack of rigor, to which I 
have occasionally fallen victim: from time to time, I have been accused (by 
Louis Seguin, for example, with a somewhat inexplicable excess, because 
he does not know me) of never having watched a f ilm. This is, of course, 
because I cite the titles of very few f ilms in my writings. But this gives no 
indication whatsoever of the f ilms that I have seen or not seen. And yet 
the advocates of this type of argument cannot seem to fathom that, when 
I see a f ilm (I see about four per week and, right after the screening, I take 
lengthy notes on each one), I do not feel the need to tell everyone who cares 
to listen, to declare myself a cinéphile, to spout out lists of credit sequences. 
This is one of the petty infantilisms proper to the f ilm world: actually doing 
something counts for little, you have to sing it from the rooftops.
Well, since it must be said, this interview provides me with an excellent 
occasion to say it: yes, I am a cinéphile, and I even have a certain Mac-
Mahonian bent that my reason tempers with great effort. Yes, I was raised on 
f ilm noir. Yes, I am one of those who melt at the sight of Humphrey Bogart, 
who never tires of Welles, Fellini, Stroheim, Murnau, Ozu, Dreyer, etc. Yes, 
I love f ilms, many f ilms, and it took me 25 years to understand that I had 
wronged myself, in the eyes of some, by remaining silent on this matter 
through what was for me a simple concern for discretion and restraint. One 
should not hurl one’s tastes and actions in the faces of other people. Can 
you imagine Genette declaring ‘I love Proust’? And yet…
Gardies: I believe that what is not perceived is that semiologists, due to the 
nature of their work, generally only speak about a limited number of f ilms, 
or even f ilm sequences. But in order to do this, they must have already seen 
a large number of other f ilms, precisely in order to nurture their painstaking 
work. Critics, by contrast, because their primary function is to inform the 
reader, must refer to the vast ‘corpus’ of current releases. The two objectives 
are different.
Metz: Yes, we are in agreement on this. I would add that, when a critic has 
talent, he can, when informing the reader, do more than just inform…
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Influence on Criticism
Gardies: Absolutely. Given that the objective of semiology is to better un-
derstand both the cinematic fact and the f ilmic fact, it might be surprising 
that it has not had more of an influence on criticism. Is this not the sign of 
a partial failure?
Metz: On this point, I would go even further than you: semiology has had 
no inf luence on criticism, except, as I said earlier, for Cahiers du Cinéma 
during a certain period, and in a more intermittent, more superf icial 
fashion, in some other journals: Image et Son, Jump Cut, Wide Angle … 
(I am leaving to one side, of course, the theoretical journals like Screen, 
Camera Obscura, and so on, where my inf luence has, on the contrary, 
been considerable). You asked me whether, as far as criticism is concerned, 
this is a failure. Of course, we can always say that the lack of inf luence is 
a failure. In one sense, this is true. But personally (and in opposition to, 
I should clarify, some of my close friends), I do not feel it to be a failure. 
I am not affected by it in the slightest. In effect, everything depends 
on the goal we assign to semiology, and more precisely on the social 
surface that we wish to see it occupy. I have little concern for proselytism, 
and I spontaneously share the radical views of Lévi-Strauss, his skepti-
cism toward applied sciences, and the very project of applying them: 
the ‘human sciences’, he effectively said, do not need to be applied, the 
objectives of knowledge, analysis and intellectual curiosity alone suff ice. 
In short, to give a more direct answer to your question, I do not think it 
is indispensable for f ilm criticism, which has its own requirements, to be 
semiologized, or even that anything whatsoever should be semiologized, 
apart from semiology.
Gardies: All the same, with the institutionalization of f ilm, which has 
become an object of learning, has semiology unavoidably entered the era 
of its application?
Metz: We have not understood each other properly. Firstly, teaching. Film 
does not necessarily (or not only) mean teaching f ilm semiology, it also 
means teaching f ilm history, the major rules of the f ilm industry, etc. 
Secondly, the didactic activity you allude to – notably, analyzing f ilms for 
students with the aid of video cassettes – does not constitute an ‘application’, 
it is the transmission of knowledge itself.
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Gardies: Precisely, is it not at the level of discourse that this problem presents 
itself? Of semiology itself, as a discourse? In sum, is it perhaps more a fun-
damental question of ideology, rather than the application of techniques? 
Is there an ideology of semiology? Does it secrete its own ideology? In other 
terms, does it adopt a fundamental stance in relation to the cinema-object 
and the f ilm-object?
Metz: On a question as ‘profound’ and complex as that of the stance, which 
would require a whole interview on its own, I believe that every semiologist 
has their own answer. I can only speak in my personal name. I started out in 
phenomenology, which was triumphant at the time of the Libération, when 
I was studying, and to which I remain very attached. In one of my articles, 
‘Le perçu et le nommé’,5 I have tried to show that phenomenology is the 
necessary, prerequisite condition for all of semiology (Greimas already said 
this before I did). In my khâgne,6 Jean Beaufret was my philosophy professor. 
When André Bazin presented f ilms in the ciné-clubs of the Latin Quarter, 
I went to listen to him with passion. Later, Mikel Dufrenne published my 
f irst book. Dufrenne, who I often quote, is a great aesthetic theorist, and 
he is a man whose generosity of spirit and openness toward others are 
exceptional. In the same book series, he also published Lyotard’s f irst book, 
and yet Lyotard, too, used phenomenology as a point of departure to go in 
other directions (in that book, he found the exact words to pay homage to 
Dufrenne, and I have taken advantage of the circumstance to associate 
myself with it).
In short, I started out in phenomenology [départ dans la phéno] (this 
would make a great title for a crime novel!). And as far as films are concerned, 
everything began (as an adolescent, of course) with an intense, insatiable 
cinéphilia. In the provincial town where I grew up, I was part of the group 
that ran the youth ciné-club, then I co-organized with a friend the khâgne 
ciné-club at the Lycée Henri IV, in Paris. Then, with a different friend, I ran 
the ciné-club at the Rue d’Ulm campus of the École normale supérieure. 
Subsequently, for a few months in 1955–1956, I worked for Georges Sadoul, 
who was looking for a sort of secretary and possible successor (our tempera-
ments, which were at odds with each other, soon ended this attempted 
collaboration, but without any conflict between us).
But all these activities did not provide me with a profession. At the same 
time, I was pursuing classical studies, in the style of the time (I did my 
agrégation de lettres, etc.). For several long years, I simultaneously ‘lived’ in 
both of these two universes. They are truly very different. The humanities 
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were already paving the way for the ‘human sciences’, much more than we 
care to admit.
I would go to pieces emotionally when admiring Marlene [Dietrich] in 
The Scarlet Empress [1934] and, once the emotion had passed, consider the 
f ilm, its star and my own emotions as facts that could be questioned and 
analyzed with passion. For analysis, too, is a passion, it is the other passion, 
and the greatest passion is to question one’s own passion. The opposition 
between the heart and the mind is the most absurd of them all, at least in 
its simplistic form, which is too often what is emphasized.
Analysis is also a Passion
In short, the education I received – with the minutiae that is the underlying 
principle of translation exercises, with the complexities of the extinct 
languages, etc., with the implicit ‘moral’ of the matter, which requires 
calm, attentiveness, wariness toward being overly excited – led me to a 
‘spontaneous’ practice that was, in reality, acquired from this education, 
a practice of objectif ication, including (especially) when it came to those 
things that I most dearly treasured. The semiological project is born (for 
me) from this conjunction. When I read articles on Hitchcock that were 
limited to saying, in an exclamatory, feverish mode, ‘I love Hitchcock!’ I 
was dumbstruck, in spite of my own, very ardent, liking for the f ilms of 
Hitchcock.
My way of doing things is also related to the fact that f ilm semiology was 
a belated choice for me, which came when I was about thirty years old, and 
which was preceded by a wide range of different activities. For example, I 
was a translator from German and English specializing in historical and 
theoretical works on jazz music, for Cahiers du Jazz and the Payot publishing 
house. When you do several different things, each one tends to ‘objectify’ 
the other.
Gardies: Is this need for objectif ication also at the origin of your work on 
the ‘imaginary signif ier’?
Metz: Absolutely. My point of departure is that there is no contradiction, no 
incompatibility, between emotional affect and ‘intellectual’ analysis. It has 
often been observed that reflecting on our feelings does nothing to change 
them (they are stronger than this). Fellini’s 8 ½, which I have studied a lot,7 
still moves me every time I watch the f ilm.
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Gardies: Objectif ication allows us to invent a discourse (I will come back 
to this) while holding onto these emotions.
Metz: Yes. And even, if it is appropriate, an ‘autobiographical’ discourse 
(without all the useless probing into personal lives): my fascination for Ava 
Gardner is not unrelated to a familial lack that I can feel, and that I can talk 
about more or less clearly…
The Cinema as an Object of Teaching
Gardies: Something really strikes me about what you have just said: namely, 
the presence of this essential Barthesian stance according to which the 
fundamental human activity is discursive activity. That is, we must f ind, 
invent and produce the right discourse, the discourse that allows us to talk 
correctly about certain objects while constituting them as such.
Metz: I would add: the right discourse on what touches us the most. Take 
the objects of Barthes’ discourse, for instance: Racine, Michelet, Werther, 
the photograph of his mother…
Gardies: Is there not a link between the emergence of a possible objectifying 
discourse and the present development of teaching cinema at the university?
Metz: The question could, in fact, be posed as follows: how has it come 
about that the cinema, today, is taught in several French universities, by 
a signif icant number of teacher-researchers, the majority of whom are 
quite respectable, whereas twenty years ago there was only a tiny number 
of them?
This surprisingly rapid expansion has, in my opinion, been the result of 
three contributing factors, which are partially independent of each other 
(it is their conjunction that has advanced matters). Firstly, there was the 
relative mental liberation of the university after the explosion of 1968, a 
partial but real drop in the level of naivety. Then there was the indefatigable 
devotion of a few individuals (Michel Marie being a prototypical example), 
who had a taste and a flair for organization, and who created the necessary 
networks. Finally, to return to the subject of our interview, the presence of 
a teachable ‘corpus’. (Michel Marie again, and Roger Odin have said very 
interesting things on this matter8). For love is not something that is taught. 
The always renewable complicit pleasure of watching the obvious codes 
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of the classical Western in action, the passionate admiration for Bresson’s 
‘Jansenism’, Rossellini’s Franciscanism, Louise Brooks’ famous bob, Mizo-
guchi’s framing, Renoir’s dialogues, etc.; all these points of fascination that 
I have in common (yes, I do indeed…) with the f ilm critics of my generation, 
all this cannot be taught, it is an imprint of our feelings, a valuable piece of 
baggage that is both collective and, for each individual, intimate, fetishized.
Gardies: Does this mean that with the ‘teachable’ we have entered the era 
of knowledge [savoir]?
Metz: That word is perhaps a bit strong. I would prefer to say: the transmis-
sible. And, by the same token, we have seen the formation of a small group 
of scholars who have in common, if not their ‘ideas’, at least some principles 
of discussion, of theoretical proximity, precision, a ‘separation’ between 
criticism and attack, etc.
Gardies: Perhaps there has also been the specif ic development of semiology 
itself? At a given moment, research carried out in neighboring f ields, or 
outside academia, was able to establish exchanges and meeting points with 
what we could call the primary core.
Metz: Of course (and fortunately!). It should also be clarif ied that this 
transmissible ‘corpus’ I spoke about was not provided by semiology alone, 
except right at the beginning. The role of semiology has more been to shake 
things up a bit, and unleash a more diverse movement.
Gardies: Previously, the transmissible, institutionally recognized dis-
course – the f irst teaching positions, created in the immediate aftermath 
of 1968, attest to this – was that of f ilm history, or general aesthetics. At 
the time, did semiology allow for an extension and a diversif ication of this 
discourse?
Metz: Yes. But f ilm history remains an essential task. I have sometimes 
been wrongly criticized by those who condescendingly adopt the mantle 
of History, who do not see that there are distinct projects which do not 
match up with each other (the mania for ‘articulating’ everything with every-
thing else is absurd). This is why I would never allow myself the inverse 
(and corresponding) dishonesty that would consist of despising historical 
research and teaching, or foisting semiological methods on them. We have 
to put a stop to this pointless bickering, which annoyingly shows up the 
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underdevelopment of the f ield of ‘f ilm studies’ to everybody (and I do mean 
to say ‘the f ield’; this is not a question of individual f laws, but the result of 
a history, the history of this discipline, its marginality, etc.).
Gardies: But, at present, after this exponential expansion of the teaching 
of f ilm studies, is there not the risk of academicism, or even a fossilization 
of scholarship, as the price paid for success?
Metz: It is more than a danger, it is the actual state of things. But this 
is a specif ic aspect of those movements that become well-known. See, 
for example, pseudo-Derridean deconstructionism in certain French 
departments in the United States, which is a form of scholasticism, like 
bad semiology.
Because you have broached this point, I will add that I am in no way 
an advocate of indefinitely extending the teaching of f ilm studies. It has 
its place in the University, where we offer a large number of specialized 
disciplines, but if we imagined, like certain enthusiastic reformers, integrat-
ing it into basic education, then we would also end up having to include 
music, painting, three living languages, architecture, audio-visual studies, 
physical education, etc. So we would end up with a nonsensical list, whose 
only merit would be to remind ourselves that the function of mandatory 
schooling is actually to transmit the major tools of thought, which are small 
in number, and not to explore everything that is ‘learnable’.
But I will return to what you said about the perennial possibility of fos-
silization. When this occurs, we cannot do anything about it: how can we 
foster inspiration and initiative in a sclerotic scholar – that is, a sclerotic 
person? Where we can act is ‘around the edges’, thanks to those who have 
retained a freedom of mind, whether they are semiologists or not.
The Film Studies Landscape
Gardies: Indeed, today it seems that f ilm semiology has spread to other 
domains, that it has created zones of specif icity that the ‘f irst generation’ 
had not explored.
Metz: Yes, semiology has introduced – either directly, or as a backlash – a 
breath of fresh air, a general renewal of f ilm studies (I am only speaking of 
theoretical studies here), which goes well beyond purely semiological writ-
ings, and which has resulted in a large number of specialized publications. 
300 Conversations with Christian Metz 
In this rich outpouring, I would distinguish three categories, or, in any case, 
three categories that are of interest to me, that have enriched, completed or 
modif ied my initial contribution rather than repeated it while distorting 
it in all directions. This does not include those who have def initely headed 
off for new territories. As you see, I do not count on annexing them to my 
own work, but they do participate in the overall movement over the last 
25 years.
At Cerisy, in a few days [the colloquium ‘Christian Metz and Film 
Theory’, held at the Cultural Centre of Cerisy in 1989], I will cite the names 
of scholars (including yourself) while trying to briefly situate the work of 
each one – close to a hundred of them in all. But it would be overly fastidious 
to write this all down, so I will limit myself to a few particularly clear 
examples, without any thought of creating hierarchies or awarding prizes, 
in order to try to let it be understood what my three ‘groupings’ consist of. 
Roughly def ined, they would be formulated as follows:
1. Those who were originally ‘Metzians’, and who have added something to 
Metz’s work, inflecting it or extending it, or transcending it to go further, 
etc. The clearest example here is Michel Colin, an exceptionally creative 
mind, who tragically died, and whose memory should be acknowledged 
with the utmost respect. But I am also thinking of the advocates of 
semio-pragmatics, or certain forms of narratology.
2. Non-Metzian semiologists; that is, explicitly semiological undertakings 
that are independent of my work, if you exclude the inevitable interfer-
ences due to the climate of the era. The prototype here is Marie-Claire 
Ropars and her theory of écriture. Or even, in America, John M. Carroll 
and his psycho-linguistics of the cinema.
3. Extra-semiological works, which are very important to my unrepen-
tantly pluralist eyes, because they show that the emergence of semiology 
has not impeded the development of the rest of the discipline. Here, I 
would immediately point (in France) to Michel Chion, Pascal Bonitzer, 
Dominique Noguez, Jacques Aumont, the three Jean-Louis (= Baudry, 
Leutrat, Schefer) and a few others.
4. Finally, to refine these classif ications, there are intermediate positions, 
like those of Raymond Bellour and Thierry Kuntzel, who are at once 
‘Metzian’ and f iercely independent.
The work of the Anglo-Saxon feminists, which I f ind very interesting, would 
also occupy a specif ic place: they often owe a lot to my book The Imaginary 
Signifier, while critiquing it on certain points.
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Another clarif ication: when I speak of general renewal, I do not mean 
in an absolute or dramatic sense. There have been other renewals in the 
history of f ilm theory, whether before my contribution (for instance, the 
first incarnation of Revue de Cinéma and Jean-George Auriol), or afterwards, 
with Deleuze’s extraordinary intervention. In my mind, we have a dated 
renewal effect, as is also the case with the others. I was always astonished 
by those cataclysmically-inclined minds who see every book as refuting all 
the others, of such a kind that the anguish of divisive choices and revisions 
knows no end.
Refusing the School Mentality
Gardies: A classif ication such as your own could be surprising, because you 
have integrated both people who work in a manner quite close to semiology 
and people who are external to it. Since semiology cannot be the criterion 
for selection, what criteria are pertinent for you in making your selection?
Metz: My criterion is an open semiology, alien to any school mentality, 
refusing to condemn everything that happens outside of such a school, 
and focused on peacefully pursuing one’s own projects. Schools, in our 
disciplines (and perhaps in all disciplines?), are instruments of power, 
‘terror’ and rejection, they are machines automatically manufacturing 
schisms and other heresies, sometimes even hatred. Every week I receive 
up to twenty (and sometimes even more) professional letters, occasionally 
accompanied by a written project, coming from France and abroad, and I am 
well placed – by this and by the very diverse range of people attending my 
seminars – to see the ravages caused by Schools, which sometimes paralyze 
the best writers with the anguish of orthodoxy, while inciting among other 
people the childish hope of f inally having the universal key, the method, etc.
I would also like, by means of this cavalier overview, to react against a 
confusion I have seen at work here and there, the confusion between ‘f ilm 
semiology’ and ‘the works of Christian Metz’. It evidently relates to the fact 
that I was the f irst one to begin this work (I am also, let’s not forget, the 
oldest member of the gang). But it has an absurd side, because it would be 
impossible to call me the initiator of something if nobody had followed me, 
if I was all alone in the landscape, that is, if there was nothing for me to have 
‘initiated’. This is an absurd confusion, and what is more, it is unjust: unjust 
for all the f ilm semiologists who are working today in various different 
countries, and unjust also, or at least inaccurate, in another, less obvious 
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but no less serious, sense: blinded by labels, some people fail to see that 
around a f ifth of my writings, the equivalent of a whole book (texts such 
as my article on 8 ½), are only partly semiological in nature and, whether 
good or bad, essentially consist of ‘studies’ of a classical type, rather similar 
to longer articles that f ilm journals occasionally publish.
To come back to the point, or to summarize what I have been saying, 
I would like to show both that semiology, for its 25 years of existence, has 
played an important role, and that it was not alone. I think any other posi-
tion is inexact and, in the end, dishonest.
Gardies: Independently of their fundamental options, for what reasons are 
the works that you evoke ‘good objects’ in your eyes? In other terms, what 
qualities do you expect of a work in order to recognize some value in it?
Metz: It should be serious, rigorous… The qualities one expects of any intel-
lectual work… The standard of writing, of course…
Gardies: Being serious and rigorous, here we come back to…
Metz: Not only being serious and rigorous, but also the novelty of the 
contribution, the exploration of little known terrain, the f illing in of a gap…
Gardies: In other words, the three qualities you have constantly mobilized 
in your own work.
I believe that what is also important, but you are unable to say it, is that 
this rich, diverse, thriving activity exists because you have never had any 
desire for being exclusive. This is both a deontological and scientific position 
that is totally opposed to the sectarianism and zealotry which semiology 
has too often been accused of.
Metz: I do not see for what sake one could pronounce an exclusivity for our 
research where the ‘truth’ is evasive, multiple and admits several different 
perspectives (which does not, however, mean that any idiocy should be 
validated). Way back in 1964, in the f inal pages of my f irst long article, I took 
the effort to explain in detail that ‘my semiology was unable and unwilling 
to replace the other approaches toward the cinema (criticism, history, etc.)’. 
I hoped for a calm and courteous insertion alongside the existing and future 
orientations. I added that it should go back over the entire past of f ilm 
theory (I was still naïve and I had no idea that at this time I was virtually 
the only one, along with Jean Mitry and two or three others, to know this 
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past…). On the whole, little attention has been paid to these concluding 
pages, or it has been felt that they were just there to be polite, whereas in 
my eyes they were of the utmost importance. And all of a sudden, despite 
such a precautionary statement, I had whipped up a hurricane, with people 
rallying ‘for’ and ‘against’ me, like in a rugby match. I was turned into a 
living God, or into a Great Satan. All this is quite amazing, and I was largely 
powerless before the sporadically catastrophic sociology of the intellectual 
and academic machinery.
But not entirely impotent: confronted with this turn of events, I have 
striven, for more than fifteen years, to ‘break up’, through passages published 
in prefaces or interviews, not (of course) the idea of semiology and less still 
the works of numerous scholars of quality who surround me at varying 
distances, but to break up semiology as a dogma, or as a superego (= a 
school, once more). And I fully intend to continue to do so, just as I have 
done in this very moment.
Gardies: Something else. Whereas the terms ‘sémiotique’ [semiotics] and 
‘sémiologie’ [semiology] are given as equivalents, or sometimes competitors, 
which of the two do you prefer?
Metz: I prefer sémiologie. Because sémiologie means Roland Barthes, Saus-
sure, the European tradition, which does not separate semiology from 
philosophy, from general culture, from the literary tradition.
Sémiotique clearly orients toward other forms of thought: the rational 
empiricism of the Anglo-Saxons, or on the contrary the vast edif ice estab-
lished by Greimas. I do not underestimate these phenomena, but they are 
alien to my way of thinking.
My Current Work
Gardies: What if we spoke about Christian Metz now, about his work, his 
projects? We have had the habit of expecting books written by Christian 
Metz, but it has been a long time since you published anything. I imagine 
that there is a reason for this.
Metz: Yes, I have been silent for a long time. Firstly, as a result of personal 
issues, which are now over. And right afterwards, because I worked a lot 
on a manuscript on the joke, a literary and psychoanalytic study, the joke 
in Freud, as well as more generally speaking. It was f inished, but I was not 
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satisfied with it, above all its structure, its mode of exposition, uselessly long 
and weighty. In short, I put it to one side, ‘in the cooler’, in order to return to 
it in my retirement. In our circles, it is customary not to speak of our failures 
(this is another superfluous taboo), but I f ind this custom quite idiotic: do 
we hope to make other people believe that we have never failed at anything?
As for my current work –  ‘current’ meaning that it has occupied my 
attention for the last four years – it relates to the notion of enunciation, and 
more specif ically enunciation in the cinema. I am preparing a book, about 
which I will not say too much, for my two articles recently published in 
Vertigo have already given an idea about it.9 The subject, by the way, is not 
original, it is in the air. There was the special issue of Communications (no. 
38) in 1983,10 the work done by the Italians, and many others; you yourself 
took part in this debate, in your article ‘Le su et le vu’, and in your book on 
African cinema.11
To simplify matters drastically, I can express the idea of this book in a 
single phrase: the conceptions of f ilmic enunciation that are often proposed 
appear to me to be too closely linked to the linguistic model, with deictics, 
enunciator/enunciatee, I/you, etc., whereas enunciation, in a dispositif 
without an interlocutor, can only be of a metadiscursive type, folded in on 
itself, whose content is ‘It’s a f ilm’ more than ‘It’s me’.
Filmic enunciation is impersonal and is often confused with the very 
place of the f ilm. As its ‘markers’ it has everything that, in a f ilm, reminds 
the spectators that they are watching a f ilm, or that they are in a cinema. 
On this basis, I give an overview of different ‘positions’ of enunciation more 
or less governed by rules: the off-screen voice addressed to the viewer, the 
dialogue title-card, the I-voice of the character (‘voice-over’), the subjective 
image, extra-diegetic music, etc., with, in each case, various examples of 
shots and sequences drawn from the repertoire of well-known f ilms (this 
will be a more ‘concrete’ book than the other ones, to put it bluntly).
The exploration of the deictic ‘network’ is, by the way, a normal and 
necessary approach in the early stages, as Jean Paul Simon mentioned to 
me, who theorized these problems very early on. And yet, the most deictic 
f ilmic constructions, like the off-screen voice directly interpellating the 
spectator, still stage a false deixis, or more precisely a simulated deixis, 
because the spectator cannot respond…
Gardies: Like the aside in theater?
Metz: Exactly. Incidentally, Vernet and Casetti have both made this 
comparison.
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Gardies: In the midst of this discussion of enunciation, I note that we have 
not broached a question that is nonetheless important as far as semiol-
ogy is concerned: is one of its major contributions its emphasis on the 
textual dimension of the f ilm, thereby provoking a clear rupture with 
the discourse of the widespread doxa on cinema, ‘The cinema is life, it is 
reality, etc.’? In a certain way, has semiology not adopted, without saying 
so, these words by a certain famous f ilmmaker, ‘A just image is just an 
image’? Filmic enunciation, we have just said, has the specif ic function 
of designating itself as cinema, and hence of disturbing the transparency 
of the windowpane.
Metz: Yes, but to varying degrees and in different modes. If enunciation is 
never entirely ‘effaced’, it can happen, willingly or not, that it is ‘marked’ 
with a great deal of discretion.
This reflexive conception of enunciation, so to speak (the text that more 
or less refers to itself) has been pref igured, to my mind, in certain remarks 
made by Pierre Sorlin, Marie-Claire Ropars, yourself, and François Jost. In 
my case, it has become the guiding thread of my whole work. But I owe a lot 
to all those theorists – there are at least f ifteen of them – who have studied 
this question, and who, by the way, I cite abundantly.
Gardies: I believe that you would not want to end this interview without 
paying homage to someone who was very important to you.
Metz: Yes. I am unwilling and unable to f inish without a thought for my 
only mentor, Roland Barthes who, in 1966, assigned to me the task of taking 
care of f ilm semiology in the École des hautes études. Of course, I inherited 
neither his genius nor his style (his way of writing books, but also his elegant 
and inimitable manner of managing the profession’s day-to-day administra-
tion, which Jacques Le Goff evoked so well12). On many points, I have not 
adopted his ideas. But he taught me day by day for 24 years – from 1956 
until his death in 1980, as I knew him when I was still teaching at a lycée. 
He taught me something that is just as important as any of his theories, 
and that I strive to put into practice with my own, obviously more modest, 
means: the meticulous attention one must give other people, and which 
is generally lacking in scientif ic exchanges; the bypassing of hardened 
divisions like ‘structuralism’, ‘schizo-analysis’, ‘post-modernism’, etc.; the 
refusal of all brash tirades and triumphalist boastings; the avoidance of all 
jargon, including the jargon of semiology; the necessary inscription of spe-
cialized research in a vaster, older culture, not through pedantic citations, 
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but through tone, and a concern for style even in technical publications, the 
choice of the exact word even outside of the terms defined by theory; and 
above all, his amicability, which in his case  led to a recognition of kindness 
and civility, spontaneously undertaken, day after day, to the benefit of the 
lowliest student who came to visit him, and this despite the fact that our 
crumbling universe, founded on demand and the self-engendered hysteria 
of the institutions, crushed him with fatigue and was the nightmare of 
his life. Amicability is not friendship (the latter is not commanded, it is 
encountered, and it would be absurd to wish to generalize it through some 
kind of precept), but it is an indispensable prerequisite, and is insuff iciently 
perceived as such, for remotely normal relations between scholars, for the 
opening of a breathable space for agreements and disagreements, for discus-
sions exempt from theatrical stiffness or anguished hostility, and, by dint 
of this, for more rapid progress in scholarship itself.
Conversation recorded by André Gardies (Paris, June 15, 1989).
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